Private Sector Domestic Intelligence

In relation to terrorism, domestic intelligence collection is relatively limited in scope due an absence of an agency or structure dedicated solely to domestic intelligence collection. While the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies participate in intelligence collection and analysis within the United States, it is largely case-based and limited to involved parties. To be clear, domestic intelligence collection does not include subjects discovered communicating with foreign nationals (in those cases, there is a structure to go through with FISA courts that will lead to further intelligence collection and analysis.)

A collaborative effort between non-government parties could address many of the issues found in using government entities to conduct domestic intelligence operations. Such an approach has a proven track record of success, as there is a long history of private companies being tasked with intelligence operations, even domestically, dating back to the very beginning of the United States.

There have been attempts to address flaws in intelligence collection and dissemination by the federal government. Notably, the establishment of Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces was intended to bridge the disconnect between federal law enforcement, the private sector, and state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. These groups have had debatable success, and there are many reports that private sector involvement in these groups is limited.

The objectives of domestic counter-terrorism intelligence collection are broad and seek to acquire data on a variety of activities, including:

  • Recruiting to extremist ideologies and groups
  • Acquiring funds and logistics
  • Training for terror operations
  • Detecting surveillance and reconnaissance
  • Planning of terror operations

Limiting the collection process to government entities, which have limited resources and limited scope of capabilities in domestic intelligence, leaves substantial gaps in which crucial intelligence may be missed. Indeed, there are several private intelligence companies as well as private research entities, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, that provide a significant amount of data on terrorism and extremism in the United States.
Another key area in which collaboration should be made is the inclusion of subject matter experts involved in numerous areas of American critical infrastructure, of which the vast majority is controlled and operated daily by the private sector.

However, when these groups work individually and do not cooperate, they often fail to close many of the gaps which exist in domestic intelligence.
This large pool of individuals and groups, ranging from non-profits to academic institutions, have created arguably the largest store of knowledge on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism- and yet it is not being fully utilized.

Establishing collaborative groups that unite academics, private companies, non-profits, and researchers could address the ‘explorative’ component of domestic intelligence collection and analysis. This element of intelligence seeks to develop more broad understandings of the threat picture facing the homeland, as well as collect data on individuals and groups involved in extremist ideologies which may lead to operational violence. Utilizing non-government entities to conduct intelligence could bring the technical strengths of the private sector, including innovation strengths and technology, to the forefront of the fight against terror.

The collaborative effort mentioned throughout this writing would work most effectively in collection and analysis of the vast open source data available, which comprises nearly 80% of useful intelligence. While there are brief collaborative efforts on research, the collaboration often occurs on specific, case-sensitive research studies about a specific topic- not long-term collaborations.

How can non-governmental entities be brought together to produce a unified intelligence product? A plausible strategy would be to first hold a conference or a series of conferences to bring together representatives of respected organizations from the disciplines discussed above, conducting meetings about logistical options for such a collaboration. An academic institution may be the strongest location to physically host such a collaboration due to its facilities, space, and readily accessible traditional sources of data. Furthermore, a strong online network in which research can be shared and collaboratively worked on with a clear system of dissemination must be established. All of this would develop a relatively substantial cost, however, and perhaps partial government funding would produce sufficient impetus to begin work on such a project.

The Mysterious Case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis

Mohamad Jamal Khweis while in Kurdish custody. Image Credit: Associated Press.

Few in Alexandria, Virginia, would have suspected that the man driving a bus for the elderly would travel halfway across the globe to join the Islamic State (IS) and wage violent jihad. But this is the case of Mohamad Jamal Khweis, who went by the kunya Abu Omar al-Amriki while living in the self-declared caliphate. While the story of Khweis can be compared in some ways to others, not much is known about the actual path of radicalization he took in the lead-up to joining the IS. Khweis consistently lied and changed his story throughout his capture, interrogation, and trial, forcing officials to play a guessing game. What is known about Khweis’ case is analyzed here.

Khweis grew up in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., graduating from Edison High School in Fairfax County in 2007. As the child of two Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, Khweis grew up attending mosque. However, according to his parents, he was not particularly religious growing up. After high school, Khweis got a job as a bus driver for the elderly and disabled. He drank and smoked cigarettes, not activities associated with a devout extremist.

However, something happened between 2007 and 2015. Khweis lied to family and friends in late 2015, a month after the IS attacks in Paris, when he began scheduling travel to Europe. In mid-December Khweis travelled to London before making several stops across Europe en route to Turkey. In Turkey, scheduled contact was made with an IS facilitator who directed him, along with several French would-be jihadists, across the Turkish border and into Syria.

Upon arrival in Raqqa, which was under IS control at the time, Khweis underwent religious training and began work doing miscellaneous household tasks for caliphate fighters. According to documents discovered by forces combating the IS, during this time, Khweis indicated that he was willing to become a martyr by utilizing himself as a suicide bomber for the caliphate.

After months of cooking, cleaning, and taking out the garbage, Khweis grew increasingly frustrated by his lack of military training. Throughout his time in the caliphate, Khweis was also routinely ill from consuming poor-quality drinking water. These factors, and possibly more, combined to make his frustrations unbearable. When Khweis was relocated to IS controlled territory in Tal Afar, Iraq, he made an “escape.”

Kurdish Peshmerga forces discovered Khweis walking alone, and after it was confirmed that he was not a suicide bomber, he was taken into custody. When Khweis was captured he carried several hundred dollars in Iraqi and Turkish currencies, three cell phones, and his Virginia driver’s license. At first, Khweis stated to his captors that he had been deceived by a female he met in Turkey into coming into Syria and essentially becoming a slave; however, this story quickly fell apart. Peshmerga forces were able to contact American authorities to inform them of Khweis’ presence, and he was quickly transferred to American custody. In American custody, Khweis changed his story over 15 times between intelligence interviews and criminal investigation interviews.

Even so, authorities obtained enough information to levy criminal charges. Lawyers representing Khweis argue that this was unfair, and that Khweis gave false information to investigators out of desperation to return to the United States. However, many indicators disprove this- including signs of remaining loyalties, such as Khweis’ refusal to identify or provide any information on Americans he knew who had also joined the IS. Throughout his criminal trial, Khweis again changed his story multiple times, at times even indicating that his time in the caliphate was a mistake made after a night partying in Turkey.

Extremist propaganda was discovered on Khweis’ cell phones after capture, but once again eluding to his own radicalization, Khweis stated that the propaganda was only on his devices because he was conducting research into life in Syria. It is unclear if he was radicalized by online propaganda like so many others. There has not been any mention of other radicalized individuals whom Khweis may have been in contact with in the United States. Ultimately, there is no strong evidence to suggest how Khweis fell towards extremist ideology.

Although a clear path towards radicalization cannot be observed due to Khweis’ lack of cooperation, some comparisons can be made to other cases of radicalization. First, Khweis was the child of Muslim immigrants, growing up in the United States in the wake of 9/11. This time challenged many young Muslims, leading many to seek answers about their identities. It was also a time which caused notable marginalization, or at the very least perceived marginalization, of Muslim communities in the United States.

Circumstantial evidence would suggest that Khweis was vulnerable to radicalization due to his perceived marginalized position in American society. As a child of Muslim immigrants in post-9/11 America, Khweis certainly grew up with various forces pressuring him and challenging his identity. While not much more can be properly guessed about what exactly occurred along Khweis’ journey, his uncooperative nature and refusal to provide information about other American jihadists belies the fact that he likely remains radicalized. Fortunately, his 20-year sentence for providing material support to the IS will provide critical time that may lead to more cooperation and insight into his beliefs and radicalization process.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and Research Fellow for Rise to Peace.

Countering Extremism in the Digital Age

Source: Rand Corporation (2016) 

The Global War on Terror has challenged Western conceptions of warfare. The days of clearly defined winners and losers amongst nation states, as seen in the world wars, are largely in the past.

Tomorrow’s winners and losers will be defined in much more blurred terms as ongoing battles of information and communication seek to win over the hearts and minds of people around the world.

The State Department has acknowledged that for any legitimate success to occur in the fight against terrorism, countering the propaganda of extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) is critical. While entering the fight in the war of information is a massive step in furthering counterterrorism efforts, the State Department has not yet taken the steps necessary to match the surging campaigns of extremist networks, particularly IS.

The State Department first officially began this type of counterterror operation with the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was active on social media, directly challenging IS profiles with counter-messaging while conducting various media campaigns such as ‘Think Again, Turn Away’.

Conceptually these were reasonable strategic maneuvers that attempted to challenge the cyber prominence of the IS’s media strategy as well as online recruitment efforts. However, what came to be considered tit-for-tat online trolling between low-level jihadists and the United States government likely emboldened and legitimized the IS.

The State Department would go on to restructure the CSCC, creating the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is also tasked with addressing social media activities of nation states such as Russia. The GEC however is experiencing similar issues in conjunction with reported limited staffing and funding.

The IS media strategy has often been simplified by Westerners in an effort to de-legitimize the IS as a whole. However, this has led to a fundamental separation between our understanding of the IS propaganda campaign and the means by which we counter it. In order to truly combat a propaganda campaign, its purpose, narrative and mission must be understood.

Once these elements are comprehensively understood, a counter-narrative strategy must be implemented rather than a counter-messaging strategy. A successful counter-narrative strategy must address issues to include factors that IS relies on to recruit vulnerable individuals to their ranks: desires for purpose and belonging. A counter-narrative campaign must also be inclusive of the Muslim faith, understand local cultural concerns, and be conducted in a way that does not appear to be dictated by the West.

The CSCC did re-post relevant material from news outlets in the Arabic world in an effort to appear more representative of local cultures, as opposed to speaking purely as an American source. Beyond the limited scope of the CSCC and GEC efforts, several governments now deny terror networks a platform to circulate their propaganda.

This strategy places pressure on social media platforms to promptly delete extremist content and profiles. This strategy does slow the spread of propaganda, but does not provide a counter-narrative to what these groups are using to recruit and draw sympathy.

The State Department’s GEC has implemented one significant upgrade from its predecessor: one of the GEC’s core competency areas, ‘partnerships’, has the GEC develop partnerships with organizations, religious leaders, and community leaders to help engage with those at risk of becoming radicalized or to help those who are already.

One recommendation for a counter-narrative strategy proposes that the narrative must portray the IS as manipulative and as a failure, as opposed to promoting the often-observed idea that the group is tremendously dangerous. Any successful counter-narrative campaigns must be directed towards specific sub-audiences of those vulnerable to radicalization or those radicalized who are vulnerable to being deradicalized.

The IS has been the latest international terror network to capitalize on the ease of using the internet to communicate propaganda. Terror networks have become adept at using the internet to accelerate the radicalization process, share ideals, and develop support networks across the globe, all while remaining largely uncontested by the governments of the world.

The State Department must conduct systematic changes in the near future if there is to be hope for success in this war of ideas.

First, the State Department must see an increase in staffing to properly manage the overwhelming load of work that comes with fighting international terror propaganda on the internet.

Second, incorporating community and religious leaders will be essential to foster an image that this is not a counter-narrative strategy dictated solely by the United States government.

Third, the GEC, in conjunction with these community and religious figures, must jointly develop the counter-narrative strategy.


John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional as well as a Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

Lessons from the KKK

KKK recruitment propaganda. Source: Link

Upstate New York experienced a unique threat to the safety of their community this year: attempted Ku Klux Klan (KKK) recruitment of their school children. Specifically, the United Northern & Southern Knights of the KKK, two specific sects of the Klan, printed propaganda and placed it into bags accompanying candy. These bags were then placed onto driveways of school children in the early morning hours in an effort to ensure that the children got the packages while exiting their homes for school.

Oneida County Sheriff Robert Maciol was careful to note that the recruitment effort was a form of protected free speech; however, any attempt to solicit acts of violence would be prosecuted. Upstate New York is not alone in experiencing Klan activity, despite the fact that many perceive the KKK as essentially defunct. As of 2017, 42 known Klan groups were active across almost two dozen states. Current estimates place the number of Klan members, or those sympathetic or open to their ideology, at around 3,000 people. However, blanket recruitment efforts such as those used in upstate New York are distinctly unsophisticated and rely on chance, because the propaganda will only work if it lands in the hands of a child vulnerable to the beliefs presented.

Interestingly, many members of the modern Klan have a mixed ideology of traditional Klan beliefs and neo-Nazi beliefs. In some cases, these mixed ideologies can weaken extremist groups as it makes their members’ loyalties much more complicated.

However, Ken Parker, a former leader in the Ku Klux Klan, is an example proving that full-fledged members of the Klan can change their ideological loyalties. Parker was recruited into the Klan after spending 11 years in the United States Navy, leaving the service during a terrible economic downturn. Parker was first driven to contact a local chapter of the Klan by programs on Netflix that looked at the history of the Klan and neo-Nazism. At first, according to Parker, he was uncomfortable with the anti-Semitic rhetoric of his newfound friends; even so, he fully radicalized within 6 months. Though he met his fiancée at a cross burning, Klansmen close to Parker disapproved of the relationship, leading Parker to renounce his position in the Klan and commit to being a neo-Nazi. After some time with the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement, Parker became friends with a Muslim filmmaker and renounced neo-Nazism altogether. Parker now spends his social time as an active member of a local church group.

What does Parker’s case tell us about those vulnerable to recruitment by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups? Their belief system is not as strong, nor is it as deeply rooted as other extremist ideologies. The identity associated with being a Klansman has perhaps become diluted, making for weaker loyalties. If Parker’s case is representative of even a moderate percentage of Klan recruitment, then the Klan is relying on recruiting individuals who are susceptible to recruitment from a wide variety of groups. Many of these individuals are high-risk to be recruited by a wide variety of organizations, whether they be extremist groups, cults, or street gangs. These high-risk individuals often are looking to belong, to be meaningful members of a group, and to find an ideology which explains their real or perceived problems. While this may be seen as beneficial for the Klan, in reality it fails to produce long-term members for the group.

Lack of sophisticated recruitment capability likely is representative of a disorganized organization. While it is repulsive to experience Klan recruitment efforts at all, attempts like the candy drive in upstate New York are an indicator that the Klan is not in a position of returning to the strength it once held. Local law enforcement should monitor such cases to look for solicitation of specific acts of violence or changes in sophistication of targeted recruitment efforts. A change in recruitment operations for the Klan likely will signal a change in the organization, towards a more decentralized structure or to a more rigid structure depending upon the direction the Klan attempts to take going forward.

 

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional and a Research Fellow with Rise to Peace.

How Minnesota is Attempting to Combat Radicalization

Abdifatah Ahmed, who travelled to join the Islamic State, posted this image on Facebook with the caption “The return of the khilaafa [caliphate] insha allah [God willing].” Image credit: Facebook.

In 2014, 18-year old Abdullahi Yusuf was about to travel internationally when he was stopped at the Minneapolis airport by FBI special agents. Yusuf was confronted by the special agents about his plans to travel to Syria and join the ranks of the Islamic State.

This encounter soon led to nine members of a loosely connected cell being arrested and charged after it was discovered that all of the men had planned to travel and join the declared caliphate. Pre-dating these arrests, several others linked to the nine young men through various community connections had already travelled to join ISIS.

All of these men were connected through the tight-knit community of Somali immigrants in the Minneapolis area. All of the men had been targeted for recruitment in person (at pick-up basketball games at a local mosque) as well as through social media. Abdifatah Ahmed, one of the men who had managed to travel to Syria and was killed fighting for the Islamic State, confirmed in messages to family members that he had begun to socialize with like-minded individuals at these recreational basketball games and was further radicalized by online recruitment.

Judge Michael J. Davis, who was tasked with overseeing the cases, could see that addressing the issue went far beyond the normal criminal justice system utilized in the United States. After thorough research into deradicalization programs across the globe, Judge Davis contacted Daniel Koehler of Germany to help establish a Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program. Koehler had previous experience in multiple countries, focusing much of his efforts on combating neo-Nazism.

Koehler’s method of deradicalization is unique, as it does not focus on theological re-education or debate. Instead, Koehler suggests that radicalized individuals experience ‘tunnel vision’ which affects how they view life’s problems and potential solutions. Gradually, they begin to believe that all of life’s problems can be solved through violent action- making them increasingly likely to commit terrorist acts.

Koehler believes the key to deradicalization is to introduce alternative, nonviolent solutions to life’s problems. Once a radicalized individual begins considering these options, then other ideas can be introduced to reduce the damage done by radicalization. For example, Koehler suggests introducing hobbies and passions from the individual’s life prior to radicalization. Once these are reintroduced, the individual should arrange contacts with other Muslims who are interested in these activities- ideally ones who are successful and well known.

Not every radicalized individual is eligible for participation in the program. Koehler has developed a psychological profile of individuals for whom he believes the program will be effective. These individuals exhibit specific traits such as being able to disassociate with group-think, and are able to recognize old hobbies and interests as enjoyable.

However, the program does have its limits. First, Koehler believes that each case needs a minimum of four mentors as well as a case coordinator. This staffing plan, while likely justified, is a budgetary concern for those attempting to spread similar programs to new states or cities. Second, the program is relatively new in the United States, resulting in a shortage of data about its successes and failures.

While the program sounds plausible in terms of potential success, gaining widespread acceptance will require supporting data. Third, there is not yet a solution in place to address an individual who begins to relapse into radicalization once they have completed the program.

The program’s staffing issues could potentially be eased by working with universities in the areas it is being implemented in.

These programs could utilize graduate students in the social sciences to ease budgetary restraints. Unfortunately, the lack of data can only be solved with additions of new data; this involves similar programs being spread and studied critically, and there is not much immediate action that can address this issue.

The program in Minnesota may be tested in the near future, as the FBI stated as recently as 2017 that there are multiple open investigations on individuals who want to join the Islamic State. Hopefully it proves a success.