Recruitment

 by Ahmad Mohibi

The Emergence and Expansion of ISIS-K and the Taliban

The Taliban blamed ISIS-K for the Kabul explosion on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul, killing at least 30 people and wounding dozens this Tuesday. Though there is no immediate claim of responsibility, it’s more likely that IS-K is behind the attack. IS-K has carried out some of the deadliest attacks since its appearance in 2015.

This included the August 26 suicide bombing that killed 13 US service members and 180 Afghans at Kabul airport. Hundreds have been killed and wounded in two separate suicide bombings this past month, in Kundoz and Kandhar at two Shia mosque gatherings.

One of the group’s greatest strengths and factors that sets them apart from the Taliban is not only their ability to leverage the local expertise of its fighters, but also the funding they have.

There is substantial evidence that the group has received money, exceeding $100 million, along with training and advice from the group’s core organizational body in Syria and Iraq. With their funding and expertise, IS-K has launched numerous attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating chaos, uncertainty, and fear – one of their main goals.

Background

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest and well-known terror groups the world has known. Emerging in the Middle East due to inter-state fragility, failed foreign policy, and instability in the region, ISIS emerged as a force to be recognized and feared. ISIS is present in Afghanistan under the name the Islamic State Khorasan, also known as IS-K. It was formed in Pakistan in 2014 and later appeared in Afghanistan in 2015 at the height of ISIS’s power in Syria and Iraq.

Moreover, they are known as the most extreme and violent of all the jihadist militant groups in Afghanistan and one of the top four deadliest terrorist organizations in the world.

The group recruits both Afghan and Pakistani jihadists, especially members of the Taliban who do not see their own organization as extreme enough. Throughout its history, IS-K has carried various attacks on different targets. This has included Afghan security forces, the Taliban, US and NATO forces, religious monitories, Afghan politicians and ministries, international organizations, and many more. Consequently, there will be an increase in activity by IS-K due to the instability of Afghanistan.

 Different in idea, same in nature

IS-K and the Taliban are two different sides of the same coin. Both are extremist groups, fighting for the same idea, but with different goals, both voicing their disdain for each other. However, ISIS and the Taliban are not as different as IS-K claims to be. One of the reasons is that IS-K is essentially copying attacks and tactics that the Taliban deployed in the past. One example is in the northern part of Afghanistan in the Balkh Province, IS-K is expanding in the eastern and northern provinces with their night operations and coordinated terror attacks, while in the day they are dormant. This draws a parallel to the Taliban who has and is doing the exact same thing.

Moreover, as IS-K and the Taliban are strategic rivals with IS-K branding the Taliban as “filthy nationalists” who only want to form a government within the borders of Afghanistan and therefore contradicts the IS’s goal of establishing a global caliphate, one would assume that IS-K would adhere to different strategies. But, IS-K is following similar patterns that the Taliban launched against the government over the past 20 years. For example, almost a year ago on the 12th of May 2020, the Taliban attacked a maternity ward of a hospital in Kabul. On the 2nd of November 2021, IS-K launched an attack on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul.

The only thing that really sets the groups apart is that the Taliban is struggling against ISIS as they do not have the same training and resources to enable them to maintain their power. To further emphasize the similar patterns, ISIS knows that in order to obtain power for political objectives, violence is the key.

Therefore, ISIS is taking the same measures that the Taliban took to gain the same power in the name of jihad. Consequently, the method of their attacks and strategies are very similar to those of the Taliban. IS-K simply justifies their tactics as being better, even though most of the attacks and methods are the same as the Taliban.

What is next for ISIS-K and Afghanistan?

Since its emergence in 2015, IS-K is continually growing and expanding. Not only is this because IS-K is conducting more attacks and gaining more territory, but also because Afghanistan is a country ridden in poverty. Most people think that people join ISIS or IS-K due to religious causes, but it is quite the opposite.

Many people, especially youth join ISIS to get out of poverty. Furthermore, it is a historical fact that poverty has determined the fate of many Afghans. So, while the Taliban struggles to maintain power in Afghanistan with the financial crisis along with the fact that half of the country is facing starvation before the winter, there is and will be a rapid increase in IS-K fighters because they will have the opportunity to gain money when joining to provide for their families.

Additionally, it is a researched fact that one of the main incentives for people to join extremist groups is economic hardships and poverty. For example, CNN reported an Afghan father selling his daughter in order to take care of the rest of his family. The money being offered to new recruits with or without experience is a huge reason for the increase in IS-K soldiers. Moreover, this is occurring while the Taliban cannot afford to pay their own soldiers. This tells us that the trajectory of the number of IS-K fighters in Afghanistan will increase because there is more money involved.

Looking Forward

With more and more attacks occurring, it is not senseless to expect even more. It will be important for international players and organizations to actively aid the civilians caught in the middle, who are being treated as collateral damage. There is a lot to be done in order to stabilize an increasingly fragile and hostile area. Relative peace is not on the horizon, but there must be steps in motion to aid in the facilitation of some sort of coordination in the nation.

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 by Mathew Tyris

ISIL’s Original Web Series

As a part of its propaganda machine, ISIL created the video series ‘The Best Outcome Is for the Righteous.’ Each video contains common themes: members ready for battle, photos of enemies in respective regions, and calling upon other Muslims to join the fray. Alongside this they renew, or pledge their allegiance to Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL. Its thirteenth installment — The Best Outcome Is for the Pious — was no different, however it was released by its Bangladeshi faction.

Visual propaganda attempts to showcase that ISIL still has Wilayah, or regional territory. Therefore, it seeks to divert attention away from the group’s ongoing struggles, such as loss of their last physical stronghold. According to Raphael Gluck, they have transitioned into a kind of ‘insurgency mode’. ‘The Best Outcome Is for the Pious’ reached wider audiences by way of its release by Amaq News Agency and pro-ISIL Telegram channels.

Bangladesh is not the only Wilayah ISIL claims to have a presence. Other videos have been released in Khorassan (historical region of Iran and Afghanistan), the Caucasus, East Asia (Philippines), Sinai, West Africa, Azerbaijan and Libya. All of these videos have been posted since Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi released a video in April 2019, in which he stated the battle of Baghouz has been lost.

The correlation between ISIL territorial losses and release of video propaganda is not coincidental. They want to depict they still have a presence in diverse states. The fact remains that terrorist ideologies have no set borders, but ISIL is adamant that the word knows they have a presence in these thirteen regions.

The videos serve as a moral boost after ISIL lost its territory in Syria and elsewhere. It is a show of faith in the organization and leadership when cells of ISIL fighters pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. They are intent on continuing the fight. Further, these videos are depictive of a current desperation for recruitment. ISIL needs to show that it still has strength and it is apparent a heavy recruitment campaign is underway, with emphasis on regional sympathizers in various locales.

‘The Best Outcome Is for the Righteous’ series claims active regional involvement, but ISIL’s only authentic presence remains in cyberspace. Revealing this factor is the way to counter ISIL sympathizers from seeking membership in an actual insurgent formation. Authorities in the aforementioned regions must focus on limiting any exposure that showcases ISIL’s presence locally.

Terrorist organizations strive on fear, and fear often leads to publicity, which in turn translates into influence. The only power ISIL has is that provided through complicit exposure.

Image Credit: A clip from an ISIL propaganda video courtesy of the Long War Journal.

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 by John Wilson

Countering Extremism in the Digital Age

Source: Rand Corporation (2016) 

The Global War on Terror has challenged Western conceptions of warfare. The days of clearly defined winners and losers amongst nation states, as seen in the world wars, are largely in the past.

Tomorrow’s winners and losers will be defined in much more blurred terms as ongoing battles of information and communication seek to win over the hearts and minds of people around the world.

The State Department has acknowledged that for any legitimate success to occur in the fight against terrorism, countering the propaganda of extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS) is critical. While entering the fight in the war of information is a massive step in furthering counterterrorism efforts, the State Department has not yet taken the steps necessary to match the surging campaigns of extremist networks, particularly IS.

The State Department first officially began this type of counterterror operation with the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was active on social media, directly challenging IS profiles with counter-messaging while conducting various media campaigns such as ‘Think Again, Turn Away’.

Conceptually these were reasonable strategic maneuvers that attempted to challenge the cyber prominence of the IS’s media strategy as well as online recruitment efforts. However, what came to be considered tit-for-tat online trolling between low-level jihadists and the United States government likely emboldened and legitimized the IS.

The State Department would go on to restructure the CSCC, creating the Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is also tasked with addressing social media activities of nation states such as Russia. The GEC however is experiencing similar issues in conjunction with reported limited staffing and funding.

The IS media strategy has often been simplified by Westerners in an effort to de-legitimize the IS as a whole. However, this has led to a fundamental separation between our understanding of the IS propaganda campaign and the means by which we counter it. In order to truly combat a propaganda campaign, its purpose, narrative and mission must be understood.

Once these elements are comprehensively understood, a counter-narrative strategy must be implemented rather than a counter-messaging strategy. A successful counter-narrative strategy must address issues to include factors that IS relies on to recruit vulnerable individuals to their ranks: desires for purpose and belonging. A counter-narrative campaign must also be inclusive of the Muslim faith, understand local cultural concerns, and be conducted in a way that does not appear to be dictated by the West.

The CSCC did re-post relevant material from news outlets in the Arabic world in an effort to appear more representative of local cultures, as opposed to speaking purely as an American source. Beyond the limited scope of the CSCC and GEC efforts, several governments now deny terror networks a platform to circulate their propaganda.

This strategy places pressure on social media platforms to promptly delete extremist content and profiles. This strategy does slow the spread of propaganda, but does not provide a counter-narrative to what these groups are using to recruit and draw sympathy.

The State Department’s GEC has implemented one significant upgrade from its predecessor: one of the GEC’s core competency areas, ‘partnerships’, has the GEC develop partnerships with organizations, religious leaders, and community leaders to help engage with those at risk of becoming radicalized or to help those who are already.

One recommendation for a counter-narrative strategy proposes that the narrative must portray the IS as manipulative and as a failure, as opposed to promoting the often-observed idea that the group is tremendously dangerous. Any successful counter-narrative campaigns must be directed towards specific sub-audiences of those vulnerable to radicalization or those radicalized who are vulnerable to being deradicalized.

The IS has been the latest international terror network to capitalize on the ease of using the internet to communicate propaganda. Terror networks have become adept at using the internet to accelerate the radicalization process, share ideals, and develop support networks across the globe, all while remaining largely uncontested by the governments of the world.

The State Department must conduct systematic changes in the near future if there is to be hope for success in this war of ideas.

First, the State Department must see an increase in staffing to properly manage the overwhelming load of work that comes with fighting international terror propaganda on the internet.

Second, incorporating community and religious leaders will be essential to foster an image that this is not a counter-narrative strategy dictated solely by the United States government.

Third, the GEC, in conjunction with these community and religious figures, must jointly develop the counter-narrative strategy.

John Patrick Wilson is a Law Enforcement Professional as well as a Research Fellow at Rise to Peace.

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