military funding

 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Policy for a New Generation

This is the final piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

After understanding Cabo Delgado’s history of economic marginalization, socio-political agitation, and geographic remoteness, one might not be surprised by the government’s military-oriented approach to dealing with ASWJ. With politics dominated by FRELIMO since independence, Mozambique ranks 149th in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Consequently, only 27% of Mozambicans see a difference between the ruling party and the state.

The central government has long lacked credibility in the region due to its ties to criminal networks, acquiescence to foreign companies, and a highly publicized scandal in which government officials hid and pocketed $2.2 billion in off-budget loans. Cabo Delgado is also home to the single largest private investment in Africa, Total SA’s $15 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project along the coast. But this project has provided little profit or opportunity to the locals, fueling further discontent and rent-seeking. 

Missteps and Militarization

For the past few years, the central government has outsourced its handling of the ASWJ crisis to foreign mercenaries. The notorious Russian Wagner Group was initially deployed but replaced by the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) after sustaining losses. In 2021, Amnesty International accused government forces, ASWJ, and DAG of war crimes targeting civilians, and DAG let its contract lapse in April.

The governments of South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United States, and the European Union have all expressed their commitment to resolving this crisis, and their assistance initially came as advising, training, and financing government forces. But these government forces are the same ones frequently accused of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and harassment of civilians. 

And now international military involvement is escalating. South Africa, a regional leader, initially ruled out putting boots on the ground but ended up sending soldiers to extract its foreign nationals from the siege of Palma. Last month, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the deployment of its standby force, but much of its makeup and mission remain unclear. In early July, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda preempted them, sending 1,000 troops in a bid likely meant to increase Rwanda’s sway in the region. The EU also announced its own military mission, staffed primarily by Portuguese, to provide further training to Mozambique’s armed forces.

The government and its partners seem to be making the same mistakes that the Portuguese made when battling guerrillas in the very same region. Over the course of their ten-year fight to keep their colony, the beleaguered Portuguese made various attempts at dislodging FRELIMO from Cabo Delgado. Yet, they never seemed to try the classic counterinsurgency strategy of developing communities and protecting the populace. This, local support was pulled away from the guerrillas. Instead, they swept the jungles of Cabo in the massive Operation Gordian Knot, which ultimately failed due to its onerous death toll and resource drain. This lack of community outreach, paired with blind military violence, only perpetuated the grievances fueling the insurgency. The same cycle of government rigidity and insurgent vitality appears to be the case in modern Cabo Delgado.

Attention and Investment

The chorus of international funds and troops meant to pacify Cabo Delgado has mainly reinforced this militarized approach. International partners must instead only finance those government initiatives which support rather than antagonize communities. They must also be more discerning in which squads they are funding and training, pulling support from those government forces with bad track records on human rights and battlefield conduct.

It seems that the West has yet to learn in its dealings with Islamist insurgencies that military force and weapons proliferation are not conducive to de-escalation. Throughout the war with FRELIMO, Portugal’s semi-fascist dictatorship also formed alliances with the West, yet for all the intelligence, finances, and training provided from abroad, Portugal could not pacify Cabo by the strength of arms alone. 

In the 1960s, Cabo consisted primarily of smallholder peasants growing cash crops. Today, though this region remains largely rural, there are increased opportunities in coastal trade and energy extraction. Yet, the youth see few of the benefits. The locals should be enabled to participate in their own economy, and this starts with conscious governmental policy. Instead of abusing already-marginalized communities, the government could push the conflict in a constructive direction if it took a whole-of-society approach to peace in Cabo. This involves responsive community policing, accountability for rights violations by security forces, development partnerships that include local businesses, investment in infrastructure and education, increased space for journalists and civil society, and consultative mechanisms to communicate with locals. These are the practices and institutions that international partners should be funding instead, even if they must be built entirely anew.

Conclusion: 

One can reasonably conclude that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is only going to intensify, and will remain a major security issue in southern Africa. Though international actors from the West to SADC have expressed their willingness to provide training and even troops, the history of Cabo gives little reason to be optimistic about external intervention. The people of this resource-rich coastal province have experienced purely extractive, disinterested economics for centuries, from Britain to Portugal to Total SA. And yet, when hundreds of youth take up arms under a salvationist banner of Salafism, the government and its international partners immediately opt for clumsy militarization and pacification.

Though their violence has been brutal, meeting the insurgents on the battlefield does little to solve the problems that energized them in the first place. Instead, anyone concerned with actually de-escalating the conflict must look to NGOs, local activists, and social institutions that should be invested in and listened to.

 

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 by Jack Ryan

How Will COVID-19 Impact Efforts in Afghanistan?

It is often surmised that modern conflict is characterized by a steady decline in inter-state warfare and increased conflict perpetrated by illegal non-state actors. In the current context, assumptions about a post-COVID-19 world and conflict add to this discussion as it will present a range of unique challenges to the international community. More specifically, COVID-19 will prove to be another factor in the decline of inter-state warfare, but provide a unique opportunity for terror cells and other illegal sub-national organizations to extort at the same time.

Due to the vast economic measures directed to fight the virus domestically as well as funding to support individuals and businesses during mandated lockdown measures, states will have to reexamine their national budgets. Countries will struggle to maintain pre-COVID-19 military spending, especially as citizens’ concerns shift from international affairs to domestic issues.

One only needs to read Geoffrey Blainey’s The Causes of War to get a grasp of his accurate argument that optimism guides a nation’s decision to go to war. Nations have been more inclined to go to war when they are more optimistic of victory and all it takes is one actor’s pessimism to favor a peaceful outcome, even if it means acceptance of conditions that may be less than favorable. COVID-19 has reduced optimism in states around the world. For example, the United Kingdom’s furlough scheme is estimated to have cost the country £60 billion (approximately $76.1 billion USD) between March and July. As nations look to rebuild their coffers, military spending will inevitably fall and with it, public support for military activity abroad.

This leads to the question: what does this mean for Afghanistan and American military engagement in the country?

Firstly, the pandemic has resulted in reduced military activity. As noted in outside analysis, COVID-19 has “prompted the United States and its partners to pause wargaming exercises that are meant to reassure allies and bolster readiness to protect the health of its military members.”

Not only does the U.S. need to keep a close watch over its military spending, but it also needs to keep a closer watch over the health of its fighters. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. In addition, it has been noted that, “Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected.”

Therefore, these factors will result in a growing trend of reluctance of countries to engage, especially those like the U.S. who have entered into conflicts under the banner of the responsibility to protect. This reluctance will also result from social pressures. It is easier for a state to promote counter-terrorism operations when its citizens believe they are directly at risk of becoming a victim of terror. On the other hand, expectations of governments shift when citizens are faced by other threats to their livelihood, such as a pandemic like COVID-19. Support for actions abroad will undoubtedly waver.

COVID-19 and the reaction from the international community will inevitably impact the Afghan government, which was characteristically fractious long before the pandemic. Afghanistan has long struggled with a subpar health care system and the pandemic has only reiterated these struggles. A 2015 study determined that, “For one in five people, a lack of access to health care had resulted in death among family members or close friends within the last year.” Further, the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan reports, “Afghanistan has a total of 35,526 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) and 1,185 deaths attributed to the disease (Ministry of Public Health).”

The increasing number of cases and evident lack of access to appropriate health care facilities presents an even bigger challenge to a government already stretched thin by the ongoing conflict with the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani’s government continues to pursue medical relief and stimulus packages including the allocation of “$86 million and then $158 million in the second phase to provide food to people across the country.” However, the critics fear the program will become riddled with corruption, a disease of its own within Afghan leadership. A free bread distribution program set up earlier in the year was found to be compromised by corruption.

Whilst the Afghan government battles corruption, a pandemic and wavering international support, the Taliban continue to launch attacks and publicly blame the Afghan government for the delay in the intra-Afghan peace process. Whilst the ongoing pandemic provides challenges to governments across the world it also provides a unique opportunity for terror organizations to take advantage of these pessimistic and economically weakened states.

As the government diverts security to hospitals as the number of patients rise by the day, the Taliban has taken advantage of the situation launching a range of attacks across the country in an attempt to gain an advantage over the Afghan government before peace talks begin.

Another pressing issue is that of prisons where thousands of Taliban fighters (as well as those of other groups) are incarcerated. It is common knowledge that prison conditions are favorable to the spread of disease. This will present an even greater challenge to a government already stretched thin on the ground.

Thus, it is integral that whilst the U.S. faces domestic pressure, they remain focused on their longest war. The US will need to accept responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan and continue its facilitation of intra-Afghan talks. Though the U.S. and other stakeholders will face increased pressure to reduce military activity in Afghanistan, continued support for the Afghanistan government, especially in the run up to peace talks, is essential. This is extremely important as the Taliban strive to gain any increased bargaining power over a weakened Afghan government.

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 by Arman Sidhu

Do Civilian Self-Defense Groups Help or Harm Counterterrorism Efforts?

After enduring what may be considered one of its most violent years, the West African nation of Burkina Faso has taken a new approach to countering the proliferation of armed insurgent groups that have traversed the country’s rural peripheries. Back in January, the country’s parliament sanctioned a program designed to equip and train civilian volunteers. Known as the “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act”, the intent of the program is to deter and fend off the increasingly brazen attacks carried out by armed groups in remote areas, in addition to reducing the workload burdened by the country’s underfunded and overstretched military.

Although Burkina Faso’s decision to train and arm civilians is neither novel nor surprising, the program does call into question the broader implications surrounding safety, efficacy, and authority. As one of several countries located in the heart of the Sahel region that spans West Africa, Burkina Faso is not alone in its struggles to contain and combat violent extremist groups, many of which operate as affiliates of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

Instead, the relatively lawless and remote geographic setting of the Sahel has allowed armed groups to ravage the region with attacks, kidnappings, and the trafficking of humans, arms, and drugs. Such conditions led to the formation of the G5 Sahel, a joint force that includes the militaries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. Established in 2014, the G5 Sahel has also received support and/or training primarily from France, which is currently engaged in the Sahel through an anti-insurgency campaign known as Operation Barkhane, and the United States, which has maintained a presence in the region for over 13 years.

Nevertheless, the decision to use civilian volunteers as an auxiliary to any military must be evaluated in the specific context of the conflict. These include assessing the following criteria: the quality of support & training given to the groups, and the level of state supervision and authority of said groups.

Quality of Support & Training

Throughout history, the use of state-sanctioned militias was designed to address shortcomings in the capacity of official forces, particularly in rural and remote communities. Militias offer a relatively cheaper solution for security and surveillance of the enemy. Though mandates vary, these groups typically do not participate in any offensive campaigns, and their tactical goals are confined to a specific geography.

Given the number of attacks that occur in Burkina Faso’s periphery (specifically its northernmost borders), civilian militias could be useful as a temporary deterrent to stave off enemy forces. However, mounting a successful defense normally necessitates a prompt response by professional forces, which must be located close enough to assume the reins from self-defense groups.

The sophistication of a fighting force, whether professional or amateur, is correlated to the quality of its resources, support, and training. Burkina Faso’s “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act” accommodates just two weeks’ worth of training for civilians, coupled with basic armaments and communication equipment. Although Burkina Faso’s military expenditures (as % of GDP) have nearly doubled in the last few years, its professional forces remain outgunned and ill-equipped to confront the insurgents. Thus, the prospect of civilian forces, which receive a substantially smaller share of investment in training and equipment, repelling an attack are unlikely. In the absence of high-quality, rigorous training and nearby support from professional forces, civilian forces may only end up attracting more attention to themselves from insurgents, resulting in additional bloodshed, while decimating confidence in the civilian program.

Though successful civilian auxiliary forces exist and have proven instrumental in conflicts throughout Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, none of them have succeeded in a unilateral fashion. Rather, the success of such groups remains dependent on continuous improvement, capacity-building, and adequate linkages with professional forces.

State Supervision & Authority

Among the oft-cited issues regarding armed civilian forces is the level of accountability and control by state actors (i.e. police, military). In the case of Latin America, autodefensas have started out as autonomous vigilante groups, but eventually were absorbed into official designated police or military units. In the case of Mexico, negotiations between the autodefensas and the federal government have often been long drawn out. In states with poor security institutions that are perceived to be subject to graft, skepticism is likely to emerge and persist between civilians and the government. A well-defined command structure and lines of communication that incorporate voices from central and local authorities is often overlooked in this regard, but can be effective in a post-conflict transition.

Whether civilians arm themselves or procure arms through government mechanisms, there exists a need to ensure these empowered groups do not evolve into autonomous organizations that either perpetuate crimes they were designed to prevent, or begin to clash with other militias, insurgents, and official military forces. For countries with significant ethnic or religious divisions, the issue of oversight is even more imperative to ensure unity and alignment between self-defense groups and the military.

Like many post-colonial African states, Burkina Faso’s borders were drawn in haste, and not necessarily in consideration of the varied demographics of its population. With nearly 60 different ethnic groups, Burkina Faso is no stranger to ethnic-based violence. Given the fact that such groups often cluster geographically, the risk of a state-sponsored program evolving into raised militias that operate independent of any official chain-of-command remains significant. While the government has attempted to get in front of this issue by assuring checks of moral conduct and proper vetting of recruits will be implemented, disarmament and demobilization remains subjective and tricky in many instances.

Conclusion

In spite of their domestic or foreign support, the Sahel’s armies remain woefully inadequate in their fight against insurgent groups. The region’s infestation of militants has further been complicated by the droves of Islamist militants fleeing Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. As a result, the region has become a popular spot of refuge, while allowing transnational terrorist organizations to regroup.

Given West Africa’s proximity to Europe, and the lack of a formidable military to confront them, concerns of the Sahel evolving into a permanent safe haven and operational base have only risen in recent years. Containing the spread of these insurgent groups will require additional funding, equipment, and capacity for any and all participating forces. Evidence of further coalition-building, spearheaded by France, remains promising. The most effectual defense will require an alignment in objectives between foreign, national, and local forces.

– Arman Sidhu

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