The Afghan Future Looks Promising After Decisions at the Loya Jirga

With Final Prisoner Release, Afghanistan Takes a Giant Step Toward Peace

Originally published at The Diplomat

At long last, the Afghan government and the Taliban are ready to start their long-delayed peace talks.

The Afghan Loya Jirga (grand assembly) approved the release of 400 Taliban prisoners on Sunday, and President Ashraf Ghani endorsed the decision. This hopefully paves the way for the intra-Afghan talks between Afghan delegates and the Taliban insurgency, aimed at ending the 19 years of war.

“I look forward to the intra-Afghan dialogues,” said Khalid Noor, the youngest member of the Afghan negotiating team. He added, “I believe it’s going to start in the next few days.”

On Monday, the Taliban and the Afghan government agreed on August 16 as the start date for the intra-Afghan dialogues. The 21 members of the Afghan negotiation team headed by Massoum Stanikzai (former chief of the National Directorate of Security) is likely to depart Afghanistan for Doha, Qatar once the prisoners are released — as early as tomorrow.

The 400 prisoners were the last of a group of 5,000 whose release was promised in the U.S.-Taliban peace deal, signed on February 29. The Afghan government was hesitant to release these last prisoners for various reasons, from a lack of presidential constitutional authority to a desire to hold the prisoners responsible for their actions as well as a need for leverage for the Afghan government after the U.S.-Taliban deal.

Read the full article on the website of The Diplomat


Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace

Disparate Positions Stall Afghan Peace Talks Yet Again

Although the United States-Taliban agreement outlined the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners, the Ghani regime stalled the process before they reluctantly agreed to the release of 100 fighters. The Taliban remain upset that the entirety of their jailed fighters have not been released and such reversals prompted the Taliban technical team charged with prisoner swap negotiations to leave the discussion table frustrated days prior.

Peace seems impossible as both sides push partisan agendas and a serious political stalemate has derailed any intra-Afghan dialogue. As a consequence of this perennial dirty politicking, violent attacks on military personnel across Afghanistan began shortly after talks collapsed.

Undoubtedly, this is a fraught period for Afghanistan in general. Citizens struggle with COVID-19 while political crisis hampers any wider development. The Afghan government has been cynical of any peace talks from the start as they consider this development as a threat to their power.

Further, the Taliban seek the complete release of their prisoners. Tremendous effort has been applied in this regard, such as the recently released list of negotiators with the Taliban and a decrease in suicide bombings after the United States and the Taliban signed a peace deal in late February. On top of this, Washington decided to boycott integral aid as a method to pressure Afghan leaders to power-share through compromise.

The United States Has Stakes in the Peace Process

Presidential administrations have different objectives in Afghanistan. Under the George W. Bush administration, the 2001 US intervention sought to topple the Taliban, eliminate Osama bin Laden, and free Afghanistan. President Trump simply wants to end the US’ longest war he deemed as a “waste” and fulfill his 2016 campaign promise to bring troops home. As a result, his administration introduced a series of policies, such as the South East Strategy and the appointment of a special envoy to sign a deal with the Taliban. In a meeting with Afghan representatives, Zalmay Khalilzad once expressed, “I’m not a representative of Bush who asked me to restore Afghanistan, I’m a representative of Trump who wants our troops out.”

The Afghan government cannot understand or refuses to grasp that Washington will fulfill its stated objectives even if Kabul refuses to release prisoners or delay intra-Afghan dialogues. As Fawzia Koofi (member of the negotiating team and former MP) states, “The Afghan government is pressuring the US to recognize the Afghan government and in return, they will release the prisoners.”

Afghans will pay the price if the current government continues to delay the peace process — such as the $1 million cut in aid and suspended projects after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo failed to resolve the turmoil between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Anytime the government postpones the release of prisoners or stall the peace process, the Taliban retaliate violently. In one single attack in Zabul last month, 28 Afghan forces were killed by the Taliban.

Are the Taliban Willing To Make Peace?

The US agreement signified victories for which the Taliban fought for 18 years: recognition and the withdrawal of US troops. Consequently, the Taliban have used it to disseminate propaganda against the weakened Afghan government. However, a lack of unity among the Taliban remains a barrier to peace though leadership and a sizable portion of the group are interested in further gains through diplomatic negotiations.

Taliban leadership and their masterminds understand that there is no return to the Islamic Emirate of the 1990s; therefore, they are willing to compromise on an Islamic type of regime — one that is acceptable to the wider Afghan government and Taliban interests. This is a principal topic of the peace process that is explicitly puzzling and debatable.

Something that remains misunderstood, primarily in Afghanistan, is that the Taliban agreed to a reduction of violence, but not a ceasefire. Violence remains the Taliban’s preferred tactic and remains vital in their power plays to force the Afghan government to retaliate militarily. Without violence, the Taliban is nothing.

Until they reach a deal with the Afghan negotiation team, the Taliban will continue on a violent path towards their ultimate goal of an Islamic Emirate. Peace will not prevail in the sole context of a US-Afghan agreement, as 22 other terrorist organizations, such as Daesh and increased activity by Chinese militants in new groups, continue their battles.

The route to peace in Afghanistan is complex and it will not be easy. Nonetheless, there is a sense of hope among Afghans that decades of civil war and extremist regimes, like the 1980s and 1990s, are behind them. The peace process will go nowhere if the current political stalemate does not come to an end. Leadership and cooperation are key to any ceasefire and the start of intra-Afghan dialogues.

Afghanistan

An Afghanistan peace might be in reach, after all

It is a rational assumption that President Trump is likely to resume peace talks in Afghanistan after comments made during a Fox News radio interview. Trump said that the United States is “working on an agreement now with the Taliban” as well as “Let’s see what happens.”

The impetus towards this change of heart is rooted in recent events in which two university professors — an Australian and an American — were released this past week in exchange for the top three Taliban commanders, including Anas Haqqani. 

This past September, Trump abandoned the peace agreement with the Taliban due to the death of an American soldier and the high level of violence in Afghanistan. A subsequent United Nations meeting with the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and the latest hostage release compelled the US to pursue an agreement with the Taliban. 

Sayed Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander, told TOLOnews that “the talks right now are underway secretly and I think that they are in favor of Afghanistan.” He added, “based on my information, official negotiations are not underway like they were in the past.”

Afghan presidential spokesman Sediq Sediqqi said that “this time, we are in agreement in the sense that our goals and priorities for peace are completely clear, with issues like a reduction of violence which will result in a ceasefire, and, ultimately, the start of direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.”

Any effort to reduce violence in Afghanistan is in the best interest of all sides of the conflict, including the Taliban. With or without a peace deal, no circumstances justify the targeting of civilians.

A Civilian’s View

While the secret meetings are taking place, Afghans are confused, discouraged, uncertain and lost over the future of their economically unstable and politically corrupt country. Key factors fomenting these sentiments include:

  1. a lack of election results for the presidential elections that occurred two months ago
  2. a peace process without a true destiny that only results in violence
  3. withdrawal of US troops and the potential development of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorism and a battleground for regional rivalries.

Afghan citizens remain hopeful and willing to make sacrifices for peace as it has been the norm over the past 18 years. However, dealbreakers include political manipulation, destruction of schools, mosques and the lives of their children.

Political Complications

Taliban are not the only problem in Afghanistan; political, religious and influential leaders contribute to political instability as well. Historically and culturally, Afghans have been at war with each other as the result of toxic politics and ethnic conflicts provoked by foreign interventions continue into the present day. 

Afghan domestic rivalries remain a serious concern and an obstacle to peace. The incumbent Afghan government is posed to be the victor in the latest elections and consequently aim to extend terms. Conversely, opposition parties currently boycott the election counts, are engaged in building resiliency and regrouping for a possible state of emergency in case of any attempts by President Ghani’s team to shift results in their favor. 

Opposition candidates like Abdullah Abdullah (current Chief Executive of Afghanistan) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (leader of Hizbi Islami party and presidential candidate) chastised the government over any efforts to meddle in the elections. In any case, political leaders will lead Afghanistan into a state of chaos jeopardizing any peace effort, and more critically, contributing to a strengthened Taliban.

A clear solution requires Afghan political leaders to commit to a unity government whilst combating transnational terrorism and making peace with the Taliban.

Lessons Going Forward

The Trump administration must heed lessons learned over the past 18 years. This includes the decisive support of a specific candidate and signing any peace agreement with the Taliban.

Two points are crystal clear and require serious attention. First, the Taliban are in a war for their reputation. They want to manipulate the situation to demonstrate a significant victory in their favor. The group continues to grow and regroup due to funds generated through drug trafficking, illicit resources and donations from foreign donors to ensure the continuation of ‘jihad.’

Making peace at the macro-level is good, but it is imperative to pay closer attention to the sources of Taliban financing. This is important to stop the insurgency from gaining strength and subsequently challenging local governments.

The likelihood of the peace process is significantly reduced if the Taliban continues to fund its operations through illicit means at the same time as it negotiates with the American and Afghan governments. It is vital to cut their finances (especially assistance from wealthy foreign donors) and block their drug trafficking routes.

As long as drug trafficking remains profitable, the Taliban will continue to buy weapons, ammunition and pay fighters, which leads to a continuous cycle of war. Bankrolling the Taliban means they will not enter peace process negotiations in good faith.

American interests must determine whether the Taliban’s true intentions are peace or manipulation of the entire situation to ensure a shift of dynamics for their benefit. A deal should be struck if Taliban leaders promise to reduce violence and leave civilians unharmed. At the same time, the Taliban must respect the peace talks process. They cannot engage in lethal attacks and expect to gain the support — and hearts — of Afghans and American negotiators. All sides of the conflict should work to build trust and confidence. 

Each side desires disparate conclusions. The Taliban wants all US troops to withdraw while Afghans want American forces to remain. This is a serious issue and it cannot be pushed aside. Afghanistan is not ready for the US to leave or simply trust the Taliban to rebuild Afghanistan through a negotiated settlement.

American support is required to ensure the country does not develop into a safe haven for terrorist organizations with a wider regional reach. Simply put, the US is the main actor in this situation — acknowledged by both the Afghan government and the Taliban — so they must stay as long as it takes and broker a deal.

Second, the US should be cautious about choosing a preferred president in the next Afghan government. Any attempt to support a specific candidate in the context of a fraudulent vote and with a negative reputation will further jeopardize the US presence in Afghanistan. It is best to gain respect while implementing US foreign policy focused on combatting terrorism, building Afghanistan and stabilizing the region. 

Realistically, 2 million votes are not a true representation of a 34 million population. US decision-makers must critically think about how they will manage scenarios in which the Afghan election committee announces one candidate as the victor, nationwide protests erupt or how to quell angry candidates with strong local ties.