US troop withdrawal

 by Rise to Peace

What We Can Learn About the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan in Anticipation of the U.S Troops Withdrawal

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, signaling the end of a nearly decade of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of a period of uncertainty.

As in 1989, the upcoming U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, fosters much of the same uncertainty concerning the competence of the Afghan security forces and their ability to prevent the Ghani government from collapsing. According to U.S intelligence assessments, this may be as soon as six months after U.S withdrawal. Like their predecessors, the Afghan security forces and their foreign supporters will experience similar challenges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet force withdrawal, the Afghan security forces continued to be fully dependent on the USSR. The USSR continued supporting the security forces with advisors, ammunition, fuel, and funds. Furthermore, with the main raison d’être that unified all Mujahideen factions together, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan disappeared. Soviet agents managed to leverage those tensions and reach agreements with different factions to support the security forces.

Whilst security forces were successful in holding off Mujahedeen for three years, the dependence of the Najibullah government on Soviet support eventually led to its demise. Consequently, the government collapsed shortly after Soviet support ceased. This demonstrated the failure of the USSR to develop an Afghan security force that could sustain a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan. In part, failure is a product of the USSR and the Afghan government’s inability to develop a functioning Afghan state.

The security structures implemented by the Soviets in Afghanistan raised public distrust, which were frequently prone to corruption and bureaucracy. Consequently, many structures established by the Soviets collapsed shortly after their withdrawal. Others, such as the interior ministry structure, survived, however, they became components of militias, receiving orders from strongmen.

KhAD, the government’s intelligence agency, was the most successful and effective of the security forces. Consequently, the government was heavily dependent upon KhAD for regime survival. Nevertheless, even KhAD couldn’t prevent the government’s collapse.

One might question, whether the security structures implemented by the Soviets were appropriate for the mission they were designed to accomplish. As effectiveness is not merely a measure of the number of arms or quality of forces but rather of mission compatibility, some believe the answer is probably not.

Currently, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are supported by international funds and substantial U.S. support. However, the ANDSF is undermined by lack of capacity, corruption, factorization, high casualty levels, poor intelligence, lack of willingness to launch offensive actions, and more. Consequently, the government heavily relies upon the Afghan Special Security Forces, its most competent force. The central government’s control of the country continues to erode as the Taliban captures more territories and local warlords assemble militias to confront the Taliban.

The U.S. has poured more than $70 billion in weapons, equipment, and training into the Afghan security forces. Yet, the competence of these forces to survive a massive Taliban offensive post-U.S. and NATO withdrawal is unclear. All of the above, resemble the challenges the Afghan security forces experienced following the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S should honestly and openly ask itself if the current ANDSF structure is the right one for the mission. As in 1989, the answer is probably not. The recent Taliban successes and territorial gains strengthen that assertion.

In anticipation of September 11, the U.S and Ghani governments should work together to reform the ANDSF. A framework should be considered to confront the challenges that the Afghan security forces will face, post-U.S withdrawal. The collapse of the ANDSF will raise the probability of President Ghani sharing a similar fate to former President Najibullah, scenes that nobody wishes to witness again. Furthermore, it will plunge this war-turn country into further chaos. This may result in renewed terrorist threats to the U.S and its allies.

By learning from the Soviet withdrawal experience, the U.S could structure and prepare the ANDSF in such a way, that they could effectively and independently sustain peace and regime stability in Afghanistan.

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Afghan peace talks
 by Jonad Anderson

Recent American Decisions Will Influence Afghan Peace Talks

Two current events have implications for Afghanistan. Joe Biden was declared as president-elect in the United States presidential election by several news outlets on November 7. He will be the fourth president since the war began in 2001. Further, on November 17, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. will reduce its troops in Afghanistan from approximately 4,500 to 2,500 in mid-January.

Stakes are high. A rushed withdrawal from Afghanistan can affect the country in the short and long term. It is important now is to secure a safe period while the intra-Afghan peace talks take place and then the U.S can leave Afghanistan without the risk of the nation bursting into a civil war. With this in mind, this article will look into what effects the withdrawal can have on the Afghan peace process and the views of different stakeholders.

Joe Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs in March 2020, “It is past time to end the forever wars, which have cost the United States untold blood and treasure. As I have long argued, we should bring the vast majority of our troops home from the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East and narrowly define our mission as defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS).” Biden’s plan was to keep a small number of counterterrorism forces in Afghanistan, but since the withdrawal now seems to start before Biden takes office, it is possible it will inhibit him in his plans.

According to interviews conducted by Al-Jazeera, many Afghans believe that the Trump administration rushed with the peace process and did not prioritize a responsible withdrawal of U.S. troops. The respondents fear that this can lead back into a civil war. On the same note, the Second Vice President of Afghanistan, Sarwar Danish, commented that he wants “a full review of the peace process” and to “apply more pressure on the Taliban to reduce the violence.”

However, the Taliban commented that they expect the new president to remain committed to the peace deal. Moreover, an Afghan analyst stated that it is important to have a permanent ceasefire, agreed to by all parties, in the peace agreement before U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

In addition, it is argued that the withdrawal will undermine fragile security in Afghanistan and that it will affect the peace talks. The latest announcement from the Pentagon, on the withdrawal of troops before Biden takes office, can put him in a difficult spot and he might have to redeploy troops to secure the situation in Afghanistan for a peaceful agreement.

Given the history of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, it makes sense that officials in the U.S. want to leave as quickly as possible. However, it is important to bear in mind that a quick withdrawal can affect Afghanistan, both in the short-term with intra-Afghan peace talks, and in the long-term with fear of civil war and more violent attacks on civilians.

It is therefore very important that the withdrawal of U.S troops is done in a responsible way, especially when a ceasefire agreement is signed and the talks have moved forward. As Mitch McConnell, the top Republican in the U.S. Senate told the press on Tuesday, “a precipitous drawdown in either Afghanistan or Iraq is a mistake.”

The war in Afghanistan has been ongoing for almost two decades and since the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan began counting, it has cost the death of more than 100,000 civilians, 45,000 Afghan security forces since 2014 and over 2,300 American soldiers.

While the incoming presidential administration states similar intent as the current one in regard to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it needs to be done in a responsible way. Troops should be kept in Afghanistan during the negotiations so that long term goals can be achieved for a peaceful Afghanistan.  As an Afghan official mentioned, “We expect more predictability, a more coordinated withdrawal.”

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 by Anja Apfel

Problems in the Way of Progress: Uncertain US Troop Withdrawal and New Challenges Facing the Afghan Peace Process

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace agreement, widely referred to as the ‘Doha Deal’, which is considered to have provided a foundation upon which a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan can be built.

One of the primary tenets of the ‘Doha Deal’ focuses upon the gradual reduction of the remaining 12,000 US troops currently stationed in Afghanistan, with plans for an eventual full-withdrawal. Throughout the first half of 2020, the US has already significantly reduced the numbers of its troops in Afghanistan to 8600, therefore greatly surpassing the agreed upon reduction (as defined in the Doha Deal) to 12,000 remaining troops. However, whilst this major tenet of the deal has been accomplished seemingly with no major complications, the satisfying of other primary elements of the Doha Deal can be seen to have experienced various considerable setbacks.

Even days after the agreement was originally signed, the progress was largely overshadowed by issues arising from each constitutive party. The Afghan government immediately raised concerns regarding another of the deal’s primary components: the numbers and time-span of the agreed upon release of 5000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government. These concerns regarding the prisoner swap have not only caused major problems in developing the peace process further in the last months, but the anticipated nation-wide reduction in violence (which was expected to arise as a direct result of the agreement) has also failed to occur.

Although there have been notable periods since the signing of the deal within which the violence between parties can be seen to have subsided (e.g. The Eid Ceasefire), the country has still experienced regular sparks of conflict. In fact, this conflict has escalated to such a point that, in mid-June 2020, the deadliest week for Afghan government forces in Afghanistan’s 19 years of conflict was recorded.

Alongside the multitude of issues which have arisen as a direct consequence of the Doha Deal’s signing, Afghanistan’s stabilization, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process, has been largely stunted by the Afghan state’s attempted resistance to the global COVID-19 pandemic. With over 34,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (14.07) and over 1000 deaths in Afghanistan alone, the resolution of the Doha Deal, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process as a whole has been largely inhibited by the national prioritization of a new kind of challenge for the Afghan state.

However, aside from this aforementioned environment, which presents an array of complex new challenges and concerns for the Afghan government, trepidation surrounding the potential negative consequences of the US withdrawal of troops has retained focus in the midst of this climate. These concerns have especially been raised in relation to the remaining presence of various violent-extremist groups in Afghanistan, particularly Al-Qaeda. It has been argued that, without the support and presence of US troops, Afghanistan is vulnerable to both continued attacks from the Taliban itself and from the other aforementioned violent-extremist groups.

This concern is also not entirely unfounded as, despite the fact that under the Doha Deal the Taliban agreed to not allow extremist groups (Al-Qaeda in particular) to operate in Taliban controlled areas, recent information suggests that the Taliban has not been working towards challenging the presence of such groups. Therefore, a scenario in which violent extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, will re-establish/strengthen their footholds throughout Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan following the US withdrawal of troops is not inconceivable. In fact, a recent United Nations report specifically warned of the remaining active links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to the report, “The Taliban regularly consulted with Al-Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered guarantees that it would honor their historical ties.”

This information, as presented by the UN, clearly states that the Taliban is failing to fulfill this particular component of the peace deal, as they have seemingly failed to sever their bonds with Al-Qaeda. This perhaps consequently suggests that, upon acknowledging this continued relationship between the Taliban and violent extremist groups, the US will consider halting the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan until the Taliban has evidently severed such relationships, which would subsequently also fulfil one of the Taliban’s key commitments to the Doha Deal.

However, the decision of the US in this case not only depends on the actions of the Taliban, but also on US domestic interests. Some US officials are concerned that, regardless of the shortcomings of the Taliban in absolutely fulfilling their agreed upon components of the Doha Deal, all US troops are going to be withdrawn before the US presidential election in November 2020. This is a direct consequence of statements made by President Trump during his 2016 election campaign and throughout his ongoing 4-year administration, in which a full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, prior to the on-coming 2020 presidential election, was promised.

Although these aforementioned challenges are obstructing progression of the Afghan Peace Process, there is hope for the change which the long-awaited intra-Afghan talks may bring for the dynamics of the implementation of the overarching peace deal. However, due to the interdependent nature upon which each of the constitutive parties’ commitments rely, it can be reasoned that until a greater degree of dedication to satisfying key components of the Doha Deal from each party is established, the intra-Afghan talks may fail to bring the long-awaited constructive solutions which they are hoped to result in.

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 by Cameron Hoffman

Could US Retaliation for ISIL Strike Influence Afghan Peace Talks?

On April 9, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant -Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) claimed responsibility for rocket strikes on an important United States airbase. The strikes resulted in zero casualties, but have the potential to spark retaliation from the US while it negotiates troop withdrawl as part of their deal with the Taliban. This could derail already fragile negotiations.

ISIL-KP has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks targeting the Taliban, Afghan citizens, and the US-backed Afghan government in the past few years. Though they control little territory, their strength has been assessed at approximately 2,000 fighters limited to North-East Afghanistan. Stalled peace talks and the recent prisoner release debacle offer ISIL-KP a window of opportunity and indicate why the group chose to strike now — nearly six months since its last claimed major attack. Simply put, ISIL-KP is trying to disrupt the peace talks to keep the US in Afghanistan.

Terrorist groups like ISIL-KP thrive on instability and chaos as they develop in the shadows of larger players and conflicts. These groups utilize destruction and economic disparity to increase their numbers and influence. However, if the US leaves Afghanistan, ISIL-KP lose the cover of the US-Taliban conflict to hide their actions.

The Taliban can focus on dismantling smaller insurgent and terrorist organizations as a consolidation of power in the case that the US leaves Afghanistan. ISIL-KP is not an exception to this rule as they are unable to match the strength of the Taliban. Therefore, it is assumed that the ISIL-KP attack was an attempt to keep the US in the region by destabilizing the peace talks.

If the Taliban and the US continue to fight each other — in the battlefield or the negotiation table — then ISIL-KP survival is expected. It is very likely that violent attacks of some kind will continue because deterioration of the peace talks is crucial to the longevity of ISIL-KP. Now is not the time for the US to be sidetracked and fall into a trap set by ISIL-KP.

Any strikes in Afghanistan can be used as pretext for the Taliban to retaliate as well as lose whatever little trust they have in the US. The Taliban could pull out of the already fragile negotiations and this is not something the US can risk. Too much is at stake and too much can go wrong.

In order to demonstrate that the US will keep its troop withdrawal commitments, now is not the time to retaliate against ISIL-KP. Energy must be focused toward the present negotiations and building trust with the Taliban. The strike on the US airbase may be cause for concern, but it cannot be a distraction from the mission at hand: leaving Afghanistan.

– Cameron Hoffman

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 by Jack Ryan

Afghanistan in 2020: Secrets and Negotiated Peace

The recent agreement between the United States and the Taliban is a significant political development that will undoubtedly shape the future of the country, the region and relations with external stakeholders. However, cracks in the pact began to show only days after its signing.

Retired US Army colonel and former member of the National Security Council, Jeff McCausland, correctly pointed out that, “American troops have been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly as long as direct US involvement in World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam combined.” Further, he noted that the Marines sent to Afghanistan recently were not even born on September 11, 2001.

The withdrawal of forces is integral to a successful reelection for President Trump, but this is a difficult task. It is important that the US leaves an impression that they left Afghanistan a better place, but at the same time, in the words of Donald Trump, “Eventually countries have to take care of themselves, (America) can’t be there for another 20 years.”

Afghans are tired of the prolonged conflict; however, fear is ingrained in those who lived through Taliban rule, especially the growing population of women. They still support a US presence in the region and lack faith in their own military capabilities. A poll recently conducted by Rise to Peace found that the majority of respondents support US presence. Thus, there is a growing distance between Afghans who wish for continued US presence and an impatient US government that hopes to bring its troops home as soon as possible.

On the subject of this divide, mounting criticism from many fronts continues to grow against two classified annexes within the US-Taliban agreement. All this occurs while the Afghan government attempts to understand their place in the Afghan peace process and the US public come to terms with the content of the ‘Afghanistan Papers’. This exposé may have been hidden by a media storm focused on other aspects of controversy within US leadership, but criticism of the secret annexes within the US-Taliban peace agreement have not had the same fortune.

It is alleged that the annexes remain secret so that information is not shared with other insurgencies, such as the Islamic State, who claimed responsibility for a recent attack that left 32 dead in Kabul. However, critics believe that annexes give “Trump, or his successor, enormous latitude to simply declare that the war is over and leave.”

The Taliban stand to benefit significantly from US troop withdrawal. Survival of the organization certainly took a hit due to US operations, but a growing divide exists between commanders and foot soldiers too. For instance, Taliban fighters circulated messages of jubilation on messaging application WhatsApp during the early — and unsuccessful — days of US-Taliban negotiations. Junior soldiers believed that peace had been achieved whilst senior leaders knew that they were no closer to signing a peace agreement. The lack of top-down communication was abundantly clear.

The United States continues to spend a substantial amount of money in Afghanistan — approximately $2 trillion US with inflation considered. For context, with inflation considered, this surpasses US spending allocated in the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe in the post-war years. The Taliban can only match these economic and military initiatives for so long, therefore, it is difficult to predict whether the organization or US public opinion over the war in Afghanistan falters first. Thus, these negotiations serve both sides well.

Serious questions remain: will the already fractured agreement bring lasting peace to Afghanistan? Will the early months of 2020 be remembered similarly to the ceasefire of 2018, a short-lived flutter of hope? If there is one certainty in this agreement it is that the American interests and the Afghan government face an enormous obstacle. As an organization, the Taliban cannot be held responsible for individual actions and attacks. So where does the US draw the line? How will the Afghan government establish itself as a strong counterforce to the Taliban without US support?

Answers can be found in how the US withdraws its troops. In order to fulfill their end of the deal, the US must remove its forces and ensure that the Taliban make good on their promises. At the same time, the US will need to maintain readiness to provide support (financially and militarily) for the Afghan government as they prepare to contend for power with an organization that has survived close to nineteen years of sustained US military operations.

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