Congo

ISIS in the Congo: A Counter-Terrorism Perspective

With much attention spotlighting ISIS-K’s increased capabilities, little attention has been brought to their counterparts within Central Africa. Much like their counterparts in Central Asia, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has increased its activities within Central Africa this year.

As ISCAP has carried out attacks, they have united the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in combating them, despite their past differences. While ISIS has lost territory in the Middle East, it is evident that its affiliates remain salient threats to the regions they operate in, as well as international security as a whole.

Origins of ISCAP

The formation of the Islamic State in Central Africa traces back to ISIS’s ambitions to expand into Africa in late 2018. The first attacks in the region occurred one year later within the DRC. That same year, the group expanded operations into Mozambique, which cemented their threat to Central African security.

ISCAP has traditionally been composed of the Congo-based Allied Defence Forces (ADF) and fighters within Mozambique. In 2020, the Mozambique branch had conquered cities within Mozambique, which alarmed states within the region. This year, the branch within Mozambique has been the target of a multilateral offensive from a coalition of states, which has weakened their operational capacity compared to their previous success in 2020.

Growing Operational Capability

The ADF did not begin life as an exclusively Islamic militant organization, but rather as a rebel group seeking to oust the current Ugandan government. As the group went into remote regions of Uganda it began to change into the militant group it is today, recruiting disaffected Muslim youth.

The branch within the DRC has seen its capacity grow in 2021, as they have been attributed to an uptick of attacks within the country. They have also become increasingly brutal, demonstrated through released videos of beheadings as part of their propaganda. This is in light of this branch conducting over 20 attacks this year alone. Moreover, their attacks within Uganda have become indicative of an augmentation in their capabilities to harm the people of Central Africa. The most brazen of such attacks occurred on November 16th in which they bombed the capital of Uganda.

Ghosts of the Past

While both governments are interested in the defeat of ISCAP, relations between the DRC and Uganda have been fraught with tensions. These strained relations stem from the actions of the Ugandans during the Congo Wars, which ended in 2003. The Ugandans were found to violate the DRC’s sovereignty and were forced to pay reparations by the Hague.

As these wounds are still fresh in the minds of many within the DRC, skepticism of another Ugandan intervention underlies their thoughts. Despite these reservations, the government of the DRC has invited Ugandan troops into the country to aid in the fight against the insurgents.

A Roadmap for Peace

The fight against Islamic militants within Africa is not a new endeavor. However, it is important to note the evolution of such groups within Africa and their capabilities. More than 20 years ago, the United States’ embassy in Kenya was attacked by suicide bombers. Since that time, a small group, which at one point pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, captured large swathes of sovereign territory in the Levant, and created a network of global affiliates that carried out their own attacks. No longer are such groups content with attacking government symbols, such as an embassy, but rather they seek the prestige of carving out states from the territory of sovereign nations.

As this is Africa’s new reality, there are policy directives that should be considered to effectively address the current situation of the Congo. To effectively rout this group, it is imperative that a formalized dissemination of intelligence exist between states in the region. While the DRC and Uganda are engaged in combating the DRC-based branch, the Mozambique-based branch still can provide refuge to any escaping combatants to regain strength. Without such a coordinated effort, it is unlikely that ISCAP’s threat to Central African security will subside.

Secondly, a concrete timeline should exist detailing when Ugandan troops will be present and what they must abide by while in the DRC. Any such violation would be met with recourse similar to the previous deal given by the Hague.

The DRC has deemed that the Ugandans would be beneficial to combat ISCAP; however, any such breakdown of relations between the two would detrimentally impact security. Finally, the states of Central Africa must address the underlying conditions which have driven their Muslim youth to join ISIS affiliates.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Daesh Within the DMV? Assesing the ISIS-K Threat in Northern Virginia

Bereft of the territory which they conquered at their height, ISIS seeks to restore their ability to instill fear in those who don’t share their fringe ideology. Recent operations conducted by the group such as their attack on the Kabul airport are congruent with this aim. With their fervent desire to be seen once again as the preeminent jihadist group, officials within the United States have sounded the alarm over potential lone-wolf attacks within Northern Virginia. These warnings from the law enforcement community come at a time where ISIS has increased its online activity.

At the height of their power in 2015, ISIS shocked the world with how swift they were able to capture large swaths of territory within the Levant by exploiting political instability. Through this success, they were able to create a global network of affiliates like ISIS-K and inspire lone-wolf attacks throughout the world. The most infamous of these attacks was the 2015 Paris attacks which were carried out by radicalized European-raised nationals. The Paris attacks ultimately took the lives of 130 people with injuries sustained by many more.

The attacks also provided the impetus for a wide coalition of nations with differing interests to combat the group and its affiliates. Air support tied to Operation Inherent Resolve proved critical in aiding regional forces in reducing the amount of territory held by ISIS. As a result of these multilateral efforts, ISIS had lost almost all of its territory by 2017. Furthermore, Operation Inherent Resolve proved effective at dismantling the leadership of ISIS.

As ISIS lost territory in the Levant, they began to direct resources toward ISIS-K to bolster their presence within Central Asia. ISIS-K has also received hardened veterans as well as foreign fighters dedicated to furthering the aims of the organization. The ultimate goal of the affiliate is the establishment of a Caliphate within the region in which they operate. They have also been known to advocate for attacks against the West.

Moreover, the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan has proved to be beneficial for ISIS-K. The withdrawal allowed for many of their members to be released from prison who could aid in their pursuit of a Caliphate. In addition, the lack of military pressure by the United States allows them ample space to revive an operational capacity similar to what they had in the Levant. To achieve this they will likely seek to radicalize foreigners to carry out lone-wolf attacks. Successful attacks would bring them prestige for recruitment while they direct their efforts to establish their Caliphate. Furthermore, by occupying Afghanistan they lay claim to a heritage of Islamist groups of the past who have successfully resisted great powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States. With this in mind, ISIS-K will likely attract foreign fighters using this as a tool for recruitment.

The chaos caused by the withdrawal has caused a multitude of refugees who sought asylum to avoid living under Taliban rule. With the primary focus of the United States being to safely evacuate Americans out of the country, the disarray allowed for a lack of vetting of those seeking to exit Afghanistan. According to those on the ground, there could have been the possibility of ISIS-K members entering the United States with asylum seekers. The prospect of this proves a challenge to our national security.

To meet the challenges presented by ISIS-K the United States must be cognizant of the threats which are posed by the group. One such threat is that the group may adopt new technology in the same manner in which their predecessor did. As the technology evolved, ISIS had been able to create videos that inspired waves of attacks to be conducted in their name. Secondly, the group has entrenched itself in one of the most geographically intense terrains on the globe. As a result, the group will likely be active for years to come given the advantage which their geography affords them.

Although the chance of a successful ISIS-K attack within Northern Virginia is slim, the U.S. should take concrete steps in mitigating an attack. This can be achieved by building trust in local Muslim communities with law enforcement agencies within the DMV region. Furthermore, the U.S. could also partner with tech companies to block content from ISIS-K. They can also work with regional partners to weaken the operational capabilities of the group within Afghanistan. Finally, the United States can also set up a strict vetting regime to screen for potential extremists. By thwarting a potential attack, the political capital which the group uses to recruit and fundraise is significantly reduced.

ISIS-K represents the latest iteration of a jihadist group that has learned from their predecessors. The group also seems to be poised to experience an increase in their breadth of capabilities and foreign combatants. Without proactive action by the United States and the international community, the group could very well establish a Caliphate within Central Asia. In doing so, the group would have safe haven to orchestrate plots worldwide on those it considers its targets. While their capacity to carry out an attack on the homeland is limited now, their ability to do so only increases with time.

The Islamic State of Khorasan and the Afghan Peace Process

The recent attack on the girl’s school in a Hazara neighborhood warrants discussion concerning the threat of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 and wounded over 100. However, IS-K has conducted similar operations in the past. The Hazara Shia are particularly threatened because IS ideology considers them to be more problematic than foreign actors. The group challenges the implementation of the delicate peace process between the Taliban and Afghan government. IS-K can also strain trust within the Taliban as more radical factions join the group to continue a successful insurgency. Due to the challenges of controlling territory, more civilian attacks are likely as the group struggles to maintain relevancy amid the American withdrawal. Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will also serve as a recruiting bed for the group to make inroads in the border region. The future of the Afghanistan after US troops leave is unclear, but IS-K may unify Taliban and government forces against a shared threat. To understand where IS-K fits into Afghanistan’s recent history, we must explore its beginnings.

IS-K History

Like other IS franchises, IS-K gained disaffected members of other terror groups. These groups operated autonomously until several high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. These initial defections created a domino-effect of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan joining the group. IS’s increasing notoriety in Iraq and Syria catalyzed its expansion. The Taliban and IS-K eventually declared war on each other because of ideological differences and competition for resources. From its stronghold in Nangarhar province,, IS-K began a campaign to overrun Taliban positions to consolidate its power. At one point, it controlled over one-third of the province. By 2015, the group began losing popularity because of its policies banning poppy cultivation and harsh interpretation of Sharia Law. Taliban, US, and Afghan offensives have weakened IS-K control over Nangarhar. Despite this, the group has responded with horrific suicide bombings on minorities and election centers around the country. Although it has little support in Pakistan, TTP defectors in the group have utilized Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus to increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan. 

Challenge to the Peace Process

Although IS-K is a mid-level threat in Afghanistan, it still poses challenges to the implementation of a peace settlement, fostering trust between the Taliban and Afghan governments, and maintaining 2-decades of progress for women and minorities. For radical Taliban who disagree with peace negotiations, IS-K represents an alternative in order to continue their campaign against the central government. They will not negotiate a settlement, especially if the opponent approaches defeat. Tragic attacks on minority communities like Hazaras and Sikhs, women, and schools undermine public confidence in the government to maintain safety. Little faith in government motivates Afghans to join terror groups as well. These attacks reduce trust between the government and Taliban leaders if the latter provided support to IS-K. Although the two groups are technically at war, IS-K attacks provide Taliban leadership plausible deniability when they conduct attacks on security forces or “illegitimate” institutions. The recent attack on a girls’ school highlights the danger of losing hard-fought gains. The resilience of these institutions is unclear, but these attacks will quicken their deterioration. If a group threatens political rights, a civil war between ethnic militias jostling for influence could occur. A disenchanted public could prevent Afghanistan from overcoming its challenges and reaching its economic and social potential. Education is important to increase mobility and de-radicalize, but Afghanistan’s decades-long problems will persist without addressing these concerns. 

Future Cooperation

The sincerity of the Taliban in peace negotiations is debatable, but IS-K presents an opportunity to fight a mutual threat. Beyond prisoner exchanges, the two parties do not trust each other. However, cooperating on this issue could set the foundation for greater security cooperation in the future. It would also mitigate radicalization concerns because people will not join extremist groups out of concern for safety. Here, the government will cooperate with an extremist group to counter an even greater threat. Like Afghanistan in the 1980’s, both sides must put aside differences to defeat a common enemy that complicates their negotiations. After each group deal with the external threat, a compromise in achieving their respective goals in Afghanistan becomes possible.

Link for Photo

مركز المستقبل – Is ISIS-Khorasan Province Seeking to Consolidate its Role in Afghanistan? (futureuae.com)

Rise of ISIS in Afghanistan

Special Report: The Rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest and most potent terror groups the world has ever known and has made its way to Afghanistan. It emerged due to interstate fragility, foreign policy failure, and perennial instability in the Middle East. The 2003 United States’ intervention in Iraq and the Arab Spring contributed to the creation of ISIS. The United States’ removal of late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein — hardly the region’s first socio-political convulsion — facilitated figurative tectonic shifts in political and religious realities. Sunni Muslims, who long ruled Iraq, suddenly found themselves overtaken and systematically oppressed by Shiites. ISIS capitalized on the subsequent Sunni grievance. Given the recent developments which have included President Trump dropping the “mother of all bombs” which targeted a network of tunnels used by ISIS in 2017,  the loss of territory in Syria and the continued battles with the Taliban, has led ISIS to look for new opportunities. This search has led ISIS to move toward Afghanistan as they are geographically strategic and currently the government is very fragile.

[gview file=”https://www.risetopeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Rise-of-ISIS-in-Afghanistan-by-Ahmad-Shah-Mohibi-of-Rise-to-Peace.pdf”]

New ISIL Leader Officially Named and Confirmed

It was recently officially confirmed by two intelligence services that Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi is the new head of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to the reveal of his identity, Al-Salbi was known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi: a name implying that he is of Qurayshi descent and thus legitimizes his role as a new ‘caliph’.

Early Years and ISIL Roots

Al-Salbi — alias Hajji ‘Abdallah — was born in the small northwestern Iraqi city Tal Afar; a city once under Al-Qaeda control from 2004 to 2006 and a subsequent strategic base for the Islamic State. He graduated with a degree in Sharia law from the University of Mosul, was a religious scholar in al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and is believed to be a founding member of ISIL.

Like most of the Islamic State’s leading fighters, he is a former officer who had served under Saddam Hussein and played a prominent role in the fight against the United States and its allies. In 2004, he was captured by American troops for associations with al-Qaeda and placed in Camp Bucca detention center where he met al-Baghdadi.

It was only natural that al-Baghdadi took advantage of his period of detention to indoctrinate as many inmates as possible and set up a common vision, namely the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Within Camp Bucca, Baghdadi created a network of hardline fighters that he destined for positions of leadership in the Islamic State.

The new ‘caliph’, nicknamed as the ‘Professor’, is one of those fighters connected with Baghdadi and adopted his unwavering commitment to the Islamic State. He appears to have led many of their international operations and he is considered to have played a decisive role in the enslavement of thousands of Yazidi women and children, as well as the murder of an equal number of Yazidi men in Iraq, started in 2014.

Current Situation

Although the succession of Baghdadi by al-Salbi was only recently confirmed, he is likely to have taken over the day-to-day operations of the terrorist organisation well before the former’s death. Being wounded and suffering from a chronic illness, al-Baghdadi had already designated a successor since last August. During that time, the Rewards for Justice Program (RFJ) of the US Department of State announced a reward up to $5 million for information regarding al-Salbi, placing him on the list with the most wanted terrorists. There is no doubt that he will be an efficient leader that will attempt to reinvigorate the Islamic State. What remains to be seen is whether he will be as inspiring as his predecessor who had been admittedly very successful in recruiting fighters from all around the world and inciting them to fight for a common cause.

Recent discussions around its new leader indicate that the Islamic State is indeed regenerating and confirms fears about a possible re-emergence. The situation both in Iraq and Syria has created a favourable environment for ISIL to rebuild its strengths and organise its operations. This is certainly not a simple task without any territory under their control, however, regional instability has disrupted security and reduced the effectiveness of the security services.

If tensions and conflict are not addressed soon, intelligence gathering will be extremely challenging, and attempts to prevent the Islamic State from breaking their imprisoned fighters out and retaking territory will be even less likely to be successful. Consequently, prisons where IS fighters are held should be properly guarded, in order to avoid a mass break out, and a particular attention must be focused on monitoring desert regions around the Iraq-Syria border, and other areas which are beyond the control of the central government.