Khalid noor Taliban

From Negotiations to the Front Line Fighting the Taliban: Hoping to End Their Fathers’ War

A Rise to Peace Exclusive interview with Khalid Noor, member of the Afghan negotiating team.

Afghan negotiator, Khalid Noor, has been fighting the Taliban alongside his father in northern Afghanistan, with the aim to reverse Taliban advances in Balkh Province. Noor’s diplomatic shift to the military is in response to the Taliban’s military attacks across Afghanistan gaining new territories while pushing back the Afghan security forces.

Driven by a sense of patriotism and a desire to see his country at peace, Khalid Noor believes resisting the Taliban is his duty, stating:

“(We have been trying to negotiate with them, but they would drag their feet). We have no other choice but to continue the fight, given that the Afghan government does not have the capabilities and human resources to fight everywhere.” Noor added: “We are still hopeful that negotiations and a political settlement are in the best interest of Afghanistan and that’s if the Taliban are willing to negotiate or fight. Our stand is clear, that negations are the path to peace and prefer talks over fighting.”

At just 25 years old, Khalid Noor was the youngest negotiator for the Afghan government in the Doha peace talks with the Taliban. The son of a legendary mujahideen commander, Ata Muhammad Noor, and a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and George Mason University, he is capable of bridging the gap between Afghanistan’s traditional politics and its rising younger generation.

As negotiations stalled, the Afghan government with its fragmented leadership has failed to turn back Taliban offensives. Instead, instigating heavy casualties for Afghan forces and territory loss. The situation turned brutal for Afghans when President Biden announced troops withdrawal by September of this year. This ultimately furnished a psychological moral to the Taliban militants, leveraging their cause – the “defeat” of the “world’s super-power.” Whilst Afghan security forces were pushed back by the Taliban, a national mobilization or uprising forces started across Afghanistan. This gave hope, that the Taliban cannot succeed militarily.

Within days and weeks, thousands of Afghans like Khalid Noor, used their ancestors’ guns to defend their communities and loved ones from the Taliban. Among them, women and teenagers as young as 15, have been seen with Ak-47 and machine guns. Instead of returning to Doha, Noor and his two younger brothers, Tariq Noor and Suhaib Noor, opted to defend their home province.

Along with his father, Noor mobilized a militia that intends to retake districts captured by the Taliban. On June 27, we interviewed Khalid Noor regarding his activities on the ground.

Video: by https://www.facebook.com/dw.dari/

Noor stated that thousands of his uprising forces, comprised of the grassroots, are fighting to retake Kaldar, a small district near Afghanistan’s border with Uzbekistan. On June 27, Uzbekistan’s state news agency reported that a Taliban attack on a government checkpoint in Kaldar, forced 17 Afghan soldiers to retreat. This left the district in Taliban control. Only days later, with Noor’s forces on the front lines, the district governor’s office and police station were retaken by government forces.

Noor reports that the Taliban has engaged in little face-to-face combat. Instead, they have primarily focused on guerrilla tactics. This has included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as artillery strikes targeting local infrastructure.

“The next target will be Balkh district, which is near the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,” said Noor. Balkh, the capital of Mazar-e-Sharif, has been seized by the Taliban recently. However, Noor’s operation days later was a huge success.

The Taliban do not have strong grassroots support in northern Afghanistan, unlike other parts of the country. However, in the last decade, their support has grown. This is primarily due to the government’s inability to secure the region. During their regime in the 1990s, the Taliban left a dark chapter with bitter memories. This was due to their destructions and killings of thousands of people when they overran Mazar-e-Sharif. The majority of Noor’s forces are volunteers who are willing to fight and prevent another catastrophe.

While demanding, these district-by-district advances are slow and dangerous, but the only way for the uprising militias to retake Taliban-held territory with their limited resources.

In response to Taliban aggression, forces like Noor’s are rising across Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani has called on them to form a “united front” to support the Afghan security forces, but their efforts currently appear uncoordinated and localized. Ata Muhammad Noor recently presided over a meeting of the political parties in northern Afghanistan and was subsequently selected as head of the military council for National Mobilization.

Noor’s forces have been on the front lines against the Taliban for weeks now and yet have over 22 casualties; six killed and 16 wounded. “The first three of our soldiers martyred by IED and the rest including four of my own personnel guards died in face-to-face combat,” said Noor. 

But Noor understands the potentially harmful implications of an uncoordinated militia-led resistance. His father, during the 1990s, was party to the intra-mujahideen civil war that left Afghanistan in ruins and without a government after the Soviet withdrawal.

It is very dangerous if we [Afghans] go back to the ‘90s. That’s why my father has been pushing the government to work together to control the public uprising forces to avoid any future crisis. (My father believes in consensus. He sees a united front and voice the only way forward; a front that will decide unitedly at this difficult moment),” said Khalid Noor.

It will be up to young Afghan leaders like Noor to ensure that Afghanistan progresses into the future without forgetting the important lessons of its past.


Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

The Security Threats to Afghanistan and its Problematic Shift to Peace

As the conflict status for Afghanistan resides on worsening, there has never been more reasonable grounds for troops to patrol and protect their people and prevent attacks from awaking.

With a robust Afghan National Security Force of approximately 350,000 troops, (1,000 UK and 3,500 US troops) deployed from the country Army Forces, its violence and security threats are supposed to have decreased under the freedom and protection intended under the NATO political and security agreement. After all, 30 countries are making executive decisions and a consensus on the actions best used to provisionally deter the threats and control of the Taliban and its ‘safe haven’ to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, such as Al-Qaeda.

There is still doubt among the citizens of Afghanistan, that deadly violence will most likely persist as a national surge. This is said to last until the Taliban and Afghan Government can form an alliance. Principally, this agreement is realistic in terms of how safety and control can be preserved. This is without further disruption from adversary parties or terrorist groups. To understand what could influence a peace alliance for Afghanistan, it is best to explore its current and emerging threats. 

Afghan Threats: Now and Tomorrow

Since 1978, there has been internal conflict, centred around revenge violence and political insurgence. This is between Afghan anti-communists and Afghan’s communist Government, known as the ‘Afghan War.’ Deadly threats soon turned into actions. This was largely in response to the September 11 terrorist strikes, which were mostly US-led invasions on the Afghan people. Subsequently, this guided the withdraw of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan.

Ever since the devastating attacks, the US has been Afghanistan’s greatest threat – and in many ways – enemy. However, it is agreed that whilst both forces work together in the fight against terrorism, the elimination of “real threats” is underway. This is evident with the Taliban, ISIL, Al-Qaeda and their offline and online affiliates, in light of “#TalibanOurGuardians” circulating on Twitter as a top trending hashtag as they attempt to takeover across Central Asia. 

Today in the small and large cities of Afghanistan, there are ongoing security threats from Kabul towards Pakistan that highlight a potential resurgence of Al-Qaeda after the Taliban fails to cut ties, even after they pledged to do so. The Taliban are utilizing Al-Qaeda’s men that reside in Afghan, as their military position is stronger than ever before. If the Taliban choose to echo Al-Qaeda’s chain of commands, there will likely be an increase in violence.

Furthermore, there may be a disturbance to homes when used as ‘shields’ and predominantly women’s rights. This may jeopardise the progress made towards education and work for Afghan women and girls.

While terrorist groups become more advanced with technology and intelligence, the rationale for defence and preventing further threats is to form a relationship and offer cooperation between the Taliban and outside Governments. This may be an attempt to end the ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan. 

Many argue that the Afghan War will heighten with bloodshed and brutality. Consequently, this may result after its mutuality is lost between the NATO groups and the withdraw of US and British troops. This is evident with the Taliban capturing over 30 districts across Afghanistan, 48 hours following the US withdrawal announcement on June 19.

This is further reinforced with approximately 200 Humvees having been captured from All Nippon Airways in just 3 weeks. This will cause substantial disruption for US and British Air Forces in conflict zones. Essentially, this a faster reign of power than ISIL in Iraq in2014.

Could this jeopardise the US Government’s hold on the fight against terrorism? Many have argued that it has at least confirmed that their 20-year led mission to defeat has. Consequently, there is a difference in opinion. This is due to the conflicting opinion that peace action will bring great alliances for Afghanistan. This may eventually prevent the level of terrorism on their soil in years to come.

However, it is most likely the Taliban will continue to surge without cutting ties with Al-Qaeda. This is both a terrifying and dangerous period for the Afghan people; especially for those who disagree with the Taliban’s extreme beliefs.

Conclusion

There will always be crime and extremism among Afghan communities. This is likely due to its unrepairable history of terrorism conflict. Consequently, the momentum for change to peaceful neighbourhoods is heading in an undepictable direction.

Without ground protection from troops, threats will become harder to suppress and may be too late to prevent. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat logical basis for the Government’s decisions to build trust and alliance with Afghanistan’s violent extremist organisations. Most importantly the Taliban.

The progress towards peace will be determined in the forthcoming months. This will be measured by the Afghan Government’s attempts to tackle the Taliban insurgency. Beyond all, this will depend on how the control takeover is targeted whilst utilizing the advantages of Counter-Terrorism strategies, such as networking and negotiation, for inviting cooperation and harmony in Afghan. This is before there is no way of “containing” terrorist groups and their affiliates in such countries.

 

Reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia discussed at UN meeting

Lessons To Be Learnt From Colombia’s Economic Reintegration Programs

A successful peace agreement does not guarantee lasting peace. The successful reintegration of ex-combatants back into society, while it does not guarantee lasting peace, is essential if peace is to stay. Afghanistan is at a crucial moment in its history. If a peace agreement is negotiated, ex-Taliban fighters must be reintegrated back into Afghan society. This will be achieved by implementing a sound reintegration project. Afghanistan might find success by looking at what other countries have done in the past. In particular, Columbia and its economic reintegration programs that have been implemented in recent years. 

Economic Reintegration In Colombia

Decades of war has led to several cease-fire agreements between the Colombian government and its guerrillas and paramilitaries. As a result, there have been demobilisation efforts which have resulted in the need for reintegration programs. During President Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, the economic programs that were created were centred around the integrity of the free market. Thus, the government had a program whereby ex-combatants would receive a 1.5 million Colombian Pesos (COP) grant to start their own businesses or to invest in housing or education. However, the program was not as successful as the government hoped. The grant allowed the ex-combatants to start their own businesses, but it did not prevent them from experiencing severe income insecurity. Moreover, the Colombian government, in the early stages of reintegration, seemed to put more stock into entrepreneurial programs.

Entrepreneurship In Colombia

Alongside the grant program, the government implemented an entrepreneurial program that gave ex-combatants a one-time 8 million pesos (COP) seed capital. The idea was for the recipients of this capital to invest and create their businesses. This program was a success for some but not all. The main problem stemmed from the fact that the ex-combatants simply did not have the entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The government then shifted its focus away from entrepreneurial programs to employability programs.

The 2010 Law of Formalization and Job Creation (Ley 1429) marks this shift. Ley 1429 gave businesses incentives to hire ex-combatants partaking in reintegration programs by granting them a tax exemption. Despite the government’s attempts to increase employability through vocational training and Ley 1429, there has not been an increase in employment opportunities. Even those that are employed earn less than minimum wage. With some ex-combatants earning less than COP 200,000 per month. Moreover, there is wide stigma that prevents ex-combatants from finding and keeping jobs. Although these programs have not had wide-reaching success, there are a fair number of individuals that have benefitted and succeeded through these programs.  

Entrepreneurial programs should only be implemented for those that possess the sufficient entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The Afghan government, if it intends to implement these types of programs, should provide individuals with entrepreneurial training. It should also implement a loan-based program that should run parallel to any grants that they might provide. If Afghanistan is to implement a loan program, it must supply the individuals with loan management training. Businesses that are created must also fill a need in the community.   

How Can Afghanistan Learn From Colombia?

The Colombian government failed, in the early days of the reintegration process, to prevent the stigma of ex-combatants by the Colombian society. This complicated the reintegration process and made economic reintegration programs less effective. Businesses did not want to hire ex-combatants for fear of being publicly judged. Thus, there was a lack of employment opportunities and the vocational training they received did not increase their employability. The stigma that ex-combatants faced in Colombia will likely be faced by ex-Taliban members and this must be taken into account before implementing an economic reintegration plan. By building trust between ex-Taliban members and the wider Afghan community through community-based programs. 

The Afghan government should also make sure that it provides ex-combatants with adequate vocational training. Which covers a wide variety of skills and professions. However, the training should reflect the community’s needs in order to prevent a lack of employment opportunities. It would be pointless to provide ex-combatants with training for professions that are not in high demand.   

Moreover, Afghanistan should create programs that provide reintegration assistance to ex-Taliban members with disabilities. If not, these individuals run the risk of being excluded and they will be less likely to reap the benefits that untailored reintegration programs will provide. 

Success will depend on the ability of the State to promote a more community-focused reintegration that focuses on both the social and economic aspects of reintegration.  

What Can Afghanistan Learn from Rwanda?

When the war in Afghanistan finally ends, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Taliban fighters will have to be reintegrated into Afghan society. The current generation of Taliban fighters has known little besides war for the majority of their lives. For many, their opposition to the Afghan government and life as an insurgent has formed a key element of their identity. While this might at first cause anxiety about the possibility of reintegrating these fighters into civilian life, the example of reintegration in Rwanda provides a reason for optimism.

Context

The Rwandan genocide was one of the bloodiest events of the twentieth century. Beginning in April of 1994, Hutu militias, indoctrinated into a genocidal ideology by demagogic politicians and “hate radio,” murdered their fellow Tutsi citizens without mercy. Within a mere hundred days, 800,000 people were murdered.

Over 300,000 Rwandans have spent time in prison for their crimes during the genocide. While Rwanda Correctional Services’ main responsibility was overseeing these incarcerated Rwandans, they also provided services useful to the reintegration process. Prisoners were advised to be honest with their loved ones about the crimes they committed, to be understanding if their partner had entered a new relationship, and to work to embrace their identity as a citizen of Rwanda. Some prisoners were provided preparation for employment while incarcerated.

Other participants in the genocide who admitted their guilt and expressed remorse for their crimes chose to participate in TIG (a French acronym for “works of general service”). In exchange for staying out of prison, these citizens have agreed to complete unpaid work to repay their debt to society. TIG participants have been involved in building roads, constructing houses, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.

Many former genocidaires have only recently been released from prison and allowed to return to their communities. Many have received a warm welcome. They are greeted by neighbors who are eager to reconnect and given small gifts like soda pop and beer. Some former genocidaires even manage to have meaningful relationships with the families of their victims.

Rwandan society has chosen to move forward. Recently released Rwandans often comment on the nation’s economic development since their incarceration. Government investment has provided livestock to farmers and helped boost Rwanda’s growth rate to an average of 8% over the last two decades. It is now the second-best place to do business in all of Africa. While powerful commemorations are held every April 7 to remember the genocide’s victims, daily life in Rwanda is now concerned with more simple economic issues: home construction, the agricultural season, and employment.

While reintegration in Rwanda may at first appear to be a niche issue, it makes apparent the possibility of reintegration and forgiveness after even the most extreme instances of violence. Rwanda’s example can provide lessons that are applicable to the case of Afghanistan.

Lessons

Reintegration is a difficult and painful process but it is far less costly than continued fighting. The Afghan government and the foreign powers financing both sides of the war will have to make a serious investment in the reintegration process. This process must be pragmatic and not just symbolic. While truth and reconciliation processes can be psychologically beneficial for ex-combatants, they will not deter another outbreak of violence. Given the influence of money in driving the Afghan war and Afghanistan’s general culture of impunity, it must be in the self interest of Afghanistan’s ex-combatants to accept peace.

Like Rwanda, Afghanistan must successfully foster a spirit of citizenship among participants on all sides of the conflict. While Afghanistan’s long history of decentralized governance makes this difficult, it is a necessity if there is to be a long-lasting peace. A commitment to reconstruction, economic development, and small business projects would be a significant start.

However, these projects must steer clear of the corruption and connections to poppy cultivation and trafficking that plagued previous development initiatives. Pursuing simple programs consisting of only small transfers of cash —like the Rwandan government’s “one cow” program— could help avoid these problems. These programs must not discriminate against ex-combatants. The Taliban must have a stake in Afghanistan’s future if they are to be reintegrated into society.

When a peace agreement is signed between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, the Taliban will be free men. Compelling them to take part in the sort of reintegration programs and commemorations that Rwandans do will be near impossible. Instead, they must voluntarily rejoin their communities. Through the construction of economic, social, and religious interdependence, Taliban fighters could find peace to be in their self interest. While reintegration will prove a difficult task, it will certainly be far less difficult —and less costly— than another outbreak of war in Afghanistan.

— Connor Bulgrin

Biden Administration Resumes Taliban Peace Talks

After weeks of increased violence, uncertainty, and a stalemate between the negotiating parties, talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban resumed earlier this week in Doha, amid a looming deadline for US troops to fully withdraw from the country by May of this year. Despite the flurry of historic developments that have taken place in Afghanistan over the past year, the next couple of months will be a critical test for both the momentum of the peace process and the patience of the major players involved.

For the Biden Administration, the outcome of the dialogue in Doha will be the first major foreign policy challenge, one that will either culminate in a historic agreement or continued entrenchment for what has already been America’s longest war. Public opinion polls conducted amongst a diverse group of American voters suggest that while most have experienced fatigue with the conflict, very few support a complete withdrawal of US troops, even when accounting for partisan differences.

Nevertheless, a full drawdown would likely strengthen the Taliban’s position, and encourage a repeat of the chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, and the cessation of Soviet foreign aid in 1991, which quickly brought down the government of Mohammad Najibullah a year later.

The Taliban’s current fighting force (estimated between 40,000-60,000 fighters) would take complete control of Afghan territory, highly unlikely. However, a potential breakdown of the current unity government, buttressed by the Taliban’s enduring connection to both Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-Khorasan), would whet the Taliban’s risk appetite for sustained engagement with the Afghan armed forces as seen in the past months.

Given the fragility of the Ghani government, and waning enthusiasm from the American side, the Biden Administration’s best option is to pursue a compromise that would postpone their scheduled withdrawal in May and buy more time for the negotiators. Dr. Amin Ahmadi, who is a member of the Afghan government’s negotiating team, notes the importance of a clear American policy. “I think they can pursue a multi-pressure strategy. First, the US exit from Afghanistan should be condition-based on peace in Afghanistan. The Americans should make it clear to the Taliban that if they don’t want peace, they will stay in Afghanistan.”

At present, US policy toward Afghanistan remains vague, and although President Biden’s approach is expected to be a marked departure from that of his predecessor, it appears unlikely that he will undo either of two signature moves made by the Trump Administration, including the existing withdrawal agreement, and the recent drawdown of American troop levels to their present level of 2,500. Key personnel tied to the current deliberations, most notably US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, are also expected to be retained in the Biden Administration’s foreign policy team.

Ahmadi adds that the “Taliban have the upper hand at negotiations, not because of the US-Taliban deal, but because they can simply walk away from the talks and go back fighting. The Doha agreement has defined the US troops withdrawal condition-based so there is no pressure on Taliban at the moment.” The Taliban has also benefited from the successful release of imprisoned fighters, and the international legitimacy that the US peace deal conferred to its organization and its external relations with foreign powers.

The recent recess in peace talks saw the Taliban appeal to Iran, Russia, and Turkey in a bid to cultivate support and obstruct US efforts to put pressure on regional actors. In the event that calls for an interim government (one that would presumably replace Ghani) go unheeded, the opportunity would be ripe for the Taliban to exploit factionalism between Ghani’s supporters and political rivals.

Khalid Noor, the youngest member of the Afghan government’s negotiating team, notes that the “interim government is preferred by a majority of the political community, however, there should be some sort of guarantee by the Taliban, along with the support of regional actors before such a thing could happen.” Yet, Ghani and his supporters have been steadfast in their opposition to such a plan, suggesting that a premature conclusion of his term would be a rebuke of Afghanistan’s republic system. Nevertheless, even if Ghani agrees to a transfer of power, Dr. Ahmadi suggests that “the question of an interim government should be part of the solution, not the solution.”

In order to reach the ideal scenario of a postponed withdrawal, the United States will likely have to lean on its existing relationship with state actors in lieu of a direct appeal to the Taliban. While generating strong buy-in from the likes of Russia, Iran, and Turkey is unlikely in the next 2 months, the Biden Administration does possess leverage over the Taliban’s main source of financial support (member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council) and political support (Pakistan).

Ahmadi agrees, noting that “the most important country for the Taliban in Pakistan, and when Pakistan is under American pressure, it will help the peace process.” By wielding the threat of sanctions, the United States could fulfill Pakistan’s long-standing demand to be removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s “grey list”, which would provide relief for Pakistan’s access to global capital markets and encourage foreign direct investment. 

The economic argument for peace in Afghanistan has only grown stronger given the presence of lucrative natural resources, particularly mineral wealth, and the favorable location that could help the country generate transit fees from energy projects and improved infrastructure to facilitate trade between East and West Asia.

Dr. Adib Farhadi, an Assistant Professor of Peace & Conflict at the University of South Florida, believes the economic case could be compelling to win support from regional players like Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. “You counter violent extremism by winning hearts and minds, which includes giving Afghans jobs. Afghanistan is a rich country, but the economics only works if everyone is included.” The recent commodity boom bodes well for the resources found in Afghanistan, with technology-critical elements like Lithium and Rare Earth Elements in a large abundance.

With little more than 60 days remaining before US troops are scheduled to withdraw, the next set of developments will be a harbinger for the trajectory of the peace process. Sustaining the momentum of the milestones achieved in the past year will require difficult political compromises from a long list of state and non-state actors.