Oil

The Effects of Oil Production on the Niger Delta

Peaceful, full of life, resource-rich, and green are all features that were once attributes of the Niger Delta. The region, located in Nigeria, comprises a few states in its southern area. The region’s economic buoyance dates back to its pre-colonial days when it boasted of trade explorations extending beyond its borders. With such magnificent antecedents, expecting the Delta to attain far-reaching heights in infrastructural development at the least is not exactly out of place. Unfortunately, the rightful expectation is far from reality. Regardless of its several positive attributes and resources such as oil, the region remains underdeveloped; and continues to fall victim to challenges which worsen its state.

Why is the Region Important?

After almost half a century of exploration, the year was 1956, and oil was discovered in Oloibiri, Niger Delta. The discovery led Nigeria to join the ranks of oil-producing countries in 1958, with a production output of 5,100 barrels per day. Over the years, Nigeria continued to reach a significant record in its production output, recording up to 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004. With the discovery of oil in 1956, Nigeria, which had a vibrant agricultural sector, slowly began to overly focus on oil and gas at the cost of developing other potential industries.

According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the body charged with covering the spectrum of all petroleum industry operations, the petroleum and gas industry accounts for about 90% of Nigeria’s gross earnings, though this figure has significantly reduced. Simply put, the oil industry is a significant player in Nigeria’s economy, and the Delta is home to this crucial resource.

Twenty-Six Years Ago

On November 10, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel, and John Kpuine, commonly referred to as the Ogoni Nine, were hanged at a prison in Port-Harcourt under the military rule of Sani Abacha. These men were leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). The crimes of these men were that they demanded better environmental practices and oil revenue sharing for the region. The response was imprisonment and eventual execution.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

In 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for kidnapping four foreign workers in the region. MEND’s demands are very similar to those made by the Ogoni Nine, howbeit through a different means. The group expressed concern for environmental pollution, underdevelopment, and perceived unfair revenue sharing that belittles the oil-producing communities. The group’s continued attacks on oil facilities and oil workers impacted Nigeria’s economy significantly, reducing its oil outputs by one-third.

Overall, MEND has become a prominent militant organization posing significant challenges to oil production through its relentless efforts to undermine the oil industry in the Delta.

Truth or Imaginations

The continuing long-term struggle that has dominated the region for decades in various forms is not misplaced. Even though oil accounts for most of Nigeria’s earnings, making it the largest oil producer in Africa, the region bears significant environmental pollution.

In the last six years, the Nigerian Ministry of Environment has recorded an alarming 5,000 cases of oil spillages, with a record event occurring a few months ago. In November of last year, members of a community in the region where the devastating effect of a leaking wellhead had become unbearable held a protest. The leak, which began about a month before the demonstration, had continued to spread into nearby communities and extended into neighbouring states. Unfortunately, such cases are not uncommon and have left a lasting impact on the environment.

The environmental impact is multi-layered affecting lands, rivers, air quality, and income sources for residents. So devastating are these effects that accessing clean and safe water is nearly impossible. Unsurprisingly, the overall consequence is unequivocally visible in the significant difference in the life expectancy rate in the region, which is ten years lower in the Delta region in comparison to other parts of Nigeria.

Beyond the Obvious

Jonah Gembre, an activist from Iwhrekan, stated, “we were thinking the oil companies were coming to elevate us from poverty, but they only give us poverty, and the economy is dying.”

The statement above reveals the expectation of many others living in the region. Sadly, the reality is farther away from the desires of the Delta people. Another overwhelming disappointment that further makes their desires for change seem unrealistic is the rise and fall of emancipators, whose sole goal, it would seem, is self-enrichment. 

A Blink of Hope

In January 2021, a Dutch court indicted a famous oil giant for spills in the region, ordering it to pay $111 million to affected communities. With the long history of exhaustion, frustration, and exploitation of the advocacy journey, January 2021 remains noteworthy to the people of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, there may be left, a remnant of truly devoted patrons that would bring to an end the critical dilemma of the region.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

COVID-19

Terrorism and COVID-19: An Overview of their Impact on Syria

Syria is mired in poverty and disarray as a result of terrorism, and the impacts of COVID-19 have exacerbated the conditions. Syria needs a comprehensive plan to fight a series of unresolved difficulties after decades of terrorism, civil conflict, poverty, and famine. The largest refugee exodus in history occurred across the country during the previous year.

Desperation and Disarray in Syria

In 2016, 366 terrorist attacks occurred in Syria, and in 2019, more than 10,000 people were killed, and finally, according to the Observatory, in 2020, 6,800 individuals were killed. However, while these numbers are staggering, they do not compare to 2014, Syria’s deadliest year, in which 76,000 people were killed.

2021 marked one decade since Syria’s uprisings erupted; unfortunately, the nation remains impoverished and plagued with violence. It began as ruthless assaults on anti-government demonstrations, evolving into a complicated battleground involving international forces, local militias, and foreign fighters. The conflict also spawned the world’s biggest refugee crisis, with more than half of Syria’s people displaced. There are 5.5 million refugees living primarily in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, while another 6.7 million are internally displaced.

The confluence of wars and attacks, economic crises, water shortages, and COVID-19 has created an atmosphere of terror and a dire humanitarian situation, according to Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Humanitarian needs in Syria are at their highest as there is an urgent call for a total change in terms of policies and measures to demolish terrorism.

The Brutal Effects of Terrorism 

Terrorism has had a significant influence on oil, which is one of the Middle East’s most important industries. Attacks on oil production have resulted in supply disruptions. Considering ISIS’s primary revenue stream is the illicit sale of oil, Syria became a target for territorial control to gain access to oil wells and establish dominance in the oil market.

Additionally, day-to-day life, such as access to clean water and adequate living conditions, have been impacted by both terrorism and COVID-19 in Syria. However, even though humanitarian conditions have eroded, the Syrian government continues to restrict the distribution of humanitarian aid across the nation.  Roughly 11.1 million of the 17.5 million Syrians required humanitarian aid in 2020.

Of the humanitarian aid that was distributed to Syrians in the first half of 2021, the contributions consisted of food, access to clean water, hospital renovations, hygiene products, and basic essentials.

Notable improvements and humanitarian aid contributions across Syria include, the implementation of a water purification program to 10.5 million individuals across nine governorates; the distribution of food parcels to 1.3 million Syrians and the donation of basic household items, blankets, mattresses, and hygiene kits to 500,00 individuals throughout seven governorates; and the distribution of COVID-19-specific hygiene kits to prevent the spread of the virus. Additionally, thousands of Syrians received vouchers as a means to access food and hygiene products.

Current Outcomes and Future Suggestions

Syria’s current situation is inhumane. According to sources, terrorists belonging to the Islamic State (IS) in Syria appear to be plotting more fatal strikes in 2022. The assessment comes amid an uptick in IS activity in recent weeks, including two strikes in the war-torn country’s eastern and central areas, which the organization has claimed as its own.

Worldwide collaboration is needed to remedy the Syrian crisis. Shortages of basic goods, such as bread and petrol, have become a common concern, and the number of people in need of humanitarian aid climbed by 21% in 2021. Another aspect to consider is the COVID-19 vaccination rate. Currently, only 5% of the country’s overall population has been reported as fully vaccinated, raising questions about the government’s capacity to deliver vaccinations equitably even within its own borders.

Also, calls for Kurdish-led authorities and the U.S.-led coalition to compensate for the civilian casualties inflicted in their fight against the IS is sought to remedy the impact of their attacks in northeastern Syria. Moreover, the individuals with suspected ties to the IS and who continue to remain in camps and prisons must be swiftly investigated to provide answers and mitigate indefinite detentions.

Since the onset of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the U.S. Institute of Peace focused efforts on Syria, but an effective and long-lasting resolution is still lacking. Terrorism is demolishing the country, and the unstoppable attacks over the years make Syria a high priority for help.

 

Katerina Rebecca Paraskeva, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Poverty and Violent Extremism in Yemen

For over 1,000 days now, Yemen has been devastated by horrific violence and a brutal civil war.[1] In 2014, the Houthis, a group of Zaidi Shi’a rebels who subscribe to the principles of pan-Islamism,[2] advanced into the Yemeni capital of Sana’a. By January 2015, the rebels had gained control of the presidential palace and successfully pushed the Yemeni government from power.

A student at the Aal Okab school stands in the ruins of one of his former classrooms. He and his fellow pupils now attend lesson in UNICEF tents nearby.

President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi was eventually forced to resign, parliament was dissolved and a Houthi ruling council was established in its place.[3] In March 2015, the Saudi-led military coalition targeted the Houthis and began bombing the rebels in an effort to dislodge them from Sana’a.[4] While the Saudi coalition was able to aid Hadi and various local forces in regaining southern governorates of Yemen, the Houthis continue to control much of the north- including strategic parts of the country such as Sana’a.[5]  On December 4, 2017, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president of Yemen who had stepped down during the Arab Spring in 2011, was killed by the Iranian backed Houthis. Driven by the desire to regain power, Saleh and his loyalists formally allied with the Houthis in 2015.  However, he broke ties with the rebels in December 2017 and days after expressing his support for Riyadh, the Houthis killed him.

In Yemen, alliances seem to be constantly shifting and the political situation appears to be an endless quagmire. The unrest and dynamic conflict has enabled the Yemen based group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to greatly expand its territorial control and there are ISIS training camps in al Bayda governorate.[6] While AQAP remains a much greater threat than ISIS in Yemen, it is clear that the war torn country has become a breeding ground for terrorism. While a thorough analysis of the current political situation in Yemen is beyond the scope of this discussion, this piece will seek to examine the relationship between poverty and terrorism in Yemen. I will argue that while poverty is not the only underlying cause for terrorist activity in Yemen, it frequently serves as a mobilizing factor that aids in AQAP’s recruitment efforts.

Her bruised eyes still swollen shut, Buthaina Muhammad Mansour, believed to be four or five, doesn’t yet know that her parents, five siblings and uncle were killed when an air strike flattened their home in Yemen’s capital. Despite a concussion and skull fractures, doctors think Buthaina will pull through – her family’s sole survivor of the Aug 25 attack, on an apartment building, that residents blame on a Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen since 2015. The alliance said in a statement it would investigate the air strike, which killed at least 12 civilians.

The civil war in Yemen has produced the world’s worst humanitarian crisis as well as the world’s worst cholera outbreak. More than ten thousand innocent civilians have been killed,[7] over fourteen million people are without access to medical care and millions have been internally displaced by the conflict. The Saudi coalition has imposed a de facto blockade, which has significantly worsened the crisis and now roughly seven million people are at risk of famine.[8] The ongoing violence and extreme poverty in Yemen have left families extremely vulnerable. In the April 2016 United Nations annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General reported that…“in Yemen, a particularly worrisome escalation of conflict has been seen. The United Nations verified a fivefold increase in the number of children recruited in 2015 compared with the previous year.”[9]

Yemen is a state on the brink of collapse and this has produced an enabling environment in which extremists are much more successful at mobilizing support for their violent causes. One way terrorists have been able to exploit the extreme poverty of Yemen and gain new recruits is through social service provisions. AQAP has appeared in images and videos on Twitter, showing the group’s fighters paving roads in the Hadramout province and assisting local hospitals.[10] Elisabeth Kendall, a Yemen scholar at Oxford University, tells Reuters, “In one video posted on Feb. 28, 2016, AQAP members deliver free medical supplies and equipment to the kidney dialysis and cancer wings of a local hospital.”

In another video, an AQAP militant states, “These are some medicines from your brothers, the Guardians of Sharia, to al-Jamii hospital which was going to be closed … because of no money.”[11] The deputy prime minister of Yemen, Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi, is well aware of the relationship between violent extremism and poverty, especially when it comes to young boys who are often recruited as foot soldiers. Abdel-Karim al-Arhabi states, “Most young people have no prospects in life. Those fanatics offer them the illusion that they can take power and implement authentic Islam – and if they get killed they go to paradise. It’s a win-win situation for them.”[12]

Yemen has been in the grip of civil war since March 2015, when Houthi rebels drove out the government and took over the capital, Sana’a. The crisis quickly escalated, allowing al Qaeda and ISIS — enemies of the Houthis — to grow stronger amid the chaos.

It is clear that young men faced with high levels of poverty and little to no employment prospects are often lured to organizations like AQAP. AQAP not only provides social services but also the promise of financial rewards and compensation.[13] The links between poverty, unemployment and young Yemeni men joining al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not new. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the first Guantanamo detainee to stand trial before the military commissions and a Yemeni citizen, worked as a driver for Osama bin Laden. The Sana’a based mosque where Hamdan was recruited was described as a “gathering place for the dispossessed,” and thus “exerted an especially strong pull on the country’s poor.”[14] Hamdan claimed to have chosen to work for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan because, “working as a driver and mechanic in bin Laden’s motor pool paid better than driving a dabab (minibus) in Sana.”[15]

In this discussion, it is vital to note that many researchers have claimed that the terrorism-poverty thesis is flawed. However, poverty’s role in undermining state capacity has often been overlooked and scholars have often failed to make distinctions between terrorist elites and impoverished communities. Karin von Hippel explains, “Although the leaders of terrorist organizations seem to come from both indigent and bourgeoisie backgrounds, this is not true of their humble servants. Strangely, most researchers recognize that poverty may be a factor among lower ranks but do not include the foot soldiers in their research when aggregating data”.[16]

We cannot dismiss the fact that elites often use the grievance of poverty as a recruitment mechanism and extremists continuously exploit ungoverned or disputed territory. Corinne Graff of The Brookings Institution contends, “There is little evidence to suggest that poverty does not affect the incidence of terrorist attacks. The body of scholarly research thus far has failed to establish this, let alone explain how to measure terrorism. Hence the quantitative data and ensuing data disputing such a relationship remain a poor guide for policy. More convincing is the mounting evidence confirming that poor weak states are vulnerable to violent extremists.”

Abdellatif Allami walks with his three-year-old daughter Sara in the Harat Al-Masna’a slum in Sana’a, home to the families of former factory workers. They used to receive a basic pension of around $120 a month, but the payments stopped seven months ago, and the families now rely on donations to survive.

We cannot simply overlook the fact that “an estimated 17 million Yemenis (about 60 percent of the total population) are estimated food insecure and a further 7 million severely food insecure…malnutrition has increased by 57 percent since 2015 and now affects close to 3.3 million people, 462,000 of which are children under five.”[17] If the state truly does collapse, Yemen will not only become a terrorism hotbed for Sunni jihadists but also for Iran backed Shia militant groups.

Sources:

[1] Faisal Edroos and Ahmad Algohbary, “1,000 days of war in Yemen ‘land of blood and bombs'”, Al Jazeera, December 20, 2017.

[2]“Q&A: What do the Houthis want?”, Al Jazeera, October 2, 2014.

[3]“Yemen: Houthi, Saleh council formation criticised by UN”, Al Jazeera, July 29, 2016.

[4] “Saudi Arabia launches air strikes in Yemen”, BBC News, March 26, 2015

[5] “Yemen Control Map & Report – January 2018”, Political Geography Now, January 7, 2018.

[6] DoD News, Defense Media Activity, “U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Against ISIS Training Camps in Yemen”, October 16, 2017, U.S. Department of Defense.

[7] Nicolas Niarchos, “How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse”, The New Yorker, January 22, 2018.

[8] Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Agency Foresees Severe Famine in Yemen Under Saudi Blockade”, The New York Times, November. 21, 2017.

[9] United Nations General Assembly Security Council.  “Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary General” A/70/836–S/2016/360.

[10] Yara Bayoumy, Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari.“How Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has made al Qaeda stronger – and richer”, Reuters Investigates, April 8, 2016.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ian Black, “Yemen terrorism: Soft approach to jihadists starts to backfire as poverty fuels extremism” The Guardian, July 29, 2008.

[13] Christopher Swift, “Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’s and the Struggle for Yemen”, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 6 (2012).

[14] Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual, Confronting Poverty: Weak States and U.S. National Security, (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 69.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Karin von Hippel, “The Role of Poverty in Radicalization and Terrorism” Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Thousand Oaks: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2014), 61.

[17] “The World Bank in Yemen”, The World Bank, April 1, 2017.

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