Syria

 by Vasileia Kioutsouki

The High Possibility of the Reemergence of the Islamic State

In light of the recent developments in both Iraq and Syria, it is quite understandable that the Middle East faces yet another enduring crisis. Current rhetoric and military actions highlight the fragile security situation and the possible scenario of the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Indeed, the resurgence of the Islamic State is now a likelier outcome and there is a twofold explanation for this. Firstly, the Turkish operation ‘Peace Spring’ against the Kurds in north-eastern Syria, together with the withdrawal of American troops from the region, complicates the operation against any remaining powers of the Islamic State. The Kurds, who had long combatted ISIL, are now preoccuptied by the Turkish military activities, thus leaving unattended many prisons where tens of thousands of IS suspects are held. There are already reports of hundreds of ISIL escapees and, even worse, there are fears that a mass break-out of ISIL members is being planned. Should this be the case, IS fighters will once again become a grave security threat.

Secondly, the death of General Qassem Soleimani disrupted regional security too. As a well-respected member of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and commander of the Quds Force, he was a key figure in Iran and central to the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East. In addition, he played a pivotal role in the fight against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which cost the lives of a large number of American soldiers. Nonetheless, although the Quds Force is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization in the US, they have been especially effective in the fight against ISIL. Consequently, the US move to dispatch him, has certainly benefited the Islamic State, as he was their enermy.

In view of the above, without these credible rivals in their way, the Islamic State is faced with fewer obstacles to regain territory. A mass release of ISIL fighters from prisons and the drone strike on General Soleimani actually distract Iraqis’ attention from their political grievances, namely the corrupted government and the Iranian dominance in the country. The Iraqi people are now more concerned about a possible resurgence of the Islamic State rather than anything else. Despite their discontent due to the Iranian military presence in the country since 2014, they acknowledge the important contribution of Soleimani to ISIL’s defeat.

Moreover, Iran’s determination to take revenge for Soleimani’s death has raised serious concerns for the anti-ISIL coalition. In this sense, they halted operations against the remaining IS fighters in order to focus on protecting their troops and envoys based in Iraq; a decision which turned out to be correct as Iran has launched numerous ballistic missiles against US bases and the US embassy.

It goes without saying that such circumstances provide the breeding grounds needed for the Islamic State to re-emerge. Further, it must be acknowledged that the ever-increasing instability and discontent across the region, as well as the ongoing violence, were some of the underlying causes which motivated ISIL in the past. Therefore, there is little doubt that the Islamic State will again take advantage of the situation created in Iraq and Syria to rise once more, almost unimpeded.

In order to prevent this disastrous scenario from happening, policymakers must stop being distracted and losing direction. Although ISIL has suffered considerable losses in terms of fighters and territories, it has not been completely defeated yet. Consequently, instead of fighting each other, countries such as the US and regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, must act together with the joint aim of combating ISIL and preventing their expansion again.

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Iran
 by Harun Basli

Iran’s Approach to Turkey’s Military Operation in Northern Syria

Iran joined numerous countries that scrutinized Turkey’s military operation (Peace Spring) in northern Syria. The operation has been discussed and commented on not only by the Iranian authorities, but also by the Iranian press, social media, and even in Friday sermons.

Most of these assessments and comments indicate negative views against Turkey’s actions. The level of criticism has at times resulted in what could be considered as a serious insult against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Iran sought a policy focused on stability, such as the advocation of the continuation of the Assad regime. In this context, Iran provides various kinds of support, especially in the military field to Assad. Some high-level Revolutionary Guard Army officers lost their lives during the clashes in Syria, and large ceremonies were held in Iran to honor them. To summarize, Tehran aims to use its position in Syria as a deterrent against regional and international forces.

Statements by Iranian authorities, in particular, President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, called on Turkey to end the operation as soon as possible. Emphasis on Syrian territorial integrity and that a viable political solution could only come through political negotiations was apparent.

Further, to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the events, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani cancelled his official visit to Turkey on the day the operation began and the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad postponed his trip to Istanbul for an event.

The conservative segment close to the Iranian religious leader used more severe expressions in their reaction to the operation. Farhikhtegan Newspaper —which is known for its close ties to Dr Ali Akbar Velayati; the international relations advisor of the Iranian religious leader Khamenei — used the title “Sultanism in the Service of Terrorism”.

The Tasnim News Agency predicted that the future of the operation would be similar to the situation of the Saudi military operation in Yemen. The Friday imams — representatives of the religious leader — also used similar language in their sermons, such as heavy criticism of Turkey, blaming Turkey of having Ottoman dreams and engaging in Mongolian-type aggression.

In the Iranian Parliament, many deputies made statements against the operation. Declarations stated that the operation was illegal and that it would further complicate the situation in Syria. However, some Azeri members of parliament expressed support for the operation. In these statements of support of Turkey, they claimed that the military operations were carried out in order to fight against terrorism.

Iranian artists have not kept their disagreement with the operation silent either. Their reactions mostly focus on the humanitarian dimension and serious allegations, such as genocide and alleged evidence of war crimes. Some Iranian singers cancelled performances in Turkey as a response to the Turkish operation in northeastern Syria.

Additionally, in some parts of Iran, civilians took some form of action. A demonstration held in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Tehran attracted a significant number of participants; even some that wrote anti-Turkey and Erdoğan slogans on walls. Other protests occurred in the cities of Senendec, Bane, Merivan, Chios and Mahabad in the west of Iran.

Such demonstrations do not occur very often and it should be noted that this expression against the Turkish military operation was permitted, or at least tolerated, by the government.

Social media revealed even broader —and often more extreme —reactions of Iranian citizens. Messages went so far as to claim that the military operation would be the downfall of Erdoğan and called for boycotts of Turkish products.

The position — or lack thereof —of the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards is an additional remarkable point to consider. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the religious leader, referred to as the rahbar (guide), and the Revolutionary Guards that act under him are significant actors in the determination of the state’s domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, it is interesting that neither the religious leader nor the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards who typically state their opinions on almost every subject, have not made any statements about the Turkish military operation so far.

This silence drew criticism from all segments of Iranian society, however this lack of public comment can be regarded as an opinion. It is important that in a country like Iran, where every action takes place under strict control by the government, at least the people were allowed to react.

Iran and Turkey —rivals throughout history — remain at odds over their respective interests in the Syrian crisis. Iran perceives Syria as the axis of resistance and it does not want to lose its interest in the territory, therefore it is of little surprise that the reaction of the Iranian public continued after the military operation concluded.

Despite the aforementioned points, the two nations attempt to follow a balanced policy towards each other due to their commercial and cultural relations. Iran currently experiences serious economic difficulties due to sanctions and it will want to maintain its influence in the Middle Eastern countries, especially Syria.

Harun Basli has a MSc. in Persian Language and Literature. He conducted important research on Turkey-Iran relations and Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as radicalization and violent extremism in the region. He worked as a consultant on security cooperation in Tehran and currently acts as a researcher at the Global Center for Security Studies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of Rise to Peace.

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baghdadi ISIL
 by Rise to Peace

Death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Consequences and the Future of the Islamic State?

On October 26, United States special forces conducted a raid in Barisha, in northwestern Syria, that concluded with the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Fear of capture made him detonate a suicide vest while being pursued in a tunnel. According to US officials, the death of ISIL’s former Caliph is the result of five intense months of investigation by intelligence services.

Therefore, there is no doubt that Baghdadi’s last video in April – five years after his last appearance – may have been the catalyst towards his death. Coincidence or not, thirteen years ago, US strikes that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, happened just one month after he appeared in a video in May 2006.

Baghdadi’s death is a turning point and marks the end of ISIL as experienced by the international community. After having lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has now lost the last link of its so-called Caliphate originally founded by Zarqawi during the US intervention of Iraq.

The short-term success of this unique ideological position could only function through the destruction of communities and the killing of countless lives. However, ISIL under Baghdadi’s authority will always be remembered as the terrorist group that first used new technologies to achieve its goals: drones, propaganda videos worthy of Hollywood movies, and use of the Internet to recruit many foreign fighters.

Despite the lack of information about his real role and powers within ISIL, killing al-Baghdadi still remains truly symbolic as he was the public face and voice of the most pro-active contemporary terrorist organization.

Terrorist attacks across the Middle East and in Europe, heinous crimes such as executions of journalists, aid workers, and a Jordanian pilot, and broadcasting decapitations of civilians were all results of his preaching. He was also the link and the best interlocutor with other affiliate groups throughout this region.

ISIL will experience a period of uncertainty in the short term. Indeed, due to the qualifications of the former, the Islamic State cannot afford to have a leader known solely as a fighter, but a combination of war experience and religious knowledge is a must.

Moreover, the new leader will have to be well known and respected, otherwise, some groups’ leaders may not pledge allegiance. For example, Aboubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria, could negotiate strongly his allegiance to the new Caliph.

De facto, this could result in a dispersion of different ISIL branches and a lack of coordination between them. However, ready-made biographies with family trees and organizational charts were found on a number of ISIL leaders who were killed. This is a sign that the Caliphate may have prepared a scenario for the future.

Nevertheless, the death of the former Caliph does not mean the end of ISIL. The terrorist group is now a “brand” and will persist in Iraq and Syria as an insurgency and a franchise in many parts of the world.

Franchises are to be found in Yemen, Libya, West Africa and in Afghanistan. These countries represent a big threat because they possess multiples factors (political, criminal and terrorist) that helped ISIL rise in the first place. This is besides the ongoing threat of the return of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe. It still remains the biggest challenge for intelligence services.

In a short-term vision and from a counter-terrorism perspective, it is always good news that al-Baghdadi has been neutralized. But for occidental governments, they need to be prepared for the next step, as they fear vengeance and revenge from radicalized people within their home countries.

They could be willing to follow orders from al-Baghdadi’s last video in which he stressed the importance of spreading terror worldwide at all costs.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not as infamous as Osama bin-Laden, but the aftermath of his death is undetermined. It could, however, produce graver consequences.

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ISIL
 by Suleyman Ozeren

Decapitation of the Leader of ISIL and Its Potential Implication?

In a successful operation on October 26, United States special forces killed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) in Idlib, northwestern Syria. What could be the implications of this very critical operation for the actors in the conflict and the impact on ISIL itself?

From a strategic perspective, this operation could be a sample of the model that the US applies to Syria in the coming years. The United States coordinated the operation with the parties in the conflict, including Russia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Syrian Kurds. Given Russia’s dominant role in Idlib, the Assad regime’s presence and Turkey’s control over the northern Idlib, the United States notified them about the US military presence in the area.

The US military launched the operation from Erbil in the Kurdistan Regional Government. Although the Incirlik military base in Turkey is closer to Idlib (around 100 miles) than Erbil in northern Iraq (more than 400 miles), the US military chose Erbil over Incirlik which indicates the United States’ distrust of Turkey given Turkey’s long-time involvement with al Qaeda and ISIL affiliates.

According to President Trump, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were involved in the operation by providing intelligence. Although Turkey has been trying to push the United States against the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), it seems that Turkey’s move has not proved successful at all. On the contrary, SDF and the Syrian Kurds will continue to stay as partners of the United States. In short, although the US military pulled out of northeastern Syria, it will continue to be actively involved in the country.

As for the impact on the group, of course, the operation could trigger a chain of events that could affect ISIL in several ways. Because the group emerged in Iraq as the Islamic State in Iraq and then became ISIL under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership, his death would be a devastating blow for its members. However, given the decision-making structure of ISIL, they could survive this.

Decapitation or targeted killing of a leader of a terrorist organization is considered an effective counterterrorism tactic in the short term. On the one hand, as a short-term effect, it could disrupt activities of the group, create panic and mayhem among the members, resulting in intra-group conflict.

On the other, it could mobilize group members toward more actions and pursuing new attacks against their targets. When the target is a highly charismatic leader, then this could act as a catalyst for future attacks. In fact, research showed that the decapitation of leaders of ISIL may not lead to the intended results unless other steps are taken.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was not the founder of ISIL and had not been as charismatic as Osama bin Laden, the founding leader of al Qaeda, nevertheless, he has been the most important figure in the organization. Since the founding leader of IS — then it was al Qaeda in Iraq — Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, ISIL transformed itself into a hybrid organization under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership between 2010 and 2016.

Unlike his three predecessors, under al Baghdadi’s leadership, ISIL’s impact on the region exceeded the boundaries of Iraq. ISIL became the leading terrorist group that created its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria and attracted thousands of foreign fighters from more than 100 countries.

However, given the continuing decline, loss of territory and recruitment, his death may not create significant repercussions among current membership. But, the fact that he detonated a suicide vest and killed himself could be seen as a sacred sacrifice by other ISIL followers in the region and around the world, which might act as a catalyst for future attacks.

In Syria, between 2013 and 2015, ISIL had been the focal point for those who wanted to join the ‘jihad’ in Syria. Now a reverse trend might be seen in which ISIL members could leave the group and join other local groups in Syria.

According to some sources, al Baghdadi nominated Abdullah Qardash as his successor in August, but his death could lead some members to leave the group and trigger fragmentation within the group, especially if the leadership position is not filled soon. Because of the nature — what I describe as — of the transitivity character of these members, it would not be a surprise to see some of these members joining in the ranks of the al Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria.

Localized ISIL affiliates could take further steps to fill the vacuum and emerge as the dominant group. However, this will all depend on the territory where they are active. For example, IS in Khorasan Province could become the more prominent group within IS.

Successful targeted killings could provide states with the window of opportunity to inflict further damage against organizations like ISIL operationally. But more importantly, such developments could also enable governments and other concerned parties to spend more time and energy on prevention and de-radicalization efforts, reaching out other countries to strengthen cooperation and collaboration to tackle the underlying causes that terrorist organizations have been exploiting.

Regardless, from a counterterrorism perspective, the death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is a success. While it is critical, the true definition of success in counterterrorism is not just about the decapitation of the leadership.

Like the previous examples, including al Zarqawi and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi will be succeeded by another leader. The real challenge is to come up with policies, strategies, and tactics that address the underlying causes, terrorist organizations exploit.

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Turkey
 by Zaina Dkaidek

Turkey’s Offensive in Syria Risks the Region’s Stability

For some time, President Trump sought an opportunity to withdraw United States troops from northeastern Syria. He considers regional security issues to be the responsibility of local actors, and thus no longer saw any purpose to remain after the defeat of Daesh.

Trump began the extraction of an estimated 100 to 150 military personnel from the 1,000 US troops stationed in the area despite the perception that this decision could leave the region vulnerable.

The withdrawal of troops provides a little motive for the US to continue its alliance with the People’s Protection Units (YPG). These Syrian Kurdish Forces —along with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — have been instrumental in the fight against Daesh. With the US abandoning them, it gave Turkey the green light to enter Syria.

Why is Turkey moving into Syria?

Only days after President Trump ordered the retreat, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan commenced a ground offensive. The intent of the operation is to clear the Kurdish militias holding the territory in northern Syria. Erdogan planned this action for the last two years, with the end goal of a designated “safe zone” to house at least 2 of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees living on Turkish soil.

Nonetheless, the Kurds explain that Turkey’s actions are risking all the gains made against Daesh. For example, the Kurdish forces have thousands of Daesh prisoners, including fighters and their families, under their control. If a conflict occurs, it is unclear if they will have to withdraw to battle the Turkish forces. The prisoners could escape, and liberated cities could fall back to Daesh.

The green area on the map is the “safe zone” that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to create.

What does this mean for the region’s stability?

Trump’s decision and Turkey’s subsequent assault could result in dire consequences to regional stability. The reemergence of Daesh remains a significant security threat in the wake of this offensive. As SDF deploys forces into northern Syria to battle Turkey, this will leave other parts of the country vulnerable. In recent months, there have already been instances of erratic attacks from the Daesh prison cells as well as tensions rising between the SDF and local Arab tribes.

According to the SDF, there are over 12,000 suspected Daesh members housed across seven prisons, with at the very least 4,000 of them being foreign nationals. These prisons are scattered across the country, but at least two camps — Roj and Ain Issa — are located inside the “safe zone.”

According to the White House, these camps will become Turkey’s responsibility; however, chances of a smooth handover from Kurdish forces to Turkey are unlikely. This situation could potentially lead to hundreds of escapes of alleged Daesh fighters and sympathizers.

Another possibility is an increase of Russian influence in the region, and consequently, the consolidation of the Assad regime. The United States will renounce an essential aspect of its sway in Syria without receiving any concessions in return from the government. Therefore, Russia will be able to extend its influence over Syria’s future.

It is likely that the Kremlin will forge a closer relationship with the SDF, as they search for new allies during the conflict. Damascus could spread its jurisdiction over Syria’s territory and potentially increase control over the country’s oil fields as well as other crucial economic resources.

Finally, the humanitarian aspect of the Turkish operation will likely be catastrophic. The United Nations claims that many of the 758,000 residents along the Syrian border were displaced at least once from conflict. Further action from Turkey could only exacerbate the situation.

It can cause civilians to seek refuge in Arab-majority areas south of the border, or in Iraq, which is currently undergoing violent protests throughout the nation. Also, Erdogan’s plan to relocate over a million Syrian refugees to the “safe zone” could cause further instability by dramatically changing the ethnic composition of the region.

Overall, the decision to withdraw troops from northern Syria based on an erroneous assumption that the Islamic State has been wholly eradicated may only fuel the group’s resurgence. There are already signs of Daesh regrouping, with no changes to its ideology, and with most of its operating structure intact. Therefore, US troops leaving the region will only lead to them reemerging as a threat.

For this reason, Group of Seven (G7) countries must attempt to shift Erdogan’s advances through economic means or political pressure to avoid further instability in the region. Also, for the US to continue to have reliable allies along with some influence over the Middle East, they must not abandon the YPG by withdrawing all troops from northern Syria.

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