Islam vs Islamism? The Realpolitik of Islamic Jihadism in Africa

Decades of internecine conflicts, and bloody civil wars have left inedible scars across Africa, and the consequent weakening (or failure) of multiple nations across the continent. Islamist terrorist groups such as Ansar Dine (Mali), Boko Haram (Nigeria) and Al-Shabab (Somalia) have found fertile ground by exploiting the specific deteriorating political and economic conditions of individual African states. Jihadist groups have positioned themselves as a superior alternative to the corruption of central governments across Africa, and in doing so allowed them to win the support of some of the most desperate communities on the continent.

Why is Islamism able to spread?

In the past twenty years alone almost a hundred political conflicts have occurred in West African states alone. In north Africa Chad and Sudan are still witnessing a fratricidal war that has been going on and off for more than forty years. While in central Africa Angola has experienced thirty years of civil war. This instability and violence mean that the threat to regional peace and security posed by Islamist terrorist groups often goes overlooked. During the same period, more than 40,000 people have lost their lives in more than 9,000 terrorist attacks by religious extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional conflicts, prolonged internal violence, and civil wars nearly invariable leads to collapses of governance.  Throughout history, in any country whose central government fails to guarantee the security and welfare of its citizens, its people are driven to alternative organizations to fulfill such basic needs as food, shelter, and security. Often in such crises smaller entities (ethnic groups, tribes, clans, armed insurgencies, criminal gangs, and religious sects) find it necessary to step in, to cover many essential statal functions. And across all African regions Jihadist groups have done so too. Organizations such as Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Mali, have all established some forms of para-state structures within their territory.

One of the primary motivations behind such moves is it endears support for the Jihadist groups among regional populations. The support generated by such “hearts and minds” operations will be crucial for further Jihadist insurgent operations within this territory. And crucially jihadist organizations are heavily reliant on discontented young recruits drawn from local populations to sustain their forces. Jihadist terror groups often provide a form of hope and agency to those mired in endemic poverty and desperate social inequality. 

Regional Disparities

In the countries of the Sahel region, where the population mainly resides in marginal rural areas, the people are heavily reliant on the complex network of organized crime that was already embedded in the region before Islamist ideology. None the less jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), have also exploited the regional power vacuum to engage in both people and drug trafficking already rife in the region. This vacuum has also allowed Jihadist groups in the Sahel to recruit, train, and arm the local population, undisturbed by government interference.

If potential recruits in the Sahel are drawn to Islamist groups primarily by social and economic reasons, in East Africa and Somalia, decades of petty tribal conflicts and endemic corruption have stripped the traditional regional clans of legitimacy. Into this void Al-Shabaab have stepped in, recruiting among the disillusioned and those already vulnerable to Islamist ideology.

In cases like central Mali and western Niger, jihadists offer protection against bandits, justice against abuses by central governments, training, and armaments to address territorial disputes between local ethnic groups. In the north of Burkina Faso, on the other hand, the jihadist occupation of rural areas through intimidation and violence has had the effect of provoking clashes between locals and jihadists, rather than basic cooperation.

Islamist groups have been able to exploit not just political instability but specific regional rivalries between clans, ethnicities, and religious groups to their advantage. Clashes, such as the ethnic conflicts between Sufis and Islamists in Nigeria and Senegal, often dating back to the times of European colonialism continue to ensure Sufi’s political dominance and has been the source of much ethnic tension and violence

European nation’s influence on the African continent continues to this day such as the French intervention of 2013. While regional national governments have coordinated anti-terrorist operations such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger combined intervention, also changed the impact of Islam in the sub-Saharan region. The immediate result was a weakening of their jihadist groups and their removal from the city centers. The jihadist groups have retreated to their base of support among the population of rural areas, where Islamist ideology is prevalent among the most marginal ethnic groups.

The impact of ideology

In addition to the lack of social mobility, religious education must also be considered, since spreading basic Islamist education can predispose (or prime) the population to jihadist doctrine. In Somalia after the collapse of its state education system in, private Islamic schools proliferated. Often funded by Saudi Arabia, many of these schools are heavily focused on religious studies, were Wahhabism ideology dominants.

However, the presence of a strong tradition of the Islamic faith in a country is by no means a prerequisite for Islamist terrorism.  Senegal, where about 90% of the population is Muslim, has experienced relatively minor religious conflicts. In comparison, Nigeria, where Muslims make up 50%  of the population, Islamist extremism ideation has featured in many disturbing episodes of regional violence.

Conclusion

The impact of Islamist ideology in Africa is highly context-dependent on the specific geopolitical realpolitik of their base of operations. Individual Jihadist groups have adapted their strategies and tactics to exploit the unique characteristics of regions, and the specific needs of its ethnic groups. Such significant disparities mean it is both useless and unhelpful to apply a unified and singular explanation for the rise (and impact) of Islamist ideology in Africa.

When developing anti-terrorist and anti-extremist policies rather than focus on forced military interventions, the international community should focus on measures that enable regional governments to peacefully manage local conflict. And to limit the ability of Jihadist recruit by supporting efforts to improve the provision of services, and governance to marginal communities in rural areas throughout the sub-Saharan Region

Far-Right Versus Islamist Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) is one of the many extremist far right groups that operate in the United Kingdom, but only the second to be proscribed as a terrorist organization. More often than not, the threat posed by the far-right is neglected, especially in comparison with Islamist extremism. There is a general tendency to minimize far-right extremist incidents and the media seem to be rather reluctant to link such incidents to terrorism. This is somewhat disquieting as the far-right has been identified as the fastest growing terrorist threat in the UK, as well as in other liberal democratic countries.

According to new research, those convicted of Islamist extremist related crimes receive prison sentences three times longer than those affiliated with the far-right in the UK. For instance, Islamist extremists convicted of online crimes receive an average of 73.4 months compared to the right-wing extremists who serve approximately 24.5 months. This disparity is due to the failure of the Home Office to ban right-wing extremist groups as terrorist organizations. As well, the UK’s counter-radicalization strategy has been severely criticized for its focus on Islamic extremism although right-wing referrals have exceeded those related to religious extremism.

In the same way, there is disproportionate academic research on far-right terrorism, as indicated by Bart Schuurman study at the University of Leiden. More precisely, a review of the nine leading academic journals within the field of terrorism provided clear confirmation of something suspected all along, namely that far-right extremism is neglected not only by the government and policy makers, but also by academia.

Serious concerns over the proliferation of right-wing ideology worldwide and the lack of attention paid to it by intelligence and security services were raised following a series of high-profile far-right inspired attacks in 2019, primarily those in New Zealand, Texas and Germany. However, despite the 300% increase of far-right terrorism over the past five years, Islamist extremism continues to be the dominant threat in the UK.

Having said that, far right and Islamist extremism could be considered as being two sides of the same coin. Despite their diametrically opposed positions, they seem to reinforce each other. The rapidly growing Muslim community is essentially perceived as a threat to those that espouse far-right beliefs, therefore provoking a violent reaction. At the same time, Muslims in liberal democratic countries feel oppressed and deprived. They seek to participate proactively in the broader struggle against the oppression of Muslim people for that reason.

Notwithstanding their opposing views, both rightists and Islamists share certain common ideological characteristics, such as the anti-Semitic rhetoric and a belief in conspiracy theories. They also pursue objectives of similar nature. Far-right extremists seek to create a homogeneous society exempt of immigrants, or people of different races or religions, likewise, Islamist extremists aim at creating an Islamic Caliphate across the world with no ‘infidels’, namely people of a different religion. In addition, they are both opposed to globalization: Islamists under the fear of losing their cultural identity and right-wing extremists under the risk of losing homogeneity.

What emerges from the above is that despite all their differences, the threat posed by these two types of extremism is of equal importance. Both Islamist and right-wing extremists deserve specific attention and impartiality is an essential ingredient in the strategy of counter-radicalization. A policy which puts a disproportionate emphasis on one could be considered biased and ineffective, therefore making it difficult for experts to tackle either of those. By neglecting or over-emphasizing only one side of the problem, policymakers risk any attempt to effectively respond to such types of extremism.