U.S. war in Afghanistan

 by Elisabeta Dinu

Will Violence Stop If the United States and Taliban Reach a Deal?

The latest talks between the United States and the Taliban may conclude with a deal. Content of the peace agreement has been finalized in Doha, according to former Afghan ambassador to Pakistan Omar Zakhilwal. Sources indicate the Taliban agreed to a reduction in violence and potential talks with Afghan government if the deal is sealed.

The agreement revives hopes for a long-term solution in Afghanistan’s painful 18 years of war. However, the potential deal must be treated with caution if US negotiators do not look beyond the peace agreement.

The US-Taliban negotiations have been marked by an on and off pattern of violence. In August 2019, the US and the Taliban concluded the 9th round of direct talks and were on the verge of reaching a deal that could allow the pullout of foreign forces from Afghanistan and a ceasefire that would put an end to violence. However, in September the Taliban conducted an attack that killed one US soldier and 11 civilians in Kabul. President Trump responded by calling off a scheduled meeting with the Taliban and abruptly halted the peace efforts for over three months. At the end of November, the US president made an unannounced visit to Afghanistan, met Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, and declared he revived the paralyzed peace talks.  Yet, an alleged US-Taliban prisoner swap failed, and the ‘trust building’ exercise between the parties seemed to also be overwhelmingly weakened.

According to Trump, the Taliban strategy has been to better their leverage in the peace talks through terrorism. On December 11, the Taliban staged an attack on the Bagram military base. An explosive-laden vehicle went off in the vicinity of the airbase and was followed by shooting. One day after, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad announced a ‘brief pause’ in the already intermittent peace talks. Two more US soldiers were killed by Taliban in January, reaching a total of  2,400 U.S. troops killed in the US’s longest war. The US-backed government forces also stroke back through artillery and aerial attacks that killed over 20 Taliban.

Given that both parties have been focused on maintaining power positions during the negotiations, the content of the agreement might be less of a breakthrough than expected. The US approach to negotiations with the Taliban has been modelled on a straight forward logic: if you have more power than the counterparty, you win, otherwise, you lose. The Taliban, on the other hand, have been capitalizing on a different kind of power – that of field knowledge and terror.  However, the release of the ‘Afghanistan Papers’ by the Washington Post has confirmed it is unclear what ‘winning’ means for the US, as there is little consensus among US leadership on the war’s objectives or about how to end the conflict.

Recent developments show talks lost sight of what are the best potential results of a US-Taliban peace agreement.  Taliban’s spokesman Suhaln Shaheen declared that “there had been no discussion on cease-fire since the beginning, but the US proposed reduction in violence.” Whereas US officials praise the Taliban’s decision to accept a violence reduction plan, Afghan government officials are rather concerned: a ‘reduction of violence’ plan does not contribute anything beneficial to the peace process, said Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.  Salam Rahimi, the state minister for peace affairs, called the plan ‘unacceptable’.

The past months show no indication that an agreement will automatically lead to de-escalation. Peace processes often imply strategic and tactical deception and the second half of 2019 witnessed violence escalation. The number of high-profile Taliban attacks increased, indicating that actors willing to negotiate and eventually sign peace agreements may engage in violence in order to undermine their new partners.

Although both the Taliban and the US seem to have a common goal — the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan — on the short term its materialization remains unlikely. In practice, the US will not withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan, and nor will the Taliban stop engaging in violence. Even if the deal is signed, it is unlikely the Taliban would implement a ceasefire, given the fragmentation and lack of discipline within the organization.

Although a potential agreement between the parties revives hopes for a solution in Afghanistan, positive scenarios are likely only if the US looks beyond the current deal during negotiations. A deal between the US and the Taliban is the beginning of a long term peace process, and has little value for the future of Afghanistan unless a clear action plan for the aftermath of the agreement is formulated.  The United States must formulate recommendations and contribute to the negotiations and reconstruction efforts that will follow a deal with the Taliban.

A comprehensive plan for addressing the domestic conflict is necessary.  The conflict has a strong domestic component that goes beyond the US-Taliban conflict. The Afghani Constitution mentions 14 ethnic groups, and the country is subject of a fragile balance. Sustainable bridges must be built for further negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, as the former refused repeatedly to negotiate with Afghan officials because they are part of a “puppet government”. Furthermore, the withdrawal of US troops without a plan for security provision may witness an increase in intra-state conflicts. The power vacuum left behind may benefit not only the Taliban, but any of the 22 terrorist organization currently operating in Afghanistan.

The regional component of the conflict in Afghanistan further complicates resolution and should also be addressed. Pakistan warned thhat tensions in the Middle East following the killing of Iran’s Al-Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani could hit the reconciliation process in Afghanistan: “On the one hand, we have historical and brotherly relations with Iran, while on the other, our millions of people are working in the Gulf States. We have to be very careful. We have to maintain a balance to protect our own interests” said Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

Regardless of a potential conclusion of peace talks between the US and the Taliban, observers must remain cautiously optimistic. The potential agreement might be less of a breakthrough than it seems, and the cycle of violence is unlikely to be broken unless a long term plan for the future of Afghanistan is in sight.

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 by Jack Ryan

The Afghanistan Papers: What Do They Mean for Peace in the Region?

A recent Washington Post investigation — three years in the making — exposed a multitude of falsified positive views and deceptive action directly taken by the United States government and military officials over the course of the war in Afghanistan. Hundreds of interviews with US officials led to condemnation of the war which has cost 3804 Afghan civilian lives in 2018 alone.

“For 18 years, America has been at war in Afghanistan. As part of a government project to understand what went wrong, a federal agency interviewed more than 400 people who had a direct role in the conflict. In those interviews, generals, ambassadors, diplomats and other insiders offered firsthand accounts of the mistakes that have prolonged the war. 

The full, unsparing remarks and the identities of many of those who made them have never been made public — until now. After a three-year legal battle, The Washington Post won release of more than 2,000 pages of “Lessons Learned” interviews conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Those interviews reveal there was no consensus on the war’s objectives, let alone how to end the conflict.” 

In summary, the government deceived American citizens about the progress made during the war. Bob Crowley, a retired Army colonel who served in Kabul from 2013 to 2014 stated,  “The strategy became self-validating. Every data point was altered to present the best picture possible.” The fact that this was allowed to continue covertly for an extended period of time reflects the well-planned nature of the disinformation campaign, especially if one considers its effectiveness through three separate presidencies.

Setting aside the inevitable investigations and questions that will follow, it is important to assess the impact this exposure will have on the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan. This exposure will affect negotiations between the US and the Taliban, bilateral relations between Kabul and Washington and public opinion of the US within Afghanistan.

The Trump administration will need to make changes to their Afghan strategy in an attempt to rectify these mistakes. Conversely, they could seek to divert attention away from the Afghan Papers, but this will have a particularly strong effect on how the peace process unfolds. Speculation in the media that President Trump plans to withdraw additional troops from Afghanistan may be ‘part of the plan’, but it may be a rushed decision to avoid further public criticism. A quick withdrawal will have a major impact on Afghan security and regional stability. It is important that all parties put security above politics, especially in such a fragile region.

In an effort to keep the documents classified, the US State Department argued that the release of portions of certain interviews could jeopardize negotiations with the Taliban and therefore jeopardize efforts to end the war. The Washington Post, however, argued that these documents were classified only after the Post pushed to have them published, indicating a blatant attempt to cover up mistakes.

Despite differences of opinion over the reasons behind the secrecy classification, the release of the ‘Afghanistan Papers’ will undoubtedly influence negotiations with the Taliban, an organization that has been testing the US government long prior to the talks. For example, in an effort to demonstrate strength, the Taliban carried out an attack that killed a US soldier in September. Washington deemed this a step too far and consequently compelled Trump to cancel a secret Camp David meeting. The re-establishment of peace talks — after what can only be described as a cooling-off period — exemplifies that each side pushes the other over acceptable terms and those deemed unreasonable to accept.

Statements within the Afghan Papers that accuse the US of uncertainty and a lack of control over their Afghan strategy gives leverage to the Taliban; an organization so eager to gain power over an enemy that they have struggled to match on the battlefield.

“Was al-Qaeda the enemy, or the Taliban? Was Pakistan a friend or an adversary? What about the Islamic State and the bewildering array of foreign jihadists, let alone the warlords on the CIA’s payroll? According to the documents, the U.S. government never settled on an answer.”

Thus, whilst the US may have tried to keep the Afghanistan Papers hidden for security reasons or to save face, it will undoubtedly affect peace talks with The Taliban as both sides take time to reassess their respective strategies based on the new information available.

In addition to negotiating with the Taliban, the US strategy for peace in Afghanistan has revolved around the development of a close relationship with the Afghan government built on financial and military support. The Afghan government sat patiently at a distance whilst the US negotiated with the Taliban, however, accusations of fraud and corruption within the Afghanistan Papers will provoke the Afghan government to reassess their relationship with the US at the very least.

Sustainable peace in Afghanistan is distant, but it is achievable. It is integral to maintain effective security whilst at the same time allowing Afghanistan to take control of their peace process. As the US slowly relinquishes its duties in the region, they must reassess the outcome of their withdrawal and make assurances that policies and resources remain in place to ensure peace prevails at every opportunity.

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Nancy Pelosi in Afghanistan
 by Ahmad Mohibi

Pelosi and Esper in Afghanistan: To Leave or Not To Leave?

Two United States envoys visited Afghanistan this week: the Secretary of Defence Mark Esper under the direction of President Trump and a congressional delegation headed by Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. These trips signify the growing divide in opinion related to the US strategy in Afghanistan.

Trump’s growing impatience with the presence of American armed forces still entangled in the Afghan conflict — fueled by the 2020 presidential election — is matched by Pelosi’s urgency to maintain a presence in the region. The Speaker counters that US troops are needed for the sake of stability and the possibility that Afghanistan might return to its previous role as a haven for terrorism.

Esper’s unannounced trip on Sunday marks his first visit to the country since being confirmed as Pentagon chief. His unannounced arrival comes amid uncertainty about the administration’s strategy after the collapse of peace talks with the Taliban.

The Secretary told reporters on Sunday that the number of US troops in Afghanistan could be reduced to 8,600 — while maintaining counterterrorism operations — but the reduction would have to coincide with a peace agreement. The United States currently has 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. This is significantly less than the 130,000 troops that were stationed there in 2009 as part of broader counter-insurgency operations.

The Pelosi-led delegation met with President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, Afghan women and ‘briefly compared notes’ with Secretary Mark Esper. Pelosi concluded: “While Afghan women have made some progress in some areas, more work is needed to ensure their security and durable economic and educational opportunities for women and girls in Afghanistan,” which highlights her belief that US support is integral to peace and development in Afghanistan.

Trump consistently critiques any US involvement in the Middle East and a series of tweets reflected that sentiment. He noted: “Fighting between various groups has been going on for hundreds of years. The USA should never have been in the Middle East. The stupid endless wars, for us, are ending!”

Although these tweets were specifically defending his withdrawal from Syria, the president’s view on US military involvement in Afghanistan is clearly in support of exiting the region. Meanwhile, Pelosi’s comments — especially those urging the need for support of Afghan women — appear to support the need for extended US involvement in the region, providing both military and societal support.

Esper told reporters “the aim is to still get a peace agreement at some point, a political agreement.” However, the Taliban’s propensity for violence continues to divide opinion in US circles as Trump’s initial decision to host a Taliban delegation at Camp David was met with heavy criticism.

The Taliban refuses to compromise on their demands, such as their desired institution of the patriarchal Islamic Emirate, characterized by strict social and cultural policies based on man-made principles and radical ideologies. As long as their use of violence and patriarchal political ideologies continue, the US will face divisions over its Afghan strategy.

The US is by no means the only international stakeholder in Afghanistan. The European Union envoy to the region Roland Kobia said, “The EU would like to see a swift resumption of the US bilateral talks with the Taliban and the start of negotiation between the government and the Taliban.”

The EU diplomat also called on the Afghan presidential candidates to contribute to the transparency of the electoral process and avoid any moves that could create problems for the election results.

Kobia’s comment on the presidential candidates re-enforces an important factor to consider when assessing the differing US opinions on the region: the Afghan elections. Putting aside the US-Taliban talks and the conflict itself, it is important to note that all of this is taking place while the country’s politics are in limbo.

Afghanistan is awaiting the results of the September 28 election. Riddled with accusations of fraud and voter-discrepancies, the post-election period has been tumultuous. This chaos is multiplied with the constant onslaught of Taliban instigated violence.

Opening a dialogue with the Taliban will be one of the most significant challenges facing the victors of the September 2019 elections.

Dialogue between political actors is integral to the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan whilst allowing a US withdrawal. However, intra-Afghan dialogue will be impossible without continued support from the US. It is integral that the US keeps its policy towards Afghanistan distinct from its withdrawal from Syria, despite growing criticism and support for Trump’s decision in the Middle East.

Military support in the region remains crucial, especially during this fragile transitional period as Afghanistan nervously awaits election results.

Although the envoys are divided in opinion, they must focus on insight gained during the 18-year Afghan intervention and put domestic political conflicts aside for the time being.

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 by Sara Huzar

U.S. War in Afghanistan: Review of Previous Strategy

U.S. War in Afghanistan: Review of the Previous Strategy:

2001-2013

The launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 marked the start of US involvement in Afghanistan. The operation consisted mainly of airstrikes but also included a special operations force of roughly 1,000 later joined by 1,300 Marines. The primary goal was to support Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban fighters[1].

In December 2001, the Taliban fled Kandahar, effectively ending their regime. From this point on US forces focused on raiding suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda villages, until an end to major combat was declared in May 2003[2]. The US continued to carry out raids against insurgent violence until 2005 when they considered the insurgency defeated and turned control to NATO and ISAF forces2. Immediately thereafter, Afghanistan saw an increase in insurgent violence and the US decided to keep 30,000-40,000 troops in Afghanistan through the rest of the Bush Administration[3].

In March 2009, soon after taking office, President Obama added 21,000 troops to that force3. That December he deployed 30,000 more and introduced a plan to begin a withdrawal in 2011 and complete it by 20143.

In keeping with this plan, and given that the killing of Osama bin Laden accomplished a key US objective, President Obama announced in June 2011 that US forces would fall to 90,000 by the end of the year, and then drop to 68,000 by September 20123. In February 2013, he revealed plans to reduce the overall troop levels to 34,000 by February 20143.

2014-2016

From that point on, the focus in Afghanistan was on US withdrawal. The Resolute Support Mission sought to decrease US troops in Afghanistan to 9,800 in 2015, then to 5,000 in 2016 and finally to 1,000 troops from 2016 onwards3. However, the Islamic State’s surge in Iraq along with worrying Taliban gains in Helmand Province created concern that, without adequate support, Afghanistan’s security could be in jeopardy3. With this in mind, the Obama administration changed plans in March 2015, opting to keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan for all of 2015 and reduce to 5,500 throughout 20163. In October of that same year, it was decided that the troop level would instead remain at 9,800 through the end of 2016 and then drop to 5,500 from then onwards3. In July 2016, the Obama administration made its final revision, deciding to leave 8,400 troops in Afghanistan post-2016, rather than 5,500 (see fig. 1).

Figure 1

Current Concerns

During US operations in Afghanistan from 2003-2009, insurgent attacks were steadily on the rise[1]. In the earlier part of this time period (2004-2007) average daily attacks hovered under 30, but in 2008 they broke that barrier and continued increasingly rapidly, reaching their highest point in 2010 (see fig. 2).

Figure 2

 

 

 

 

Figure 3

What may be of greater concern, however, is militant control of territory. Since 2015, areas under insurgent control have been incrementally increasing while areas of government control have decreased substantially (see fig 4&5). By September 2016 the Afghan government controlled approximately 68%-70% of the population, the Taliban controlled 10%, and the remainder was contested[1]. Government control is mostly concentrated in urban population centers, while the Taliban is strongest amongst rural populations5.

Additionally, Afghan forces have recently suffered high casualties5. In 2016, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) logged 6,700 combat deaths, a 21% increase over the previous year[2]. This, combined with the fact that 35% of the ANDSF does not reenlist after their first tour, leads to concerns about whether the ANDSF has sufficient resources to effectively combat the Taliban without US assistance6.

Figure 4

 

 

Figure 5

New Strategy

President Trump’s remarks on the administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia suggest three major deviations from previous operations. One is a switch from a time-based to a conditions-based approach to withdrawal. Two is an increase in pressure on Pakistan to stop harboring Afghan militants. There is a rejection of nation-building in favor of simply “killing terrorists”[1].

Conditions Approach

The Trump administration’s decision to leave troops in Afghanistan until “conditions on the ground”7 warrant their withdrawal reflects concerns around Iraq’s continuing struggles with ISIS. The US’s decision to leave Iraq completely after 2011 has been blamed by many for creating the power vacuum that allowed ISIS to thrive3. President Trump articulates a related concern about insurgent forces feeling that they can “wait us out”7.

While sound in theory, this approach leaves several areas of concern. First is the ambiguity of what conditions must be met for the US to withdraw. If the ultimate goal of continued US involvement is to ensure that the ANDSF is able to control Afghanistan on their own and to remove the substantial insurgent threat, an objective definition of what that looks like is essential to any strategy. There is widespread agreement that a time-based approach led the US to begin withdrawal prematurely, but a conditions approach is not immune to that problem if the conditions are poorly or inaccurately defined. The necessary elements for a lasting peace in Afghanistan are difficult to pin down, but would likely include factors such as the percent of territory contested versus under government control, the casualty levels among ANDSF forces and the projections of their force strength, and the stability and legitimacy of Afghanistan’s government, especially among rural populations. Without laying out specific goals in these and other areas a conditions approach cannot function as a viable strategic approach.

Pakistan

President Trump’s remarks indicated that Pakistan’s involvement in insurgent activity will be a major factor in US actions in the region, and with good reason. Even if every Taliban and Islamic State fighter was removed from Afghanistan, a lasting peace would be impossible if they remain on the other side of the Durand Line.

Pakistan’s primary goal at all times is relative power over India, and its activities in Afghanistan depend on how it feels that goal is best achieved. Historically, Pakistan has viewed the Afghan government as too sympathetic to India and supported insurgents in order to weaken a potential Indian ally and create a sphere of influence for itself. These concerns are unlikely to be alleviated by President Trump’s declaration that “another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India — the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of the United States“7.

 It’s unlikely that Pakistan will ever be fully willing to relinquish ambitions of holding influence over Afghanistan against India. Therefore, the best path to peace is to force them to settle by making supporting insurgents inconvenient and ineffective. The tide may be turning already, as reports indicate that Pakistan is beginning to find Afghan instability taxing due to the refugee situation it has created[1]. US efforts to block any path the insurgent success in Afghanistan will continue to eliminate remaining incentives for Pakistan to harbor violent insurgents. However, it is also worth noting that even if Pakistan enthusiastically cooperated with denying refuge to Afghan insurgent groups, Pakistan has its own militants to combat, and may be stretched too thin to effectively deal with Afghan insurgents as well. Indeed, testimony by US officials indicates that the Pakistani military has issued orders to deny safe haven to Afghan insurgent groups, but is unable to direct resources to actively combat them8. In short, a Pakistan hostile to a stable Afghanistan will be a major hindrance to US interests in the area. Linking a stable Afghanistan to a stronger India is almost certain to create such a condition. At the same time, the US needs assurances that Pakistan will not harbor insurgents while still being aware that, even with full cooperation, that may be an unattainable goal.

Nation Building

President Trump’s remarks on nation-building in Afghanistan are some of the most nuanced and complicated, and yet may be the most important to predicting future stability in the region. His statement that the US will “no longer use American military might to construct democracies in faraway lands, or try to rebuild other countries in our own image”7 speaks to two common concerns about US presence in the Middle East. The first is the issue of cultural sensitivity. President Trump goes on to say that “We are not asking others to change their way of life,”7, in other words, assuming a level of western superiority and trying to rebuild Afghanistan according to a standard of civilization that fails to account for equally valid cultural differences. Such concerns are valid and important to informing an equitable and effective strategy in the area. The US must strike a balance between defending universally recognized rights and values while allowing for differences. The second concern is costly involvement with no benefit to the US. International aid can easily be interpreted as using taxpayer money for charitable hand-outs to other countries. President Trump’s references to “shared interests” and “principled realism” indicate that he is thinking in those terms7. The question then becomes what, if any, aid is essential to securing these “shared interests,” which presumably include a stable and widely legitimate Afghan government and an end to insurgent violence. Evidence indicates that at least some level of practices that would fall under “nation-building” is necessary to those interests. A good example is the ANDSF. Department of Defense reports

The question then becomes what, if any, aid is essential to securing these “shared interests,” which presumably include a stable and widely legitimate Afghan government and an end to insurgent violence. Evidence indicates that at least some level of practices that would fall under “nation-building” is necessary to those interests. A good example is the ANDSF. Department of Defense reports express concern regarding widespread illiteracy among the force and how it might inhibit its combat effectiveness. In this case, security would benefit from measures to improve education systems in Afghanistan. On a larger scale, feelings of abandonment could have very real security implications for the US in the future. In the past, the perception throughout the Middle East has been that international powers, the US included, have fought for their own interests there and then left the countries in tatters when their mission was accomplished. Extremists groups have proven adept at capitalizing on these feelings. Therefore, devoting some resources nation-building is essential to creating a lasting peace.

Conclusion

The Trump administration’s articulation of its Afghanistan strategy is still in its early stages. So far, three key change has emerged: conditions approach in determining the appropriate time to withdraw, a doubling down on Pakistan’s activities, and a cessation of nation-building. Given the deterioration of Afghanistan’s security situation after the US began withdrawing troops in 2014, changes of some kind are clearly needed, but whether the new strategy will be able to implement the right kind of changes and succeed in bringing peace to the region remains to be seen.

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Endnotes

  1. “Timeline: The US War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2017 https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan
  2. Katzman, Kenneth and Clayton Thomas. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy” (Congressional Research Service Report, 2017), 7
  3. Katzman, Kenneth and Clayton Thomas. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy” (Congressional Research Service Report, 2017), 24-29
  4. “Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined” (United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Addressees, 2011), 4
  5. General John W. Nicholson Jr. (Commander, Resolute Support and U.S. Forces Afghanistan) in a Department of Defense Briefing, September 2016
  6. Katzman, Kenneth and Clayton Thomas. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy” (Congressional Research Service Report, 2017), 32
  7. Donald Trump “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia” (Arlington, VA, August 21, 2017)
  8. Katzman, Kenneth and Clayton Thomas. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy” (Congressional Research Service Report, 2017), 45

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia

http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/afghanistan-partial-threat-assessment-november-22-2016

 

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