United States

 by Meghan Rahill

Why The United States Needs to Reform Counter-Terrorism Efforts on the Home Front

Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, many believe that the biggest threat to the United States is from foreign jihadists.  Media outlets constantly associate terrorism with foreign jihadist organizations such as ISIL or Al-Qaeda; however, they fail to give adequate attention or coverage to extremist incidents that occur directly on our own soil.

Today, the largest threat facing the United States does not comes from foreign jihadist extremists.  Instead, the largest threat to the United States appears to be the rapidly growing threat of domestic violent extremism. Domestic extremism includes homegrown radical Islamist terrorism, right- and left-wing extremism, white supremacist and neo-Nazi extremism, and more.  The domestic extremism threat facing our nation today has essentially evolved over time into two major issues that have gone unaddressed by policy makers. First, overseas terrorist organizations have become increasingly adaptable and now use online platforms to recruit vulnerable individuals across the country in order to incite violence.  Second, the rise in hate crimes and right-wing extremist events over the past decade has occurred at an alarming rate, and has been disregarded by many public officials and policy makers.

The Recruitment of Jihadi-Motivated Extremists in the US

With the availability of new technologies, foreign terrorist organizations no longer need to infiltrate foreign states to attempt attacks of their own.  Now, organizations have the capability to recruit, motivate, and initiate attacks online with false messages and propaganda. The rise in Islamophobia has led many to believe that individuals who have conducted such lone-wolf attacks are Muslim or Arab. However, this has not always been the case.  According to a study by the RAND Corporation, “the historic stereotype that Muslim, Arab, immigrant males are most vulnerable to extremism is not true to today.  Today, recruits in the United States are more likely to be white, black, younger, uneducated, and born citizens.”  New America’s study on Terrorism After September 11th explains how since 2001, the number of domestic jihadist terrorism cases

has risen dramatically, from only two individuals being charged in 2001 to a record high of eighty being charged in 2015.  The study also reiterates the trend that the majority of the individuals being charged with a lethal extremist attack have been American-born citizens; in fact, according to the study, eighty-five percent of individuals charged with a lethal attack in the United States have been citizens or legal residents.  Of this percentage, a majority (two hundred and twenty nine) of terrorism cases have involved American-born citizens. Ninety-nine of the cases have involved naturalized citizens, and fifty-five of the cases have involved permanent residents.  Only five cases have involved illegal immigrants, nineteen cases involved refugees or asylum seekers, and twenty-five cases involved non-residents of unknown status. The majority of domestic terrorists are now everyday American citizens and residents who have been inspired by the jihadist movement abroad to take action against the secular West.  As Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric who joined Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, famously stated, jihad today has become “American as Apple Pie.”

The Rise of Right-Wing Extremism

Jihadi-extremism, while mainly homegrown, now makes up only a small portion of the attacks occurring on American soil.  Throughout the last decade, right-wing extremist attacks have risen at an alarming rate.  Right-wing extremism includes white supremacy, anti-government extremism, and single-issue movements such as anti-abortion, anti-immigration, and anti-Muslim extremism. While the United States has remained focused on the danger posed by jihadi extremism, there has been a “glaring blind spot” towards the changing dynamic and magnitude of threats facing the United States.  According to statistics from the Anti-Defamation League, between 2009 and 2018, 73.3 percent of domestic extremism incidents in the United States were due to right-wing extremism, while only 23.4 percent of incidents were due to jihadist extremism and 3.2 percent were due to left-wing extremism.  Furthermore, the rate at which the incidents are increasing is dangerously rapid.  In 2018, of the 50 extremist-related murders that occurred, right-wing extremists caused almost all incidents.  In fact, right-wing extremists caused 98 percent of the incidents, while only 2 percent of the incidents were caused by domestic Islamic extremism.  According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, individuals targeted for the recruitment of right-wing terrorism are often one of three categories: “frustrated and angry youth looking for solutions to their problems; individuals looking for intimate relationships outside of their families; and younger adolescents who typically lacked maturity and may have been unable to fully comprehend the ramifications of the groups radical ideology.”

Policy Recommendations

  1. Politicians and policy makers need to make reducing domestic extremism a national security priority.

Domestic extremism needs to be recognized as a major threat.  In the past decade, it has largely been ignored and pushed aside by policy makers and politicians, who have been putting a disproportionate amount of attention on the foreign threat of jihadi terrorism.  Domestic terrorism needs to be made a federal crime by Congress.

  1. Seek to increase community awareness about the dangers of all forms of terrorist recruitment, especially in the populations that are deemed to be most vulnerable.

Community awareness programs should partner with the Department of Education in order to educate children, teachers, parents, and guardians about the dangers of terrorist recruitment.  The programs should specify the different types of extremism in the United States, the way groups attempt to recruit individuals, and the risks and consequences associated with being involved with such organizations.

  1. Promote anti-bias intercultural education and after-school programs in elementary and secondary schools.

Education can be the most proactive measure to counter youth radicalization.  With the average profile of radicalized individuals being young and uneducated, it is most important to promote educational programs in schools to counter the radicalization and recruitment of young individuals who feel frustrated, angry, and alone.  After-school programs should especially be promoted as a way to offer a sense of belonging, community, family, and purpose for individuals who are particularly vulnerable.

  1. Reframe the Countering-Violent Extremism Program, and reassess how to properly distribute CVE resources.

The CVE program does not just need a new name, it needs to be completely reframed.  As of right now, the program has been largely targeted at countering jihadi extremism in the United States, and has cut funding for programs that counter other forms of extremism.  Muslim communities have been targeted by the current CVE programs while young black, white and uneducated individuals have become more and more vulnerable to being recruited by different forms of domestic extremism.  Funding for grants and research needs to be expanded in order to combat all the different forms of extremism in the United States.

  1. Make an honest and prioritized effort to countering the ideology of hate.

The United States government must make countering hateful ideologies and extremist groups a top-priority. Politicians have continuously failed to punish right-wing extremist groups for their actions, sending a confusing message about what is constituted as terrorism and when it is considered acceptable to use such violence in the United States.   Continuously cutting funding for research grants and for countering right-wing extremism programs has also enabled such issues to escalate in the United States. To stop such incidents from occurring again, changes must be made.

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 by John Wilson

Developing a Law Enforcement Model for Countering Violent Extremism

Ever since the first police departments were formed in the 1800s, there has been continuous debate over the appropriate model of policing to address criminal behavior and activities. The criminal threat, combined with the demands of an ever changing society, drive this debate and dictate the desired model for law enforcement to pursue. In recent decades, the community-oriented policing model has become increasingly popular and many police forces have implemented elements of it into their procedures. Community oriented policing is believed by many to have the potential to deter some level of criminal behavior, prior to it ever happening. In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and The Global War on Terror, intelligence-led policing has received strong levels of attention as many desire to see a more direct approach to addressing serious criminal threats. While debate rages on over the appropriate model for local law enforcement to use, it is worthwhile to question whether a hybrid model would be impactful. This is particularly true when assessing how to properly address and counter violent extremism, which has underlying issues that encompass an array of psychological, sociological, and criminological aspects.

To start the discussion, a brief explanation of both community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing is required. Community oriented policing is a model of policing that emphasizes community problem solving through partnerships between the community and the local law enforcement agency. This usually is done in conjunction with a reorganization of the police force to diminish the barriers between the force and the local community.

Intelligence-led policing is based on both qualitative and quantitative data and intelligence, leading to directed police activities based on the evidence gathered. An example of this type of policing model would be to analyze data on burglaries in an area. Police can, with enough data collected, determine the time, days of the week, geographic tendencies, and method of entry used by the involved criminals. Forces can then make informed decisions and direct increased patrols during these times and in these areas in an effort to catch the criminals.

Countering violent extremism is related to countering terrorism, but is a distinct discipline. Countering violent extremism requires an understanding of the ideological, sociological, and psychological influences that lead individuals to develop extremist ideologies which leave them more likely to commit acts of violence.

By developing a comprehensive understanding of this process and the ideology itself, one can develop solutions to prevent the radicalization process, intervene in cases where the process has begun, or attempt to roll back the ideology of someone who has been radicalized. Punitive policing and criminal justice measures do little to prevent, intervene, or rehabilitate someone who has become radicalized or is vulnerable to radicalization; in fact, punitive approaches may make the situation worse.

Both models of policing mentioned above are accompanied by challenges unique to each one. For community oriented policing, law enforcement faces the struggle of a changing power dynamic as the community becomes increasingly involved. Further, especially when dealing with organized crime and even violent extremism, law enforcement must come to terms with working with former gang members or violent extremists in order to address the issues with the involved community.

In applying a hybrid policing model which blends community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing, public perception is critical. On the surface of the model, the focus must be on community-oriented policing as this is critical to develop ties with communities, particularly those which are marginalized. The model must present itself as a grassroots movement whose priority is helping the community, not developing criminal cases to be prosecuted. Once established, relationships with the community will serve as the primary source of methods to prevent the radicalization process from ever starting. Those cases in which the process begins, it will likely be the community members who first become aware of the trend in the individual or group towards extremism. This will allow for proper intervention, preferably led by the community members but in conjunction with local law enforcement. Local law enforcement must not treat these individuals as terrorists, as this may further develop a sense of marginalization in the individual.

In cases that are further along in the radicalization process, these community relationships will also foster intelligence collection efforts for law enforcement. A community that feels valued and important is much more likely to provide information to local police services. Through this intelligence, police can direct strategies to monitor individuals or groups. These strategies must involve other applicable jurisdictions and there must be adequate dissemination of intelligence products to all agencies involved.

However, law enforcement should be careful during this process. Overt surveillance may lead the community as a whole to feel as if the police are working against them. Another area of concern is that once intelligence is developed about an individual or group, strict protocols must be implemented and followed to ensure complete privacy rights of the individual. Being labeled as a ‘terrorist’ before one is even confirmed to be an extremist may lead further marginalization and eventually to full-on extremism.

This hybrid model is meant to be implemented by state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. For this reason, it is highly dependent upon support from state policymakers who understand the strategy and support it to their utmost ability. While this discussion was a very simplistic and brief explanation of the reasoning for, and basic procedures of, this type of hybrid model, it serves as introductory post towards implementing this model of policing.

 

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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 by John Wilson

Strategies for Countering Neo-Nazi Radicalization

American members of the National Socialist Movement. Source: Southern Poverty Law Center.

Decades after the end of World War II, Nazism continues to incite hatred and divide the globe. Thousands have been radicalized into what is now deemed neo-Nazi ideology from dozens of countries across the world. Although the phenomenon of neo-Nazism is well documented, research has yet to establish a common profile of those deemed vulnerable to its recruitment. Several have attempted to establish a potential profile; however, the American cases that have been studied stem from vastly different backgrounds, and their diversity is too difficult to account for with any one theory.

Though the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks stemming solely from neo-Nazi groups is relatively low, such groups present a unique threat. Neo-Nazi groups tend to be embedded with other racist extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and other anti-Semitic groups. Fringe members of these groups present an often-undetectable lone wolf threat which is extremely difficult for law enforcement to counter. Neo-Nazi groups are also often associated with the trafficking of narcotics and prostitution, potentially leading to a large indirect cost on society.

In discussing neo-Nazi radicalization, former neo-Nazi Christian Picciolini has a unique take on the process. Picciolini, who become radicalized into neo-Nazi ideology after attending a gathering of a skinhead group at 14 years old, has since deradicalized and now works to help others do the same. But Picciolini does not attribute neo-Nazi radicalization to an ideology at all. In an informative interview, Picciolini stated that “I can tell you that every single person that I recruited or that was recruited around the same time that I did, up to now, up to what we’re seeing today, is recruited through vulnerabilities and not through ideology”. The vulnerabilities mentioned in the interview stem from both real and perceived grievances, felt by some youths as they grow and learn about the world and their place in it. Like so many youths searching for answers to their anger and frustrations, Picciolini found answers amongst neo-Nazi propaganda. Unfortunately there was not a counter narrative strategy in place to address the statements presented to him.

Exploiting vulnerabilities is a normal gang recruitment strategy. Many neo-Nazis are recruited while in prison, and the process is similar to other gang recruitment methodologies. However, neo-Nazi gangs are distinct in their provision of a more thorough ideological base for those who they radicalize. Further, the agenda of neo-Nazism is the creation of a Fourth Reich, which obviously goes far beyond the belief system associated with a typical street gang. Because of the hybrid nature of the radicalization process between extremist group and street gang that is observed within neo-Nazism, a hybrid approach to deradicalization and a hybrid counter-narrative strategy is needed.

Law enforcement’s response to neo-Nazi groups has begun to change in recent years. Whereas for a long time neo-Nazi groups and skin heads were often associated with the punk rock scene and were considered kids acting out their frustrations, now they are being considered legitimate concerns for homeland security.

Though they may pose a significant security concern, simply addressing neo-Nazi radicalization as a law enforcement matter does not properly address the underlying issues that cause some to become radicalized. In discussion about freedom of speech when it comes to hate speech and propaganda, experts suggest that education is the likely best route for countering extremism. An effective solution will couple education with a strategy in which local governments and communities adapt partnerships with organizations who have experience in deradicalization. One such organization and program is the Anti-Defamation League’s “A World of Difference” campaign, which uses mass media and education in schools to address bias, racism, anti-Semitism, and a variety of radicalization and extremist behaviors. Policy encouraging local communities to embrace programs mentioned above could potentially hold the key to severely disrupting recruitment efforts of the dozens of neo-Nazi groups operating in the United States.

 

John Patrick Wilson is an Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

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 by Jesse Morton

The Caliphate’s Returnees? From the Refugee Camps of Syria to bin Laden’s Grave

From 2003 to May 2011, I was a prominent Jihadi propagandist, the head of a New York City based organization that set the tone, template, and methodology for radicalization and online recruitment in the West.  It was the era of al-Qaeda, not ISIS. However, as the controversy continues over whether Hoda Muthana, the 24-year-old Yemeni-American who joined the so-called Islamic State and now sits in a refugee camp in North-Eastern Syria, should be returned to the United States, it seems to me that we ought to reflect on a bigger picture. We need to consider that in the Hoda Muthana situation, the true victor will be neither Donald Trump nor Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi; instead we should remember the ghost of Osama bin Laden, whose long-term strategy lives on.

Ms. Muthana was twenty years old in 2014, when she left her Alabama home and made her way to ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliphate.  As the terror group’s territorial control spread from Eastern Syria to Northern Iraq, a terrain the size of Britain, its propaganda became all the more powerful.  Osama bin Laden once claimed that “everyone follows the strong horse,” and at least two hundred and fifty Americans heeded ISIS’ call.

When she first arrived in Syria, Ms. Muthana tweeted a photo of her American passport. She wrote, “Bonfire soon; no need for this!” On Memorial Day in 2015, she called for attacks in New York City.  Now, like most who have survived the collapse of ISIS’ so-called caliphate, she claims that she is “deeply sorry” and wants to return. Yet, the Trump administration contends that her status as a citizen no longer applies.

Like other Western governments, it appears the Trump administration will attempt to deny the rights of those lingering in the refugee camps and prisons of northeastern Syria that should be afforded under international law.  Were I still a propagandist, such a circumstance would have given me fodder for weeks. Guantanamo Bay, Bagram, and Abu Ghraib were all cornerstones of our propaganda machine. ISIS targets Western civilians simply because they are non-Muslim, at least that is what an article in their English-language magazine suggested in 2015.  

I penned the lead article of the first English-language jihadi magazine in 2007. We were fighting the West, in part, because of the unequal application of the rule of law. This made it quite easy to claim that the ‘war on terror’ is actually a ‘war on Islam’. This narrative plants the seed that sprouted and went viral when Syria’s civil war became a front of bin Laden’s global insurgency.  As he described it, “the freedom and democracy that you call for is for yourself.”

The controversy surrounding Ms. Muthana’s return also highlights the danger of sustained height and domestic polarization, two prongs of bin Laden’s strategic plan.  In a 2004 speech directed at the American public, bin Laden explained, “All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note other than some benefits for their private corporations…” Does the weeklong controversy that a few women jihadis can stimulate not prove that this remains the case, that, while serious, the threat remains overblown?  The only difference is that it is no longer about waging war and wasting resources abroad, but about whether spending money to bring those that traveled abroad to join the terrorists may one day lead them to wage war on us at home. These are not indicators associated with success.

Also alarming is the polarizing nature of the debate.  The Trump Administration’s position largely has to do with a need to appeal to an anti-Islamic base. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, twenty-five percent of conservatives had unfavorable views of Muslims.  Today, most polling holds that rate at around sixty percent. Anti-Muslim sentiment serves a key-prong of the growing anti-establishment, right-wing sentiment that is sweeping throughout Western nations. In response, the mosqued American-Muslim community has allied with the Democratic Party.  Many left-leaning legislators have supported Ms. Muthana’s return. Nevertheless, around twenty-five percent of Democrats now hold unfavorable views of Muslims, more than conservatives on 9/11. A 2016 poll conducted by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that fifteen percent of Democrats thought Islam should be illegal.  All of this conjoins with bin Laden’s plan of inducing collapse from within.

For certain, bin Laden would not have supported ISIS.  Before he died, the godfather of global jihad had already distanced al-Qaeda from their Iraqi offshoots.  And by 2014, the so-called Islamic State was brandishing supporters of al-Qaeda as apostates. In turn, al-Qaeda ideologues warned ISIS that controlling territory would prove impossible.  They had already done so, unsuccessfully, in places like Somalia, Yemen, and Mali. They also warned against ISIS’ excessive zeal and wanton violence. Now, however, in the event that Ms. Muthana and others are not returned to their countries of origin, their expressions of regret will not prove a means of rejecting the notion of an Islamic State modeled on 7th Century norms.  Instead, they may serve as a means of rejuvenating al-Qaeda, proving their criticism of ISIS correct.  Already, pro-al-Qaeda Jihadi groups in Syria, numbering in the tens of thousands are running deradicalization camps for ISIS survivors and defectors.  These jihadists would be all too happy “liberate” women like Ms. Muthana, their children, and men from the refugee camps and prisons of northeastern Syria.  We might recall that ISIS itself was resurrected by way of a prison break at Camp Bucca in 2013.

These considerations are largely missing from the sensationalist debates.  In a similar scenario last week, a British woman, Shamina Begun, set off a jointed firestorm in the United Kingdom when she also asked for return from the same refugee camp.  In an interview, she defended her actions, but said she had not made propaganda, claiming, “I didn’t know what I was getting into when I left.” It is a common narrative. Last year, the story of a Canadian man, Abu Huzaifa, served as the focal points of a popular New York Times podcast produced by the intrepid reporter Rukmini Callimachi.  Hazaifa had returned to Canada after joining ISIS and admitted to carrying out executions in Syria.  Canada went into a frenzy when the government determined that they did not have enough evidence to charge him criminally.  To make matters worse, it seemed that he was not remorseful. Interviewing for that podcast, I described the three fundamental beliefs jihadi propagandists used in recruitment.  It was clear that Abu Huzaifa still held them, but I emphasized the need for patience. Deradicalization is a process, not an event. Often times, it is not unlike the ups and downs of recovery from addiction.  Soon thereafter the controversy subsided and most moved on to the next episode. Now, however, Abu Huzaifa is doing well and an intervention program has helped him turn things around. He is deradicalizing, denouncing some of the core beliefs of jihadism in general, and is re-identifying with the value of Western norms.  I remain hopeful that he will one day become a voice not unlike my own.

The world has changed a great deal since I was arrested outside a mosque in Casablanca in May of 2011.  Just days after the killing of Osama bin Laden, and weeks before my colleagues Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were killed in a drone strike in Yemen.  Many then proclaimed the beginning of the end on the war of terror. Yet today, almost eight years later, the landscape looks like perpetual war. At home, America is torn into two black-and-white political camps.  Polarization abounds. Nearly eighteen-years after September 11, 2001, we’re waging a war on violent extremism, at home and abroad.

Internationally, we are losing the ability to project liberal values.  We have become an object of resentment, particularly in the Middle East.  Overwhelming numbers of Arab youth now prefer the stability of authoritarianism to democracy.  More Sunnis in Iraq support ISIS-style sharia law than the governance of the Iraqi state. This, of course, is music to the ears of Bashar Al-Assad, Syria, Iran, Russia and China.  A new era of great-power rivalry has returned. Bin Laden’s war of attrition and policy of “bleeding to bankruptcy” does not seem an impossible feat. In fact, Osama’s son Hamza, the godfather’s prince, looks poised to wage his father’s jihad far into the future.

Yet, it is not too late.  To snatch victory from the jaws of unrecognized defeat, it is time to recognize that it is no longer merely about who the Islamic terrorists are, but about who we are, as well.  It is time we stop letting terrorists take us away from the principles that built the liberal world order. To start this transition, we should bring Ms. Muthana, her child, and others like them home.

Jesse Morton is a former extremist and founder of the Parallel Network.

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 by Kristyn Hartwyk

Afghanistan: What Does Peace with the Taliban Mean for Women?

Source: PRI (2016)

The United States and leaders of the Afghan Taliban are currently in the process of discussing peace talks and negotiations to end the 17 years of conflict. For many, this is a signal of hope that deadly violence and war will finally come to an end. For others, the peace talks have stimulated fear and uncertainty.

Her name is Laila Haidari. She is an Afghan woman, who owns and operates a rather unruly cafe in Kabul. Ms. Haidari is not your typical woman living in Afghanistan. In fact, she drives her own car, owns her own business, and chooses not to wear the required hijab.

The cafe she runs, “Taj Begum”, allows men and women to eat and drink together, even if they are not married. In addition, within the walls of her cafe, women can choose whether or not they dine wearing the hijab; a decision woman don’t typically have in Afghanistan.

Ms. Haidari is an example of an Afghan who isn’t completely convinced on the Taliban-U.S. peace process. Despite the progress of the talks, she insists the Taliban and their severe rulings are coming back. For Ms. Haidari and many other women living in Afghanistan, the peace talks have provoked fear and worry of what will happen in the aftermath of the withdrawal of western troops. Ms. Haidari states, “We are face to face with an ideology, not a group of people.” Ms. Haidari and the many other women in Afghanistan feel optimism at the possibility of peace, but they remain concerned at the distrust of what their lives and freedom will be like in the future.

When the Taliban seized the Afghan capital in 1996, life under the militants was brim, especially for women. The implementation of a brutal version of Sharia Law meant that women had very little to no independence or basic rights. They were forced to wear burkas, covering essentially every inch of their body.

Women of all ages were banned from schools and public life. Their lives were constantly under a magnifying glass. Everything they wore, everything they said, and everywhere they went was under supervision. Ultimately, it was the women in Afghanistan who paid the highest price under the Taliban and their government.

During the peace talks in Moscow, the Taliban seemed open to addressing the rights and concerns related to women. For example, the Taliban promised “that Islam guaranteed women’s rights to education and work”, but on the other hand, the Taliban also “attacked women’s rights activists for spreading immortality and indecency.”

These contradictory messages have given ammunition to the fears and concerns of women in Afghanistan that the Taliban is making false, empty promises to expedite the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, only to eventually regress to old laws and rules that severely affect the daily lives of Afghans.

The fact that the Afghan government and its citizens have been excluded from the peace process is frightening for them. Many women fear that a peace deal giving power to the Taliban will result in a war on women and their rights. All of these concerns only solidify the notion that Afghans, especially women, should have a seat at the negotiation table.

Without their presence, the likelihood that women’s basic rights will be forgotten is painfully high. Their biggest fear is that women and all the freedoms they have achieved will fall victim to the peace process.

Afghanistan has made tremendous progress over the past decade in terms of women’s rights, independence and quality of life. Today, there are young girls being educated in many disciplines and pursuing careers in medicine, government and education.

But still today, there are provinces within the country that impose barbaric laws and treatment of women and girls. This brutality and oppression cannot be ignored and there is still significant headway ahead. For Afghans, the time has come to rebuild their country and continue to move forward. Peace, stability and happiness are all things the people of Afghanistan yearn for, but peace in Afghanistan should never come at the cost of women and their rights.

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