Kurdish and Chechen Women in Separatism

Women’s activities and levels of involvement in non-traditional military organizations are diverse. Because of that, it is important to approach case studies for a better understanding of the connection between women’s personal experiences, their inner environments and their work in such organizations. In this article, Kurdish and Chechen women involved in separatism will be explored, along with the sociological, historical and ideological background of the groups they joined. 

Separatist Kurdish women

Starting with the formerly Kurdistan Workers’ Party/PKK (now Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kongra-Gel), considered by some states and organizations as a terrorist, it is important to notice that Kurdish women are an essential part of its advancement in Turkey. This is evident with a participation rate of 40-50% of the whole organization.

Embedded in a paternalistic and restricted society, many Kurdish women felt the grievances of not being allowed to pursue education and secure employment. Women would have to silence their memories in fear of retaliation. Additionally, many were forced to marry when teenagers and experienced abuses and honour killings, throughout the 70s. This is similarly present in the modern day. The politicisation of women started to grow, however, when the conflict intensified in the 90s, when Ankara was destroying Kurdish villages, and when Kurdish people were killed or disappeared.

Therefore, women’s condition and their desire to escape it, following liberation beliefs, maybe the strongest factor for them to join the PKK. This may be done voluntarily the majority of times (according to ex-PKK terrorists that decided to give interviews). But different factors might also be relevant to other women, such as trauma, and/or revenge, for instance. The group’s message evoked justice, gender equality and freedom, to deter the male-dominated sphere and power in their inner circles and in the Turkish state. As a result, women perceived themselves as leaders, receiving political and military training. Subsequently, they observed the prohibition of domestic and sexual violence, conducting their own military units, between other implementations.

Those advancements came with some debates from men. They did not recognize women with enough strength for combat or as a figure of authority from the start. Women were seen to have constantly argued with them, did not obey their orders, and challenged their roles. The consequences of this reaction went from women being put in auxiliary activities to constantly trying to prove their value in harsh duties. This included volunteering for suicide bombings – until the implementation of penalties by the PKK’s board destined to men that disrespected women’s positions or instructions.

After this episode, a new code of conduct was established, reaching the Kurdish society. This is where Kurdish men could be separated from their wives if there was any denunciation of husband abuse to the PKK. 

Another characteristic involving women is that sexual relationships are not allowed inside the organization. The death penalty was utilized as a means of punishment in the past (actually banned) amongst jail sentences, disconnection from the group, or denials of leadership positions all as forms of punishments. If there are pregnancies, the newborn children are considered to belong to the group. As a result, they are separated from their parents, with only limited visits per year.

Separatist Chechen women

Although a dormant movement now, it is interesting to examine Chechen women that joined terrorist groups, with their participation rate in more than two-thirds of suicide bombings from 2000 until 2014. The origin of such an involvement relies on the Second Chechen War, where tactics by Islamist extremists started to be implemented. Consequently, one of them consisted of female suicide bombers, labelled as “Black Widows” by the media.

With a limitation to state how many groups were formed, it is not possible to detain a whole image of Chechen women’s participation. However, it is notable that the crisis was between the Russian army and semi-independent commanders from the separatists. Talking about the condition of women, some suffered honour killings, domestic violence and abductions. The ones that had opportunities to enter university and full-time jobs saw their hopes of securing them vanished by the two conflicts.

On the side of women’s reason for participation, the majority of them witnessed the brutalities of the Russian military. This included death, beating or mistreatment of relatives, and the destruction of their neighbourhoods. Against this background, Chechen women usually had a strong desire to be martyrs as the conduction of their entrance into such groups. This was largely in response to their own visions and their country’s fight to be independent of Russia. Furthermore, this was aided to have justice for them and their families.

There is also evidence that the recruitment was based on their friendship and familial ties. However, womens experienced changed their lifestyle once they joined those organizations. Mostly, they were in charge of traditional roles, such as cleaning, nursing or cooking. Furthermore, they wore the traditional Arab dress and hijab. When they took suicide missions, there was the protocol of only travelling with an older woman or designated chaperone.

Another difference from Kurdish women is that, if training existed for Chechen women, it was very short. This was due to the two weeks it took from leaving their homes and beginning to act. Their roles were also distinct, with Chechen women having traditional and subsidiary activities. However, the male-run command did not have a problem using women as suicide bombers, as it could also signify propaganda to attract more recruits.

Conclusion

The context of separatist Kurdish and Chechen women is different in terms of historical times and players. Nonetheless, the issue of women’s restrictive conditions in their societies and post-war settings are a trend in both. Although their organizations grew in ideological basis away from each other, they may reveal a large image of women’s situation, their needs, the observation of any conflict escalation in the following years, and the initial de-radicalisation strategies that have to emerge.

 

Was President Erdogan’s Visit to Washington D.C. a Success?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington D.C. last week received stanch opposition not only from the Kurds and pro-democracy groups in the United States, but also both aisles of the political parties in the US Congress.

The meeting between President Trump and Erdogan included several points of tension between the United States and Turkey: Ankara’s purchase of the S400 missile defense system from Russia; their suspension from the F-35 fighter jet program, military incursion into northeastern Syria; a federal court case against Halkbank (the Turkish state-owned bank) and a Congressional sanctions bill including investigation into Erdogan’s family assets.

Erdogan has a special interest in the case against the state-owned bank due to alleged involvement of his inner circle in the scheme. Halkbank “was charged … in a six-count Indictment with fraud, money laundering, and sanctions offenses related to the bank’s participation in a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.”

Another obvious important agenda item was the Turkish military incursion and its implications on the future of the Kurds in Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the region in general.

For Turkey, any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria is considered an existential threat. For the United States, however, the Kurds are reliable allies in the fight against ISIL and their situation became one of the contested issues between Washington D.C. and Ankara. Erdogan pressed the position that the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) are the same and the United States should not be aligned with the ‘terrorists’.

Further, during the press conference, he tried to discredit the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Ferhat Abdi (a.k.a. Mazlum Konabe). By discrediting him, Erdogan aimed to discredit the PYD (offshoot of the PKK). This move aligned with the objectives of the Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria.

While Erdogan and Trump responded to questions from journalists, Erdogan explicitly criticized Trump and US officials for inviting Mazloum Kobane to the White House. Trump responded to Erdogan by stating “A lot of that is definition – what’s your definition of the various groups within the Kurds. You have various groups and some like them and some don’t.” He implicitly reaffirmed the US position that they consider the PYD very differently than the PKK.

In other words, Trump and the entire US administration have a consensus on the idea that the PYD is a legitimate actor and the sole representative of the Kurds in Syria. Mazloum Kobane and the PYD have now become more legitimate than ever in the eyes of the international community despite the objections of Erdogan and Turkey.

Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government push a narrative that was meant strictly for domestic consumption which created an opposite effect and elevated the PYD’s position. In fact, Turkey’s military incursion acted as catalyst for PYD’s legitimacy and popularity. Using the remnants of al Qaeda affiliated militants as Turkey’s proxies further damaged Turkey’s image in the international community. This had a detrimental effect because Turkish-backed forces have been accused of committing war crimes against civilians in northeastern Syria.

As discussed in my previous piece at Rise to Peace, the US withdrawal and the Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria have already created turmoil that has taken its toll. According to the Pentagon’s Inspector General report “ISIS has exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent drawdown of US troops from northeastern Syria to reconstitute its capabilities and resources both within Syria in the short term and globally in the longer term.”

The S400 crisis is another major issue which has overarching implications, including Turkey’s future in NATO and Western Alliance. The purchase of the S400 defense system represents a blueprint of a major shift in Turkey’s axis. Seeing that there has been no concrete response from the United States, rather than considering it as a concerning issue, Erdogan’s leadership started to use the S400 crisis as leverage and exploit it against the United States and the European allies.

However, Erdogan is walking a thin line between the United States and Russia. While he is trying to contain the tensions with the United States, he also does not want to galvanize Russia which could become very costly for him domestically and internationally.

In his most recent remarks, Erdogan downplayed tensions between the United States and Turkey. He reiterated Trump’s critical position and emphasized the importance of US-Turkey relations. For Erdogan, his visit aimed to focus on “the areas of cooperation instead of deepening the chronic problems.” He also reemphasized that Turkey would not take a step back from the S400 deal with the Russians.

So, has Erdogan gained anything from his visit to Washington D.C.? The answer is a soft yes because he did not aim for complete success anyway. Erdogan’s most important gain was to have facetime with President Trump at White House which he desperately needed. In fact, Erdogan’s entire strategy relies on President Trump’s continuing courtship.

Turkey claims that neither Russia nor the United States kept their promises and threatens to expand its area of operation in northeastern Syria. Such an attitude would again create the opposite effect which would bring Russia and the United States against Turkey. In any case, the worst scenario could be deepening instability in the region in which ISIL benefits.

As for the Kurds in Syria, Erdogan’s visit confirmed that US support is firm and will continue notwithstanding the strong objections from Turkey. While concerns over ISIL resurfacing in Iraq and Syria are rising, Turkey’s ability to maneuver and pressure the Kurds will weaken.

Turkey

Turkey’s Military Incursion into Northeastern Syria Poses Many Risks to Regional Stability

President Trump’s decision to outsource the mission to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Turkey caught many observers off guard. In fact, allowing the Turkish military to carry out a military incursion in northeastern Syria has faced strong reactions in Washington D.C. and around the world. President Trump, who saw little justification in keeping the United States’ military in Syria after his declaration of victory against ISIL, gave a green light to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to realize its long-awaited ‘safe zone’ in the area.

Having two major goals, Turkey aims to prevent the Kurds — Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) — from having autonomy in Syria and resettle 1-2 million refugees in the safe zone. This is an especially complex political situation because Ankara considers the YPG as a terrorist organization under the guidance of the PKK, a far-left political entity with a contentious reputation internationally.

The initial plan is to establish a safe zone that will be 30 km (18 miles) and a length of 480 km (298 miles) that will allow resettlement of up to 2 million Syrians refugees who have been in Turkey. But according to Erdogan, the safe zone could be extended to Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor which could host the Syrian refugees in Europe as well.

As ambitious as it sounds, the plan has received little support from any country, including the United States, European Union (EU) member states, and several Middle Eastern countries. In the United States, except for Trump’s consent, the entire US Congress and most of the administration oppose the incursion.

Erdogan is attempting to balance numerous diplomatic interests in the Syrian conflict. For example, he proposes to the United States that Turkey could claim leadership of fight against ISIL while offering the Europeans a path to ease their burden of hosting refugees. He also proposed building hundreds of thousands of homes for the refugees in the safe zone which could boost the Turkish economy. So, it was supposed to be a ‘win-win’ for everyone.

The military incursion embodies several risks. For example, fighting between the Turkish military and the Kurds in Syria could create more refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in northeastern Syria. Particularly if the incursion will be extended and prolonged, this will force thousands of people to leave their homes which could mean that Iraq, Turkey, and eventually Europe could see another influx of refugees. Even more concerning is the idea that the safe zone would be used for resettlement of up to three million refugees. While there are Arab-majority areas in northern Syria, resettling Arab refugees in the area could lead other ethnic tensions and possible conflict between Arabs and Kurds.

Second, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) could carry out attacks in Turkey which could create another chaotic situation. While PKK has allocated several of its militants in the Syrian conflict, with sensational attacks, PKK could ignite a nationalist backfire against the Kurds given the emotional and heated psychological climate in the country. If the incursion leads to even a small-scale uprising in Turkey, the PKK would engage in opportunistic attacks. If the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds endures, Kurds in other countries, including Iran and Iraq, could rally around the Syrian Kurds. Contrary to what Erdogan and his government are trying to do, the operation could consolidate the Kurds in such a way that it could have several consequences for Turkey.

Fourth, feeling betrayed by the United States, the PYD would reach out to Damascus to seek closer relationship with Russia and the Assad regime which also would strengthen the Iranian influence over the Syrian Kurds. Syrian Kurds would rather have the Assad regime forces patrolling the Turkey-Syria border in the northern Syria than the Turkish military and Turkey-backed forces.

For Russia, the Turkish military incursion presents new opportunities. According to Moscow, while Turkey has a right to address its security concerns, it also should respect to the territorial integrity of Syria. In Russia’s view, Turkish military incursion can be tolerated as long as the Turkish military presence will not be prolonged. In other words, Russia sees Turkey’s move as an opportunity.

On the one hand, Turkey’s unilateral action contradicts with Moscow’s support for the territorial integrity of Syria and upsets the regime in Damascus. On the other hand, Russia sees the incursion as another opportunity to weaken the Western Alliances in which Turkey had been an important actor. Erdogan’s recent foreign policy decisions since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt have favored Russia in that Turkey aligned with Russia on many issues, including the Astana process; a series of initiatives and plans aimed to end the Syrian civil war.

Iran could benefit from the United States’ decision to pull out of critical areas in northeastern Syria too. This action provides Tehran with significant political capital to expand and deepen its area of influence in the entire Middle East.

Fifth, the region could witness another resurgence of ISIL. Recent experience in the region demonstrated that whenever there is ethnic and religious tension or a conflict, ISIL benefited from it. More importantly, Turkey’s record on fighting against ISIL is far from encouraging. Throughout the Syrian conflict, Ankara had turned a blind eye to the foreign terrorist fighters who have used Turkey as a transit country. Grave allegations that the Turkish government has provided extremist groups with weapons and other ammunitions discourage any expectations about the capability and willingness of the government to handle the ISIL threat in the region properly.

While in the short term the military incursion is helping Erdogan to consolidate popular support in Turkey, in the long term it could weaken his position both domestically and internationally. Already facing a lot of criticism and potential sanctions by the United States, if Erdogan cannot deliver the intended outcome of the operation, the military incursion could be very costly for him and Turkey.

Editor’s Note: Suleyman Ozeren, the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Counterterrorism program at Rise to Peace, provides comprehensive analysis of the many repercussions of the ongoing Turkish military operation in northeastern Syria. It is especially important to consider conditions on the ground and the consequences faced by average civilians in the wake of recent developments. Shifts in the regional balance of power in the Middle East are connected to the quality of life for many people, therefore this topic must be seriously discussed.