ISIS

 by Josephine Neulen

What Becomes of Returning ISIS Fighters?


Graphic from the Washington Post[1]

Since the Islamic State’s collapse in Syria and Iraq, returning jihadists pose a problem to countries that don’t know how to handle the risk they present. While most are imprisoned, some are being rehabilitated. The rehabilitation process is costly and long and it raises questions about how to deal with radicalized individuals and avoid additional radicalization and violence[2].

Solutions for de-radicalizing jihadists and their children are hardly one-size-fits-all. Especially when the people in question were not directly involved in attacks or violence, but could still radicalize others. While most countries have addressed the problem of returnees in their respective criminal justice systems, some critics have been vocal about potential negative ramifications.

In an interview with I.R.I.N. (Integrated Regional Information Networks), the father of a radicalized Kosovan fighter states that steep jail sentences will not help returnees, but rather encourage more people to become radicalized[3]. That may be true. By punishing returnees harshly, states run the risk of giving extremist groups more reasons to feel antagonized and persecuted, which they, in turn, could use in their rhetoric when radicalizing others.

The problem is that there are limited options for such people. While de-radicalization programs exist, they are costly and must be tailored to each individual. The programs work if done properly, but with approximately 5,600 fighters returning home, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate so many at-risk people[4].

That said, mass incarceration does not eliminate the problem in the long run. A radicalized person needs to create a new identity and life purpose that does not revolve around violence. Therefore, a fusion of de-radicalization programs and incarceration might be the most efficient, realistic option for most states.

[1] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[2] Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/
[3]Nianias, Helen. Lessons from Kosovo? How a European hotbed of Islamist extremism deals with returning fighters. (2018, March 2). https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2018/03/02/lessons-kosovo-how-european-hotbed-islamist-extremism-deals-returning-fighters
[4]  Meko, Tim. Analysis | Islamic State fighters returning home. (Feb 22,2018.). Retrieved March 6, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/

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 by Josephine Neulen

Wrong Place at the Wrong Time: Europe unsure of how to reintegrate the offspring of the Islamic State

As ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliphate has collapsed in Iraq and Syria, many European States have to decide whether or not to let the children of European women who have joined the terrorist organization back into their country of origin.

Last December, three French-born children of suspected Islamic State members were flown back to Paris as the first act of repatriation of this kind. Similar kinds of appeals have been made by families from Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This does not mean that these countries have agreed on a procedure, however.

In Belgium, the Council of Ministers has decided to allow entry to children younger than 10 if DNA research confirms their Belgian heritage.  Similarly, in the Netherlands decisions are based on DNA tests to determine that a child has a Dutch parent.

Some have argued that letting former militant families back into their countries of origin would be a security risk that could make states increasingly vulnerable. While the caliphate might have collapsed, the ideology can last and has the potential to spread. According to researchers in Germany, radicalized children do not integrate well and “know nothing but war”.

However, many of these arguments seem only to emphasize the impact that the wrong kind of education has on children instead of trying to implement the right kind. This means tackling extremist ideology with education, new ideas, opinions, and a lot of family assistance. Many of these European states do not have an agenda that targets reasons people leave their home countries and join the caliphate in the first place.

While it might be easier to leave these children alone and not repatriate or educate them,  it is better to take control of the situation and understand the radicalization process in order to avoid these instances in the future. These children are often born into a terrorist organization, rather than having chosen to be in it.

It is understandable that authorities in European states are hesitant to invite members of terrorist organizations back into their countries, even if these “members” are small children. On the other hand, it is important to remember that if radicalization is possible, so is de-radicalization.

[arve url=”http://www.dw.com/en/children-of-is-in-belgium/av-41462421″ /]

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 by Maya Norman

The Defeat of ISIS’s “Caliphate” Does Not Mean the Defeat of ISIS’s Ideology

What Does the Future Look Like for ISIS?

Though the international coalition in the war against ISIS has experienced more gains than losses over the past few years, by no means is the enemy defeated. However, ISIS remains a fragment of what it once was and its goals appear even more unattainable. ISIS will never fully disappear. Its ideology is just as dangerous as its fighters, and while fighters can be physically defeated, an ideology cannot. This is especially true in the era of the internet, where an entity does not need to control a territory and its people to espouse ideas and maintain a following. While ISIS, as a physical organization, may become greatly diminished to the point it seems non-extinct, radical extremist ideology will prevail.

Background

ISIS formed out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a splinter group of Al-Qaeda central that emerged after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and aimed to entice a sectarian war and establish a caliphate [1]. In 2006, AQI was rebranded as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). They held a large swath of territory in Western Iraq, but in 2008, U.S. troops and Sunni tribesman significantly degraded the group [2]. As the Syrian Civil War ramped up in 2011, ISI used this state of turmoil in which the government was distracted by rebel groups, to try and govern land, led by their Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi [3]. After U.S. combat forces withdrew, a vacuum was created that allowed the Islamic State to exploit the “weakness of the central state” and the “country’s sectarian strife” [4]. After growth in Syria, in 2013 the group began seizing land in Iraq leading to the adoption of the name Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [5].

In June 2014, ISIS seized Mosul and announced the creation of a caliphate. This move prompted military action from the U.S. in the form of Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Department of Defense, as of August 2017, the Coalition had conducted 13,331 airstrikes in Iraq and 11,235 airstrikes in Syria. As of May 2017, ISIS has lost 70% of the territory it controlled in Iraq in 2013 and 51% in Syria [6]. ISIS is rapidly losing its seized territory, and with it goes its dreams of a global caliphate.

Iraq and Syria: May 2017 (Source: theglobalcoalition.org)

Why Won’t Traditional Counterterrorism Work Against ISIS?

ISIS’s goal is to establish a caliphate and enact Sharia law. The counterterrorism tactics used against ISIS did little to degrade them initially. According to David Kilcullen of the book Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla, ISIS does not hide out in rural deserts like past terrorist groups; they live in urban areas amongst civilian populations. This means drone strikes are difficult because of the almost guaranteed collateral damage. Furthermore, killing leadership will not harm the group because of its cell-like structures. Attempts to cut off funding did very little to degrade the group because the land they held sustained them with oil fields, banks, and antiquities. Countering their propaganda remains difficult because young, susceptible men find the ideology incredibly inviting. Pure military strength has taken most of the physical caliphate away from ISIS, but their ideology remains and their ability to inspire attacks is an enduring threat. Thus, the answer to the question is such – traditional counterterrorism did not work against ISIS because ISIS is an insurgency, not just a terrorist group.

Will ISIS be Defeated?

According to Audrey Cronin, Professor of International Relations at American University, ISIS is not a terrorist organization; it is an insurgent group that uses terrorist tactics [7]. This is important to keep in mind when attempting to discover what the future may hold for ISIS, as well as figuring out what are the best ways to respond to the continued threat. It is still absolutely vital to respond to the terroristic aspects of the organization, but it is important to keep in mind that the end of terrorism does not mean the end of its other elements.

Cronin has explained six ways in which terrorism ends – success, failure, negotiation, repression, decapitation, and reorientation [8]. ISIS will not succeed in establishing a global caliphate; it has lost too much territory and it was never a truly achievable goal. It will not fail or self-destruct because it functions in a cell-like structure, so while one cell may struggle, another cell can still operate unaffected. Negotiation is not feasible as the group’s demands are simply too ludicrous. Decapitation, in which a leader is killed or arrested, will do nothing to degrade ISIS because, while Baghdadi is a powerful symbol and well versed in Quranic studies, he is just that; a symbol of the movement, but not a real leader [9].

SEAN CULLIGAN/OZY

Reorientation is how ISIS will end; they will transform into a different type of group. It is important to note that the end of terrorism does not mean the beginning of peace [10]. ISIS will no longer remain an insurgent group that uses terrorism as a tactic, but they will continue to pose a threat in terms of sporadic attacks via its cells. Daniel Shapiro, professor of International Affairs at Princeton, does not think ISIS “has significant prospects for renewed growth anywhere” but does agree that the threat of attacks do remain [11].

What Will Work Against Radical Ideology?

The threat of terrorism will never fully go away. Diminishing ISIS’s territory has hindered their ability to finance themselves, coordinate, and plan large-scale attacks. However, taking away their physical caliphate does not mean ISIS cannot continue to propagate on the internet in the form of a virtual caliphate. We cannot win a war on ideology with weapons. The threat of a global caliphate is no longer existent, but the dangerous ISIS-inspired mindset will remain. As Scott Atran argues in his book Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (un)Making of Terrorists, de-radicalization, just like radicalization, works from the bottom up, not the top down [12]. This begs for continued advancement of community programs, including those that stress education and reinterpreting theology, to ensure susceptible young men and women do not radicalize via the internet, as well as collective vigilance to stop homegrown attacks.

Sources:

[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/19/AR2007111900721.html

[2] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html

[3] The ISIS Apocalypse. William McCants 2016.

[4] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group

[5] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html

[6] http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/maps_and_stats/daesh-areas-of-influence-may-2017-update/

[7] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group

[8] How Terrorism Ends. Audrey Cronin. 2009.

[9] http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/30/can-the-islamic-state-survive-if-baghdadi-is-dead/

[10] How Terrorism Ends. Audrey Cronin. 2009.

[11] https://www.princeton.edu/news/2017/10/20/shapiro-what-fall-raqqa-means-future-isis

[12] Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (un)Making of Terrorists. Scott Atran. 2010.

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 by Kevin Carpenter

The Latest Spat of Terror Attacks Threaten to Alter or Halt the Provision of Humanitarian Aid

On Wednesday, January 24, 2018, the headquarters of the humanitarian aid organization, Save the Children, was attacked by ISIS. The attack occurred in the city of Jalalabad located within Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. The official death toll currently sits at six and over twenty-five people were injured during the assault. The attack began with a suicide bombing outside of the organization’s headquarters destroying a van belonging to the organization. Following the bombing, gunmen stormed the headquarters building. The attack lasted a total of ten hours until the Afghani Security forces subdued the assailants. Four of the group’s employees were killed in the attack.

The attack was initially thought to be the work of the Taliban, but the Taliban denies responsibility. On Wednesday, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid insisted the bombing and assault were not carried out by the Taliban. (1) The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack in Jalalabad via the group’s news agency Amaq.

Following the attack, Save the Children announced that it would temporarily halt all operations in the country. Carolyn Miles, President and CEO of Save the Children, responded to the attack on Wednesday saying, “We have temporarily suspended our operations across the country following today’s events, however, we remain fully committed to helping the most deprived children of Afghanistan.” (2) On Thursday, Carlos Carrazana, the Chief Operating Officer of Save the Children, assured observers that the organization would not be pulling out of Afghanistan.

The staff members of Save the Children are the latest victims of the evolving phenomena of extremist violence perpetrated upon humanitarian aid groups and NGOs. High-profile attacks upon aid groups burst into the public consciousness afresh in 2003 following a series of attacks upon the Red Cross and UN headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. At the time, such attacks were beyond the pale; this is no longer the case. Aid organizations are now well aware that they are targets and can become victims of extremist violence. While the media profile of attacks upon aid groups grew, so did public perceptions of their frequency and impact.

The number of documented violent attacks on NGOs rose sharply in 2013. According to the Aid Worker Security Report, 475 aid workers were the victims of violence in 2013. (3) While the profile and prominence of these attacks in media and news coverage remain large, it appears that the number of attacks and their efficacy is on the decline following the 2013 spike. In 2016, 288 Humanitarian aid workers were killed or injured in violent attacks. (3)

Zarghoona* is a 13 year-old girl, in grade 6 at school in Afghanistan. She has four brothers and four sisters. She has been receiving training in Child Focused Health Education (CFHE) from Save the Children. *name changed for protection (PRNewsfoto/Save the Children)

Save the Children’s decision to not conclude its operations in Afghanistan speaks to the dedication of the organization’s staff to its mission, but it might also expose a disconnect between the media narrative surrounding attacks on humanitarian aid organizations and NGOs, and reality as these organization’s see it. The number of attacks upon aid workers in 2016, when compared to the number of attacks carried out between 2008 and 2015, excluding 2013, is fairly consistent. The relative consistency of such attacks is even more striking when we consider the large spike in attacks carried out in 2013.

Any attack on humanitarian aid workers is an attack too many, however, the media frenzy associated with these sorts of events may hurt aid groups rather than help them. The larger a group’s profile may be, the more value there will be in attacking said group. In addition to increasing the profile and then vulnerability of aid groups, intensive media coverage of attacks may exacerbate difficulties attracting funding and recruits. Several aid groups have already begun to scale down their operations in Afghanistan, as the result of violence.  An outsized discussion of risk may further damage humanitarian efforts, hindering the provision of humanitarian aid. Nonetheless, humanitarian aid remains a significant tool in combatting extremism and radicalization.

Sources:

  1. One dead and 14 injured after charity offices attacked in Afghanistan. (2018, January 24). Retrieved January 26, 2018
  2. Update on Attack at Save the Children in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. (n.d.).
  3. Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., & Czwarno, M. (2017, August). Behind the attacks: A look at the perpetrators of violence against aid workers.
  1. ISIL claims attack on Save the Children in Jalalabad. (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2018,
  2. Salahuddin, S. (2018, January 24). Islamic State attacks Save the Children charity in Afghanistan. Washington Post.
  3. Death Toll Rises to 6 In Save The Children Attack In Jalalabad. (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2018
  4. Why are aid organizations increasingly targeted? (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2018,
  5. Ogwude, E. C. (2015). Twelve Years Later: Afghan Humanitarian Aid Workers on War on Terror (Ph.D.). Nova Southeastern University, United States — Florida.
  6. Thomas F. Lynch III (2015) After ISIS: Fully Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan, The Washington Quarterly, 38:2, 119-144, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2015.1064714
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 by Tim O'Shea

ISIS in Kirkuk: What’s Happening and What it Means

What’s happening

Recent ISIS losses in Kirkuk Province in Iraq have been the latest blow in a series of major hits to the group, including their loss of their major stronghold of Mosul.  These losses represent a total decimation of the group’s strength: at its peak, the group controlled a third of Iraq, and yet it’s now relegated to mainly rural areas and small cities [1].  The attack itself was captioned by the retaking of Hawija, the most prominent city in the region.

The attack was carried out by a combination of U.S.-backed Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed Shia militias, which forced the remaining ISIS forces to fall back to isolated villages along the Syrian border [2].  The exact makeup of the group is controversial, with Iran-backed forces holding serious sway over even U.S. trained Iraqi units [3].  Regardless of the makeup of the unit, they were effective in removing the last major ISIS stronghold in northern Iraq, removing an important strategic asset for the so-called Caliphate.

The Future

The fight against ISIS is likely to morph into much more asymmetric and drawn-out warfare now that the group holds no urban centers.  Urban areas not only offered ISIS units the space to train and plan attacks but also offered the population needed for to maintain the group’s recruitment and resources.  Instead, Iraqi forces are now faced with clearing the vast deserts of Anbar Province complemented with a porous Syrian border [4].

While this seems daunting, Iraqi forces have confronted similar arenas in the fight so far: in the days leading up to the assault on Hawija, forces retook 25 small villages throughout Kirkuk Province while preparing to retake Hawija [5].Indeed, Kirkuk had already been experiencing mainly terror tactics such as IED and hit and run style attacks rather than full-on battles [6].

However, the relegation of the remainder of ISIS soldiers to this frontier may intensify this form of conflict.  Especially given the difficulty of maintaining consistent control over desert territory as well as tracking groups in the absence of strong infrastructure, this last leg of the conflict would be quite protracted.

Perhaps the most unsettling prospect of the decline of ISIS is the inevitable reintroduction of the social and political crises that generated space for ISIS to grow.  The emerging crisis with Kurdish independence, new worries over Sunni-Shi’a tensions as a result of Iranian involvement in the conflict, spillover from the Syrian civil war, and the huge task of postwar reconstruction could all contribute to new security challenges if not planned for proactively [7].

Indeed, the governor of Kirkuk noted the legacy of anti-system political violence stemming from the region, spanning al-Qaeda to the hypothetical groups to come [8].  And while it may seem arrogant to begin postwar planning, it was the same short-term planning strategies that have failed the United States time and time again in protracted wars around the globe.  Unless the U.S. wishes to be back in Iraq in another 5 years, the need for comprehensive postwar planning should be done soon.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/fighting-in-kirkuk-threatens-u-s-canadian-efforts-to-defeat-isis-1.4357964

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/iraqi-army-claims-recapture-islamic-state-isis-held-areas-hawija

[3] http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/16/if-trump-wants-to-confront-iran-he-should-start-in-kirkuk/

[4] https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/1.817709

[5] https://www.albawaba.com/news/iraqi-forces-recapture-25-kirkuk-villages-isis-1028378

[6] http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/19092017

[7] https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/islamic-state-collapse-on-the-battlefield-1.3255019

[8] http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/19092017

[9] Wikimedia Commons

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