Remembering 9/11 in the Wake of Growing Threats

Remembering 9/11 in the Wake of Growing Threats

As the 21st commemoration of the September 11th terrorist attacks approaches, the solemn anniversary brings a new wave of urgency. It has been one year since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan.

Throughout the past year, the Taliban have worked to reinforce oppression by stripping women of their rights and indoctrinating young boys. Once again, the threat of terrorism is pervasive. After 21 years, we must ask ourselves: how much progress has been made in effective counterterrorism?

Last month, the United States  killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. While this is a victory for the United States, it may only be a short-term cause for celebration. The death of their leader will undoubtedly fuel the anti-Western hatred held by al-Qaeda.

In addition, the Taliban have created a friendly environment in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda, a UN report says. In fact, Ayman al Zawahiri was found in the heart of Kabul. The amicable relationship between the two terrorist groups is dangerous not only for the future of Afghanistan but also for the West who may see the Taliban’s war-ridden intentions in the coming years.

How can the United States prevent this? First and foremost, the U.S. should analyze its role in history. The Soviet War in Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989 provides insight into the mistakes made by the United States that ultimately played a part in the rise of terrorism in the 90s.

Throughout the Soviet War, the United States supported rebel groups in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviets and advance their anti-communist agenda. Soon after the defeat, the United States abandoned the country leaving an unstable Afghan government that was easily seized by the Taliban.

From the 1989 up until the attacks on 9/11, Afghanistan then became a safe haven for radical jihadists and terrorists. During that time, some of the most heinous attacks were carried out with 9/11 being the most catastrophic.

The United States could avoid the repetition lost of the past by engaging with Afghanistan to ensure that the upcoming generation of Afghans is not a product of radical, fundamentalist indoctrination to be used for a terrorist agenda.

The United States can further intervene by analyzing relationships with regional actors like Pakistan, who delayed accountability for the 9/11 attacks by providing refuge for Osama Bin Laden, and reconsider new allyships that will further the prospect of counterterrorism in the face of the growing threat. In doing so, the United States can learn from the lessons that came after the Soviet War and contribute to active counterterrorism efforts.

At the very least, it is crucial for the United States to maintain vigilance. The Taliban and al-Qaeda now occupy Afghanistan, however, their desire to exert influence will not stop there. The fundamental principles of these two groups are rooted in Western hatred and the desire to return to Islamic Sharia law of their own version, further perpetuating violence and oppression.

As we remember the events of September 11th, it is also important to remember the role that the United States has as a powerhouse in international relations. With this considered, the U.S. must exercise influence through the correction of its past mistakes. In doing so, the United States can play its part in reducing the expansion of terrorism.

Deradicalization and Combating Domestic Terrorism in the U.S

On January 6th, 2021, white supremacists and militias breached the Capitol, deploying the use of violence and force. In light of this, government officials and researchers are working to identify the factors contributing to domestic terrorism in America.

Domestic Radicalization

In 2020, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recorded 110 domestic extremist attacks. Of those, two-thirds were from the far-right and about a quarter from the far-left. The remainder were driven by religious or “ethnonationalism” causes.

In the technological world we live in, social media provides the main clues experts use to learn about the radicalization process and when, where, and why this violence occurs. In 2016, social media played a role in the radicalization processes of nearly 90% of the extremists. The internet gives experts access to study extremist viewpoints and conspiracy theories that are being circulated. This is often the most vulnerable of people.

Deradicalization

However, it is not enough for people to disengage, people need to be deradicalized. Deradicalization is the process of making an individual become less radical in their political or religious beliefs. Disengagement didn’t necessarily reduce their level of radicalization, meaning that these individuals have stopped enacting extremist crimes but may still hold radical views. Most psychological counterterrorism strategies have been developed for international use for Islamist extremists. Thus, experts worry that these interventions might not translate to U.S.-based groups. Evidence has shown that using former group members is one of the best ways to encourage individuals to leave extremist groups. They provide social support and can reflect on the challenges and fears associated with leaving.

A recent study by Gina Ligon, the Director of National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center at the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and her colleagues, found that one of the main reasons people disengage from extremist groups is for the same reason many people leave jobs or other organizations. They dislike their boss. They came to this conclusion after reviewing nearly 100 exit interviews with left-wing and right-wing domestic extremists. Ligon identified: “it wasn’t that they realized their beliefs were wrong, it was that they didn’t trust their leaders or were dissatisfied with the way the group was being managed.

Combating Domestic Terrorism

Towards the end of the Trump administration, DHS was provided with around $500,000 for a project at American University to study the “growing threat of violent white supremacist extremist disinformation.” The program is aimed at preventing the spread of disinformation through what researchers call “attitudinal inoculation.” Attitudinal inoculation aims to give people who may be vulnerable to disinformation the skills to recognize it and argue against it. This can be comparable to how a vaccine builds antibodies to a virus before the body encounters it.

However, during the Trump administration, DHS officials were directed to use the term “violence prevention,” instead of  “domestic terrorism.” Elizabeth Neumann, DHS’ Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention states:

“We did expand domestic terrorism prevention under Trump. But, when it came to questions of how we could change the domestic terrorism statute to charge people more easily, there were no adults at the White House who were willing to go there. Nor was anyone willing to define the threat.” 

The DHS under the Biden administration is very outspoken about naming and preventing domestic violent extremism. In response to the uptick, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is expanding research into violent extremism in the United States. The Biden Administration is expanding grants to the DHS’ Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention. Similarly, the Homeland Security Department is looking to collaborate more closely with private social media companies. This includes Facebook and Twitter to spot indicators of potential violence.

However, there is a widespread belief within DHS that it should not be the federal government’s role to censor people or organizations, especially if the pressure is exerted by a Democratic administration on conservative media. The government will need to continue research and adapt to this goal of combating domestic terrorism in the United States. It has become very clear that there will not be a quick or easy solution to this growing issue.

 

9/11

This 9/11 Anniversary Brings Afghan War to the Forefront

9/11 is undoubtedly a tragic and disturbing act of terrorism on US soil, but it acted as a wake-up call for American policymakers at the same time. It is a logical conclusion that the horrible events of that day would not have happened had the US not walked away from the region once their interests were victorious after a prolonged proxy war against the Soviet Union (1979-1989).

After 19 years of conflict, Afghan negotiators headed to Doha for the intra-Afghan dialogues, an initiative started by the United States as they act as the catalyst between the two warring parties- the Taliban and the Afghan government being the most prominent third-party mediator.

Two days before 9/11, the National Hero of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda in Takhar-Afghanistan. The legendary fighter who battled the Soviets and later the Taliban, warned months before his death, that a large-scale attack is underway on the US and Europe soil by al-Qaida. Either the US neglected to grasp the full picture of the attack or did not get enough intel to act and prevent the catastrophe.

Since the commencement of the 19-year long War on Terror, the US has played a pivotal role in ending the Afghan conflict, having as many as 100,000 troops stationed there as part of the 2009 surge. Over $2 trillion USD has been spent on infrastructure, counter-terrorism operations, and building the Afghan National Defense Security Forces to reach a 360,000-strong force, as originally envisioned. This combination of nation-building and counterterrorism has cost the US heavily — financially as well as the 2400 American troops who have lost their lives.

Despite the failures to form strong Afghan institutions and violence of the past nearly two decades, tremendous progress has taken place. Today, an estimated 3.5 million Afghan girls are enrolled in school, a stark contrast to the 50,000 that were enrolled during the Taliban’s reign.

The Taliban governed for five years (1996-2001) and instituted barbaric Islamist policies, such as banning girls from school and stoning women to death. In the 1990s, they provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, turning Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorist groups, seeking ‘an entry to heaven.’ Infamous leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the founder and leader of the Islamic State) used Afghanistan as a strategic transit point. Terror groups used Afghanistan as the logistic headquarters for deadly attacks in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the orchestration of 9/11.

The push from the Trump administration to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, with the latest US-Taliban deal reached earlier this year may result in further destabilization. An exit strategy is not always the best strategy. Important questions arise: Will the Taliban remain loyal to their promises? Will there be a guaranteed agreement that the Taliban will no longer harbor terrorism and plan attacks on US soil?

An exit from Afghanistan would result in the creation of another battleground for terrorism. Similar to the vacuum of power created by a lack of American interest in the early 1990s, parallel circumstances would emerge now. The Taliban were enabled to usurp power and consequently turn the country into a safe haven for Islamist extremism back then and thus it remains imperative that the US understands what is at stake if they decide to completely leave Afghanistan now. The Taliban is estimated to have 60,000 active fighters and control roughly 50-70 percent of Afghan territory. They maintain a feared presence across the entire country, and international support for law and order against them is starting to dwindle.

Additionally, the current global political atmosphere commands that the United States adapt its commitments within Afghanistan and focus greater attention towards the East. China continues its ascendance and an ever-stronger India are taking their places on the world stage. Given that the US rivals in the region, primarily Russia, China, and Iran also compete in the region, another regional power may quickly supplant their former position and advance to this strategic location.

The Taliban are not going to cut ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan peace process is unexpected to reach a conclusion soon. Both require time and commitment. It is vital that the next US presidential administration retains a small presence of US troops (as low as 4000) in combination with intelligence operators and diplomats to ensure promises are kept over the next few years. As well, these factors are important in the elimination of terror cells. A new US strategy may also focus on the proper allocation of resources to further avoid wasting US taxpayer money and systematic corruption in Afghanistan.

Finally, as the Taliban are making peace, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISK, ISP, or Daesh-Khorasan) — continues to gain strength through deadly attacks just as the Taliban remain engaged with the Afghan government. It is imperative to devote attention to their rise and activities in this general analysis. Further IS-K has been regrouping and the radical Taliban fighters who opposed the US-Taliban agreement can create a combination of “Islamic Emirate, Caliphate” as their objective.

Given that the Taliban’s main supply route for both personnel and weapons is through Pakistan, the insurgency group can and will continue to fight as long as they have support and safe-havens in Pakistan. They can do so by blocking foreign fighters and state-sponsors of terrorism in interfering in the Afghan peace talks. Further, they can use their diplomatic expertise to ensure that foreign actors, push the Taliban to join the negotiation table.

A stable Afghanistan benefits the region and protects the United States from any potential 9/11 style attacks in the future.


Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace, a Washington-based counter-terrorism organization. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

NeverForget 9/11

Exclusive interview with Khalid Noor on Doha peace conference

From Left, Khalid Noor and Lotfullah Najafzada at Doha peace conference. July 8, 2019.

Amid a series of peace talks over the last months, Taliban and Afghan representatives gathered in Doha and agreed on a roadmap to end the 18 years of war. Since last year, the U.S. appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as the lead Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation to broker a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government, in hopes for a long term ceasefire. 

In Doha, Qatar, a meeting co-hosted by German and Qatari officials brought together diverse individuals interested in achieving lasting Afghan peace. Sixteen Taliban and sixty Afghan representatives (composed of delegates from political parties, government officials and civil society organizations) engaged in discussions that led to a potentially positive arrangement. Doha conference, instilled newfound hope as the Taliban agreed to reduce its reliance on violent attacks by avoiding various public spaces. Rise to Peace’s Ahmad Mohibi interviews Khalid Noor, one of the participants at Doha conference, to give a closer look at the future of the Afghan peace process. 

What is your takeaway from the Doha Peace Conference?

Khalid Noor: I think the Doha meeting was a great opportunity for the two sides [Taliban and the Afghan representatives] to sit down and share their issues, and to explain their concerns with each other. The talks provided the opportunity for both sides to discuss some of the most sensitive and critical topics that were overlooked at previous peace talks. For instance, we talked about regime creation. I personally changed the nature of the meeting from ceremonial to more serious discussions with my thoughts, that we want the regime to be the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan — this is our goal and our red line. The Taliban wants an Islamic Emirate and that’s their red line. 

What were some of the questions that were brought forth to the Taliban at the Conference?

Khalid Noor: We would like to know how likely it is that the Taliban is willing to participate and accept our Islamic Republic if we bring substantial changes. My next point was that elections are valuable to us and we are not willing to lose them at any cost. Our fellow citizens are concerned about this, but they want to know: will you [Taliban] participate in an Afghan lead election that is controlled and financed by Afghans after reaching an agreement on a coalition government?

The moderator interrupted me shortly after my first two questions and requested if it’s possible to avoid technical and serious questions in order to not disrupt the meeting. I respectfully accepted but continued with my last question: Is it possible to elaborate and emphasize freedom of speech? For instance, you [Taliban] have said though press releases and other forms of public messaging, that the Taliban would respect freedom of speech. Although, in your other statements the Taliban threatens media over the same matter. It’s imperative for us to understand, ‘what’s happening on your side and what is your vision of certain freedoms in Afghanistan?’

What was one of the main points that both parties were mostly concerned about?

Khalid Noor: After listening to each other’s questions and concerns, the two sides started to raise their issues about violent attacks. For instance, we shared our sorrows and criticized the current Taliban tactic of sending suicide bombers to kill innocent people in congested parts of the cities. It is not Islamic or logical. The Taliban also criticized the Afghan government by saying that the government ‘only talks about the civilian casualties caused by us [Taliban] and not the night operations conducted by the government, that resulted in the martyrdom of our people and civilians. No news agency reports that. So, when you [Afghan government] raise such concerns, it’s also necessary to discuss our casualties as well.’ One of the Taliban members sternly asked, “Do you think our civilian casualties are not human beings?”

Were there any other matters discussed following the Taliban’s concern of mass casualties?

Khalid Noor: The Taliban raised another point about human rights after we repeatedly defended human rights, women’s rights, and freedom of speech. They told us, “since you are speaking about human rights, is human rights only what you hear about on television and what you believe is right, or do you think about what we go through? They [Afghan National Security Forces and Coalition Forces] enter our homes at night, disrespect our women, our children, and mothers.  For example, one of our commanders was arrested by the Afghanistan National Intelligence Agency and the National Directorate of Security (NDS).

When he was taken into custody at NDS, the investigators told him “Now call your God to help you.” The Taliban expanded on this example and challenged us on “what part of this misbehavior of our personnel, where torture is following the principles of human rights?” They continued and said, “if you look at the prison systems, they are not fair to us [Taliban]. Aren’t your human rights’ values applicable to this case or it’s only the media that shows our negative actions?” Taliban said “we are not denying our mistakes. We have done mistakes but to be fair, it’s good that both sides accept the mistakes.”

Who were some of the other key representatives at this Conference?

Khalid Noor: The two sides listened carefully to each other’s issues and concerns. Our Muslim scholars, who were part of the Kabul delegates, also condemned Taliban actions and illustrated that our interpretation of Islam is better than the Taliban interpretation. The Muslim scholars added that it’s imperative that we [Afghan and Taliban] scholars sit and discuss these issues and come to a conclusion whose interpretation of Islam is right or wrong.

Would you consider this meeting successful?

Khalid Noor: The main point of this meeting was that an opportunity emerged so that both sides could clearly raise their thoughts patiently. This was unlike many other peace talks. In previous conferences, the intra-Afghan dialogues were smaller, about 5-6 people from the Taliban and Afghan side. Unlike before, this time we were part of a bigger team where we discussed various topics. Most importantly, the Taliban delegates participated in the conversation and answered questions. This was a great achievement.

What can be done to increase the likelihood of success in future peace talks?

Khalid Noor: On day two, we were more open to collaborative discussions compared to the first day where mostly everyone was serious and had this hatred towards each other. Representatives from both sides felt comfortable to share something and they listened to each other. I really think that this was a good meeting as the two sides exchanged ideas. If we had one or two more days, I really believe that our discussion could have been more technical and friendlier. It’s imperative to keep such talks in the future. In addition to actual Afghan-Taliban peace negotiations, we need to have separate dialogues, because negotiations can be tough sometimes and in that circumstance, it’s better to refer the issue to the dialogue team, so they can discuss it without a judgment call or simply answer out of ignorance.

Do you believe that the Taliban will keep their promise in efforts to reduce violence? 

Khalid Noor: It’s too early to know if the Taliban will keep their promises or not. But I have to express that the two sides [Taliban and Afghan government] should be involved and support each other. It’s important that both the Afghan National Security Forces and the Taliban fighters implement the promise reached by both sides at the meeting. We are both held accountable. A judgment call can be made if we see a civilian casualty in any of their attacks. We would ask them: You promised us that you would not attack civilians, so what happened that now you attacked schools, hospitals, and targeted civilians? Thus, their promise is a way to keep them responsible for their actions.

This is in case they break the agreement, and they most likely will. But, it’s difficult for us to understand how strongly they are going to keep their promise.

What are some of the drivers for the Taliban to end their fight and join the Afghan government?

Khalid Noor: Some of the main reasons that the Taliban are willing to come to a negotiated settlement and end the war which the Afghan and American governments, along with the international community, believe that no party or side will create peace through war or the use of force. Neither the Taliban can defeat us, nor we can defeat them. In the past 18 years, we have been fighting continuously on the frontlines. Although the Taliban had massive casualties, they are still standing strong against the Afghan government. I do believe that each side has come to the understanding that negotiations are the best option, as war is not the solution to problems.

At the same time, we can tell they [Taliban] are tired of fighting and do not want to continue this war. Their foot soldiers are getting older and the leadership may face trust issues with the current generation of soldiers, as they may not be as loyal. I do not know for sure, but this is my personal understating.

Taliban said, “We also would like to see our children go to school. But because of you [Afghan government], we seek refuge in the mountains, so we cannot send our children to gain proper education and have the basic needs of living.”

What can the Afghan leaders offer to meet those drivers?

Khalid Noor: I strongly believe that the two sides [the Afghan government and the Taliban] should compromise on certain issues and accept each other’s point of view. Without compromise and understanding, there is no other way to solve the problem. The two sides should meet in the future to discuss their concerns. They may need to revise some of their strong policies or views to reach the common goal of a deal to build a regime in Afghanistan.

How does the U.S. contribute as the main broker in intra-Afghan dialogues?

Khalid Noor: The U.S. role in negotiations is critical. Bringing the two sides to a negotiation table is great assistance. Second, if the U.S. direct talks with the Taliban are successful, then this will definitely support the Afghan peace process. Additionally, the U.S. role in pressuring political parties and the Afghan government, so they can come to a united stand in efforts to negotiate with the Taliban, is very critical. I do believe that the U.S. has a key role in encouraging politicians, elites and the opposition to work together on a unified agenda and concept.


Ahmad Mohibi, a writer and activist is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi