After the Violence in Gaza; Is There a Way Forward?

Mahmud Hams/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Recent violence along the border between Gaza and Israel has sparked significant international concern and condemnation. Sixty protesters of varying ages were confirmed dead as a result of violence on May 14th in Gaza, a self-governing Palestinian territory sandwiched between Israel, Egypt and the East Mediterranean Sea. In a statement on May 23rd, Nickolay Mladenov, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, told the United Nations Security Council that, “…the number [of dead and injured Palestinians] continues to climb.” UN figures claim that Israel Defence Forces killed more than 76 Palestinian protesters in  May 2018. 3,000 more were left injured. The largest protests took place on the day the United States moved its embassy from Tel Aviv, Israel to Jerusalem. It also happened to be the eve of Nakba Day, when  Palestinians remember their expulsion from specific Palestinian territories during the 1947-1949 war. The protests resulted in the most bloodshed since the 2014 Gaza war.

Protesters demonstrated for a variety of reasons but are unlikely to achieve any of their objectives. The massive demonstrations were aimed at the decision to move the United States embassy to Jerusalem, a city which Israelis and Palestinians have disputed for decades. The protesters sought to display the Palestinian desire to return to homes in Israel from which they have been prevented from returning for 70 years. Their demonstrations also called for an end to Gaza’s siege and economic isolation. The territory currently experiences high levels of poverty and is faced with the additional economic challenges of significant import, export, and travel restrictions.

According to Nathan Thrall from the International Crisis Group, “Israel, Egypt and the U.S. share an interest in containing the protests, and it is possible that they will now act with greater urgency to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.” Israel could face a variety of long-term consequences if it responds improperly or inadequately to the protests. According to Thrall, it could result in the fraying of bipartisan support in the U.S., alienation from parts of the American Jewish community, growing calls for boycotts and sanctions, the announcement by the UN Office of Human Rights that it expects to publish a database of businesses that are linked to Israeli settlements or enable and support their establishment, expansion, and maintenance and the warning in April from the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that, “Violence against civilians, in a situation such as the one prevailing in Gaza, could constitute crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC, as could the use of a civilian presence for the purpose of shielding military activities.”

AP Photo/Nasser Ishtayeh

It is possible that given international responses to the violence in Gaza, the three countries will work in close coordination to expand their efforts to address the conflict and the issues that allowed it to flourish. According to reports from Arab media, Egypt offered to make concessions to Hamas in exchange for their agreement to dampen protests. According to Thrall, these included, “…expanding the area in which Gaza fishermen are permitted, opening Egypt’s crossing with Gaza on a regular basis, increasing imports of fuel and goods through the Kerem Shalom crossing with Israel, and allowing greater numbers of medical patients to be treated in Israel and the West Bank.” The progress these steps represent is substantial. Actors involved in the conflict should adopt similar measures aimed at improving conditions in  Gaza as well.

According to UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov the international community should take the following steps: prioritize the  identification, facilitation, support, and acceleration of crucial infrastructure projects. Second, the UN and other international bodies should work alongside the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt to alleviate economic burdens on Gaza. Third, all parties should be ordered to abide by the terms of the 2014 ceasefire. The envoy said such steps would facilitate, “…the unification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single, democratic and legitimate Palestinian authority in line with the Quartet Principles, and an end to the occupation and resolution of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict (UN News).”

Actors engaged in the conflict directly and the international community alike should take steps to de-escalate tension, prevent further loss of life, and make real moves toward a political settlement. Gazans should be permitted to protest peacefully without being threatened by Israeli forces. Israel must stop using excessive or lethal force against unarmed protesters. Such actions provoke  severe upticks in hostility amongst Palestinian protesters who may, in turn steel themselves for more aggressive activity. Israeli military officials should be permitted to protect their border from hostiles posing existential threats to them and Israeli civilians. According to sources from the Israeli army, Palestinians threatened border officials during the protests by hurling firebombs, planting explosives, and flying flaming kites. Protest organizers must prohibit such activity. They must ensure that demonstrations remain peaceful. Failure to do so will yield further loss of life, more injuries, and delays on the way toward peace.

Palestinian leadership and Israel should agree on a comprehensive ceasefire including a  dialogue about peaceful governance and the free flow of goods and services between Gaza and Israel. Further, Hamas and Israel should take steps to exchange detainees captured during  the last few decades of hostilities. Such confidence-building measures have the potential to be productive and lead to increased cooperation in the future. The European Union should support the government of Gaza as long as it respects the ceasefire with Israel and refrains from supporting groups, individuals, or entities that threaten Israel.

Israel and other international actors should also take steps to address the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza. Improved living standards there would do much to eliminate despair and hostility toward Israel, two conditions upon which violent extremist groups feed. International actors with economic influence over Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) should strongly urge the three to relax their economic pressure on Gaza. International organizations who have supported the PA in the past could improve the situation in Gaza by investing in infrastructure projects with prospects for long-term benefits for Gazans. A greater part of the budget should be apportioned to essential goods and services like sanitation, health facilities, trash disposal, and clean drinking water. Israel could stop providing the PA with tax revenues and instead use its money to fund projects such as these directly. Developing an environment in which jobs abound is crucial.

(AP Photo/Adel Hana)

The UN Special Coordinator said the Middle East Quartet (the UN, European Union, United States, and Russia) continues to play a vital role in monitoring and mediating the conflict. As stated in a UN News report, the quartet remains, “…a key forum for resolving the conflict, including within the broader regional context (UN News).” Special Coordinator Mladenov concluded his remarks to the UN Security Council on May 23rd by saying “We must continue to work together to achieve a peaceful future for all the people of this troubled land.” The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has persisted for decades. Unless steps are taken to improve relations between local Palestinian governments and Israel, it will endure. Recent flare-ups may have reminded the international community of the importance of cooperation to address the conflict’s serious challenges. With time and steadfast resolve, the international community will make progress. The first steps to peace, however, must come from within Palestine and Israel.

Unrest Over Austerity Measures in Tunisia

Unrest erupted across Tunisia following a government decision to implement a new finance act on January 1st, 2018. The act mainly targeted the wealthy but also triggered elevated prices for basic goods and services throughout the country. It lifted Tunisia’s value-added tax from 18% to 19%, making the consumption of taxed goods and services more expensive. Thousands gathered in public spaces across Tunisia to protest the decision. According to Al Jazeera, “Protesters torched government buildings, looted shops and blocked roads, prompting the army to deploy some 2,100 troops to different parts of the country,” (Al Jazeera). Tunisia has unquestionably made progress since initiating the Arab Spring in December 2010. It would be a shame to have it reversed due to public impatience and a harsh, miscalculated government response.


Tunisian police stand guard during a demonstration against the government and price hikes on January 9, 2018, in Tunis. AFP PHOTO /
© FETHI BELAID

According to statements released by the United Nations, since the beginning of the protests, which began immediately following the decision to implement the act, more than 778 people have been arrested. A spokesperson for the Tunisian Interior Ministry stated that at least 151 people were arrested on charges of vandalism and looting, as they should have been. Tunisians should not use the unrest as an excuse to commit crimes and foster instability in the country following the significant progress it has made since protests began in 2010. At least one person was reportedly killed in the western city of Tebourba. Protests that turned violent in other cities resulted in multiple injuries. The Tunisian government should refrain from arresting people arbitrarily and should respect the Tunisian people’s right to peaceful protest, demonstrations, and assembly. Tunisian security forces should be ordered to respond to the protests with calculated caution and restraint.

Protests began peacefully in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid. They quickly spread to other parts of the country, with the largest demonstrations occurring in the capital, Tunis. People chanted, waved Tunisian flags, and held banners demanding the Tunisian government abandon the act. To reiterate, notably, it was young Tunisian protesters who, in calling for reform, demanded progress and government accountability sparking the conflagration that came to be known as the Arab Spring in 2010. Tunisia is widely revered as the only country to emerge from the Arab Spring as a stable democracy. However, the country has experienced sluggish economic growth, fueling public dissatisfaction. The Tunisian President was quoted as saying, “2018 will be the last difficult year for Tunisia,” (Reuters). Tunisians have clearly demonstrated an understandably impatient yearning for progress.

In response to mass detentions, students and activists from around the country railed against the government, encircling official buildings and overflowing public squares demanding the release of protesters arrested during the past week. Rupert Colville, a spokesperson for the UN Office on Human Rights stated to press in Geneva, Switzerland, “We’re concerned about the high number of arrests, some 778 people we understand have now been arrested since Monday, and around a third of those arrested were between the ages of 15 and 20 – so very young.”


© Faouzi Dridi, AFP | Tunisian protesters take to the streets in Siliana, some 130 km south of Tunis, late on January 11, 2017

Austerity measures were adopted by the government in response to World Bank requests that the country act urgently to fix its budget deficit, which swelled to 6% of its GDP in recent months. The IMF committed itself to providing Tunisia with $2.8 billion in loans to achieve sustainable economic growth and stability. The loans were provided on the condition that the country’s governing bodies implement significant social and economic reforms. As mentioned earlier, the finance act elevated prices of basic consumer goods including bread and fuel. The increased value-added tax rate has lifted the price of cars, phone calls, internet and hotel accommodation. The IMF should provide additional recommendations to the Tunisian government and its finance ministry to help resolve the budget deficit without increasingly burdening the Tunisian people. Steps to improve the country’s deficit are crucial to establishing lasting stability.

According to Al Jazeera correspondent Hashem Ahelbarra reporting from Tunis, “People on the streets were enthusiastic about the movement’s momentum. People here say that they want to continue to take to the streets in order to put more pressure on the government to scrap the austerity measures,” (Al Jazeera). Protesters have also used the protests to express discontent with the government for failing to stand by promises to improve living standards, reduce poverty and lower high unemployment rates. The government would be wise to pursue options that will address the budget deficit without imposing too steep a cost on the middle and lower classes. This could be achieved by encouraging investment and consumption.

Tunisian protesters shout slogans outside the governorate’s offices in Tunis during a demonstration over price hikes and austerity measures on January 12, 2018. / AFP PHOTO / Sofiene HAMDAOUI

Governments around the world have responded to the protests by encouraging peace, reform, and restraint. When speaking with Tunisian officials, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that he is confident that if the country, “…stands united,” Tunisia could, “…overcome its problems,” (The Seattle Times).

Progress in Tunisia will come in time. Its people are determined and hopeful to achieve the rights and prosperity they were promised in 2011. Just as they brought about change then, they will so today. It is important that the government reminds people it is working for and not against them. Though plodding, the country has made a great deal of progress since the revolution in 2011. According to an article from The Economist Intelligence Unit,

The dictatorship that repressed opposition parties, jailed political dissidents and curtailed free speech and human rights has been replaced by a pluralistic political system with over 200 registered political parties, freedom of speech and assembly, and free and fair elections, underpinned by a progressive constitution,” (EIU). Progress will continue if not hindered by unrest. The international community and its institutions must be prepared to support that progress. Tunisia is a prime example of what can be achieved when people voice their concerns about political change and the government responds through thoughtful reform. The country should continue to lead by example. If it does, the Tunisian people will see the progress for which they have yearned. At the moment, the protests are likely to continue.

Sources:

“Tunisia’s Difficult Economic Situation Will Improve in 2018 -PM.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 9 Jan. 2018, af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1P41TJ?feedType=RSS&feedName=tunisiaNews.

Jazeera, Al. “More Protests Expected in Tunisia after Mass Arrests.” News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 12 Jan. 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/protests-expected-tunisia-mass-arrests-180112122337505.html.

Bouazza, Bouazza Ben. “Tunisian Govt Hopes That Days of Food Protests Are Subsiding.” The Seattle Times, The Seattle Times Company, 12 Jan. 2018, www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/tunisian-government-hoping-days-of-protests-are-subsiding/.

EIU Digital Solutions. “Tunisia.” Has the Jasmine Revolution Failed?, country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1916476975&Country=Tunisia&topic=Politics&subtopic=At%2Ba%2Bglance.

Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso

Twin terrorist attacks targeting Burkina Faso’s army headquarters and the French embassy shook the country’s capital, Ouagadougou on March 2nd (Associated Press). The attacks were conducted by two groups of men, each with 4 to 5 people, and left 30 dead (including nine perpetrators) and 85 wounded. According to the International Crisis Group, “The attacks represent an alarming escalation for Burkina Faso in terms of organization, lethality of armaments and length of engagement,” (BBC). Symbolic locations in the capital were chosen as they represent power and authority to terrorist groups throughout the region. The attacks have heightened concerns about Burkina Faso’s increased jihadist violence.

The attacks appeared to be coordinated. One set of men drove to the army headquarters’ main entrance. Using a rocket-propelled grenade they made their way through the front gate. Inside the complex, a second vehicle packed with explosives hurtled toward the headquarters’ main building, at which point it detonated, causing damage not only to the building but also to the infrastructure surrounding it. The attackers then opened fire on military personnel near the main building’s courtyard. Reports have been confirmed by French and Burkinabe forces. Measures have been taken to heighten security around the complex but more measures are in order to secure additional terrorist targets throughout the country.

A group of attackers tried to enter the French embassy but were repelled. They then shifted positions, encircling the embassy and exchanging fire with Burkinabe security forces.  Burkinabe forces were supported by French military personnel, who in turn, had been deployed by helicopter around the building. The ensuing gunfight lasted several hours. French support was crucial to the local security force’s defense. According to a French military source, “Burkinabé forces were crushed at the beginning. We helped them,” (Depagne). According to Rinaldo Depagne, West Africa Program Director at The International Crisis Group, despite that Burkinabe forces were unable to counter the assailants on their own, “…compared to the previous two attacks in Ouagadougou in 2016 and 2017, the response time and organization of the reaction seem slightly improved.” Burkinabe security forces would benefit from additional training from international forces in the area in order to be more effective should a similar attack unfold in the future.

AFP PHOTO / Ahmed OUOBA (Photo credit AHMED OUOBA/AFP/Getty Images)

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin claimed responsibility for the attack the next day, March 3rd.  JNIM, or, translated to English: The Group to Support Muslims and Islam, aka GSIM, is an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel region, comprised of formerly disparate jihadist groups including Ansar Eddine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front. JNIM’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, said the attack was retaliation for French military airstrikes on February 14th. During that attack, a number of JNIM’s leaders, including the deputy of Mourabitoun, al-Hassan al-Ansari, and Malick ag Wanasnat, an ag Ghali confidant, were killed. That mission was part of an increased effort by Malian armed forces (FAMA) working closely with French counter-terrorism, aka The Barkhane, in support of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Burkina Faso has experienced a spate of terrorist attacks since experiencing a coup in 2015. Notably, in January 2016, 30 people were killed in the capital by an attack claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On August 13th, 2017 jihadists shot up a Turkish restaurant in the capital killing 19 and wounding 25. Areas in the country’s north, along its border with its unstable neighbor, Mali, have also seen jihadist violence. Many of the attacks have been conducted by Ansarul Islam, a local Islamist group with working ties to jihadist organizations in Mali.

Burkina Faso’s security forces deteriorated following the departure of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, rendering them incapable of repelling attacks like those on March 2nd. According to Burkinabe sources, the army has become disorganized. The Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), Burkinabe’s special forces, were dismantled and have not been replaced since the president left. According to the International Crisis Group, “Intelligence gathering appears to be weak, judging by the failure to detect or disrupt the major attacks that happened on Friday. Two teams totaling at least eight men were able to cross the city center carrying heavy weapons and driving a car full of explosives without being spotted,” (Depagne). Burkinabé authorities suspect members of their own army leaked vital information, aiding the attackers. Military attaches under President Compaore’s leadership, including spymaster Gilbert Diendéré, had been in charge of a comprehensive, international intelligence network that was quite effective. Key counterterrorism structures have not been replaced since their departure.

Steps have been taken to operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint Force, supported by France plus Burkina Faso and four of its neighbors. Military officials claim task force meetings were in progress when the attacks occurred. The attacks, in fact, may have been aimed at discouraging the mobilization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Failure to address security challenges in Burkina Faso could lead to the intensification of an already complex regional conflict. The international community, including organizations like the United Nations, should cooperate to prevent the country from falling further into violence and instability. Cooperation to implement such efforts and foster stability in the region has worked in the past. It can work today and in the future as well.

Sources:

  1. Depagne, Renaldo. “Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence.” Crisis Group, ICG, 7 Mar. 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence.
  2. “Burkina Faso Attack: French Embassy Targeted in Ouagadougou.” BBC News, BBC, 2 Mar. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43257453.
  3. Press, Associated. “Burkina Faso Authorities Arrest 8 after Jihadist Attacks.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 6 Mar. 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-authorities-arrest-8-after-jihadist-attacks/2018/03/06/6dd16370-2164-11e8-946c-9420060cb7bd_story.html?utm_term=.85043c6874e5.

 

Poverty and Violent Extremism in Yemen

For over 1,000 days now, Yemen has been devastated by horrific violence and a brutal civil war.[1] In 2014, the Houthis, a group of Zaidi Shi’a rebels who subscribe to the principles of pan-Islamism,[2] advanced into the Yemeni capital of Sana’a. By January 2015, the rebels had gained control of the presidential palace and successfully pushed the Yemeni government from power.

A student at the Aal Okab school stands in the ruins of one of his former classrooms. He and his fellow pupils now attend lesson in UNICEF tents nearby.

President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi was eventually forced to resign, parliament was dissolved and a Houthi ruling council was established in its place.[3] In March 2015, the Saudi-led military coalition targeted the Houthis and began bombing the rebels in an effort to dislodge them from Sana’a.[4] While the Saudi coalition was able to aid Hadi and various local forces in regaining southern governorates of Yemen, the Houthis continue to control much of the north- including strategic parts of the country such as Sana’a.[5]  On December 4, 2017, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen who had stepped down during the Arab Spring in 2011, was killed by the Iranian backed Houthis. Driven by the desire to regain power, Saleh and his loyalists formally allied with the Houthis in 2015.  However, he broke ties with the rebels in December 2017 and days after expressing his support for Riyadh, the Houthis killed him.

In Yemen, alliances seem to be constantly shifting and the political situation appears to be an endless quagmire. The unrest and dynamic conflict has enabled the Yemen based group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to greatly expand its territorial control and there are ISIS training camps in al Bayda governorate.[6] While AQAP remains a much greater threat than ISIS in Yemen, it is clear that the war torn country has become a breeding ground for terrorism. While a thorough analysis of the current political situation in Yemen is beyond the scope of this discussion, this piece will seek to examine the relationship between poverty and terrorism in Yemen. I will argue that while poverty is not the only underlying cause for terrorist activity in Yemen, it frequently serves as a mobilizing factor that aids in AQAP’s recruitment efforts.

Her bruised eyes still swollen shut, Buthaina Muhammad Mansour, believed to be four or five, doesn’t yet know that her parents, five siblings and uncle were killed when an air strike flattened their home in Yemen’s capital. Despite a concussion and skull fractures, doctors think Buthaina will pull through – her family’s sole survivor of the Aug 25 attack, on an apartment building, that residents blame on a Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen since 2015. The alliance said in a statement it would investigate the air strike, which killed at least 12 civilians.

The civil war in Yemen has produced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as well as the world’s worst cholera outbreak. More than ten thousand innocent civilians have been killed,[7] over fourteen million people are without access to medical care and millions have been internally displaced by the conflict. The Saudi coalition has imposed a de facto blockade, which has significantly worsened the crisis and now roughly seven million people are at risk of famine.[8] The ongoing violence and extreme poverty in Yemen have left families extremely vulnerable. In the April 2016 United Nations annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General reported that…“in Yemen, a particularly worrisome escalation of conflict has been seen. The United Nations verified a fivefold increase in the number of children recruited in 2015 compared with the previous year.”[9]

Yemen is a state on the brink of collapse and this has produced an enabling environment in which extremists are much more successful at mobilizing support for their violent causes. One way terrorists have been able to exploit the extreme poverty of Yemen and gain new recruits is through social service provisions. AQAP has appeared in images and videos on Twitter, showing the group’s fighters paving roads in the Hadramout province and assisting local hospitals.[10] Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen scholar at Oxford University, tells Reuters, “In one video posted on Feb. 28, 2016, AQAP members deliver free medical supplies and equipment to the kidney dialysis and cancer wings of a local hospital.”

In another video, an AQAP militant states, “These are some medicines from your brothers, the Guardians of Sharia, to al-Jamii hospital which was going to be closed … because of no money.”[11] The deputy prime minister of Yemen, Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi, is well aware of the relationship between violent extremism and poverty, especially when it comes to young boys who are often recruited as foot soldiers. Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi states, “Most young people have no prospects in life. Those fanatics offer them the illusion that they can take power and implement authentic Islam – and if they get killed they go to paradise. It’s a win-win situation for them.”[12]

Yemen has been in the grip of civil war since March 2015, when Houthi rebels drove out the government and took over the capital, Sana’a. The crisis quickly escalated, allowing al Qaeda and ISIS — enemies of the Houthis — to grow stronger amid the chaos.

It is clear that young men faced with high levels of poverty and little to no employment prospects are often lured to organizations like AQAP. AQAP not only provides social services but also the promise of financial rewards and compensation.[13] The links between poverty, unemployment and young Yemeni men joining al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not new. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the first Guantanamo detainee to stand trial before the military commissions and a Yemeni citizen, worked as a driver for Osama bin Laden. The Sana’a based mosque where Hamdan was recruited was described as a “gathering place for the dispossessed,” and thus “exerted an especially strong pull on the country’s poor.”[14] Hamdan claimed to have chosen to work for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan because, “working as a driver and mechanic in bin Laden’s motor pool paid better than driving a dabab (minibus) in Sana.”[15]

In this discussion, it is vital to note that many researchers have claimed that the terrorism-poverty thesis is flawed. However, poverty’s role in undermining state capacity has often been overlooked and scholars have often failed to make distinctions between terrorist elites and impoverished communities. Karin von Hippel explains, “Although the leaders of terrorist organizations seem to come from both indigent and bourgeoisie backgrounds, this is not true of their humble servants. Strangely, most researchers recognize that poverty may be a factor among lower ranks but do not include the foot soldiers in their research when aggregating data”.[16]

We cannot dismiss the fact that elites often use the grievance of poverty as a recruitment mechanism and extremists continuously exploit ungoverned or disputed territory. Corinne Graff of The Brookings Institution contends, “There is little evidence to suggest that poverty does not affect the incidence of terrorist attacks. The body of scholarly research thus far has failed to establish this, let alone explain how to measure terrorism. Hence the quantitative data and ensuing data disputing such a relationship remain a poor guide for policy. More convincing is the mounting evidence confirming that poor weak states are vulnerable to violent extremists.”

Abdellatif Allami walks with his three-year-old daughter Sara in the Harat Al-Masna’a slum in Sana’a, home to the families of former factory workers. They used to receive a basic pension of around $120 a month, but the payments stopped seven months ago, and the families now rely on donations to survive.

We cannot simply overlook the fact that “an estimated 17 million Yemenis (about 60 percent of the total population) are estimated food insecure and a further 7 million severely food insecure…malnutrition has increased by 57 percent since 2015 and now affects close to 3.3 million people, 462,000 of which are children under five.”[17] If the state truly does collapse, Yemen will not only become a terrorism hotbed for Sunni jihadists but also for Iran backed Shia militant groups.

Sources:

[1] Faisal Edroos and Ahmad Algohbary, “1,000 days of war in Yemen ‘land of blood and bombs'”, Al Jazeera, December 20, 2017.

[2]“Q&A: What do the Houthis want?”, Al Jazeera, October 2, 2014.

[3]“Yemen: Houthi, Saleh council formation criticised by UN”, Al Jazeera, July 29, 2016.

[4] “Saudi Arabia launches air strikes in Yemen”, BBC News, March 26, 2015

[5] “Yemen Control Map & Report – January 2018”, Political Geography Now, January 7, 2018.

[6] DoD News, Defense Media Activity, “U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Against ISIS Training Camps in Yemen”, October 16, 2017, U.S. Department of Defense.

[7] Nicolas Niarchos, “How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse”, The New Yorker, January 22, 2018.

[8] Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Agency Foresees Severe Famine in Yemen Under Saudi Blockade”, The New York Times, November. 21, 2017.

[9] United Nations General Assembly Security Council.  “Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary General” A/70/836–S/2016/360.

[10] Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari.“How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger – and richer”, Reuters Investigates, April 8, 2016.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ian Black, “Yemen terrorism: Soft approach to jihadists starts to backfire as poverty fuels extremism” The Guardian, July 29, 2008.

[13] Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’s and the Struggle for Yemen”, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 6 (2012).

[14] Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual, Confronting Poverty: Weak States and U.S. National Security, (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 69.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Karin von Hippel, “The Role of Poverty in Radicalization and Terrorism” Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Thousand Oaks: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2014), 61.

[17] “The World Bank in Yemen”, The World Bank, April 1, 2017.

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