Mali Archives - Rise to Peace

July 12, 2022 by Rise to Peace

Katibat Macina: A Growing Threat in Mali

According to a statement by the Malian government, heightened attention is on Katibat Macina, an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization, for its massacre of 132 civilians in central Mali. Mali has not seen a death toll that high from an isolated incident since 2012, leaving the country in a complete state of grief since the attack in late June. Katibat Macina continues to grow throughout Mali and is becoming an increasing security threat in the region.

The Mali War and Current State of the Conflict

In 2012, the Mali War began, and its roots are attributed to the fourth uprising by the Tuareg separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. This uprising led an Islamist takeover of all northern cities of Mali. It included an improvised military coup against the standing Malian military. This conflict has led to the deaths of over 25,000 people and caused the displacement of over four million. With the severity of this conflict and requests from the Malian president, France, and the UN Peacekeepers became involved in hopes of mitigation. However, French troops are withdrawing due to disagreements between leaders on best practices. This leaves the Malian government with UN Peacekeepers and their military committee that has yet to be able to counter the continued insurgency.

In the past year, the Malian government has heavily relied on Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group to support their fight against jihadists. Efforts to mitigate the growing jihadism in Mali have yet to be stopped and have spread throughout the Sahel, leaving the Malian military without significant progress towards peace.

Background of Katibat Macina

Katibat Macina first found its roots in 2015 from its founder and current leader, Amadou Kouffa, a former member of Ansar al-Din, another terrorist organization in Mali. Katibat Macina first gained attention for their attack on the Byblos Hotel in Mopti. By 2016, the group’s operations focused more seriously on the Niger Delta, an area known for its rich agriculture, which only exacerbated the number of displaced persons throughout Mali.

After much public rejection for their harsh interpretations of Shar’ia, Katibat Macina was forced to hold a softer approach when aiming to gain more recruits. The group was able to grow and eventually shifted its main focus to attacking UN operations and personnel throughout Mali.

Massacre of 132 Civilians

From June 18, 2022, to June 19, 2022, Katibat Macina attacked the villages of Diallassagou, Diamweli, and Deguessagou in the Bandiagara area of Mali. Katibat Macina arrived armed on motorcycles and executed mostly men throughout the villages and set fire to many of the homes, vehicles, and barns forcing survivors to flee to Bankass.

Local sources have attributed this attack to the people of these villages for their cooperation with the Malian government and Russian mercenaries on counterterrorism efforts in the area. Katibat Macina attacked two additional cities; however, the fighters were ousted by traditional Dozo hunters or armed Dogon militiamen before the attack reached civilians. The Bandiagara area has often experienced jihadist violence, but nothing as severe as this recent massacre of innocent civilians. Some sources have claimed that the actual death count is lower than what has been reported in an effort by Dogon militiamen to gain more weapons; the Malian government has rejected these statements.

Current Mitigation Efforts & Outlook

Efforts to counter Katibat Macina have included ground combat, interviews of victims, and airstrikes. The Malian government has sent airstrikes in an effort to counter Kabitiat Macina in the vicinity of Bankass and Segue, as well as in Djenne and Tenenkou, where some of its members were located. Both the Malian government and Russian mercenaries have ramped up their counterterrorism efforts in these areas following the massacre.

The growth of jihadism in Mali and its presence throughout the entire Sahel has continued to grow without fail. The UN continues its peacekeeping efforts throughout Mali with its operation, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. However, this UN mission is often referred to as the most dangerous mission for peacekeepers due to high attacks targeting UN officials.

Following the withdrawal of French troops from Mali, the Malian government is struggling to properly counter these terrorist groups on their own, even coupled with the help of the UN. The Malian military needs proper funding and support from the international community o mitigate this growing security threat and prevent further massacres.

Claire Spethman, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

September 1, 2021October 19, 2021 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow.

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur.

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate.

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.