United Nations

Latin American
 by Rise to Peace

The Bear in Latin America: Russian Influences in Latin American Countries

Recent events between Russia and Ukraine have highlighted the support that some Latin American countries express for Moscow, which will likely translate into a greater Russian presence in the region in the coming years.

However, Russian influence in the region goes far beyond the support of certain Latin American countries for Russia’s military actions, but rather is a much deeper cooperative relationship.

Support at the UN

During the last UN General Assembly, UN member states voted to pass a resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The resolution was passed with 141 votes in favor, five against, and 35 abstentions.

Although no Latin American country appears in the five votes against, their presence was notable among the abstentions. Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua abstained from voting. Venezuela could not participate in the vote since it is ineligible due to current debts with the UN.

The position of these Latin American countries reveals the existence of a pro-Russian Latin American bloc, whose members expressed their arguments before the UN General Assembly.

The Cuban ambassador to the UN pointed out “the determination” of the United States to advance under the NATO umbrella on the Russian borders.

The Nicaraguan ambassador affirmed that there is a “military siege” on Russia, while the Bolivian ambassador affirmed that the Western powers, through NATO, are jeopardizing the security and peace of other states.

The statements of the abstaining Latin American countries may be influenced by Russian actions across Latin America throughout the last few years.

Agreements Between Allies

Venezuela was unable to vote in the UN General Assembly, however, its support for Russia is evident. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and has said on multiple occasions that President Putin has his “full support.” Following the phone call, President Maduro tweeted an old photo of himself and President Putin shaking hands, and has blamed the conflict on the “destabilizing actions of NATO.”

The current Russia-Venezuela relationship has its beginnings since the government of Hugo Chavez, who made multiple deals with Russia on economic and military cooperation. These agreements have resulted in Russia sending hundreds of advisors, military experts, computer scientists, and intelligence officers to the Caribbean. Venezuela has extensive Russian-made military equipment, including Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters, missile defense systems and tanks.

In January 2022, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov threatened that he could “neither confirm nor rule out” the possibility of sending Russian troops to Venezuela and Cuba if the U.S. and Europe did not curtail their escalating military activities in Eastern Europe.

Russia has already sent Tupolev fighter jets and warships to Venezuela for military exercises on at least three separate occasions and the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA has a business branch in Moscow to process transactions.

With Cuba, their relationship with Russia has also been extensive and long-lasting.  Before the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was announced that Russia and Cuba will deepen ties and explore collaboration in transportation, energy, industry and banking.

The two countries have cooperated on economic and debt issues. In fact, Russia has agreed to postpone some Cuban debt payments until 2027, just days after the two countries announced they would deepen ties amid the growing crisis in Ukraine. The loans, worth $2.3 billion, helped finance Cuban investments in power generation, metals and transport infrastructure, according to a statement from the lower house, or Duma.

Additionally, Russia has sent humanitarian aid to the island, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, including a ship filled with medical aid to mitigate the impact of the virus.

In regard to Nicaragua, Russian aid has resulted in military cooperation, turning Nicaragua into one of the strongest military forces in Central America.   Nicaragua has received T-72 tanks, Yak-130 fighter trainers, An-26 transport aircraft, TIGR armored vehicles, ZU-23 antiaircraft systems, Mizrah patrol boats and Molina missile boats, among other systems.

Moreover, it was confirmed that Russia is considering expanding military cooperation with Nicaragua. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov announced that “for more than 40 years we have been providing technological and military support to [Nicaragua’s] Army, and we will continue to provide our support.”

The relations of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela with Russia are of such magnitude that Jon Piechowski, advisor to the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, stated that the impact of the sanctions on Russia will affect Latin America in the coming days due to their economic ties.

Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua are the core of the Latin American pro-Russian bloc. However, other countries in the region have strengthened their relations with Russia.

Such is the case of El Salvador, whose president, Nayib Bukele, has a trip scheduled for July to Russia, which may explain the abstention of the Central American country in the UN General Assembly. For some years now, Bukele’s government has sought rapprochement with Russia and China, which has caused the United States to express its concern.

As for Bolivia, ties with Russia have also strengthened in recent years.  In 2021, the Bolivian Foreign Minister visited the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The meeting resulted in the strengthening of their commercial ties and the exploitation of lithium and gas.

Finally, earlier this year, Argentine President Alberto Fernandez offered to make Argentina Russia’s “gateway to Latin America.” Another notable collaboration with Russia occurred when Argentina received the Sputnik V vaccine at the beginning of the pandemic. As expected, President Fernandez’s gesture was a concern for Washington D.C.

In regard to Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro visited the Kremlin before the Ukrainian conflict and noted that “President Putin is a person who seeks peace. And no one in the world is interested in a conflict.” President Putin praised Brazil as Russia’s main trading partner in Latin America. Both countries have strong diplomatic and economic relations, especially with fertilizer products.

Despite the actions of the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, their representatives at the UN did not abstain in the Assembly vote. However, it is likely that their relationship with Russia will continue to strengthen in the future.

Future Implications of Russian Influence in the Region

Relations between Russia and its allied countries will very likely continue and strengthen due to Russia’s current international isolation. The Latin American pro-Russian bloc and Russia need each other in order to stay afloat.

Cooperation between states will be reflected in increased economic ties, military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and political support in multilateral cooperation organizations.

However, the strengthening of relations between Latin American countries and Russia will be a continuous concern for NATO and those countries not aligned with Russia.

Latin America could become a zone of dispute if Russia increases its influence in the region.  NATO will also seek to strengthen its alliances with its Latin American regional allies, including in military cooperation.

For the time being, all that remains is to monitor the evolution of events and advise policy makers in the region to prepare for foreign governments attempting to insert themselves into regional affairs, in an effort to preserve peace and stability in Latin America.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Child Terrorism
 by Rise to Peace

An Overview of Child Terrorism in Syria

One crisis plaguing Syria is the issue and threat of child terrorism. Child terrorism is a reality many Syrian children must face by being born into a war-torn country. No human being is safe, no future is guaranteed, no child can live unscathed. Measures and organized efforts are flourishing and need to be supported and expanded internationally to address and combat child terrorism.

Child Terrorism and Children’s Rights

Terrorist groups are doing their best to teach children that America’s war on terrorism is an act of aggression. Children are particularly vulnerable to military conscription because they are easily manipulated and subjected to violence.

The Syrian Human Rights Network (SNHR) released its 10th annual report on the violation of the rights against Syrian children. According to a report, at least 29,661 children have been killed in Syria, and 5,036 children have been arrested or disappeared.

The Action Plan

U.S. relations with Syria began in 1944 and have since resulted in a long road of support and diplomatic correspondence. Syria has been included on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since its creation in 1979 due to its continued support of terrorism and terrorist groups, and its pursuit of weapons, missile programs and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Syria has continued its efforts to use and develop chemical weapons. Finally, Syria has continuously attempted to undermine U.S. and international efforts to stabilize Iraq and Syria.

Syria is exposed to legal sanctions, including export sanctions under the Syrian Liability Law, and are not eligible to support the U.S. or purchase U.S. military equipment. Following the outbreak of conflict in Syria in March 2011, a follow-up decree was issued against continued violence and human rights violations in Syria.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) signed an Action Plan with the United Nations to prevent the recruitment or use of children under the age of 18. Through the Action Plan, “the SDF commits to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, identify and separate boys and girls currently within its ranks, and put in place preventative, protection and disciplinary measures related to child recruitment.”

Ultimately, the United Nations dedicates an office to gathering information and reports on how and where children are affected by armed conflict. Additionally, the United Nations has identified six severe violations against children which include, “the recruitment and use of children; the killing and maiming of children; rape and other forms of sexual violence; abduction of children; attack on schools and hospitals; and the denial of humanitarian access.”

The New Child Rights Law

On August 15, 2021 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad introduced a new law, known as Law No. 21, which prohibits the trafficking of children, including child soldiers in Syria. Many organizations recruit children, including the Syrian government.

While the law appears to be an important step in the right direction, many groups, such as the Syrian Center for Accountability and Justice, are skeptical of the law’s actual ability to end the use of child soldiers by militants.

This new law was a crucial win for Syrian children that have been used as a tool and helping them avoid such dark and traumatizing experiences.

Outcomes

An urgent need for an effective solution to the root of the problem of child soldiers must be found. UNICEF is helping approximately 8,700 children released from military service around the world. These rehabilitation and poverty alleviation efforts enable the proper healing of trauma. UNICEF also provides special support to Syrian children through health care, education, and improved living conditions.

Overall, the Action Plan between Syria and the United Nations, as well as the new legislation for the prohibition of child trafficking are a few organized steps that will hopefully make a difference. A global effort is needed to establish peace in a war-torn country that has suffered a myriad of wounds for many years, and ultimately stop its use of child soldiers.

 

Katerina Rebecca Paraskeva, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Humanitarian Crisis
 by Rise to Peace

On the Brink of Collapse: Afghanistan’s Humanitarian Crisis

“A full blown humanitarian catastrophe looms,” said Martin Griffiths, the United Nations’ emergency aid coordinator, describing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan following the collapse of the country’s Western-backed government in August, 2021. “My message is urgent: Don’t shut the door on the people of Afghanistan.”

Five months after the Taliban seized power, Afghanistan is accelerating toward a full-scale humanitarian disaster, as famine, poverty, drought, civil unrest, and the impact of decades-long war, plunge the country into crisis.

In response to the looming calamity, the United Nations has launched its largest ever appeal for a single country, urging international donors to contribute more than $5 billion dollars in aid. However, many western governments, including the United States, share concerns that financial support would legitimize a violent Islamist-led government. Indeed, according to P. Michael McKinley, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, “any expanded assistance to Afghanistan risks the charge that it is consolidating the Taliban in power and weakening leverage to influence their behavior.”

As the Taliban tightens its hold on Afghanistan, enacting a reign of terror involving public executions, threats against journalists, and increasing restrictions on women’s freedoms, Western governments face a difficult choice. The escalating humanitarian crisis demands a response, but the United States remains undecided in its approach. All the while, the Afghan people continue to suffer, their country sliding ever closer to the brink of collapse.

Afghanistan on the Brink

When U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the country lost three quarters of its government budget and 40% of its GDP. The U.S. and its allies responded to the Taliban takeover with various economic sanctions, freezing $9 billion dollars in Afghan state assets overseas and cutting off the country’s access to the global financial system.

As the economic crisis deepens, three-quarters of Afghanistan’s 40 million people have been plunged into poverty and, according to the United Nations Development Programme, poverty could be near universal by mid-2022. The withdrawal of financial support has crippled the country’s ability to provide essential services, starving its cash-based economy of liquid funds and leaving public sector workers without wages.

Meanwhile, devastating droughts have destroyed crops across the country, exacerbating the country’s hunger crisis. Today, just 2% of Afghans have enough food, according to the World Food Program, and 8.7 million are on the brink of starvation. Indeed, without emergency support, Afghanistan faces the very real possibility of slipping into famine within the coming months.

Outbreaks of diarrhea, COVID-19, malaria, measles, and polio are pushing the country’s underfunded healthcare services to their breaking point. Medical staff, many of whom have gone unpaid for months, are experiencing major supply shortages, and Kabul’s COVID-19 treatment center, the only facility for the city’s four million inhabitants, has run short of the diesel fuel needed to produce oxygen for its patients. Further, according to a recent report by the International Rescue Committee, up to 90% of the country’s health centers could be shut down by the end of the year.

Engaging with the Crisis

After the collapse of Afghanistan’s Western-backed government, and the conclusion of the United States’ two-decades long mission to bring security and democracy to the country, it is not surprising that Washington is reluctant to engage with the crisis. Over $2 trillion dollars was spent on combating the Taliban insurgency, a military effort that cost the lives of over 2,000 American servicemen and women, and the U.S. is perturbed by the possibility that humanitarian support funds could strengthen the Taliban’s stature, or fall into the hands of the country’s new Islamist rulers.

However, even before the fall of Kabul, the United States consistently overrated it’s leverage over Afghan authorities. The Western-backed government, despite its complete dependence on U.S. aid, consistently snubbed Washington-led efforts to have the country adopt particular security, diplomatic, and anti-corruption strategies. Moreover, a failed Afghan state would be in no one’s interest, including the United States. Such a situation would cost millions of lives, inflame refugee flows, and transform the country into a state of civil strife and terrorist activity.

Already, the United States has made some attempts to expand the humanitarian exemptions from its sanctions, and has led efforts within the Security Council to relax U.N.-imposed economic restrictions. Nonetheless, mitigating the country’s looming humanitarian catastrophe requires broader international support.

Over the coming year, the United States and its partners must ensure that the country does not collapse. Emergency efforts must be undertaken to prevent famine and to keep essential services afloat. The entire Afghan population is imperiled by the country’s humanitarian crisis, including up to one million children threatened by famine. The child death toll alone could reach up to four times that sustained by the Afghan people during the entire U.S. occupation. The United States must act, in coordination with its partners, the United Nations, and key international stakeholders, to support on-the-ground humanitarian efforts to alleviate the crisis.

Indeed, these efforts will also serve U.S. interests, ending the upsurge in narcotics productions fueled by the country’s economic crisis, and encouraging Taliban cooperation, albeit likely tentative, in combatting the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State’s Afghan offshoot.

Moreover, whilst concerns that Western relief funds could land in the Taliban’s pockets are founded, the United Nations has emphasized its “direct delivery” approach to assisting humanitarian operations, and recent moves by the U.N. Security Council exempting humanitarian support from sanctions has improved aid delivery. Nonetheless, the United States must remain steadfast in ensuring that all humanitarian support reaches the Afghan people.

Beyond 2022

Forecasting beyond the coming year, any attempt at building long-term stability in Afghanistan will require far-reaching efforts involving much deeper collaboration with the Taliban. Whilst relief measures will help mitigate humanitarian catastrophe, they also further entrench the country’s dependence on foreign aid and dissuade efforts to rebuild its institutions of government.

If Afghanistan is to be set on a path toward self-support, away from its reliance on overseas aid, then sanctions will have to be eased, and foreign support funds will need to be directed at restoring essential government functions, such as development, energy, and agriculture. Moreover, its foreign reserves will have to be released and the economy reconnected to the global financial system.

A broadscale effort to rebuild the Afghan state may well stretch beyond the will of the United States, with Washington’s reluctance to provide this level of support for a Taliban-led government inclining the U.S. toward inaction and forcing the responsibility of supporting the country’s development onto the shoulders of other international actors. Indeed, Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Iran, Pakistan, China, India, alongside key regional powers, such as Turkey and Qatar, can play an important role in stabilizing the country.

Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s escalating humanitarian crisis demands immediate action, and the United States must provide the emergency support needed to avoid catastrophic loss of life. However, the U.S. should also consider the consequences of its long-term approach for Afghan citizens, particularly given the promise made to them over twenty years ago.

Indeed, whilst many in the West are deeply troubled by any suggestion of supporting a Taliban-led Afghanistan, the consequences of failing to do so could be equally disturbing. Ultimately, a choice must be made; we can only hope it is the right one.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them. 

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow. 

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur. 

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate. 

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa: Introduction and Analysis

Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations are meant to help countries down the complex path of peace and reconciliation. Such peacekeeping missions are mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A smaller subset of peacekeeping missions, stabilization operations, are not regulated by the UN Charter, but make-up three of the four largest ongoing peace operations. Their legitimacy rests between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (use of force to restore peace), constituting the so-called “Chapter VI and a half.” These operations are a joint instrument of the Security Council (the highest political authority) and the Secretary-General, the highest administrative and functional authority of the organization.

Peacekeeping interventions are based on some strategic points, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and the possibility of deploying and integrating police forces and civilian personnel. The work that the UN conducts during peace operations is based on three fundamental principles, namely consent to intervention by countries in conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force (unless in self-defense or in defense of the mandate).

Thousands of “Blue Helmets,” the military body belonging to member states and “loaned” to UN missions, have over time morphed from mere observers limited to logistical and technical support to being assigned sensitive functions. They now operate more complex programs including political mediation, de-mining, public affairs and communication, protection and promotion of civil rights, and reintegration of combatants into society. The missions have thus become multidimensional and integrated.

Instability is not just a military fact, with a truce to guard or a cease-fire line to patrol, but has many causes. Stabilization operations thus include ever greater responsibilities, including the democratization of local institutions, economic and social development, environmental and natural resource protection, and the retraining of military forces, police, and prison services, according to modern, democratic criteria.

Africa 

An example of these new and expanded functions are assistance and support missions, which are deployed in countries that have seen the total collapse (or almost total degradation) of state structures, countries such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Mali, Central Africa, and South Sudan. UN functions are also diversified and no longer restrained to patrolling truce lines. They have been involved in such diverse efforts as decolonization in Namibia, independence in Eritrea, protection of populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the transition to democratic regimes after years of civil war in Angola, Mozambique, Central America, or West Africa. All these missions see not only the change in the profiles and structures of the missions but also their composition. 

In West Africa, there are two very different missions, MINURSO and MINUSMA. The first aims to ensure, sooner or later, the holding of a regular referendum in the territories of Western Sahara, still disputed between Algeria, Morocco, and the local population. The mission has been active since 1991 and has 485 units, of which 245 are military.

MINUSMA, in Mali, started in 2013 shortly after the French military operation Serval, which halted the advance of Tuareg and other armed groups towards Bamako. Despite the collaboration with Operation Barkhane (formerly Serval) and the G5 of the Sahel, the area is still deeply unstable. MINUSMA’s annual budget exceeds one billion dollars and over 15,000 military personnel are deployed. The states that support the mission militarily are interested in containing the Malian crisis (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal).

As for Central Africa, MINUSCA is the stabilization mission of the Central African Republic. It was born in 2014, following the outbreak of civil war. Despite numerous peace agreements signed between parties, skirmishes and structural violence remain. The mission has an almost exclusively “regional” character since the troops present are Rwandan, Egyptian, Zambian, Cameroonian, and Senegalese. MONUSCO, on the other hand, is an operation that started in 2010 and aims to stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo, devastated first by spillover from the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and then by its own wars from 1998 to 2003, which left over 5 million dead.

Additionally, three peacekeeping missions are active in the Horn of Africa, two in Sudan and one in South Sudan. The last one, UNMISS, was born in 2011 in South Sudan. After gaining independence, the country fell into a bloody civil war, dictated by patriotism and exploitation of ethnic tension, which have been intensifying since December 2013.

Analysis

Over the years, this United Nations instrument has been criticized extensively but has also received some positive feedback. Too often, in the initiatives of the powers that act in the name of the so-called international community, in which Africa, politically speaking, seems to be considered more an object than a real subject, the goal of “security” prevails. Very often, the issues of jihadism and human mobility towards Europe are considered separately from other issues plaguing African governments. There is a need for a repositioning of international diplomacy that considers the constant and progressive modification of the African geopolitical chessboard in the age of globalization.

The colonial and postcolonial models, to the test of facts, no longer represent a paradigm of reference in Africa for the control of aid institutions or even investments. The traditional partners of African countries (the former colonial powers) must now compete with the low index of “conditionality” strategies of emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and Russia itself, which is reappearing in Africa after the withdrawal imposed, about thirty years ago, by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is precisely within these parameters that the United Nations, as an organism of peoples, is called to play an indispensable role. It is worth recalling what happened in the early 1960s with the wave of African independence movements. At that time, the UN, established as an organization after World War II with the aim of preventing future conflicts by replacing the ineffective League of Nations, played a politically relevant role.

In particular, the recognition of the principle of self-determination of peoples, sanctioned by the United Nations Charter, received a warm response. International law also outlawed war, in particular, due to Articles 2 & 4 of the Charter, declaring that member states must renounce war and resolve their conflicts.

To weigh negatively on these missions are a series of factors found in many investigations. The first of these factors is the lack of discipline among Blue Helmets and the fact that the contingents are sometimes composed of soldiers from countries where training standards are not adequate for modern crises in Africa. There have also been pervasive issues of sexual violence against women and minors.

Regardless, the United Nations has taken a central and irreplaceable role in the building of congenial international relations in the modern era. In the case of the African continent, the UN provides international legitimacy and an irreplaceable and indispensable forum for negotiation at global level on the issues of development, peace, and security.

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