Taliban

Afghan refugees entering Iran from Nimroz province of Afghanistan — a key smuggling province. Photo: social media
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Afghan Youth Killed by Iranian Police Whilst Fleeing the Taliban

Afghan youth Hekmatullah Sharifi, a 19-year-old boy from Balucha Village – Badakhshan province of Afghanistan was tragically shot and killed by the Iranian patrol police at the Afghan-Iran border. Hekmat was occupied by 14 other young boys that feared recruitment of the Taliban, therefore, fled to Iran for protection from the oppression. However, with attacks intensifying in several districts and cities across Afghanistan, and territorial gains from the Taliban including Badakhshan province, Iranian patrol police became apprehensive of Hekmat’s identity as an illegal immigrant and chose to favor in fatal action due to unwanted passing across the border into Iran.

Despite Hekmat’s efforts to escape through days of smuggling via vehicles and on foot into Iran like thousands of other Afghans, his life was taken without a second thought as the relations between Iran and Afghanistan is deemed poor.

Hekmatullah Sharifi, a 19-year-old boy from Balucha Village – Badakhshan poses for a picture by the river next to his house in 2021. picture sent to Rise to Peace by his friends.

It is evident that the Taliban are frightening Afghan and Iran neighborhoods, but more critically, the Iranian police appear the most alarmed and uneased from the threat. With the Taliban’s rule of targeting families with three or more young boys to fight for the Islamist organization, Afghan teens are fleeing their hometowns to seek a safe haven in Iran but also work and provide for their families instead of the Taliban. This is causing difficulties for the Iranian police, especially at their borders whilst tensions are high and trust in people is low.

Officers are seemingly terrified and overwhelmed by the fluid situation in Afghan that is provoked by the Deobandi Islamist movement and military organization (Taliban), and as a result of this, young individuals are being brutally killed at the scene instead of formally detained. Evidence confirms that Hekmat died at 5:00 AM on 5/8/1400 after surgery in response to the attack at a 200-bed hospital in Nimroz province.

Taliban Recruitment of Children

In the current day as the Taliban’s attempt to take-over of Central Asia, the Taliban are described to be seeking out families who have 3 or more young boys and state that whilst located in Afghanistan, one of the boys has a responsibility to go fight with the Taliban organization. Necessarily forced recruitment through invasions of homes and detriment of livelihoods, to which researchers have only concluded as a possibility of the Taliban’s recruitment over the years.

Reports have described the Taliban to be recruiting minors since the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in early July, where they are described as child soldiers, human shields, and suicide bombers. It is blatant that Afghan communities are suffering since the American withdrawal. It has caused and will most likely continue to cause devastating outcomes for ethnic minorities similar to Hekmatullah for months to come. Young boys are aware of their fate set out with the Taliban and choose to risk their lives by fleeing than representing the Taliban and their version of Islam and creating peace.

Without the protection from foreign force troops on the ground, who are due to decrease drastically more until September 11th, 2021, there will always be a struggle to maintain livelihoods and critical facilitates in Central Asia.

How Can Afghanistan-Iran Authorities Do Better?

It is obvious that the governments of Afghanistan and Iran need to recognize a strategy to engage with the Taliban to discourage bloodshed, however, whilst this seems almost impossible in the current day, internal parties (i.e. patrol police) should prepare a better understanding of the hardened situations that differ in each region and allow an effective approach to questioning individuals that attempt to cross their borders. This has been the method for the Iranian patrol police towards Afghanistan people for decades when coming across desperate illegal immigrants.

Civilized and safe detainment of said individuals with a respect to human rights needs to be reinforced to better their relationship. Only then can innocent lives and low levels of youth militarization by the Taliban be preserved.

Chantelle Davis, Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Homa Aryan M, Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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The Evolving Russian-Taliban Relations

On July 7th, a Taliban delegation visited Moscow and met with the Kremlin envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabuluv. This visit took place against the backdrop of increasing Taliban gains in Afghanistan. One might ask how the Taliban, a movement designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, is being welcomed in Moscow by official Russian representatives. To understand how the Taliban achieved this diplomatic achievement, an examination of the historical relations between Russia and the Taliban, as well as Russia’s interests in Afghanistan, is needed.

Russian-Taliban Relations: Historical Background

On February 15th, 1989, the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The humiliating Soviet withdrawal greatly impacted the USSR and Russia’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. When the Afghan Civil War erupted in the 1990s, Russia tried to avoid any involvement in the conflict. However, in 1999 Russia got off the fence and threw its support behind the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The catalyst for its policy shift was the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya and its ties to international Islamist radical groups which operated in Chechnya and were loosely allied with the Taliban ally al-Qaeda.

Following the attacks of 9/11, President Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to reach out to Washington and pledge his support for the U.S response. Russia supplied the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda with intelligence, opened its airspace to planes carrying humanitarian aid, and accepted the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia. Following the initially successful U.S. invasion, Russia was reduced to the role of spectator for the rest of the decade, mainly criticizing and trying to eliminate the growing flow of drugs out of Afghanistan into Russia.

The Shift in Russian-Taliban Relations

The major policy shift towards the Taliban occurred in the mid-2010s, following the 2014 breakdown of Russian-Western relations over Ukraine. The shift was propelled by both national security and geopolitical concerns. First, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan raised alarms in Moscow. Russia was increasingly concerned by the threat ISKP posed to Russia and its Central Asian allies.

According to Moscow’s assessment, the threat from ISKP surpassed the threat the Taliban posed because the Taliban had no regional aspirations beyond Afghanistan, while ISKP posed a regional and global security threat. Russia believed that the Taliban could combat ISKP more effectively than the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. For Russia, supporting the Taliban was seen as a logical step, or as the Kremlin envoy Zamir Kabuluv explained it: “The Taliban are fighting in Afghanistan against the people we fought in Syria, that’s why our interests coincide”.

In its support of the Taliban today, Russia chooses to turn a blind eye to the reemergence of al-Qaeda in more than 15 provinces in Afghanistan and reports of Taliban collaboration with ISKP. Russia relies on the security assurances the Taliban promises Russia. The Taliban assures Russia that it will help to secure the border with Central Asian states and prevent spillover of fighting and terror activities to Russia’s southern strategic frontier.

Second, Russia sees Afghanistan as an opportunity to harass and undermine the U.S. and the West as part of their great power geopolitical competition. By challenging the West in Afghanistan, Russia wishes to reassert itself as a dominant geopolitical player in the region after its status was weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union. It has been reported that Russia supported the Taliban efforts against the West and the Afghan government with weapons and funds. Furthermore, Russia was accused of offering bounties to Taliban-linked groups for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan during the U.S.-Taliban peace talks.

Conclusions

Russian-Taliban relations have changed over the years, changing from hostility to cooperation as part of their great power competition. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is seemingly a favorable outcome for Russia. This development, however, could eventually backfire and undermine Russia’s efforts to gain regional stability and dominance. A Taliban takeover could further destabilize neighboring Central Asian countries, requiring Russia to divert attention and military resources to Central Asia to protect its allies. Russia might soon find out that you should be careful what you wish for.

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Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process

Following the ongoing U.S troop’s withdrawal from Afghanistan after the 20-year campaign in the country, the insurgency of the Taliban remains resilient. The Persian Gulf States played a key role during the Afghan conflict, in terms of mediation and reconstruction efforts. Consequently, their involvement is likely to increase once U.S troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan.

As a regional power with strong historic relations with Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia is expected to actively participate in the peace process. The “Declaration of Peace in Afghanistan”, signed in Makkah on the 11th June 2021, witnesses Saudi Arabia’s commitment to promoting peace and dialogue so as to prevent every form of violence and extremism, in line with the Islamic principles. However, it is relevant to take into consideration that Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by the anti-Iranian agenda. Additionally, their goal is to expand Saudi religious, political, and cultural spheres of influence in Afghanistan.

Background

The Saudi monarchy has a long history of engagement in Afghanistan. In 1980, Saudi Arabia partnered with Pakistan and the United States to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan by financing the mujahideen in the 1980s for humanitarian aid and weapons. Osama Bin Laden was among the Saudi financiers of the mujahideen. In 1996, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan were the only three Gulf states to recognize the Taliban, after they took control of Kabul.

After 9/11, Saudi Arabia formally cut ties with the Taliban. This was due to international pressure, prompted by Bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks.

The shift in the Saudi policy in Afghanistan is evident in the Saudi support of the Afghan government, in terms of investment, reconstruction, and mediation efforts in the country. In 2010, the former Afghan President Karzai (2001-2014) sought Saudi mediation to reconcile with the Taliban. Saudi Arabia’s mediation with the Taliban failed, and Qatar emerged as the privileged actor in the Afghan peace negotiations.

Saudi Arabia Agenda in Afghanistan

Recently, Saudi Arabia hosted the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. Important decisions and agreements between the two countries were reached.

In regards to political relations, the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the GCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The goals of which were to strengthen cultural, political, and economic cooperation. Furthermore, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are committed to enhancing security cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This is subsequently a common threat.

Concerning the educational development, both sides agreed to accelerate the establishment of the International Islamic University in Nangarhar. This is a district where ISIL-K has not been entirely eradicated. The university will deliver religious classes in Arabic rather than Afghanistan’s national languages.

However, Saudi Arabia’s reconstruction and investment efforts in the country should be seen in the bigger picture of the Kingdom’s interests. Additionally, expanding its influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a way to balance the influence of Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two leading Islamic powers, Sunni and Shi’a, are committed to the building of Islamic universities and higher education institutions in Afghanistan to exert their influence.

As stated by Simon Mabon, a lecturer in international relations and director of the Richardson Institute for Peace Studies at Lancaster University, “Funding schools and universities is an increasingly popular way of cultivating soft – cultural – power, with education seen as a way of empowering people and providing them with the means through which to improve their socio-economic positions within society”.

Conclusion

All in all, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the country may increase to fill the void after the U.S troops. In case of a full-scale civil war in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia may support armed groups based on its political and religious allies to exert influence within the peace process. Saudi Arabia and Iran should not lose their opportunity to engage in Afghanistan to mediate and stabilize the country. The result of its loss could result in a destabilization of the Middle East. Ultimately, this is not in any of the countries interests.

Saudi Arabia should rather focus on its commitment to supporting lasting peace in Afghanistan. This may be achieved by promoting peace and dialogue amongst the Afghani and Pakistani leaders, according to Islamic principles. A sustainable peace process in Afghanistan, as well as stability, can only be achieved by including Shi’a minorities.

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Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban Might Come Back to Haunt Islamabad

The scenes from recent Taliban military successes in Afghanistan were positively received among members of Pakistan’s security establishment. While denying it publicly, these Pakistani hardliners have funneled support to the Taliban for decades. If the current trajectory of the conflict continues, they will get what they wished for: a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. A Taliban triumph, however, will provide a merely pyrrhic victory for Pakistan, a victory that it will come to regret.

Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban

Since the Taliban’s emergence almost three decades ago, Pakistan has continuously provided a safe haven and financial and military assistance to the Taliban. Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistan became a safe haven for Al-Qaeda’s leadership as well. There are a couple of reasons why Pakistan continues its support for the Taliban.

First, Pakistan’s security apparatus believes that the Taliban gives it strategic depth, securing the Afghan frontier and permitting the concentration of Pakistani forces on the Indian frontier. The Taliban is the only ally of Pakistan among Afghanistan’s political actors. Pakistan believes that maintaining positive relations with the organization will prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for anti-Pakistan militants and outside powers.

Second, Pakistan fears that targeting Afghan militant groups will invite retaliation against Pakistani targets. While Pakistan sponsors these groups, it lacks full control of them. Nevertheless, it continues to argue to the contrary, believing that this strengthens its position in international bargaining.

Third, Pakistan fears a strong and independent Afghanistan that is aligned and supported by India. Such an Afghan-Indian alliance, Pakistan believes, will encircle Pakistan. The 2011 Afghanistan-Indian strategic partnership agreement and the recent call by Ambassador Mamundzay, the top Afghan diplomat in Delhi, for India to play a bigger role in Afghanistan, increases Pakistan’s paranoia regarding Indian engagement in Afghanistan.

What Can Go Wrong for Islamabad?

Internationally, the Taliban takeover will affect Pakistan’s strategic depth and its diplomatic relations with its neighbors.

First, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan sees the Taliban in Afghanistan as its strategic depth in its confrontation with India. The Taliban, however, has its own interests. The Taliban would probably intensify its diplomatic campaign to gain international legitimacy. India has already established a new direct line to the Taliban and an Indian delegation has met Taliban officials last month in Doha. Normalization between the Taliban and India will undermine Pakistan’s conception of its strategic depth.

Second, Pakistan should expect increasing pressure from its Islamic neighbors Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These countries have accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban in the past, and with the intensification of fighting between the Taliban and Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen warlords, this pressure is sure to increase.

Third, with diminishing influence over the Taliban and increasing international demand to rein in and influence the Taliban, Pakistan will find itself in a diplomatic nightmare. A victorious Taliban is less likely to defer to Islamabad in its moment of victory. At the same time, the international community will increasingly defer to Pakistan to act and impose its influence over the Taliban. The failure of Pakistan to influence the Taliban will inflict a blow on its international bargaining power.

Domestically, the Taliban takeover will create economic and security challenges for Pakistan. First, escalation of the war and a Taliban takeover will propel a massive flood of refugees into Pakistan. These refugees would join the 3 million people already seeking refuge in Pakistan. As Pakistan has its hands full, these new refugees will further exacerbate its economic situation.

Second, a Taliban win will embolden the jihadists’ anti-government factions in Pakistan. In the past, the Taliban has already inspired extremist movements in Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have launched attacks against Pakistani targets, horrifically killing 132 kids in an army school in Peshawar in 2014 in one such attack. Taliban success in neighboring Afghanistan will lead to the import of sectarian violence from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

Conclusions

While the Pakistani military establishment is cheerful about the recent Taliban successes, Pakistan might face an international and domestic blowback if the Taliban will take over Afghanistan. It might be in Pakistan’s best interest to confidentially ask the U.S. to intensify its air support to Afghan government forces operations to prevent the Taliban from taking over.

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The New Reality in Afghanistan Requires the Afghanistan Government to Change Its Strategy

Since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement in February 2020, the Taliban has accelerated its offensive, securing major gains. The Taliban has expanded its control of the country and captured border crossings, routing entire Afghan National Army units in the process.

Clearly, the current government strategy is failing. The Afghan government should realize the fact that without the presence of U.S. and NATO troops, they are the weaker side in this war. Instead of denying it, the Afghan government should adopt a new strategy that better represents the evolving reality in its war against the Taliban.

Current Strategy

Operationally, under the authority of Joint Order 125, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) holds an active-defense posture, concentrating on defending major provisional capitals. The Active Defense consists of ANDSF patrolling forward from checkpoints, conducting limited offensive actions and counterattacks within the vicinity of checkpoints, and consolidating checkpoints. With the exception of the Special Security Forces, the Afghan conventional forces rarely take the fight to the Taliban and increasingly often surrender without a fight.

Diplomatically, the Afghan government continues to ask the U.S. to keep its contractors in Afghanistan and its air support to Afghan troops. With diminishing U.S. military presence, the government also calls on other countries to provide technical and anti-terrorism operation support. At the same time, the Afghan government maintains its commitment to peace talks with the Taliban.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on two of Sun Tzu’s hierarchy of strategies, attacking the enemy’s strategy and disrupting the enemy’s alliances.

First, the Taliban strives to gain international and domestic recognition. Domestically, the Taliban tries to rebrand itself as a capable government able to provide the population with basic needs. Internationally, the Taliban strives to expand its international recognition. From its Doha-based political office, Taliban officials visit world capitals and conduct negotiations.

To confront the Taliban domestically, the Afghan government should focus on the population. Using tools of propaganda, the government should portray the Taliban as corrupt, oppressive, and foreign-controlled. With more than 60 percent of the Afghan population under the age of 24, the majority of the population never lived under Taliban rule and are not familiar with the organization’s ways. With increasing reports of Taliban committed assassinations and executions of government forces and officials, oppression of women, and reports of foreign fighters in its ranks, the government could mobilize the population against the Taliban.

Internationally, the Afghan government should defame the Taliban as untrustworthy and urge world governments to refrain from negotiating with the Taliban and providing it a façade of international recognition. The continued participation in the peace talks with the Taliban should also be reconsidered. The participation of the government provides the Taliban recognition with no substantial gains for the government.

Furthermore, the Taliban knows that the government forces are static, trying to keep control of provincial capitals. While the government forces are pinned down in cities, the Taliban takes control of more territories and expands its operations in the north. This dynamic needs to change and the government needs to take the initiative.

The government should retreat from “lost causes” such as defending overrun southern districts and solidify the government’s control in the central and northern regions. Then, it should wage guerrilla warfare in Taliban-controlled regions against the Taliban’s extended supply lines, symbols of governance, and political organizations. The successful mobilization of militias is key in bolstering the capacity of the pro-government forces. The “glue” that connects the members of these militia’s together, ethnic identity and strong anti-Taliban sentiment, decreases the chances of desertion.

Second, the Afghan government needs to disrupt the enemy’s alliances. Pakistan, traditionally perceived as the Taliban’s main ally, should be the main effort. The potential Taliban takeover of Afghanistan raises concerns in Pakistan’s halls of power. A Taliban victory will embolden Pakistan’s own anti-government Islamist movements and hinder the country’s stability. The Afghan government should take advantage of Pakistan’s concerns and urge Islamabad to cease its support of the Taliban.

Conclusion

The successful Taliban offensive requires the Afghan government to rethink its strategy. Acknowledging the reality on the ground should propel the government to consider such a change. Attacking the enemy’s strategy and its alliances is a good first step in changing the tide of war.

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