Terrorism in Africa: Will Tillerson Tip the Scale?

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to meet with leaders of five African nations this week. He is there to strengthen U.S.-African ties and discuss security and counterterrorism. The countries he will be visiting include Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Certainly, his trip will also see him mending fences with leaders in the wake of President Trump’s “sh*thole countries” comment. That notwithstanding, Secretary Tillerson is in Africa to check in on counterterrorism efforts.

© Jeremiah Wakaya Secretary Tillerson’s plane touches down at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. He is received by Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Monica Juma and U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Robert Godec.

Secretary Tillerson will be, “…visiting nations engaged in battling Islamist terrorism, including Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, America’s largest and most vital African military base,” [1]. Countries most steeped in conflict with prominent terrorist groups al-Shabaab and Boko Haram will command the bulk of the secretary’s time. Tillerson spoke at George Mason University hours before leaving for Africa. He provided the rationale for choosing the five countries, explaining that the United States has key prospects, troops, interests, and allies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, and Nigeria. Doubtless, he will be visiting Ethiopia which,“…is a close U.S. ally in its counterterrorism operations in East Africa, notably against al-Shabab,” [1].

© Austin Ludolph Before his departure for Africa, Secretary Tillerson discusses security, economic welfare, and counterterrorism with George Mason University’s President, Ángel Cabrera 

Tillerson gives an impression of equanimity, praising, “…the role the African Union and G5 Sahel Group have taken on the security and counterterrorism front.” Tillerson pledged, “…$60 million from the U.S. to the G5 security force,” this year. [2] Trump’s feelings may differ. His, “…latest budget proposal in February slashed spending for Africa by 37%, down $3.1 billion from current levels,” [3]. Time will tell how the trip affects counterterrorism and security measures in Africa. As you read these words, imagine Mr. Tillerson trying to repair this:

http://abcn.ws/2G5Yh71

Sources:

1. https://www.dailyrepublic.com/wires/tillerson-arrives-in-africa-with-a-narrow-mission-counterterrorism/
2. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/06/politics/tillerson-africa-challenges/index.html
3.http://abcnews.go.com/International/tillerson-cleaning-trumps-derogatory-comments-day-africa-trip/story?id=53609344

The Terrorist Threat in France: A Look at Prison Radicalization

ANNE-CHRISTINE POUJOULAT/AFP/GETTY

French counter-terrorism policy rejects the soft measures carried out by many of its European counterparts. So then, why has France, despite its aggressive stance against terrorism, seen more high-profile terrorist incidents than any other Western European country in the last six years?  An absence of terrorist attacks in France for more than a decade created a false sense of security. However, since 2012 France has been the victim of several jihadist attacks that have placed it on the frontline in the battle against terrorism. While some observers blame the attacks on France’s large Muslim prison population, citing prisons as a breeding ground of radicalization, others blame France’s delayed implementation of counter-radicalization programs. Other critics attribute the attacks to marginalized Muslim populations that find France’s secular policies stifling. None of these analyses, standing alone, provides an explanation sufficient to guide an effective strategy to end attacks. But this piece will focus on the prisons.

The notion of prison serving as a breeding ground for radicalization is not new. Khalen Kelkal, the main perpetrator of the 1995 Paris subway attacks that spurred counter-terrorism legislation, is believed to have been radicalized in prison. As of 2015, at least four men underwent radicalization while in a French prison and went on to attack locations in Europe. Furthermore, Cherif Kouachi, the Charlie Hebdo attacker, arrived at Fleury Merogis, a French prison, in January 2005. While imprisoned, Kouachi met Djamel Beghal – also known as Abu Hamza – who was serving 10 years for plotting to attack a US embassy in 2001. Kouachi also encountered Amedy Coulibaly, the man behind the 2015 Jewish supermarket attacks. In another instance still, Mehdi Nemouche, underwent radicalization in prison, traveled to Syria, and then traveled to Belgium where, in 2014, he attacked the Jewish Museum of Belgium. While these men represent only a small portion of the total prison population, their social ties to one another, as well as the magnitude of their crimes, demonstrates prison radicalization is an area worthy of counter-radicalization focus.

Radicalization can occur in prison for several reasons. It can stem from a confrontation with jail authorities, often worsened by the negative images Muslim inmates see on television and in other media regarding Islam. In addition, radicalization is molded, “by the conditions prevailing in prison, its organization and specific architecture.” Overcrowding can lead to sharing cells, restrictions on bathing, and unheard demands due to prison guards’ heavy workloads. This leads to exasperation, often exacerbated by the prison’s refusal to allow the practice of religion. Muslim prisoners believe Islamophobia runs rampant within their walls. Problems associated with prisons globally are vexing for many French Muslims and the disaffection they feel outside prison is only magnified behind bars.

Focusing counter-radicalization efforts in prisons would likely yield positive results if done astutely, and with advice from experts. As of 2015, according to authorities, French prisons held 238 inmates charged with terrorist offenses, with 152 of them classified as “dangerous Islamists.” There are approximately 67,500 imprisoned individuals in France. It is estimated that 70% of the prison population is Muslim, yet Muslims notably comprise only 8% of the French national population. Romain Quivooij, Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, acknowledges that the number of “dangerous Islamists” is a very low number in comparison to the total prison population, and argues that “radicalization in prison does not only involve people singled out as ‘radical Islamists.’ Cases of ordinary criminals who adopt violent extremist views in jail and engage in terrorist activities upon their release are common.” One French prison director implemented a trial run in which the radicalized individuals were segregated from the general population. While the director deemed the segregation successful, an ex-inmate of the French prison stated, “I don’t understand the idea at all of putting all the radicals together and hoping they will change.” Some believe putting radicalized inmates together strengthens bonds and facilitates jihadist ideology. Regardless, it does seem to limit their ability to attract new recruits.

Haras Rafiq of the Quilliam Foundation states neither segregating nor allowing radicalized inmates to mix with the general population is a good model, rather he advocates for an increase of professional imams. Prison guards do receive some training, however, due to the large population of inmates in prisons, in addition to the changing profile of a radicalized jihadist, guards find it difficult to detect radicalized individuals. According to one expert the, “…lack of Muslim chaplains is thought to have created a vacuum that leaves room for self-appointed and self-taught imams and their radical ideas.” In fact, Hassan el-Anoui Talibi, Chief Imam of French prisons issued a press release advocating for more financial support and resources for prison imams, as they currently receive no pay except reimbursement for basic expenses (Alexander). One offender stated that in the six years he was imprisoned, he did not see an Imam until year five (Alexander). With a surplus of resources going into hard counter-terrorism measures, it’s reasonable to assume that France could procure an appropriate number of imams.

While an augmentation in imams, in quality and quantity, may be sound policy akin to soft measures found in other European countries, one author asserts that the majority of radicalized inmates may actually go through the process of radicalization prior to their first sentence. This indicates that prison programs may need an emphasis on de-radicalization rather than solely counter-radicalization.

Does a promising policy exist that can incorporate the two? The same author argues that increasing the number of imams is urgently needed, however so is “the integration of additional services as part of a wider interdisciplinary approach.” Effective programs can be hard to implement in a favorable setting. Creating an effective program in French prisons to hinder radicalization and promote deradicalization remains an enormous challenge. However, in light of France’s high incidence of terrorist attacks, it is likely to continue augmenting its prison programs. It would be well-served by focusing on approaches that are multifaceted and by listening to suggestions from community members and academics.

 

Terrorism Has No Religion

Terrorism has no religion and no homeland. It is wrong to attribute terrorism to the teachings of a specific religion. Terrorists do not distinguish between Christian churches and Islamic mosques. Places of worship, in fact, be they mosques or churches, have both been harmed routinely by terrorists.

In addition to Christians and Muslims both being victims of terrorist attacks, terrorist attacks have targeted Sunni and Shiite mosques alike across the Middle East. In attacking holy sites, terrorists seek to destabilize the security and stability of the state, especially the economic sector. They seek to spread chaos and confusion among multiple groups and they seek to stir sedition and sow the seeds of sectarian strife.

Christian Churches of Egypt:

Churches in Egypt have been targeted by a series of terrorist bombings. Who can forget the December 11, 2016, terrorist attack on St. Peter and St. Paul’s Church (commonly known as El-Botroseya Church) in Cairo’s Abbasia district? 29 people were killed and 49 people, mostly women, and children were wounded [1]. And who can forget the twin terrorist attacks on April 9, 2017, that targeted St. George’s Church in the Egyptian city of Tanta and Saint Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Alexandria? These attacks left 47 people dead and 126 injured [2]. 76 innocent people lost their lives inside houses of worship in these three attacks. The peaceful sounds of hymns mixed with the evil sounds of explosions. The following video describes the attacks on the two churches:  

The Muslim Mosques of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia:

On Friday, June 26, 2015, an Islamic State (ISIS) militant bombed Al-Imam Al-Sadiq mosque in the Al-Sawabir district of Kuwait City, killing 27 and injuring 227 during Friday afternoon prayers [3]. Further, the attack took place during the holy month of Ramadan, during which time Muslims worldwide fast to commemorate the first revelation of the Quran to the Prophet Muhammad. Those who were injured or killed were all praying when the terrorist entered the mosque and detonated his explosive belt [4]. The sounds of the peaceful Azan (the Muslim call to prayer) mixed with the evil sounds of explosions. Not only the Islamic, but the entire world was outraged by the attacks on the mosque in Kuwait.

These videos show the attack on the Shiite mosque in Kuwait:

On Monday, July 4, 2016, also during the holy month of Ramadan, a suicide bomb attack took place in the parking lot of Al-Masjid an-Nabawi, the Prophet’s Mosque. Al-Masjid an-Nabawi is one of the largest, holiest mosques in Islam.It was built by the Prophet Muhammad [5]. The mosque is located in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Four policemen were killed and five others were wounded in the suicide bomb attack [6]. Two other attacks took place in Saudi Arabia. One near the United States’ consulate in Jeddah and another targeted a Shiite Muslim mosque in Qatif. Terrorists have no respect for what is holy. The attack on one of Islam’s holiest sites brought condemnations from all around the Middle East and the world. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “This bombing, which happened during Ramadan outside the Prophet Muhammad’s Mosque, proves that terrorism has no religion and no faith.” [7]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARo9Kjb9H68

The following video shows the attack on the Al-Masjid an-Nabawi (The Prophet’s Mosque). It also shows two other attacks that took place at the same time Al-Masjid an-Nabawi was attacked:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ex4wRXIOZj0

The sentiment “Terrorism has no religion,” is no longer just a slogan: it is a dictum. Terrorists do not care about the sanctity of a Muslim mosque or a Christian church. They don’t differentiate between Sunni and Shia. Terrorists commit vile crimes in the name of peaceful religions.

Sources:

  1. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/world/middleeast/cairo-coptic-cathedral-attack.html
  2. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/church-bombing-cairo-egypt-tanta-kills-dead-wounded-injured-latest-a7674761.html
  3. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33287136
  4. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait-blast/islamic-state-suicide-bomber-kills-27-wounds-227-in-kuwait-mosque-idUSKBN0P618L20150626?virtualBrandChannel=11563
  5. https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12435.doc.htm
  6. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/suicide-attack-holy-site-saudi-arabia-city-medina-reports-86052859
  7. http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2016/07/160704_saudi_arabia_blast

Poverty and Violent Extremism in Yemen

For over 1,000 days now, Yemen has been devastated by horrific violence and a brutal civil war.[1] In 2014, the Houthis, a group of Zaidi Shi’a rebels who subscribe to the principles of pan-Islamism,[2] advanced into the Yemeni capital of Sana’a. By January 2015, the rebels had gained control of the presidential palace and successfully pushed the Yemeni government from power.

A student at the Aal Okab school stands in the ruins of one of his former classrooms. He and his fellow pupils now attend lesson in UNICEF tents nearby.

President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi was eventually forced to resign, parliament was dissolved and a Houthi ruling council was established in its place.[3] In March 2015, the Saudi-led military coalition targeted the Houthis and began bombing the rebels in an effort to dislodge them from Sana’a.[4] While the Saudi coalition was able to aid Hadi and various local forces in regaining southern governorates of Yemen, the Houthis continue to control much of the north- including strategic parts of the country such as Sana’a.[5]  On December 4, 2017, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen who had stepped down during the Arab Spring in 2011, was killed by the Iranian backed Houthis. Driven by the desire to regain power, Saleh and his loyalists formally allied with the Houthis in 2015.  However, he broke ties with the rebels in December 2017 and days after expressing his support for Riyadh, the Houthis killed him.

In Yemen, alliances seem to be constantly shifting and the political situation appears to be an endless quagmire. The unrest and dynamic conflict has enabled the Yemen based group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to greatly expand its territorial control and there are ISIS training camps in al Bayda governorate.[6] While AQAP remains a much greater threat than ISIS in Yemen, it is clear that the war torn country has become a breeding ground for terrorism. While a thorough analysis of the current political situation in Yemen is beyond the scope of this discussion, this piece will seek to examine the relationship between poverty and terrorism in Yemen. I will argue that while poverty is not the only underlying cause for terrorist activity in Yemen, it frequently serves as a mobilizing factor that aids in AQAP’s recruitment efforts.

Her bruised eyes still swollen shut, Buthaina Muhammad Mansour, believed to be four or five, doesn’t yet know that her parents, five siblings and uncle were killed when an air strike flattened their home in Yemen’s capital. Despite a concussion and skull fractures, doctors think Buthaina will pull through – her family’s sole survivor of the Aug 25 attack, on an apartment building, that residents blame on a Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen since 2015. The alliance said in a statement it would investigate the air strike, which killed at least 12 civilians.

The civil war in Yemen has produced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as well as the world’s worst cholera outbreak. More than ten thousand innocent civilians have been killed,[7] over fourteen million people are without access to medical care and millions have been internally displaced by the conflict. The Saudi coalition has imposed a de facto blockade, which has significantly worsened the crisis and now roughly seven million people are at risk of famine.[8] The ongoing violence and extreme poverty in Yemen have left families extremely vulnerable. In the April 2016 United Nations annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General reported that…“in Yemen, a particularly worrisome escalation of conflict has been seen. The United Nations verified a fivefold increase in the number of children recruited in 2015 compared with the previous year.”[9]

Yemen is a state on the brink of collapse and this has produced an enabling environment in which extremists are much more successful at mobilizing support for their violent causes. One way terrorists have been able to exploit the extreme poverty of Yemen and gain new recruits is through social service provisions. AQAP has appeared in images and videos on Twitter, showing the group’s fighters paving roads in the Hadramout province and assisting local hospitals.[10] Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen scholar at Oxford University, tells Reuters, “In one video posted on Feb. 28, 2016, AQAP members deliver free medical supplies and equipment to the kidney dialysis and cancer wings of a local hospital.”

In another video, an AQAP militant states, “These are some medicines from your brothers, the Guardians of Sharia, to al-Jamii hospital which was going to be closed … because of no money.”[11] The deputy prime minister of Yemen, Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi, is well aware of the relationship between violent extremism and poverty, especially when it comes to young boys who are often recruited as foot soldiers. Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi states, “Most young people have no prospects in life. Those fanatics offer them the illusion that they can take power and implement authentic Islam – and if they get killed they go to paradise. It’s a win-win situation for them.”[12]

Yemen has been in the grip of civil war since March 2015, when Houthi rebels drove out the government and took over the capital, Sana’a. The crisis quickly escalated, allowing al Qaeda and ISIS — enemies of the Houthis — to grow stronger amid the chaos.

It is clear that young men faced with high levels of poverty and little to no employment prospects are often lured to organizations like AQAP. AQAP not only provides social services but also the promise of financial rewards and compensation.[13] The links between poverty, unemployment and young Yemeni men joining al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not new. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the first Guantanamo detainee to stand trial before the military commissions and a Yemeni citizen, worked as a driver for Osama bin Laden. The Sana’a based mosque where Hamdan was recruited was described as a “gathering place for the dispossessed,” and thus “exerted an especially strong pull on the country’s poor.”[14] Hamdan claimed to have chosen to work for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan because, “working as a driver and mechanic in bin Laden’s motor pool paid better than driving a dabab (minibus) in Sana.”[15]

In this discussion, it is vital to note that many researchers have claimed that the terrorism-poverty thesis is flawed. However, poverty’s role in undermining state capacity has often been overlooked and scholars have often failed to make distinctions between terrorist elites and impoverished communities. Karin von Hippel explains, “Although the leaders of terrorist organizations seem to come from both indigent and bourgeoisie backgrounds, this is not true of their humble servants. Strangely, most researchers recognize that poverty may be a factor among lower ranks but do not include the foot soldiers in their research when aggregating data”.[16]

We cannot dismiss the fact that elites often use the grievance of poverty as a recruitment mechanism and extremists continuously exploit ungoverned or disputed territory. Corinne Graff of The Brookings Institution contends, “There is little evidence to suggest that poverty does not affect the incidence of terrorist attacks. The body of scholarly research thus far has failed to establish this, let alone explain how to measure terrorism. Hence the quantitative data and ensuing data disputing such a relationship remain a poor guide for policy. More convincing is the mounting evidence confirming that poor weak states are vulnerable to violent extremists.”

Abdellatif Allami walks with his three-year-old daughter Sara in the Harat Al-Masna’a slum in Sana’a, home to the families of former factory workers. They used to receive a basic pension of around $120 a month, but the payments stopped seven months ago, and the families now rely on donations to survive.

We cannot simply overlook the fact that “an estimated 17 million Yemenis (about 60 percent of the total population) are estimated food insecure and a further 7 million severely food insecure…malnutrition has increased by 57 percent since 2015 and now affects close to 3.3 million people, 462,000 of which are children under five.”[17] If the state truly does collapse, Yemen will not only become a terrorism hotbed for Sunni jihadists but also for Iran backed Shia militant groups.

Sources:

[1] Faisal Edroos and Ahmad Algohbary, “1,000 days of war in Yemen ‘land of blood and bombs'”, Al Jazeera, December 20, 2017.

[2]“Q&A: What do the Houthis want?”, Al Jazeera, October 2, 2014.

[3]“Yemen: Houthi, Saleh council formation criticised by UN”, Al Jazeera, July 29, 2016.

[4] “Saudi Arabia launches air strikes in Yemen”, BBC News, March 26, 2015

[5] “Yemen Control Map & Report – January 2018”, Political Geography Now, January 7, 2018.

[6] DoD News, Defense Media Activity, “U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Against ISIS Training Camps in Yemen”, October 16, 2017, U.S. Department of Defense.

[7] Nicolas Niarchos, “How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse”, The New Yorker, January 22, 2018.

[8] Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Agency Foresees Severe Famine in Yemen Under Saudi Blockade”, The New York Times, November. 21, 2017.

[9] United Nations General Assembly Security Council.  “Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary General” A/70/836–S/2016/360.

[10] Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari.“How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger – and richer”, Reuters Investigates, April 8, 2016.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ian Black, “Yemen terrorism: Soft approach to jihadists starts to backfire as poverty fuels extremism” The Guardian, July 29, 2008.

[13] Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’s and the Struggle for Yemen”, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 6 (2012).

[14] Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual, Confronting Poverty: Weak States and U.S. National Security, (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 69.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Karin von Hippel, “The Role of Poverty in Radicalization and Terrorism” Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Thousand Oaks: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2014), 61.

[17] “The World Bank in Yemen”, The World Bank, April 1, 2017.

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The Global War on Terror: Myths, Realities, and Solutions

On Wednesday, December 6th, Rise to Peace hosted the first in a series of panels focusing on issues relevant to understanding violent extremism. This panel, The Global War on Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Solutions, featured Ambassador John Limbert, Distinguished Professor of International Affairs at the US Naval Academy; Professor Christopher Kojm, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council and visiting professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs; Professor Gawdat Baghat, professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University; and Ahmad Shah Mohibi, founder of Rise to Peace. The panel was moderated by Rise to Peace Senior Advisor, Assistant US Attorney Michael Sherwin, and introduced by the Director of Editorial & Outreach, Alicia Fawcett.

Through a series of questions, panelists expressed their views on the root causes of extremism, and the necessary conditions for eradicating it. All discussed the importance of perceived injustices and avenues for expressing discontent.

Alicia Fawcett, Director of Marketing and Outreach at Rise to Peace is speaking to Ambassador John Limbert about the Global Challenges.

In Professor Baghat’s words, “The main reason for terrorism is perceived injustice. When people believe they have been unfairly treated they try to do something about it.” Under repressive systems, when there are few peaceful methods of ‘doing something about it’, violent extremism becomes an outlet for discontented groups. “It is that marginalization,” Professor Kojm warns “which lead to horrors.”

The panelists also emphasized the need for the US to take a positive, diplomatic role in the Middle East. “Every other state, whether we like them or not, is a potential partner where we share interests,” noted Ambassador Limbert. Professor Baghat highlighted the need for the US to “promote democratic values and transparency.”

Sandy Maroun, MIPP student the Elliott School of International Affairs asking about role of Hezbolluah of Lebanon in the uprising of global conflicts.

Professor Kojm, however, warned of the need for responsible involvement adding, “The rise of ISIS is due to perceived injustice, perceived existential danger to a community, enormous social and political destabilization in Iraq, all as a result of the US intervention.”

Suleyman Agdag, graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs question about the role of ISIS in the Middle East.

More than one hundred people attended the panel, held at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Food and refreshments were graciously provided by the Master’s of International Policy and Practice program.