Russia

 by Rise to Peace

The Evolving Russian-Taliban Relations

On July 7th, a Taliban delegation visited Moscow and met with the Kremlin envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabuluv. This visit took place against the backdrop of increasing Taliban gains in Afghanistan. One might ask how the Taliban, a movement designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, is being welcomed in Moscow by official Russian representatives. To understand how the Taliban achieved this diplomatic achievement, an examination of the historical relations between Russia and the Taliban, as well as Russia’s interests in Afghanistan, is needed.

Russian-Taliban Relations: Historical Background

On February 15th, 1989, the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The humiliating Soviet withdrawal greatly impacted the USSR and Russia’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. When the Afghan Civil War erupted in the 1990s, Russia tried to avoid any involvement in the conflict. However, in 1999 Russia got off the fence and threw its support behind the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The catalyst for its policy shift was the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya and its ties to international Islamist radical groups which operated in Chechnya and were loosely allied with the Taliban ally al-Qaeda.

Following the attacks of 9/11, President Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to reach out to Washington and pledge his support for the U.S response. Russia supplied the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda with intelligence, opened its airspace to planes carrying humanitarian aid, and accepted the establishment of U.S. bases in Central Asia. Following the initially successful U.S. invasion, Russia was reduced to the role of spectator for the rest of the decade, mainly criticizing and trying to eliminate the growing flow of drugs out of Afghanistan into Russia.

The Shift in Russian-Taliban Relations

The major policy shift towards the Taliban occurred in the mid-2010s, following the 2014 breakdown of Russian-Western relations over Ukraine. The shift was propelled by both national security and geopolitical concerns. First, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan raised alarms in Moscow. Russia was increasingly concerned by the threat ISKP posed to Russia and its Central Asian allies.

According to Moscow’s assessment, the threat from ISKP surpassed the threat the Taliban posed because the Taliban had no regional aspirations beyond Afghanistan, while ISKP posed a regional and global security threat. Russia believed that the Taliban could combat ISKP more effectively than the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. For Russia, supporting the Taliban was seen as a logical step, or as the Kremlin envoy Zamir Kabuluv explained it: “The Taliban are fighting in Afghanistan against the people we fought in Syria, that’s why our interests coincide”.

In its support of the Taliban today, Russia chooses to turn a blind eye to the reemergence of al-Qaeda in more than 15 provinces in Afghanistan and reports of Taliban collaboration with ISKP. Russia relies on the security assurances the Taliban promises Russia. The Taliban assures Russia that it will help to secure the border with Central Asian states and prevent spillover of fighting and terror activities to Russia’s southern strategic frontier.

Second, Russia sees Afghanistan as an opportunity to harass and undermine the U.S. and the West as part of their great power geopolitical competition. By challenging the West in Afghanistan, Russia wishes to reassert itself as a dominant geopolitical player in the region after its status was weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union. It has been reported that Russia supported the Taliban efforts against the West and the Afghan government with weapons and funds. Furthermore, Russia was accused of offering bounties to Taliban-linked groups for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan during the U.S.-Taliban peace talks.

Conclusions

Russian-Taliban relations have changed over the years, changing from hostility to cooperation as part of their great power competition. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is seemingly a favorable outcome for Russia. This development, however, could eventually backfire and undermine Russia’s efforts to gain regional stability and dominance. A Taliban takeover could further destabilize neighboring Central Asian countries, requiring Russia to divert attention and military resources to Central Asia to protect its allies. Russia might soon find out that you should be careful what you wish for.

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 by Rise to Peace

Azov Battalion – Guardian Angels or Notorious Extremists?

History

Civil unrest took place across Ukraine during the 2014 revolution. This resulted in an overthrow of the elected government led by Viktor Yanukovych. Following the riots, Russia decided to send military units to Crimea and declared the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as the 84th and 85th federal subjects of Russia. Since then, collisions between pro-Russian separatists and pro-Ukrainian militias have continued.

The Azov Battalion is one of the most well-known military units that emerged during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. It was initially founded as a voluntary militia in the Azov Sea coastal area. In October 2014, it formally became a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine. The Battalion was first observed on the battleground in Mariupol. Here, they recaptured the town from pro-Russian separatist forces in June 2014. With its rapid growth, Azov Battalion has become an unignorable military force and a tangible icon of Ukrainian patriotism. 

Ideology

The Azov Battalion faces accusations claiming its close ties with neo-Nazi ideology when it was first recognized by the international society. In 2014, a German public broadcaster named ZDF released videos showing Azov soldiers wearing helmets with the Nazi Swastika and SS symbols.

The Guardian describes Azov’s symbol as “reminiscent of the Nazi Wolfsangel”, while the battalion denies it by saying it simply represents the letter N and I crossing over each other, implying “National Idea” in the Ukrainian language. Some of Azov’s leaders have been linked to neo-Nazi ideology. Andriy Biletsky, the battalion’s first commander, also leads neo-Nazi organizations “Patriot of Ukraine” and “Social-National Assembly”.

Members of Azov Battalion have attempted to separate themselves from Nazi stereotypes. Instead, they have claimed that the organization is founded upon Ukrainian patriotism. Some of them even take a more “Robin Hood alike” approach, legitimizing their gathering by saying that “the police are ineffective, corrupt or drunk.”

Andriy Diachenko, a spokesman for the Azov Battalion, stated in an interview with USA Today that ‘only 10% to 20% of the group’s members are Nazis’ and it’s all about ‘personal ideology [that] has nothing to do with the official ideology of the Azov.’

The designation of Azov battalion has been controversial internationally. In April 2021, U.S. Representative Elissa Slotkin sent a list of “Violent Extreme Right Wing” (vXRM) organizations to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, pressing the Biden administration to recognize these groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs). The Azov Battalion is included within this. Kacper Rekawek, an affiliated researcher at Counter Extremism Project, denied such an accusation and stated that Azov “does not engage in terrorist activity.”

Furthermore, former FBI officials called members of Azov Battalion “white supremacists” and compared them to “jihadists,” as enemies of the U.S. in a New York Times op-ed. In response, the Atlantic Council published an article written by Anton Shekhovtsov to deny such a claim. Shekhovtsov states that the nature of Azov Battalion has changed over time. This makes it simply a military unit controlled by the state. He also disproved the connection between the American bomber and the Ukrainian organization, claimed by the New York Times op-ed authors.

Recruitment

When Azov Battalion was first formed, it used extremist ideology and comparatively high pays to attract new members. Evolved over time, it has employed multiple new methods to recruit both domestically and internationally. According to published news pieces, foreign fighters from Sweden, Croatia, the United Kingdom, and even Russia joined Azov Battalion.

In an interview with TIME, an Azov recruiter named Joachim Furholm attributes Azov’s successful propaganda efforts to its pervasive use of social media, especially Facebook. Azov recruiters track potential members and support other right-wing organizations on Facebook. Facebook reacted quickly that it announced to ban Azov’s homepage and related accounts first in 2015 over “hate speech”. However, an article published by Buzzfeed News pointed out that advertisements related to Azov Battalion were still observed on Facebook in November 2020.

Additionally, Azov Battalion also run military summer camps domestically. Here, they taught children aged 9-18, military skills such as shooting rifles, practicing combat poses, and patrolling. Kyiv post reported that strict rules and nationalism ideology are practiced in these camps. In a documentary filmed by the Guardian, trainers at the camps teach children to salute to the Azov flag and shout “Ukraine above all”. Geopolitika, an organization based in Russia, accused such camps of ‘inciting hate by innocent children against ethnic Russians as well as opponents of the Kiev regime.” It also states that such acts are “broadly supported by US military aid”.

Conclusion

As a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov has transformed from a paramilitary organization to a national force. Its efforts to separate itself from the stereotype of “neo-Nazis” have convinced some. However, it still draws a significant number of critics. The designation of the group should be exercised deliberately and apolitically.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Prevention and Redemption Initiatives Are Key to Countering Terrorism in Russia

The mountains of Chechnya where “going to the forest” is a colloquial term for joining an extremist group. Photo Credit: eTurboNews.

A series of recent incidents validate the Russian Federation’s concerns over the rise of internationally-linked terrorist groups active within its territory. This security matter is heightened by the presence of battle-hardened fighters who returned from fighting in the Middle East and North Africa. The main query that emerges is whether Russian authorities will amend their counterterrorism tactics, or continue to engage in a framework simplified as a nexus of a military-bureaucratic-judicial instruments.

Russia has long contended with the dilemma of homegrown terrorism, especially in the North Caucasus region. Radicalization and the development of terror cells were intrinsically linked to the Chechen independence movement that expanded into neighboring Dagestan. Ayman al-Zawahiri (the current head of Al- Qaeda) once called the region ‘a shelter’ for fighters from across the globe. It is little wonder then that Daesh capitalized on homegrown ethnic grievances in Russia’s ‘inner abroad’ for recruitment.

Russian officials estimate that approximately 4000 citizens fought as militants in the armed conflicts in Syria. The state of affairs shifted domestically too. Militants that once operated under the banner of Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) transferred allegiances to Vilayat Kavkaz —  a branch of Daesh in the North Caucasus. Russia identifies the pan-Islamist political movement Hizb ut- Tahrir (Party of Liberation) as a terrorist organization, and deems it culpable in the recruitment of foreign fighters as well. It is undoubtedly a case where international groups seized upon already active movements to franchise ideologies.

As a consequence, recent terror-related events in Russia are linked to the international moniker of Daesh, although the actors are domestic agents. The Federal Security Service (FSB) conducts operations across Russia linked to Daesh through a perpetrator’s affiliation, but few links to the umbrella organization. For instance:

• April 13: two suspected members were killed in a raid in Tyumen; an oil rich town in Siberia.
• June 26: a declared member who created explosives and sought to carry out attacks in the name of Daesh was neutralized in Saratov; a city in the southwest.
• July 1: police in Khanty-Mansi (a region in western Siberia) sent out an alert of a woman suspected of membership in an international terrorist organization being in the area.
• July 12: Moscow District Court sentenced seven members of Daesh to 15-21 years of incarceration for planning to attack the Sapsan train in Saint Petersburg in 2017.

These cases exhibit a Russian reliance on strict legislation and applications of force as primary counterterror tactics. Numerous laws have been passed, including the revocation of citizenship for naturalized citizens, life sentences for some terror-related crimes, and guidelines aimed to counter proliferation of extremist ideology, especially the contentious Yarovaya package.

A preference for the military-bureaucratic-judicial nexus and intelligence collection means psychological rehabilitation and cultural efforts receive less attention. Up until 2013, Russia applied such methods until preparations for the Sochi Olympics required hardline policies. However, emphasis on these two spheres provide Russian authorities with a humanitarian method to prevent radicalization before it takes root, and to counterbalance extremist teachings post-indoctrination, to those willing to relent. This is a key recommendation that needs to be met at many levels.

Those at risk of radicalization must be exposed to civil society organizations that promote tenets of inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue. Exposure to educational and employment prospects, tolerant views amongst peers, and wider community solidarity provide numerous opportunities for exchange.

Preservation of cultural traditions that display a wider understanding of ethnicity and religion — that have not been manipulated to advocate extremist or political views — teach at-risk youth they are already part of an important community, rather than a terrorist cell or a linked international organization. Sports provide additional occasions of solidarity, especially those that prioritize strength of character. For example, combat sports widely practiced across the region place the historic mindset of a ‘Caucasian warrior’ in a positive context, at the same time young girls practicing tightrope walking in Dagestan are taught to be ‘fearless’.

Psychological supports and deradicalization initiatives are of vital importance in the current context. These programs are especially beneficial to returnees willing to shun extremist views as they are offered a path towards redemption, as well as chances to inform at-risk peers of the realities of membership in such groups. The Comprehensive Plan of Counteraction of Ideology of Terrorism 2019-2023 reveals provisions covering this matter. As well, a member of the Russian State Duma announced the development of a rehabilitation center focused on individuals influenced by Hizb ut- Tahrir in annexed-Crimea, though it is viewed as politically motivated.

The Russian Federation strongly relies on military-bureaucratic-judicial methods as violent extremism and terrorism are serious infractions under the criminal code, as they should be. It seems easier to manage the localized and decentralized nature of domestic extremism in that framework. However, such hardline measures should be employed concurrently with softer methods aimed at prevention and redemption. They offer broader social advantages in totality.

Réjeanne Lacroix is the Editor-in-Chief at Rise to Peace.

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 by Sakhi Naimzada

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks in the Absence of Afghan Government

Members of each delegation in Moscow beside Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Image credit: Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters.

Afghanistan has a long history of participating in local and international conferences on peace. The Bonn Conference was the start of a series of other conferences on peace and stability hosted in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has put together or at least sent a delegation to myriad conferences to gain international support for their peace efforts with opposition groups in the country.

Despite this trend, the last Moscow Peace talks were held in Russia without the presence of an Afghan government delegation. Organized by an Afghan-Russian Association, the conference took place six days after successful talks between the US and the Taliban occurred in Doha, according to US Special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. The Taliban refused any direct conversation with the Afghan government, but agreed to sit down with delegations from the United Sates, India, Pakistan, China, and prominent Afghan political figures including Hanif Attmar- a favorite to take over as president in the upcoming presidential elections- to talk peace. In the meantime, the Afghan government, the main absentee of the conference, called them traitors and urgently called for direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

After two days of negotiations in Moscow, an agreement was reached. The Taliban, accusing the Kabul government of being an “American puppet”, asked for a withdrawal of American forces from the country, the release of detainees, and the inclusion of the principle of Islamic Religion in the constitution. Former president Hamid Karzai, leading the Afghan delegation, declared the talks a “big achievement” that would bring peace and stability in an “Afghanistan free of foreign forces”. Current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared the Afghan delegation in Moscow illegitimate to represent Afghanistan in the conference.

Russia has been a low-key player in Afghan affairs since the beginning of the War on Terror. The Russian government, concerned about  security in the Central Asia, keeps a close eye on Afghanistan. The latest peace talk in Moscow was a step by Russia towards taking a major role in influencing Afghan governmental affairs, and sets precedent for future Russian involvement in Afghanistan.

Seeing the Taliban sitting at the table with decades-old political enemies to talk peace is the long-awaited desire of all Afghans, but it certainly poses risks. The Taliban went to Moscow demanding what seems to be the return of the Taliban regime of the 1990s, the withdrawal of foreign forces, Sharia Law, and no sign of womens’ appearance within the government. The Afghan delegation, on the other hand, was comprised mainly of political figures who fought on the front lines of the fight against the Taliban. Thanks to differences  between these two parties and the disparity in their motivations for negotiating, the fear is that an agreement between them would be more of a political move to grasp power in Kabul than a long-term solution for peace.

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 by John Sims

FIFA World Cup 2018: Russia taking security measures to prevent terrorist attacks during tournament

© Alexandr Sherbak/TASS

Every four years societies come together to watch and cheer at the largest sporting events on Earth, the FIFA World Cup. Thirty-two teams from across the globe will represent their nations and compete to be the last to lift the winner’s trophy. Russia will have the honor of hosting the World Cup this year. The international soccer tournament runs from June 14th until July 15th.

While the World Cup remains a time of celebration and national pride, the event poses significant terrorist concerns. Russia plans to host sixty-four games in eleven cities scattered across European Russia. Of these locations, three cities remain close to Russia’s North Caucasus region, a hotbed for Chechen separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. Other cities represent high-value targets for their cultural or political significance, most notably St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Image courtesy Human Rights Watch[1]

Russian citizens, like the rest of the world, have become accustomed to the possibility of terrorism in their daily lives. In April 2017, a terrorist detonated an explosive device in the St. Petersburg metro system. In 2014, just before the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, two deadly attacks in Volgograd killed 34 people.[2] A review of Russia’s recent history shows concerted terrorist efforts to attack metro systems, passenger planes, and government representations. These targets will remain critical during the World Cup as fans from across the globe travel to attend games and visit Russian tourist attractions.

(Dmitry Lovetsky/Associated Press)

Russia has had recent success in hosting a major international tournament. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics came off without any terrorist incidents. While their success is laudable, the 2018 World Cup is a much larger event. The Sochi games held a total attendance of three million people including those who attended concerts, theatre performances and exhibitions and more than four hundred thousand in attendance at the Olympic events themselves.[3] In comparison, the 2014 Brazil Cup included a total attendance of roughly three million people at the sixty-four games and more than five million attending local fan events and celebrations.[4] Additionally, while the Sochi games only occurred in one city, the 2018 World Cup will spread the Russian security apparatus across the county. This spreading of the security forces does not guarantee a terrorist attack will occur but does expose the possibilities of greater vulnerabilities for terrorist actors to slip through.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has discussed the required responsibilities in managing World Cup security. Lavrov stated, “Our ultimate priority is to ensure the maximum convenient and safe stay of players and fans in Russia. Russia’s law enforcement agencies are taking all the necessary steps in this direction.”[5]

Fighting terrorism remains a significant priority of the Putin presidency. Since his first term, Putin has sought to strengthen and reaffirm Russian presence on the world stage. By hosting notable international events, Russia hopes to demonstrate that it is a modern, bustling nation that is on equal footing with developed nations. The Russian government will seek to demonstrate that the 2018 World Cup is safe for international visitors and prevent any type of violence or terrorism from occurring. While Russia’s standing and relations with the rest of the world have fluctuated over the years, terrorism remains one front in which cooperation is possible with Europe and the United States to ensure a prosperous event.

Like any tournament, fans want to remember the events that occurred on the field, court, or pitch, not any acts of violence that shattered the spirit of the games. The 2018 Russian World Cup remains five months away. Russia has a significant task before it in assuring the safety of all international visitors. For their own national image as well as the safety of international fans, Russia will seek to rise to the challenge.

No state can guarantee 100% safety from terrorist actors who wish to maximize their message by targeting events that garner massive public awareness and notoriety. Large sporting events serve as appealing targets. Yet, fans of the game cannot let that dampen their spirits. If people start to allow terrorist actions to affect their lives and prevent the enjoyment of activities, then terrorists achieve their goal of creating disruption. So, go if you can, watch if you wish, but remember to enjoy the spectacle of some excellent soccer played out every four years.

Sources:

[1] Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118-3299, USA | “Red Card | Exploitation of Construction Workers on World Cup Sites in Russia.” Human Rights Watch., last modified -06-14T00:00:01-04:00, accessed Jan 20, 2018,

[2] “A Timeline of Deadly Attacks in Russia.”. Los Angeles Times.

[3] International Olympic Committee. 2015. “Factsheet: Sochi 2014 Facts and Figures.”: 1-7.

[4] “2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil™ in Numbers.” FIFA.com., last modified -09-23 09:36:00, accessed Jan 20, 2018,

[5] “Russia Makes all Efforts to Ensure Security at 2018 FIFA World Cup — Lavrov.” TASS., accessed Jan 20, 2018,

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