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Khalid noor Taliban
 by Ahmad Mohibi

From Negotiations to the Front Line Fighting the Taliban: Hoping to End Their Fathers’ War

A Rise to Peace Exclusive interview with Khalid Noor, member of the Afghan negotiating team.

Afghan negotiator, Khalid Noor, has been fighting the Taliban alongside his father in northern Afghanistan, with the aim to reverse Taliban advances in Balkh Province. Noor’s diplomatic shift to the military is in response to the Taliban’s military attacks across Afghanistan gaining new territories while pushing back the Afghan security forces.

Driven by a sense of patriotism and a desire to see his country at peace, Khalid Noor believes resisting the Taliban is his duty, stating:

“(We have been trying to negotiate with them, but they would drag their feet). We have no other choice but to continue the fight, given that the Afghan government does not have the capabilities and human resources to fight everywhere.” Noor added: “We are still hopeful that negotiations and a political settlement are in the best interest of Afghanistan and that’s if the Taliban are willing to negotiate or fight. Our stand is clear, that negations are the path to peace and prefer talks over fighting.”

At just 25 years old, Khalid Noor was the youngest negotiator for the Afghan government in the Doha peace talks with the Taliban. The son of a legendary mujahideen commander, Ata Muhammad Noor, and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and George Mason University, he is capable of bridging the gap between Afghanistan’s traditional politics and its rising younger generation.

Khalid Noor
Khalid Noor, in military uniform, advancing toward a Taliban position, June 26, 2021. Source: Rise to Peace
Khalid noor Taliban
Khalid Noor, in military uniform, advancing toward a Taliban position with his father Ata Mohammad Noor, June 26, 2021. Photo: Noor's Public Relation

As negotiations stalled, the Afghan government with its fragmented leadership has failed to turn back Taliban offensives. Instead, instigating heavy casualties for Afghan forces and territory loss. The situation turned brutal for Afghans when President Biden announced troops withdrawal by September of this year. This ultimately furnished a psychological moral to the Taliban militants, leveraging their cause – the “defeat” of the “world’s super-power.” Whilst Afghan security forces were pushed back by the Taliban, a national mobilization or uprising forces started across Afghanistan. This gave hope, that the Taliban cannot succeed militarily.

Within days and weeks, thousands of Afghans like Khalid Noor, used their ancestors’ guns to defend their communities and loved ones from the Taliban. Among them, women and teenagers as young as 15, have been seen with Ak-47 and machine guns. Instead of returning to Doha, Noor and his two younger brothers, Tariq Noor and Suhaib Noor, opted to defend their home province.

Along with his father, Noor mobilized a militia that intends to retake districts captured by the Taliban. On June 27, we interviewed Khalid Noor regarding his activities on the ground.

Video: by https://www.facebook.com/dw.dari/

Noor stated that thousands of his uprising forces, comprised of the grassroots, are fighting to retake Kaldar, a small district near Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan. On June 27, Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported that a Taliban attack on a government checkpoint in Kaldar, forced 17 Afghan soldiers to retreat. This left the district in Taliban control. Only days later, with Noor’s forces on the front lines, the district governor’s office and police station were retaken by government forces.

Noor reports that the Taliban has engaged in little face-to-face combat. Instead, they have primarily focused on guerrilla tactics. This has included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as artillery strikes targeting local infrastructure.

“The next target will be Balkh district, which is near the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,” said Noor. Balkh, the capital of Mazar-e-Sharif, has been seized by the Taliban recently. However, Noor’s operation days later was a huge success.

The Taliban do not have strong grassroots support in northern Afghanistan, unlike other parts of the country. However, in the last decade, their support has grown. This is primarily due to the government’s inability to secure the region. During their regime in the 1990s, the Taliban left a dark chapter with bitter memories. This was due to their destructions and killings of thousands of people when they overran Mazar-e-Sharif. The majority of Noor’s forces are volunteers who are willing to fight and prevent another catastrophe.

While demanding, these district-by-district advances are slow and dangerous, but the only way for the uprising militias to retake Taliban-held territory with their limited resources.

In response to Taliban aggression, forces like Noor’s are rising across Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani has called on them to form a “united front” to support the Afghan security forces, but their efforts currently appear uncoordinated and localized. Ata Muhammad Noor recently presided over a meeting of the political parties in northern Afghanistan and was subsequently selected as head of the military council for National Mobilization.

Noor’s forces have been on the front lines against the Taliban for weeks now and yet have over 22 casualties; six killed and 16 wounded. “The first three of our soldiers martyred by IED and the rest including four of my own personnel guards died in face-to-face combat,” said Noor. 

But Noor understands the potentially harmful implications of an uncoordinated militia-led resistance. His father, during the 1990s, was party to the intra-mujahideen civil war that left Afghanistan in ruins and without a government after the Soviet withdrawal.

“It is very dangerous if we [Afghans] go back to the ‘90s. That’s why my father has been pushing the government to work together to control the public uprising forces to avoid any future crisis. (My father believes in consensus. He sees a united front and voice the only way forward; a front that will decide unitedly at this difficult moment),” said Khalid Noor.

It will be up to young Afghan leaders like Noor to ensure that Afghanistan progresses into the future without forgetting the important lessons of its past.

Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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 by Connor Bulgrin

Biden Has Shown An Economic Commitment to Afghanistan. Now, He Must Show a Diplomatic One

The fate of Dr. Mohammad Najibullah haunts contemporary discussions over the future of Afghanistan. In the spring of 1992, Najibullah’s government collapsed under the pressure of mujahideen forces. While the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan weakened his government, the cessation of Soviet aid flowing into the country marked the final nail in his coffin.

Since President Biden announced America’s intention to fully withdraw from Afghanistan by September 11th, observers have worriedly speculated whether or not Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, might meet the same fate as Najibullah. The American intelligence community has predicted that the Afghan government could fall in as soon as six months. Despite this bleak projection, Biden is committed to bringing American troops home.

Over the last few weeks, American soldiers have transferred major American bases in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. Americans have already departed Kandahar Airfield; Baghram Airfield is expected to be vacated in the coming days. Additionally, Biden plans to evacuate the military’s Afghan contractors from the country if they wish to leave, a move Ghani warns will damage morale among Afghan soldiers. Still, Biden insists that this withdrawal does not amount to an abandonment of Afghanistan.

Accompanying his decision to withdraw, Biden is providing $300 million in additional aid to the Afghan government. This aid appears to be the crux of his strategy for defending the Afghan government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has succinctly explained Biden’s policy: “As the United States begins withdrawing our troops, we will use our civilian and economic assistance to advance a just and durable peace for Afghanistan.”

Already, the folly of an aid-driven strategy is becoming apparent. Without American military support, Afghan security forces have been reluctant to put up a fight, abandoning dozens of military bases and police checkpoints across the country. According to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, 81 of Afghanistan’s 419 district centers are now under Taliban control. While the Taliban has thus far been unable to seize any provincial capitals, they have encircled the capital of Kunduz and appear to have momentum on their side. Beleaguered by corruption, ammunition shortages, and high casualty rates, the Afghan security forces have failed to put up adequate resistance.

Some representatives of the Afghan government have begun independently fighting the Taliban. In Mazar-i-Sharif, the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Abbas Ibrahimzada, has taken to arming his supporters. Many similar militias have sprung up across northern Afghanistan. Districts under Taliban siege lack not only supplies but national leadership. It will take more than foreign aid to hold the Taliban back. Biden must make a diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan, in addition to his economic one, if the “senseless violence” he detests is to end.

In a recent statement, Biden’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, affirmed that the U.S. will continue “providing diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance to support the Afghan people.” But the strength of America’s diplomatic commitment to Afghanistan remains unclear. Biden’s administration is likely to keep encouraging a resumption of the American-backed peace talks in Istanbul. While these talks can produce temporary ceasefires, they will never sustain a long-term peace without the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Most crucially Pakistan.

Biden’s administration has been reluctant to engage Pakistan. Biden has not even called Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, even though Ghani sees Pakistan as central to the Afghan conflict. Talking to American lawmakers last Friday, he reportedly remarked that “the Taliban is the hands, but Pakistan is the brains” of the insurgency.

Pakistan’s position toward the U.S. withdrawal has been ambivalent. Khan has been adamant that U.S. troops will “absolutely not” be permitted to conduct operations in Afghanistan from military bases in Pakistan. However, in a Washington Post op-ed, he stated that “Pakistan is ready to be a partner for peace in Afghanistan.” While Pakistan is unsupportive of the Afghan government and many American objectives in the region, Khan has repudiated the idea of a complete Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Despite its long history of interference in Afghan affairs and support for the Taliban, Pakistan has an interest in peace. It does not want to endure the potential spillover effects of a prolonged Afghan civil war, no longer constrained by the presence of American troops.

Biden could work to promote the common objectives of America and Pakistan. His reluctance to do so suggests a sense of apathy about Afghanistan. Or, alternatively, a desire to take a new tact with Pakistan, given its increasingly close relationship with China. Regardless, Biden clearly has priorities that rank higher for him than Afghanistan.

Biden’s policy toward Afghanistan suggests that he has adopted the same war-weariness as the American public. For this, he can hardly be blamed. For the duration of the war, policymakers have struggled to define the preferred outcomes of the American military presence in Afghanistan. Still, Biden must avoid the aimlessness of his predecessors. He must articulate a clear alternative vision for America’s policy toward Afghanistan that puts diplomacy first.

Biden’s recent statements on the Afghan peace process are a combination of boilerplate and platitudes. One can expect this from an administration that wishes to politely exit America’s “forever war” while morally saving face. Biden has insisted that “Afghans are going to have to decide their future,” but he knows they will not be able to. Instead, the country that most forcefully devotes its resources to dominating Afghanistan will determine the country’s future. Biden seems reluctant to challenge this status quo, but he could.

A diplomatic solution to the war in Afghanistan is possible, but it would require multiple tracks of diplomacy. Biden cannot only rely on reviving the multilateral Istanbul talks. He must unilaterally engage with the key players in Afghanistan: Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Biden does not appear interested in unilateral engagement, but he should be. It could help promote a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It could also help Biden build necessary diplomatic relationships for his upcoming focus on the rise of China.

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 by Rise to Peace

What We Can Learn About the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan in Anticipation of the U.S Troops Withdrawal

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, signaling the end of a nearly decade of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of a period of uncertainty.

As in 1989, the upcoming U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan on September 11, 2021, fosters much of the same uncertainty concerning the competence of the Afghan security forces and their ability to prevent the Ghani government from collapsing. According to U.S intelligence assessments, this may be as soon as six months after U.S withdrawal. Like their predecessors, the Afghan security forces and their foreign supporters will experience similar challenges.

In the aftermath of the Soviet force withdrawal, the Afghan security forces continued to be fully dependent on the USSR. The USSR continued supporting the security forces with advisors, ammunition, fuel, and funds. Furthermore, with the main raison d’être that unified all Mujahideen factions together, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan disappeared. Soviet agents managed to leverage those tensions and reach agreements with different factions to support the security forces.

Whilst security forces were successful in holding off Mujahedeen for three years, the dependence of the Najibullah government on Soviet support eventually led to its demise. Consequently, the government collapsed shortly after Soviet support ceased. This demonstrated the failure of the USSR to develop an Afghan security force that could sustain a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan. In part, failure is a product of the USSR and the Afghan government’s inability to develop a functioning Afghan state.

The security structures implemented by the Soviets in Afghanistan raised public distrust, which were frequently prone to corruption and bureaucracy. Consequently, many structures established by the Soviets collapsed shortly after their withdrawal. Others, such as the interior ministry structure, survived, however, they became components of militias, receiving orders from strongmen.

KhAD, the government’s intelligence agency, was the most successful and effective of the security forces. Consequently, the government was heavily dependent upon KhAD for regime survival. Nevertheless, even KhAD couldn’t prevent the government’s collapse.

One might question, whether the security structures implemented by the Soviets were appropriate for the mission they were designed to accomplish. As effectiveness is not merely a measure of the number of arms or quality of forces but rather of mission compatibility, some believe the answer is probably not.

Currently, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are supported by international funds and substantial U.S. support. However, the ANDSF is undermined by lack of capacity, corruption, factorization, high casualty levels, poor intelligence, lack of willingness to launch offensive actions, and more. Consequently, the government heavily relies upon the Afghan Special Security Forces, its most competent force. The central government’s control of the country continues to erode as the Taliban captures more territories and local warlords assemble militias to confront the Taliban.

The U.S. has poured more than $70 billion in weapons, equipment, and training into the Afghan security forces. Yet, the competence of these forces to survive a massive Taliban offensive post-U.S. and NATO withdrawal is unclear. All of the above, resemble the challenges the Afghan security forces experienced following the Soviet withdrawal. The U.S should honestly and openly ask itself if the current ANDSF structure is the right one for the mission. As in 1989, the answer is probably not. The recent Taliban successes and territorial gains strengthen that assertion.

In anticipation of September 11, the U.S and Ghani governments should work together to reform the ANDSF. A framework should be considered to confront the challenges that the Afghan security forces will face, post-U.S withdrawal. The collapse of the ANDSF will raise the probability of President Ghani sharing a similar fate to former President Najibullah, scenes that nobody wishes to witness again. Furthermore, it will plunge this war-turn country into further chaos. This may result in renewed terrorist threats to the U.S and its allies.

By learning from the Soviet withdrawal experience, the U.S could structure and prepare the ANDSF in such a way, that they could effectively and independently sustain peace and regime stability in Afghanistan.

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 by Sydney Neuman

The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Park Bombing and it’s Influence on the 2021 Olympic Games

With the 2021 Summer Olympics less than a month away, there remains a lot of hesitancy from athletes, governments, and fans as many countries are still suffering from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Security officials will have their hands full this year not only worrying about the looming presence of the global pandemic but the major security issues they deal with every year to keep the athletes and the thousands of fans that pack into these facilities safe. 

Unfortunately, the Olympics, intended to demonstrate international solidarity, has always attracted the attention of terrorist organizations and individuals, who view them as an opportunity to turn the attention to economic, politics and social issues between countries. 

The Centennial Olympic Park bombing in 1996 came as a shock to the world when a 40-pound pipe bomb, equipped with nails and screws, exploded at the outdoor venue in Atlanta, Georgia. In the early hours of July 27th, around 1:00 in the morning, there was an anonymous 911 call claiming “there is a bomb in Centennial Park. You have 30 minutes.” As police began to clear fans out of the park, hundreds of people remained blissfully unaware of the potential risk as they were still gathered in the park celebrating the games.

A short 25 minutes after the call, before they could clear everyone out of the park area, the homemade bomb exploded killing one and injuring at least 111 people. 11 people were hospitalized and a majority of the others who were wounded suffered from shock and minor wounds. President at the time, Bill Clinton, denounced the bombings as “an evil act of terror” and vowed to punish those responsible. 

Immediately following the explosion, the only person in custody for the incident was Richard Jewell, the security guard who discovered the backpack containing the explosive device.  Originally deemed as a hero, Jewell was quickly vilified. He denied any role in the bombing but was not cleared as a suspect until three months later in October 1996. 

Former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Louis Freeh, stated that “within the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Program, there is no higher priority than the capture of Eric Robert Rudolph.” It wasn’t until 1998 when the FBI captured and arrested 32-year-old, North Carolina native, Eric Rudolph, in connection with the bombing as well as others during this time. This bombing was the first of four acts of domestic terrorism committed by Rudolph. When he was arrested, he was charged for the Olympic Park bombing, bombings in an Atlanta health clinic and a nightclub as well as an explosion at a women’s clinic in Alabama. 

In a special statement to congress about “the Lessons Learned from Security at the Past Olympic Games” then Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, said, “the after-action reports we received from Atlanta, and the lessons that were passed on to us by the public safety community indicated that many of the problems in Atlanta reflected how slow we were as a nation to begin to recognize that terrorism was becoming a security issue inside the United States.” 

This attack at the 1996 Olympics was the second deadly incident that has taken place at the Olympic games. At the 1972 Summer Games in Munich, Germany, nine Israeli athletes were taken hostage and killed by Palestinian terrorists. However, since there were no major security incidents following the events of 1972, not many of the security protocols were changed until after the attack in Atlanta. While safety planning and implementation still varies from country to country, there were many operational lessons that have become a standard in the following years. 

One of the biggest improvements made to the functionality of the Olympic Games was the communication and coordination between the local law enforcement and the organizing committee, which can be difficult to maintain due to the public/private sector partnership. Without this alliance, there is no clear command structure often causing many issues.

The Olympic Organizing Committee must work hand in hand with government officials at state, and local levels to ensure public safety during the games. From the strategic layouts of the venues to athlete transportation, every detail is planned out along with contingency plans in place in the case of a security threat. Another precaution taken was much stricter background checks on the 40,000 employees and volunteers at the games.

Terrorism, natural disasters, and public disorder are constant security threats no matter the games’ location. However, there are unique local security risks that also pose threats to the safety of the games. Especially relevant to this year’s Olympics, public health precautions were put into place following the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan when a small outbreak of the flu affected almost one million people who had attended the games.

The Olympic games have been canceled for 2 reasons: world wars and COVID-19. This shows just how seriously the International Olympic Committee takes the safety and security of all attendees at the games and this year will be no different. 

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Reciprocal Radicalisation – What Is It And How Do We Fight It?

With the tragic deaths of five and injury to over 150 people during the storming of the Capitol Building, ISIL propaganda channels became predictably awash with posts hailing the crowds as “great symbolism”. 

The Capitol Insurrection provided us with a recent reminder of the need to explore reciprocating narratives between extremists of differing ideology. Whether Islamist as in the example above or between the predominantly domestic movements of far-right and far-left groups, and how these narratives can aid one another, allowing us to better understand how to counter the threat.

Definitions

Reciprocal radicalisation refers to the purported reliance of terrorist organisations upon one another, sharing and feeding in narratives. According to the organisation CREST, based in Lancaster, U.K., the concept emerged initially during analysis of the 2001 Race Riots in England, and further embedded following the establishment of the EDL, a far-right Islamophobic movement. The EDL itself had formed in response to controversial protests by Ahle Sunnah al Jamah, an Islamist offshoot publicly opposing parades for soldiers returning from Iraq. 

Similarly, when the Finsbury Park Mosque was targeted in June 2017, the perpetrator shouted “this is for London Bridge”, referencing an attack that occurred three weeks prior. The resulting investigation found he was directly influenced by far-right material which called for retribution for those prior attacks. This is where the crux of the argument for drawing parallels presents itself; whilst a range of terrorising motives may exist mutually exclusive in terms of their ideological background, they often share in the modus operandi of their actions, to cause and sow division.

Challenges

Widely understood amongst academia, the term has held less recognition within political circles where support for counterterrorism policy can often fall along partisan lines, rather than out of altruistic concern for best practice. Critique has been applied to the extent to which these acts are linked, viewing a natural source of conflict between extremists of differing motivations rather than any premeditated or implicit interoperation. Supporters argue such analysis is valuable beyond the actual acts of terror, in assessing a movement or individual’s propensity towards violence – thereby evaluating the ‘powder-keg’ type incidents which do not necessarily constitute attacks, but which may be utilised to further radicalise those involved.

Whilst a reluctance to empirically adopt such processes as the norm is understandable, there are strong denominators which explain why such prevalence is apparent. After the Christchurch attacks, ASPI argued there were a number of pervasive, “eerie similarities” in the perpetrator’s far-right manifesto with Jihadist propaganda preceding and following the attack. These include the terrorists portraying their actions as a defence mechanism against ‘foreign invaders’, seeking revenge for previous attacks (further continuing the spiral of violence) and an apparent ‘restoration of glory’, drawing on historical narratives of conflict between East and West and a wish to preserve the status quo ante. Hence where the far-right position themselves in opposition to immigration, Islamists view themselves at war with ‘infidels’ and external forces, whether non-believers or other Muslims who do not subscribe to their brand of fundamentalism.

Conclusions

The road towards committing acts of terrorism is influenced by a range of factors. Rather than spreading panic in the aftermath of attacks we need legislators to take stringent action and provide measured responses. We should look to those in a position of power to reassure communities, irrespective of personal opinion.

This duly applies to any in a position to do good, for it is only with cooperation and education on a much wider scale that we can hope to defeat terrorism. The truth is no single approach will ever work in preventing extremism or the dynamics underlining it, but by raising awareness of these issues and setting a firm example of how best to respond to terror, we can progress towards stymieing these movements from gaining further traction. 

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