Lafiya Dole

Lafiya Dole: Africa’s Old Narrative

The eternally fascinating continent of Africa is home to fifty-four beautiful countries, which are rich in resources, diversity, strength, and sadly conflicts. In the words of Patricia Danzi, Regional Director for Africa for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “conflicts last and they don’t stop – and more are added.”

Leaders in Africa continue to make efforts to lessen the number of conflicts constantly arising and persisting. The challenge, sincerely, is a great one and one that has come to form, over time, the identity of Africa.

An Africa which is at peace with itself was the dream of Nelson Mandela and continues to be the dream of many other passionate leaders in Africa, but then, how can this be achieved? Could it be through Lafiya Dole?

Lafiya Dole

As part of the efforts to rework and add renewed vigor to the fight against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, especially in the Northeast, the Nigerian Army has decided to rename Operation Zaman Lafiya” to “Operation Lafiya Dole.”

Former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Major General Tukur Yusufu Buratai addressed the 103 Battalion Nigerian Army based in Konduga, Borno State. He commended the Nigerian troops on their efforts thus far in the ongoing war against terrorism, all the while urging the army to fight harder in the pursuit and destruction of Boko Haram terrorists.

Lafiya Dole is a phrase in the Hausa dialect meaning, simply, “peace by force.” Quite a paradox, but unfortunately, acceptable not only in Nigeria but across the globe. If anything, the strategy of “peace by force” has done more harm than good.

Even with the Lafiya Dole campaign, peace, in reality, remains a mirage for the people of Nigeria. There is no peace in sight for Nigeria, not with the way it seeks to drive home its point to terrorists.

In Africa

Many African leaders hold firmly to the success of the Lafiya Dole philosophy. Similar strategies are continuously developed and implemented throughout Africa, both on state and regional levels. Silencing guns with bigger guns summarizes peace efforts in Africa. In reality, these efforts only help to further enhance resistance as the continent has seen increased activities among non-state actors, despite its efforts to cripple these activities.

Merely eliminating a leader of a violent group or members without first dealing with the conditions that allowed for such will only create a bigger problem. It is only a matter of time before another conflict arises. For a long time, this pattern has existed in Africa.

Finally

The philosophy of imposing peace rather than teaching it defeats the ideology it seeks to promote. The world seems to have lost itself in the pursuit of something it is yet to understand and fully accept. We certainly do not need to inflict more injury to heal a wound. Simply put, the antidote to these conflicts is peace.

A timeless example is Libya, where the quest and drive to save the people from oppression and Gadhafi required the use of oppressive techniques. Peace was thought to be attained through force, and now, what we have is nothing close to peace and everything far from it. Today, Libya is the source of everything that refutes peace, openly serving as the continent’s illegal arms depot for criminals and terrorists alike.

From a problem within control, it has grown to become a problem that seems like it will never end. Before Africa, or even the world, speaks of peace, justice must first be achieved, for there is never peace without justice. Currently, the tactic to achieve peace is to instill fear, however, given the right opportunity, chaos will erupt and worsen current conditions.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Shekau

Abubakar Shekau: His Many Deaths and Lasting Impact

Very little is known about Abubakar Shekau, the late leader of the group Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-jihad. The little we know is that he was a one-time deputy to Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the group commonly referred to as Boko Haram.

Following Yusuf’s execution by the Nigerian forces in 2009, Shekau assumed leadership until his death on May 19th, 2021. In the almost 12 years of Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram witnessed a steady rise in global recognition, media attention, and publicly acknowledged partnerships with other international terrorist organizations.

Boko Haram’s activities significantly transformed over the years, including a change in its targets, the nature of its attacks, and the weapons it used. Year after year, the group’s choices and standards of weapons continued to improve and the question of funding became louder and more critical to decipher. Additionally, while Boko Haram’s recruitment strategy continuously evolved, it nonetheless continued to produce its desired results.

Regarding Shekau’s leadership, even though deeply flawed and occasionally challenged by top group members, it would be wrong for any counter-terrorism strategy to make light of the capabilities of such an individual.

His Deaths

Conceivably, the Nigerian government may not have thought too lightly of Shekau, due to their many attempts to eliminate him. Since 2009, the Nigerian military, on at least four occasions, declared Abubakar Shekau dead before being debunked by Shekau’s typical video statements.

With such back history, it was no surprise that many would question what may now seem accurate, the announcement of the death of Abubakar Shekau on May 19th, 2021. Although, this time, the Nigerian military did not take credit for his death; rather, ISWAP, a rival faction, accepted responsibility for the events that led to his death, death by suicide.

Some have described the “mystery man” to be a psychopath and a joke. Regardless, Shekau remains an integral part of the group’s expansion. Psychopath or insane, joke or not, was he a dangerous person? Yes. Did he take advantage of the loopholes the Nigerian system graciously afforded him? Yes. Did he get what he wanted? Most definitely.

If his goal was to undermine the Nigerian military and destabilize the country as a whole, then Shekau found success. From influencing, whether directly or indirectly, the current violent crisis and criminalities on multiple fronts, the group’s desire is being fulfilled in the nation.

The growing unrest, much of which receives minute media coverage and security responses, is having a far-reaching effect on the entire nation. One of those many ways that is quite relatable is in the area of heightened food prices resulting from food scarcity.

A Hungry Nation

Northern Nigeria, which is home to numerous crises, such as farmers’ versus herdsmen, bandits, and kidnappers, is a key player in the agricultural sector and contributes significantly to the nation’s entire crop and livestock production output. Indeed, it is not beyond the expectation, that the Nigerian government highly prioritizes the region’s development.

The failure of the nation’s leadership to consider simply this grave consequence over the years has now put the entire nation in an avoidable struggle for daily survival.  A more worrying knowledge is the projection of the hardship that awaits the country in the coming years.

In Conclusion

Unless something is done, and quickly, the present, increasing criminality among citizens will only be the tip of the iceberg. With the grave damages brought about by one “mystery man” and the ripple effect of the actions of Boko Haram, alongside the response or nonresponse of the Nigerian government, a greater problem awaits.

While the Nigerian government continues to do its best to deal with the multiple fixes, perhaps unmasking the man, the group, and the truth behind them all, may lay a solid foundation to winning this blind war against an unknown enemy.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Nigeria

What Measures Should be Taken to Counter Nigeria’s Insecurities?

Nigeria has benefited from several projects and programs, all aimed at resolving the issue of insecurity including, addressing identified root causes and engendering factors. While these efforts seem promising, over time, one realizes its temporal traits. Being a significant player with yielding influence in Africa, Nigeria must understand all that is at stake for the continent if it fails to address its internal problems.

Insecurity in Nigeria 

Since its independence, Nigeria has experienced, at an ever-increasing pace, a series of conflicts and insurgencies.  These conflicts have turned the budding land in the Sahel to a leading figure on the list of unstable regions in the continent. From political violence to ethnoreligious conflicts, social agitations, resource conflicts, and now radical extremism, the nation continues to navigate these issues in hopes of survival.

Having survived a terrifying civil war, as well as spates of violence and conflicts, one would expect that Nigeria’s resilience will lead to stability. But in reality, this is not the case, as fears that the worst is yet to come remain strong. It was, therefore, no surprise to many when events of extremism began to gradually build up in the northern region of Nigeria, with Boko Haram taking the lead.

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf, a famous preacher and proponent of the Izala sect of Islam and the founder of Boko Haram, began to radicalize his followers in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Establishing a religious center and an Islamic school, Yusuf reached many people from poor backgrounds across the country. In no time, Yusuf’s teachings attracted many followers and expanded into other states including Yobe, where it established a base nicknamed ‘Afghanistan.’ The ‘Afghanistan’ base (just like other operation bases) enjoys a geographical advantage, as it is within close proximity to Nigeria’s borders, thus aiding their expansion into neighboring West African countries.

Responses to Insecurity and Terrorism

Almost always, the first response to quell reports of security disruptions in Nigeria is the use of force. Following this response is an attempt to create a lasting solution through program developments, usually aimed at management and recovery.

Many of these initiatives, such as the NYSC scheme (introduced in the aftermath of the civil war), the Amnesty program (focused on ending militancy in the Niger Delta), and the de-radicalization program, all fail to address root causes; instead, they manage the situation for as long as possible.

Consequently, we see a resurgence of the same issues across Nigerian regions: in eastern Nigeria, there is a reawakening of secession agitations by Biafra, in the Niger Delta, an increasing rate of crime and kidnappings, and in the North East, terrorism is growing with reports of abductees willingly returning to their captors.

Recommendations

Nigeria’s rising insecurity may remain unresolved until the government understands the importance of engaging and collaborating with relevant stakeholders in the country. Thus, while external aid has its role, the outcome may not be as desired, until every group in the country bears its responsibility and the right environment to execute them is created.

Collaborate with CSOs

Civil society and humanitarian organizations have been present in Nigeria for decades, closely collaborating with the Nigerian government to maintain security and stability. Their role in Nigeria’s security largely revolves around responding to conflict situations by offering relief support, spearheading mediation and reconciliation, and rehabilitating victims and perpetrators.

While these are commendable efforts, the government and these organizations need to take progressive steps to ensure appropriate mechanisms are in place to identify and address early warning signs of extremism and incitement.

Community Engagement

The role of the community has largely been ignored in Nigeria’s decision-making system, regardless of it being a democratic nation.  A review is essential with relevant measures made effective immediately. The government should fully engage communities in various approaches to counter violent extremisms, as well as identify and prevent future cases.

Deliberate efforts to ensure a balanced representation of women and youth in counter-extremism approaches is necessary, as they introduce a unique perspective from a largely marginalized and vulnerable population.

Contingency Plans

As a nation whose primary responsibility entails protecting the lives and properties of its citizens, expecting a contingency plan is in place at all times is not out of the ordinary. Due to Nigeria’s porous borders, Boko Haram and other extremist groups are in an advantageous position. Unfortunately, even with the lessons learned from Boko Haram, Nigeria’s borders remain largely unprotected.

Address Root Causes

The impoverished state of the country and the northern regions, alongside poor tenets of its society, are some factors that aid extremists’ growth. Time and time again, we have seen extremist groups all over the world garner support from citizens by providing basic amenities that governments fail to supply. Some abductees who willingly returned to Boko Haram camps after being freed by Nigerian soldiers cited the harsh economic conditions as the reason they rejoined. The government must rise to its responsibility in driving development in Nigeria.

In addition to developmental challenges, other root causes such as intolerance and marginalization remain unaddressed. Intolerance remains a bane in Nigeria and is the bedrock for the many ethnoreligious conflicts and radicalism that Nigeria has suffered over the years. The government, alongside relevant national stakeholders, must find ways to address these root causes and allot as much attention to these challenges as they do for terrorist acts.

Conclusion

Resolving insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria does not require additional funds or aid; all that is needed is a reformation of its systems, structures, and values. Merely formulating policies without a system that allows and ensures effective implementation would yield no result; this remains the case with Nigeria.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

Boko Haram

What Went Wrong with Nigeria’s Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Mission?

Nigeria has continued to grapple with the issue of terrorism, and as expected, has had to launch many counter-terrorism missions. While domestic conflicts and extremism were not exactly new phenomena to a fragile state like Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram would understandably raise concerns, mainly because of its religious ideologies and fatal potentialities in constituting an existential threat.

Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna Lidda’wati Wal Jihad, fondly known as Boko Haram, has in its almost two decades of existence; carried out several attacks targeted at civilians, security officials, infrastructures, security facilities, international organizations etc. All these attacks, Boko Haram claims, are done to drive their mission of establishing a caliphate – a goal it briefly achieved during their brief occupation of large swathes of territories in the North East region.

Counter-Terrorism Operations

For the period that this group has existed, counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria seem to have substantially focused on the use of force, however extreme it may be: chiefly on the defensive and occasionally on the offensive.

With the military at the forefront of this campaign, alongside the collaborative efforts of other security agencies, the tactics employed to solve one problem often create a much bigger problem for the nation. Unfortunately, looking through history, this is becoming a pattern in Nigeria. The lack of restrictions in using excessive force by security agencies as a response tool (regardless of the situation, whether it is a peaceful protest or terrorist incident) significantly hampers their genuine efforts.

For instance, Boko Haram initially started as a religious sect with somewhat radical ideologies that were of no significant risk (at the time) to the nation’s security. Although there was a need to be wary of the group, at that point, perhaps a softer approach would be ideal, but this was not the case.

An unnecessary military operation that saw the maiming and killings of members of the ‘religious sect,’ and worst of all, the extrajudicial killing of the then leader of the group Mohammed Yusuf by the police; birthed a mountain of problems that have only complicated things for the Nigerian counter-terrorism campaign. Gradually, translating from a religious sect with Yusuf, the reluctant fighter as the leader- to an unstable group led by the highly erratic Abubakar Shekau, the outcome of counter-terrorism operations in the North East is visible.

The instability in Boko Haram resulted in many offshoots notable among them are Ansaru, which shares links with Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with links to ISIS. Regardless of how the choice of strategy to counter terrorism seems to be multiplying the problems rather than reducing, it seems Nigeria has still not realized the glaring lessons before them.

Current counter-terrorism missions still have the military at the forefront, with its recent operations recording the elimination of leaders of terrorist groups. Again, we see the same mistake made with Boko Haram repeated, and in this case, the consequences are far graver as these groups now have international links and are not necessarily working on their own. These operations by the military may widen access for these international terrorist groups to further launch their campaigns, and in turn, gain more grounds in the already fragile region.

Recommendations

While these military operations may have their usefulness, we have seen over time that they are usually short-lived. There has been a rise in terrorist activities in the North East region, despite all the efforts and revenue invested in countering it. These groups still manage to onboard voluntary recruits amid the heated military operations.

A successful counter-terrorism approach should encompass strategies that focus on addressing development issues such as poor governance, low literacy, poverty, and unemployment; that these groups readily take advantage of to promote their campaigns. The failure to pay as much attention to extensively resolving developmental issues in the region while intentionally minimizing military tactics (which only infuriates terrorists and does nothing to deter or disengage them); continues to foil Nigeria’s counter-terrorism campaign.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

 

Boko Haram in Nigeria

Are Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Operations Boko Haram’s Biggest Ally?

For the last decade, Nigeria’s deadliest threat has undoubtedly and consistently been Islamic group Boko Haram. The terror group would see the Nigerian government overthrown to allow Islamic law to replace it. Although established in Northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram’s operations have spread beyond Nigeria’s borders. Its occupancy has overflowed into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Despite countless counterterrorism initiatives and overwhelming expenditure, the Nigerian government has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to control Boko Haram’s spread and malicious actions. As Boko Haram continues to threaten national security, it is important to evaluate the efforts of the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism measures in their attempt to counteract the group.

Boko Haram’s Violent Actions

Since the beginning of their insurgency in 2009, the group has killed more than 30,000 people and 2 million others have been displaced from their homes across Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is not the only terrorist group operating in Nigeria, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is the regional affiliate of the Islamic State. ISWAP have claimed credit for the killing of 30 soldiers in northeast Nigeria this week.

Boko Haram’s name, translated from Hausa, means ‘Western education is forbidden’. And this message has been no more true than in April 2015 when members of the terrorist group executed one of their most shocking attacks. Despite authorities being alerted to the possibility of the threat, Boko Haram were able to abduct 276 young girls from a secondary school in Chibok in the State of Borno. Ill-equipped to manage and respond to threats of this nature, Nigeria’s military were acting on the back foot. The kidnapping caught global attention and sparked outrage not only in Nigeria but worldwide, with the campaign #BringBackOurGirls trending. Since then, Boko Haram have executed a number of kidnappings, bombings and massacres, resulting in Nigeria being ranked third for the impact of terrorism. 

Nigeria’s State Of Emergency

Since Boko Haram’s inception, the Nigerian government has used a range of techniques in an attempt to combat the terrorist group. During Boko Haram’s most lethal period, the Nigerian government attempted to implement a range of operations focusing on Boko Haram bases. However, this only led to the group retaliating by launching attacks on vulnerable communities across the country. In January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency against Islamic insurgency. He made the decision to temporarily close borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, all areas of Boko Haram operations. This temporary measure was put in place to address the security challenges that Nigeria was facing, which consequently led to the establishment of a special counter terrorism force.

By 2013, Jonathan made the decision to clamp down on military excesses and launched an offensive on Boko Haram’s insurgency. The result was Boko Haram’s loss of control in Maiduguri. However, soon after this operation Boko Haram stormed military barracks and government buildings killing 55 people and freeing 105 prisoners. The failure of these operations was clear in Boko Haram’s continued spread to the south of the country, creating a feeling of anxiety and panic throughout Nigeria.

In 2014 the Nigerian government shifted their tactics to a soft approach through their National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). It was established to counter the Boko Haram’s operations and target the roots of terrorism. In this regard, elements such as radicalisation prevention, stronger community integration and economic development were imperative. The initiatives were somewhat effective but their success did not survive long term. To this day, Boko Haram continues to enact terror, causing a divide between civilians and the government.

Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Failings

A consistent theme of Nigeria’s failing efforts against Boko Haram has been a lack of communication. On various occasions poor inter-border communication has led to many challenges. These include: the loss of resources, uncertainty across troops and ineffective and untimely information sharing. This has resulted in generally a poor response to Boko Haram’s operations. The lack of effective communication has inevitably inflated regional tensions across Nigeria’s borders where military bases meet.

Research into the counterterrorism institutions in Nigeria has uncovered that they are generally counter-productive in their work. This due to poor funding, staffing and poor managerial methods. Despite these challenges, the Nigerian military has been successful in some of its operations. For instance, the rescue of 26 humanitarian aid workers, who had been abducted by Boko Haram in recent weeks. The government has also worked to return and reintegrate 5,000 civilians that had fled the country due to ongoing violence. With Nigeria and Cameroon working together to ensure safety in some parts of the State of Borno. This has enabled some communities to return.

Future Recommendations

Moving forward, it is crucial for the Nigerian government, and their counterterrorism team to understand the importance of effective communication. This communication must take place between the government, the military, national institutions and counterterrorist organisations. It is also important that communication is consistent on both a national level and on a regional level. The Nigerian government is strict in enforcing the law and punishments for any form of terrorist behaviour. The integration of these laws and investigations must also remain consistent. The brutal attacks from Boko Haram will not end if nothing changes.