A Tale of Two Withdrawals: What the U.S. Can Learn from the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon

On August 15th, 2021, Taliban fighters captured Kabul without firing a shot, sending shock waves across the world and expediting the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like the Afghanistan withdrawal, the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was long expected and planned. Nevertheless, the events on the ground shifted quickly and forced Israel to complete the withdrawal overnight. With events in Afghanistan still unfolding, the U.S. can learn from Israeli experiences in Lebanon and prevent a humanitarian disaster from occurring at the Kabul airport.

The Invasion

Israel and the U.S. invaded Lebanon and Afghanistan, respectively, in order to eradicate the havens these countries had become for terrorist organizations. Since the 1970s, the PLO has used southern Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and successfully removed the PLO from Lebanon. Israel subsequently supported the establishment of a friendly regime in Beirut led by the Phalanges.

Following its initial success, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon and created a security zone in southern Lebanon. The military rationale underlying the establishment of the security zone was to prevent Hezbollah, another anti-Israel insurgent group, and its terror cells from entering Israel, and to deflect fire away from Israeli territory toward the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a local militia fully funded and equipped by Israel.

Similar to the haven Lebanon provided the PLO and Hezbollah, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 7th, 2001, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and with local anti-Taliban forces routed Al-Qaeda and ended the Taliban regime. On May 1st, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat” in Afghanistan.

The Withdrawal

For over fifteen years, Israelis believed that their presence in southern Lebanon and the casualties associated with it were necessary. As their presence drew on, however, Israeli consensus shifted, leading to broad public support for a unilateral withdrawal and the election of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, a vocal supporter of the withdrawal. Barak tried to tie his plans for a withdrawal from Lebanon to a peace agreement with Syria. But this plan failed, leading to his decision to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally and reject the advice of his senior military leaders that advocated against it. Consequently, the withdrawal from Lebanon didn’t go according to plan and what unfolded on the ground was described as chaos.

When Israel began to transfer its military outposts to the SLA in mid-May, the SLA proved unable to hold its ground, deciding to abandon its outposts and disband rather than continue fighting. Barak had to advance the timetable for the IDF’s withdrawal from July to May 24. The collapse of the SLA and Hezbollah’s lightning advance initiated a massive flood of SLA members and their families to the Israeli border, fearing Hezbollah’s retribution.

Unlike the Israeli withdrawal, the U.S. withdrawal was an integral part of the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban. While the Taliban has overwhelmingly violated the agreement, President Biden remained committed to the withdrawal, ignoring the warnings of his top military generals and diplomats. Emboldened by the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban launched its major summer offensive. Once the first provisional capital fell, the Afghan Army collapsed in days, often surrendering to the Taliban without firing a shot. On August 15th, 2021, the Taliban entered victoriously into Kabul.

Conclusions

Every day we bear witness to the unfolding events in Afghanistan. Similar events were unfolding on the Israeli-Lebanese border in 2000. Then, Israel was overwhelmed with the rapid collapse of the SLA and the flood of refugees towards its border. Israel opened its borders and allowed Israel’s allies and their families to enter Israel. Nevertheless, it took Israel 20 years to officially honor the SLA fighters and their sacrifice.

The U.S. shouldn’t wait 20 years to honor its Afghan allies. The U.S. has a moral obligation of not leaving them behind, regardless of whether they are citizens or allies. The U.S. can still do the right thing and open Kabul’s airport gates, its aircraft’s doors, and most importantly its heart, to the fleeing Afghan allies.

Views from Washington: How US Troop Withdrawal Will Affect the Taliban

On October 7th, 2001, former president George W. Bush launched the war in Afghanistan, following the 9/11 attacks. 20 years later, current President Joe Biden says, “it’s time to end America’s longest war,” as he announced that the United States is pushing for a full withdrawal of troops by September 11, 2021. The 3,500 troops remaining in Afghanistan will be withdrawn, regardless of whether progress is made in intra-Afghan peace talks or the Taliban reduces its attacks on Afghan security forces and citizens. NATO troops in Afghanistan will also leave.

Leaders in Washington will continue to assist the Afghan security forces and do all that can be done to support the peace process. However, the Taliban has stated that it will not participate in “any conference” on the future of Afghanistan until all foreign troops leave.

There are very mixed responses to this announcement. This is likely due to the Taliban’s psychological and military momentum in the country. The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, following the U.S.-led invasion. Since then, it has waged an insurgency against the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. Many experts are concerned that the Taliban is stronger now than ever. They currently control over half of Afghanistan’s districts.

The first direct peace negotiations with the Afghan government began in 2020, signing an agreement with the United States. However, little progress has been made.

Former President Bush called the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan a mistake and predicted that the consequences, especially for Afghan women and girls, will be “unbelievably bad.” Former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton has also voiced her concerns about the Taliban regaining control if the US withdraws its troops. She has stated that:

This is what we call a wicked problem. There are consequences both foreseen and unintended of staying and of leaving. The US government has to focus on two huge consequences: the resumption of activities by extremist groups and a subsequent outpouring of refugees from Afghanistan.”

Clinton furthermore highlighted that the potential collapse of the Afghan government and a possible takeover by the Taliban, could result in a new civil war. On the flip side, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont does not think the troops should be there. Former President, Donald Trump, advocated for US troops to return home and subsequently criticized the US military interventions for being costly and ineffective.

When the war began in 2001, the public largely supported it. In early 2002, 93%, a record high, of Americans supported the war. As time went on and troops remained, majorities continued to hold these beliefs between 2004 and 2013. Then for the first time in 2014, an equal amount of people believed that it was a mistake. More and more people began believing that it was a mistake and the war made the US less safe. In 2021, 47% say U.S. military involvement was a mistake; 46% say it was not. From a political party standpoint, the recent polls show that 56% of Democrats and 29% of Republicans now say it was a mistake.

There is no military path to victory and peace talks are believed to be the best way to resolve the insurgency. Many U.S. security experts remain concerned that under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan would remain a safe haven for terrorists, who could launch attacks against the United States and its allies.

In its 2021 report, the United Nations team that monitors the Taliban has gathered significant data. This has demonstrated that the group still has strong ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban continues to provide al-Qaeda with protection in exchange for resources and training. Between 200-500 al-Qaeda fighters are believed to be in Afghanistan, and its leaders are believed to be based in regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Biden is optimistic that the withdrawal will be completed by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The current United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, said the Biden administration was “very focused on a deliberate, safe and orderly” withdrawal of troops, but that the US would continue to assist the Afghan government. “Even as our forces are pulling out of Afghanistan, we are not withdrawing – we are not disengaging.” Also adding that if US troops were attacked before leaving the country, “decisive action” would be taken.

Biden and those who support the drawdown made this decision based on the U.S. accomplishing its main goals in Afghanistan: finding the terrorists who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, killing Osama bin Laden and trying to limit the country’s base of operations for terrorists. Nation-building was not part of the original strategy, and this is a war that has dragged on for too long, costing the U.S. far too many lives and money.

 

 

 

 

The World Needs to See the Taliban for What It Is: A Hybrid Terrorist Organization

Over the last weekend, the Taliban continued its country-wide offensive, successfully capturing several Afghan provincial capitals. While the U.S. continues to pin its hopes on a Taliban-Afghan government peace deal to halt the country’s relentless violence, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The Taliban’s offensive casts serious doubt on its supposed desire to reach a peaceful resolution. The U.N. special envoy for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, has questioned the Taliban’s commitment to a political settlement.

The statements of the Taliban’s Doha-based political office regarding their willingness to negotiate are no more than smoke and mirrors, maintaining a glimpse of hope for the West for a peaceful resolution while at the same time continuing the offensive. It represents a conceptual failure of the West in understanding the organizational nature of the Taliban. The Taliban, with all of its branches, is a terrorist organization, or more precisely, a hybrid terrorist organization.

Definitions

Terrorism is the deliberate use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political ends. The terrorist has political goals, whether nationalistic, separatist, socioeconomic, or religious. The Taliban’s end goal, for example, is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. Terrorism is differentiated from criminal violence by its deliberate use of violence against civilians for political ends.

A hybrid terrorist organization is one that stands on multiple legs. First, it has a military or paramilitary leg that engages in terrorist acts. Second, it has a political leg that allows the organization to operate and win in both the “illegitimate” arena of terrorism and the “legitimate” arena of the media. Third, it acts as an alternative provider of welfare services through seemingly innocent organizations serving a potential or actual constituency. Among jihadist organizations such as the Taliban, this activity is known as da’wa and subsumes a combination of religious services, educational services, ideological indoctrination, and welfare services.

The Taliban as a Hybrid Terrorist Organization

The Taliban’s operations today are divided between its three legs: military, political, and social welfare-da’wa.

Its military forces are advancing on all fronts, seizing provincial capitals, and increasingly utilizing terror tactics against civilians and governmental installations. In recent weeks, the Taliban kidnapped and executed a popular Kandahari comedian Nazar Mohammad, apparently because he ridiculed Taliban leaders.  The Taliban tried to assassinate the acting defense minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi in a bombing attack, leaving dozens dead but failing to kill the minister. The Taliban shot and killed the director of Afghanistan’s government media center, Dawa Khan Menapal, after ambushing him in Kabul. In its overall strategy, the Taliban has been conducting summary executions, beating up women, shutting down schools, and blowing up clinics and infrastructure.

Its political office presents a different face. From its seat in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban’s political office maintains its commitment to negotiation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Taliban has dispatched delegations to Russia, China, and Iran in hopes of gaining international legitimacy. Finally, the Taliban has also emphasized its willingness to grant rights to women.

As part of its da’wa efforts, the Taliban has created a network of Islamic religious schools, called madrasas, all across the country. These schools attract many poor families because the Taliban cover all expenses and provide food and clothing for the children. On some occasions, the Taliban has encouraged families to send their children to their schools by offering families cash. These schools are used as recruitment and training sites for the Taliban.

Conclusions

Despite what it may say, the Taliban has not changed and holds the same views as it did before. The only difference is that it has become more sophisticated in its use of technology and is better integrated within the jihadi universe. In order to successfully confront the Taliban, the world must first conceptually understand the nature of the organization. Second, it must designate all of the Taliban’s operational legs as part of the same hybrid terrorist organization. Finally, this designation will enable the world to use counterterrorist strategies to better confront all of the Taliban’s legs.

Qatar’s Mediation Challenges in the Afghan Peace Process

As NATO’s 20-year campaign in Afghanistan comes to an end and the Taliban escalate their nationwide offensive, Qatar remains the most privileged actor among the Persian Gulf States. This comes as a result of Qatar’s mediation efforts in listening to the different actors involved in the Afghan conflict and the considerable trust earned throughout the past few years.

In spite of Qatar’s long experience as a mediator in disputes and wars, the Gulf country has some challenges and responsibilities to face, in terms of regional and international stability and peace.

Background

Although Qatar did not recognize the Taliban between 1996 and 2001, it maintained “cordial” relations with the group after 9/11. The decision to open a political office hosting Taliban leaders in Doha in 2013, was a major step for the Afghan peace negotiations. Initially, the Afghan government expressed its willingness to provide protection for the Taliban leaders by opening a political office in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. This was largely based on the countries’ historic ties with Kabul. However, the Taliban expressed their preferences over Qatar, which was believed to be a more impartial and balanced power.

In September 2020, peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government took place in Doha. In spite of this, an acute rise in civilian casualties followed. According to OHCHR data, October 2020 marked the highest monthly number of civilian casualties of the year, “with targeted killings of civilians […] included media workers, civil society activists, members of the judiciary and the government administration, as well as relatives of members of the security forces”.

On 17th and 18th of July 2021, peace talks were held in Doha between the Taliban and the Afghan government. However, the Qatari facilitator stated that the two sides had only agreed to “work to prevent civilian casualties”. Despite this, both sides committed to expediting peace negotiations in Doha in the upcoming weeks.

Qatar challenges and potentiality in the peace process

Qatar is known as a power capable of exerting its regional and international influence through the mediation tool. Since 2008, the Gulf country has mediated in more than 10 international disputes. Among them, it is worth mentioning, the Qatari mediation between Fatah and Hamas in 2012, as well as the reconciliation and peace between the rival Tebu and Tuareg tribes in Libya in 2015.

Qatar could also mediate to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia’s regional and ideological tensions and goals in Afghanistan. This could be achieved by highlighting the commitment and efforts to bring peace, reconstruction, and protection of human rights.

However, Qatar will also have to face difficulties. Qatar has lately been approached by NATO concerning the possible use of a base in Qatar, to secure and train the Afghan special forces, following the total withdrawal of US-led troops from Afghanistan scheduled on September 11, 2021. If Qatar accepts NATO’s offer, it will become a strategic channel between Afghanistan and NATO countries. Nevertheless, this could result in the deterioration of Qatar’s ties with the Taliban, who may interpret the move as an attempt to support the Afghan government.

Conclusion

The Gulf country needs to reflect on NATO’s offer. Depending on the result, geopolitical consequences and changes will be inevitable in the Afghan peace process. However, it is relevant to take into consideration the regional and international commitment to empowering the Afghan population and securing sustainable and long-term peace.

A Bleak Picture for Afghanistan: A Weekly Update on Taliban Advances

Source: Long War Journal (control areas as of Aug. 8) By Scott Reinhard

In recent weeks, the Taliban have made unprecedented gains that continue to threaten Afghanistan’s stability. This furthermore increases the likelihood that it will become a haven for international terrorists.

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From strikes against prominent figures to military offensives that have resulted in the capture of three provincial capitals, the situation had become dire. So much so, that the British and American Embassies in Kabul have advised their citizens to evacuate immediately. This is in anticipation of further violence to come.

American and Afghan planes continue to bomb the Taliban in attempts to curbs its advances, with the Ministry of Defence claiming hundreds of fighters dead. Militia fighters, led by former mujahedeen commanders like Ismail Khan from Herat, have augmented government forces and pledged to fight the Taliban for their homeland. While the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, the Taliban continue to stall negotiations in Doha, while spokesman Suhail Shaheen sanctions the violence as the alternative to the current government’s rule.

The four major events of last week have serious implications for Afghanistan and foreshadow serious consequences if the Afghan government fails to counter the Taliban’s gains.

On August 3rd and 6th, the Taliban demonstrated their ability to penetrate deep into Kabul. This was shown with attacks on prominent government officials. Although Defense Minister, Bismillah Khan, escaped unharmed by the two vehicle-borne IEDs and subsequent gunfight that erupted late on August 3rd, eight people were killed and 20 injured in the battle. This is particularly concerning because the Sherpur neighborhood, where the minister resides, is home to other prominent government officials and is one of the most secure areas in Kabul.

As the Taliban make quick gains, these brazen attacks on officials are only likely to increase as the movement continues to gain momentum in the face of US airstrikes and pressure from Afghan soldiers. Unfortunately, the Taliban’s next attack succeeded, killing the top media and information officer in a roadside ambush in Kabul. Dawa Khan Menapal served as Ashraf Ghani’s spokesman and was lauded by US ambassador Ross Wilson as ”a friend and colleague whose career was focused on providing truthful information to all Afghans.”

Although covered little in comparison to these major attacks, the Taliban also killed the district governor in Kabul, Sayed Abad. These successful and failed assassinations highlight the Taliban’s lethal reach and disinterest in achieving a shared political settlement in Afghanistan. They serve not only to highlight the government’s inability to protects its leader,s but also to deter Afghan’s from supporting and participating in the political process. The military gains in Herat, Lashkar Gah, and Nimruz only serve to strengthen their resolve.

Beyond the asymmetric tactic used by the Taliban in Kabul and areas firmly held by the Afghan government, fighting in Helmand, Kandahar, and other provinces has intensified. In the last few days, the Taliban have captured several provincial capitals, Sheberghan, Laskar Gah, Zaranj, Kunduz, Sar-e-Pol, and Taloqan. Their victories at Taloqan are especially surprising because northern Afghanistan provided some of the most brutal resistance to their rule in the late 1990s. Subsequently, it became the launchpad of US operations shortly after 9/11.

Amid these offensives, US and Afghan planes continue to batter Taliban positions, killing hundreds of fighters and causing fires throughout various cities. In a notable strike, a B-52 bomber killed a group of over 200 Taliban fighters in  Sheberghan, Jowzan Province. Many have reported the bodies of women and children in these cities, whose fates may be connected to gross human rights violations by the Taliban. Some have also reported that the Taliban went door-to-door, asking for those who helped coalition forces and killing them. This was in direct contradiction to their commitments of protecting those they saw as traitors of Afghanistan and Islam. 

These extrajudicial killings of former interpreters, without due process and the targeting of civilians, greatly complicates the Taliban’s standing in the world. This furthermore reduces the possibility of peace in Afghanistan.

The international community should hold the Taliban accountable for these actions and deter the movement from similar violations through sanctions and other political measures. The recent victories by the movement appear to prove some intelligence assessments correct, mainly being that Afghanistan could fall in as little as six months to the Taliban.

However, Afghans should continue to fight, lobby for more international support, and work to bring essential services to people to deter them from joining the Taliban. The US should increase the number of evacuation flights and airstrikes in the country. Militia leaders should also mobilize and recruit willing Afghans to help government forces resist Taliban progress and preserve two decades of progress for future generations.