propaganda

 by Rise to Peace

Reciprocal Radicalisation – What Is It And How Do We Fight It?

With the tragic deaths of five and injury to over 150 people during the storming of the Capitol Building, ISIL propaganda channels became predictably awash with posts hailing the crowds as “great symbolism”. 

The Capitol Insurrection provided us with a recent reminder of the need to explore reciprocating narratives between extremists of differing ideology. Whether Islamist as in the example above or between the predominantly domestic movements of far-right and far-left groups, and how these narratives can aid one another, allowing us to better understand how to counter the threat.

Definitions

Reciprocal radicalisation refers to the purported reliance of terrorist organisations upon one another, sharing and feeding in narratives. According to the organisation CREST, based in Lancaster, U.K., the concept emerged initially during analysis of the 2001 Race Riots in England, and further embedded following the establishment of the EDL, a far-right Islamophobic movement. The EDL itself had formed in response to controversial protests by Ahle Sunnah al Jamah, an Islamist offshoot publicly opposing parades for soldiers returning from Iraq. 

Similarly, when the Finsbury Park Mosque was targeted in June 2017, the perpetrator shouted “this is for London Bridge”, referencing an attack that occurred three weeks prior. The resulting investigation found he was directly influenced by far-right material which called for retribution for those prior attacks. This is where the crux of the argument for drawing parallels presents itself; whilst a range of terrorising motives may exist mutually exclusive in terms of their ideological background, they often share in the modus operandi of their actions, to cause and sow division.

Challenges

Widely understood amongst academia, the term has held less recognition within political circles where support for counterterrorism policy can often fall along partisan lines, rather than out of altruistic concern for best practice. Critique has been applied to the extent to which these acts are linked, viewing a natural source of conflict between extremists of differing motivations rather than any premeditated or implicit interoperation. Supporters argue such analysis is valuable beyond the actual acts of terror, in assessing a movement or individual’s propensity towards violence – thereby evaluating the ‘powder-keg’ type incidents which do not necessarily constitute attacks, but which may be utilised to further radicalise those involved.

Whilst a reluctance to empirically adopt such processes as the norm is understandable, there are strong denominators which explain why such prevalence is apparent. After the Christchurch attacks, ASPI argued there were a number of pervasive, “eerie similarities” in the perpetrator’s far-right manifesto with Jihadist propaganda preceding and following the attack. These include the terrorists portraying their actions as a defence mechanism against ‘foreign invaders’, seeking revenge for previous attacks (further continuing the spiral of violence) and an apparent ‘restoration of glory’, drawing on historical narratives of conflict between East and West and a wish to preserve the status quo ante. Hence where the far-right position themselves in opposition to immigration, Islamists view themselves at war with ‘infidels’ and external forces, whether non-believers or other Muslims who do not subscribe to their brand of fundamentalism.

Conclusions

The road towards committing acts of terrorism is influenced by a range of factors. Rather than spreading panic in the aftermath of attacks we need legislators to take stringent action and provide measured responses. We should look to those in a position of power to reassure communities, irrespective of personal opinion.

This duly applies to any in a position to do good, for it is only with cooperation and education on a much wider scale that we can hope to defeat terrorism. The truth is no single approach will ever work in preventing extremism or the dynamics underlining it, but by raising awareness of these issues and setting a firm example of how best to respond to terror, we can progress towards stymieing these movements from gaining further traction. 

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 by Mathew Tyris

ISIL’s Original Web Series

As a part of its propaganda machine, ISIL created the video series ‘The Best Outcome Is for the Righteous.’ Each video contains common themes: members ready for battle, photos of enemies in respective regions, and calling upon other Muslims to join the fray. Alongside this they renew, or pledge their allegiance to Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL. Its thirteenth installment — The Best Outcome Is for the Pious — was no different, however it was released by its Bangladeshi faction.

Visual propaganda attempts to showcase that ISIL still has Wilayah, or regional territory. Therefore, it seeks to divert attention away from the group’s ongoing struggles, such as loss of their last physical stronghold. According to Raphael Gluck, they have transitioned into a kind of ‘insurgency mode’. ‘The Best Outcome Is for the Pious’ reached wider audiences by way of its release by Amaq News Agency and pro-ISIL Telegram channels.

Bangladesh is not the only Wilayah ISIL claims to have a presence. Other videos have been released in Khorassan (historical region of Iran and Afghanistan), the Caucasus, East Asia (Philippines), Sinai, West Africa, Azerbaijan and Libya. All of these videos have been posted since Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi released a video in April 2019, in which he stated the battle of Baghouz has been lost.

The correlation between ISIL territorial losses and release of video propaganda is not coincidental. They want to depict they still have a presence in diverse states. The fact remains that terrorist ideologies have no set borders, but ISIL is adamant that the word knows they have a presence in these thirteen regions.

The videos serve as a moral boost after ISIL lost its territory in Syria and elsewhere. It is a show of faith in the organization and leadership when cells of ISIL fighters pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. They are intent on continuing the fight. Further, these videos are depictive of a current desperation for recruitment. ISIL needs to show that it still has strength and it is apparent a heavy recruitment campaign is underway, with emphasis on regional sympathizers in various locales.

‘The Best Outcome Is for the Righteous’ series claims active regional involvement, but ISIL’s only authentic presence remains in cyberspace. Revealing this factor is the way to counter ISIL sympathizers from seeking membership in an actual insurgent formation. Authorities in the aforementioned regions must focus on limiting any exposure that showcases ISIL’s presence locally.

Terrorist organizations strive on fear, and fear often leads to publicity, which in turn translates into influence. The only power ISIL has is that provided through complicit exposure.

Image Credit: A clip from an ISIL propaganda video courtesy of the Long War Journal.

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 by Mathew Tyris

Using Encrypted Messaging for Terror Propaganda

In March, ISIL lost its last physical stronghold in Baghouz, Syria when United States-backed Syrian Democratic Forces overtook the territory. Although ISIL had tangible territory, terrorism is not typically bound by such lines. An examination of how encrypted messaging services, such as Telegram, spread propaganda beyond borders and jurisdictions is required. It is important to comprehend how terror groups and related media sympathizers use such services to influence and recruit.

In a recent case, an ISIL sympathy group, Ash-Shaff, posted propaganda posters on Telegram encouraging attacks in San Francisco, New York City, and London. The posters show images of Big Ben and Parliament on fire, an ISIL fighter running through New York City with an ISIL flag, and a sucidide bomber with a bomb in his backpack. These posters directly target ISIL sympathizers and loan wolves to act. They exhibit messages in English that call for terrorist acts that typically result in a high number of casualties of those deemed kuffar, the expanse of the ISIL network, and targeted countries considered crusaders. Crusaders refers to ISIL adversaries France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. The term kuffar is similar to the term infidel.

Ash-Shaff is an ISIL sympathy group either based out of Indonesia or ran by Indonesian citizens. Ash-Shaff creates and shares media to instigate lone-wolf attacks and spread propaganda. They manufactured other pieces of propaganda in January 2019, May 2019, and in July 2019, which were also shared on platforms such as Telegram. All these posters have similar themes, calling out for violence against enemies and trying to incite sympathizers to carry them out. Ash-Shaff is particularly dangerous because sharing content on platforms such as Telegram provide individuals in these channels with the ability to share propaganda on major social media sites.

Ash-Shaff is one of many ISIL supporter media groups. Other major actors include Quraysh Media, Muntasir Media Foundation and Hamlat Fadh Al-Mukhabarat. The list of groups is extensive, but they all serve the same purpose, to share ISIL propaganda. They facilitate communication within ISIL chat rooms on Telegram channels and inspire actions. For instance, during the Sri Lanka bombings, all of the aforementioned groups shared similar propaganda posters and messages on their channels celebrating the attack. What stands out is that a supporter or sympathizer of terrorism does not need to be apart of all these groups to hear the message. Just one is suffice.

Telegram is the top choice to spread terrorist ideas. It is preferred because its messages are fully encrypted and can even self destruct. The company is aware of its appeal to terrorist groups. They have in fact banned ISIL channels from becoming public, but they can remain private. ISIL remains able to use Telegrams private message services to coordinate attacks, plan social media campaigns, and recruit.

One case is telling. In 2017, a woman was arrested in Bandung, Indonesia after she was radicalized in about four months after receiving instructions from over 60 chat rooms on Telegram. It is argued that a radicalized person is ready to perform a terrorist attack in less than a year. An individual who joins five chatrooms can receive up to 500 pieces of propaganda and instruction daily. Telegram chat rooms can host up to 5,000 users.

It is difficult to put a policy solution on encryption services. A solution that has been implemented by Russia and Iran was to ban Telegram altogether. This is not ideal for many countries, but it is effective.

Currently, there are few regulations when it comes to private messaging services. The encryption messaging industry needs to come together and discuss legal and safe parameters. Like the Christchurch Call to Action, main players in encryption services need to develop a platform to combat terrorism. The issue can not be solved by blocking a service, because there is always another one.

The only other solution is that chat rooms exceeding 1,000 users should be charged monetarily. At this level of communication messages are not used for intimate conversations or privacy. Information with such a reach is part of an agenda and meant to spread ideas and information to like minded individuals.

Telegram and other free encrypted messaging platforms are the basis of terrorist communications. They allow for groups to plan social media campaigns, provide instructions for attacks, receive donations and recruit. It is easy to suggest that groups spreading terrorist ideas should be banned from using these services, but it is what needs to be done.

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