ISIS

Sikh
 by Rise to Peace

The Islamic State Claims a Deadly Explosion of a Sikh Temple in Kabul

On the morning of June 18th, a bomb exploded during an attack at a Sikh prayer place in Kabul while 30 people were inside, killing one worshipper, a Taliban member, and two unidentified attackers. The prayer site was renowned as the capital’s only and final remaining place of worship for Sikhs. The next day, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Community leaders reportedly claimed that about 140 Sikhs remained in the predominately Muslim Afghanistan in the late twentieth century, down from 100,000 in the 1970s.

According to a Taliban spokesman, the assailants attempted to operate a vehicle filled with explosives into the area, but it exploded before they reached their target. Despite the fact that the attack had concluded, the Taliban, who took control of Afghanistan last year, declared that a clearance campaign was continuing.

Since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, the country has been subjected to ongoing attacks by the Islamic State, a rival Sunni Muslim extremist group. On the one hand, the Taliban had promised and guaranteed the community’s ability to remain in Afghanistan and practice their religion. Yet, hundreds more have fled to India in the last year due to unprecedented and cruel attacks.

The local branch of the Islamic State announced the attack was in reprisal for insults directed at the Prophet Mohammed. The announcement was made on an affiliated Telegram channel by the Islamic State. The blast on Saturday was widely derided as one of the spates of attacks targeting minorities, with Pakistan’s government expressing “serious concern” over the “current wave of terrorist attacks on places of worship in Afghanistan.” The United Nations mission in Afghanistan said minorities in the country deserve protection, and India’s President, Narendra Modi, expressed shock over the attack on Twitter.

Who are the Sikhs?

Many Hindus and Sikhs have fled to neighboring countries, particularly India, during the civil war that emerged after the pro-Soviet regime fell in 1992. Before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Sikhs were a small religious minority in the predominantly Muslim country, with only roughly 300 families. According to community members and the media, many have now fled. The Sikhs, like many other religious minorities in Afghanistan, have been a perennial target of violence. The Islamic State also claimed responsibility for a 2020 attack in Kabul that killed 25 people. In 2016, it was thought that there was no future for Sikhs, Shias, and other Muslim minorities in Afghanistan.

To blend in with the population, most Afghan Sikhs and Hindus adopted Afghan traditions. Sometimes religious minorities converse in public in Pashto or Dari, Afghanistan’s constitutional languages, but solely use Punjabi at home. Despite their desire to live in peace at home, it appears that the Islamic State will continue to carry out modest to severe blows and attacks.

As external threats infect its populace in the next few months, the Taliban’s security mechanisms will be put to the test. In comparison to their initial rule in the 1990s, when they violently suppressed the Hazaras and other ethnic groups, the Taliban have positioned themselves as more moderate since seizing power. The Taliban promise to safeguard them to gain international acclaim for their acceptance of Afghanistan’s minorities. But how far can this go, and how effective is the security measure, particularly in the Taliban government, where eyewitnesses claim the Taliban also committed human rights violations?

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Civil War
 by Rise to Peace

How Likely is Another Civil War in Afghanistan and What Would it Mean for Pakistan?

For the second time, the Taliban captured Afghanistan putting an end to what is known as the United States’ longest war in the country. Though touted as the end of a twenty-year-long war, the Taliban’s return to power triggers other grave issues – a probable civil war. This results in the country again turning into a haven for regional and global terrorism, and thus threatens regional and global security. Another factor is the Taliban’s unaltered temperament toward Afghans which further increases the possibility of a public revolt against the group.

Besides the Taliban’s fundamentalist approach, Pakistan’s blatant endorsement is a likely driving force behind the prospective political and economic crises to accelerate in Afghanistan. As a result of such crises, the flames will inflict on Pakistan as well.

Additionally, the Taliban’s religiously inclined fundamental policies that are inspired by Pakistani madrasas engender a Taliban’s pro-Pakistan approach, enticing political turmoil against the group. Two major standpoints such as economic and political perspectives are therefore considered to highlight the likelihood of a prospective civil war in the Taliban-led Afghanistan.

The Economic Standpoint

The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Kabul was instantly followed by a sprint in the slowdown of the Afghan economy – an estimated 40 percent. As a result, with 500,000 job losses, the unemployment rate rampantly spiked. Such an unprecedented hike in the unemployment rate is becoming a provoking driver behind Afghans’ willingness to revolt against the Taliban’s rule, since the people might have no other alternative for survival, as the poverty rate has already spiked to 97 percent.

The exacerbating high rate of unemployment has also led to an aggravating fall in the public financial condition. As per the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, an imminent prospect of a one-third decline in the per capita incomes was warned based on the facts over the last months of the year 2021. Vulnerable to such economic catastrophe, many civilians are now stranded in destitution and even have been forced to put their children on sale in desperation for life.

The Political Standpoint

The Taliban bears the brunt of political and military challenges from the Islamic State (ISIS) militants, the National Resistance Force (NRF), and the Liwa Fatemiyoun militia.

Since the fall of the elected government in Afghanistan in August 2021, terrorist groups such as ISIS unprecedently emerged stronger. Meaning that the Taliban’s return is still seen as a welcoming note by the world’s other renowned terrorist groups to reestablish in Afghanistan. This could be an undermining threat to the Taliban’s rule. Nonetheless, in the case of the fight against ISIS, Afghans are less likely to back the Taliban given the group’s nationwide negatively perceived image created by its tenacious policies.

Vulnerable to the Taliban’s ideology, the Hazara community, which comprises 9 to 10 percent of Afghanistan’s total population, is thought to be Iran-backed pro-Liwa Fatemiyoun. After fighting ISIS alongside Bashar-al-Assad in Syria, the Fatemiyoun has now turned its eyes on Afghanistan. The Fatemiyoun’s intention to target the Taliban becomes more feasible now. This is due to the Taliban’s anti-Shia ideology and the growing number of attacks on Shia Muslims in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal. The Fatemiyoun militia will not only target the Taliban but also ISIS, as they do in Syria, which would go beyond one for the Taliban’s leadership to thus manage such a complicated triangular skirmish.

This saga turns even more perilous as the newly established Panjshir-based NRF targets the Taliban. This is primarily due to the Taliban’s reluctance to form an inclusive government and welcome the former politicians, government employees, and other prominent figures to their government circuit.

Implications for Pakistan

Driven by the Taliban’s pro-Pakistan stance, Afghans have opposed and feared the Taliban’s return. Despite such nationwide despise among Afghans, the group’s all-weather supporters, Pakistan’s military, and religious leadership warmly welcomed the Taliban’s return in August 2021. The people of Pakistan even celebrated the Taliban’s return and considered it as an indirect victory for Pakistan in Afghanistan. Given this, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Imran Khan also went on to endorse the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul during a press conference in Islamabad, stating that “Afghanistan has broken the shackles of slavery.”

However, the Taliban’s religiously inclined ideology could turn into a Pashtun ethnocentric ideology or diverge its political route, possibly to India. Recently a blend of Indian diplomats made a surprise visit to Kabul, a red sign for Pakistan. While there are already hints that the Taliban cordially provides congenial hospitality to the key Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) figures who were detained in the previous administration.

Second, Pakistan plays a double-faced game as more of a broker between the global superpowers vis-à-vis China, Russia, and the U.S. For Pakistan, leaning on and accompanying one will entice the other to recoil, as Pakistan’s brokerage role may not sustain longer given the dynamics in the world geopolitical order.

Third, Pakistan is already severely indebted and could become a buffer zone sandwiched between the great powers. Ties with the U.S. are already deteriorating with the aid flow decreasing, while the all-weather ally China’s aid does not come without huge interest rates. Already drowned in huge debts, Pakistan could face a similar fate as Sri Lanka, should the country fail to withstand such enormous debts and avoid the role of a broker and supporter of terrorist groups.

Conclusion

The controversial quell to the U.S.’ twenty-year-long war, coupled with the Taliban’s hold on power, serves as a stepping-stone to another likely political tumult in the country. Other renowned terrorist groups leverage this new phase in Afghanistan’s political scenario. The entry of these terrorist groups is a turning point for regional and global security. Additionally, Afghanistan would be devastated by another civil war. Being a significant Taliban supporter, Pakistan is going to get inflicted the most as the country may remain stuck in the great game.

The Taliban is recommended to form an inclusive government, and welcome professionals and prominent policymakers from the previous government. Also, the group needs to adhere to national interests such as retaining the national anthem, and the national flag while keeping in mind women’s rights, particularly girls’ education.

The Taliban also needs to stop solely depending on Pakistan both politically and economically, especially concerning policy level national matters. For Pakistan, it is important to shun lobbying and brokering for the Taliban on international platforms. Instead, Pakistan needs to critically examine the issues it faces.

 

Hamayun Khan, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Afghanistan / Pakistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Marawi
 by Rise to Peace

Five Years After the Philippines’ Marawi Siege: Lessons from Within

It has been almost five years since armed militants from two ISIL-affiliated organizations, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute, battled with Philippine government forces on May 23, 2017. The siege ensued when the military attempted to arrest senior ISIL leader Isnilon Hapilon.

As a result, attackers retaliated, proclaiming the city a nascent caliphate of ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS. Before capturing the city’s major thoroughfares and significant bridges, the armed militants caused severe damage to Catholic churches, the city jail, and two schools. Militants also beheaded a police officer and took churchgoers and residents hostage.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte imposed martial law across the entire island of Mindanao on the evening of the assaults. Initially, President Duterte expected the fighting to finish in a matter of weeks. However, he had no idea that this was simply the beginning of a more bloody and horrific assault.

Who Were the Perpetrators?

The main commanders of this unprecedented assault, Isnilon Hapilon, and brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute were members of the local armed groups, Abu Sayyaf and Maute. Both groups have historically been responsible for bombings, attacks on government forces, and hostage-taking in the Philippines. However, foreign militants participated in the war, including those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Chechnya. There is also evidence that the terrorist members involved in this attack enlisted a significant number of radicalized children and teenagers, many of whom were recruited from Marawi’s local schools.

During the conflict, an estimated 1,200 people were declared dead. Although the majority of these were militant extremists, Amnesty International claimed that the militants also carried out kidnappings and extrajudicial executions.

Mission Accomplished

The capture of Marawi prompted the Philippines’ most prolonged armed combatant insurgency. Government troops seized a stronghold on October 16, 2017, killing both Hapilon and Maute. After troops subdued the remaining ISIS fighters on October 23, 2017, five months after the siege began, Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana said there were no more “militants” in Marawi, which ended the long, weary battle.

The Aftermath of the Marawi Siege

The Marawi crisis, which affected many residents, had a significant impact on the local market and the daily needs of Marawi families. According to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Philippines, the Marawi armed conflict between government troops and pro-ISIS insurgents has internally displaced 98% of the area’s overall population, as well as villagers from nearby municipalities, who were forced to flee due to severe food scarcity and political and economic restrictions.

How is Marawi Now?

After years of planning and reconstructing the country’s sole Islamic city, Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) is nearing the completion of the major rehabilitation operation for internally displaced families. Even within Marawi’s most impacted area, or “ground zero,” the Maranaws, particularly those displaced by the 2017-armed war, are now reaping the first dividends of the government-led rebuilding.

Meanwhile, the Marawi Fire Substation, a Maritime Outpost, the Rorogagus Barangay Health Station, the Marawi Central Police Station, and a solar power irrigation system were all completed, to help the Maranaws embrace a complete and secure community with peace and stabilization.

Furthermore, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) administration has set aside P500 million for Marawi’s reconstruction in 2021 as part of the newly-formed government’s 12-point priority plan.

Lessons Learned and Reflections as a Filipino Counter-Terrorism Practitioner

I have learned that the scars of this historic siege will undoubtedly persist in the hearts of those who were affected, as well as the troops who were determined to defend the people, even if it meant risking their lives. The standard narrative is that it is their job. However, I am referencing their fortitude in the midst of their weapons’ failure; terrorist groups have also leveraged technical advancement in plotting, recruiting, and networking, making it even more difficult to obverse.

Filipinos are known for their “resilience.” Most people define it as the ability to bounce back from setbacks, embrace change, and persevere in the face of adversity. It is meaningless to be resilient if the Philippine government’s response to these issues is ambiguous. How eager and probing is the government to promote research to fight atrocities in the aftermath of the Marawi Siege? Is this enough, if there is a movement at all? What was the intensity of the response to the Marawi crisis?

We should not box our belief that resilience is the only chance. There is also hope, the ability to recognize important goals, the measures required to achieve them, and the willingness to take those steps. This requires an extensive effort of the government to connect with the civil society in order to prioritize their goals in the field of local security. Although the resilient superhero is often thought to be preferable, it has a dark side; it possesses the same characteristics that hinder self-awareness and, as a result, the ability to maintain a realistic self-concept.

As a Filipino, I believe we should start by assessing where we stand in terms of counter-terrorism operations, such as preventing and suppressing terrorism financing, and encouraging constructive dialogue on counter-terrorism challenges, particularly based upon the principles between state officials and the private sector, social service organizations, and news outlets. Although there is evidence of a deterrent, the government should always consistently take action to prevent such unprecedented happenings.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Asia / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Pakistan
 by Rise to Peace

ISIS Claims Responsibility for the Suicide Bombing in Pakistan

According to security officials, a suicide explosion occurred on March 4th during prayer services at a Shia Muslim Mosque in the northern Pakistani city of Peshawar, killing at least 58 people and injuring almost 200 others. On a side note, while terrorism in Pakistan has decreased in the past few years, the underlying foundations of extremism, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, remain active. Pakistan had 319 terrorism-related incidents in 2020, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, with 169 civilian casualties. This is down from roughly 4,000 such instances in 2013, which resulted in over 2,700 civilian deaths. Will this recent attack serve as a major blow in the next few months in Pakistan?

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the blast in a statement on Friday, making it one of the group’s largest operations within Pakistan. When police stopped an armed man on a motorcycle near the mosque, he opened fire before forcing his way inside a congested hall and detonating his suicide vest, according to senior police official Haroon Rasheed. As specified by Moazzam Jah Ansari, the chief police commander for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where Peshawar is the capital, the assailant had attached a strong explosive charge to his body, containing 5 kg (12 lbs.) of explosives.

Several of the injured, according to Asim Khan, a spokeswoman for Peshawar’s Lady Reading hospital, were in serious condition. Hundreds of people were hurt by shrapnel, several had their legs amputated, and others were hit by flying debris. Doctors struggled to transport the injured into operating rooms at the hospital’s emergency department, which was chaotic. Hundreds of families gathered outside the emergency room, many of whom were sobbing and shaking their heads, desperate for information on their family members.

Shia Muslims as ISIS Targets

When reviewing the actual circumstances of earlier attacks, it is evident that ISIS, an extreme Sunni militant group, has long targeted Shia Muslims in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and now Pakistan, and has a particular interest in the Hazara ethnic minority, which is primarily Shia. Pakistan is predominantly Sunni, with 76 percent of Pakistanis identifying as Sunni and 10–15 percent of Shia, based on a 2010 estimate.

ISIS issued a statement in 2021 claiming that it would assault Shia in their homes and centers “by any means conceivable,” from “slaughtering their necks to distributing their limbs.” Murder and other inhumane acts inflicting severe pain are alleged crimes against humanity committed by ISIS. According to the group’s public statements, the violent attacks are clearly part of a determined policy.

Until recently, there was no animosity between Sunni and Shi’a religious organizations. The origins of terrorist attacks against Shi’a in Pakistan may be traced back to General Zia-ul-dictatorship Haq’s, which began in 1978 after a military takeover the previous year and lasted until his death in 1988. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, many majority Sunni states, including Pakistan, began to be concerned about the spread of Shi’a Islam. To counter this, Zia bolstered ties with Saudi Arabia and welcomed Wahhabism, a hardline interpretation of Sunni Islam.

In 2011, extreme Sunni militants published an open letter to Quetta’s Shi’a community, which is mostly Hazara, declaring that “all Shi’a are deserving of killing” and that they intend to “create a Pakistan graveyard.” These words were supplemented by a methodical wave of terror directed at Shi’a professionals, officials, and visitors traveling to and from holy places and festivals in Pakistan. Militant groups have continued to target Shi’a professionals to this day, and all of these assaults have indeed been particularly violent in recent times. Militants and terrorist organizations have destroyed social gatherings and thickly urbanized Shi’a neighborhoods with reckless abandon.

A Weak Government is a Weak Defense Force

Vulnerability in the Pakistani government has impacted the lives of the minorities, such as schooling and career opportunities. This insecurity presents itself along gender lines as well, with Hazara women’s mobility being severely limited. As ISIS gains momentum, attacks on minorities will undoubtedly become more cautious in the coming months. To state the obvious, Pakistan has poor governance, allowing extremist organizations to carry out minor to major attacks in regions and cities. Pakistan’s administration lacks transparency and accountability. Political instability and corruption are also present, and the Pakistani government’s ongoing struggles will not be enough to silence ISIS, which will continue to grow in strength.

Developing investigation protocols and the use of corroborating analysis in the formulation of terrorism cases would be extremely beneficial in combating this expanding threat. Improving state and cross coordination on intelligence, police, and counter-terrorism divisions in Pakistan, as well as strengthening capacity on terrorism-related situation plans and promoting greater judicial legitimacy and human rights for minorities, are all crucial. Regardless of the support given by other countries to counter threats in Pakistan, it would be useless if the internal system of their government was compromised.

 

Kristian N. Rivera, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Pakistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Syria
 by Rise to Peace

An Update on Syria: The Execution of an ISIS Leader and Prison Attacks

In recent news, U.S. efforts against the leader of ISIS, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, resulted in his death via airstrike and was recently reported by the Head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism. Despite the death of the ISIS leader, the international community must remember the show of strength ISIL displayed this past January in north-east Syria when they attacked a prison.

The Attack and Collateral Damages 

ISIL’s prison attack occurred on January 20, 2022, lasting for a few days and greatly impacting Syria. The attack attempted to release fighters from al-Hasaka prison, highlighting the need to swiftly bring them to trial and hold ISIL fighters accountable. Ultimately, while the military is an effective tool to combat terrorism, it alone is not sufficient to address all of terrorism’s intricate facets.

Specifically, an example of immediate action stems from ISIS fighters attacking a Syrian prison, which housed some 3,000  fighters and 700 children. While this event was foreseeable, due to the nature of the target, attacks such as this can be minimized through urgent action amongst the entire international community to combat those suspected of being associated with extremist groups in Syria’s prisons and camps.  Deputy Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov told the UN Security Council that the Islamic State group “emphasized and called for a break in prisons.”

The Result of an Overnight Raid

On early Thursday morning, February 3rd, U.S. President Biden said the ISIS leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, was killed in an airstrike conducted by U.S. Special Forces in northwest Syria, killing at least 13 people in the raid. President Biden addressed the use of special forces to attack the ISIS leader, stating that the choice was a tactical decision to minimize civilian casualties, despite a greater risk to U.S. troops.

However, initial reports indicate that al-Quraish installed an explosive device in his apartment on the third floor of the building, which killing several people, according to President Biden and Pentagon officials.

While speaking in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, President Biden explained the story of the ISIS leader, saying that he had ordered a series of atrocities involving the Yezidi. “Thanks to the courage of our soldiers, this terrible terrorist leader no longer exists,” President Biden stated.

Overall, al-Quraish did not initially appear to be a major problem. Intelligence officials spotted him sometime last year while tracking a package in Syria. However, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in the midst of locating al-Quraish did not appear to be a major problem.

Current Situation and Outcomes

Undersecretary-General Voronkov of the U.N. Security Council urges states to repatriate suspected ISIS fighters and their families from prisons and concentration camps in northeastern Syria. “The repatriation of third country nationals from Syria and Iraq remains a major priority for the United Nations and we stand ready as a reliable partner to member states in responding to these challenges,” Voronkov said.

Although the United Nations has made tremendous progress against ISIS, the group continues to pose threats, so the United Nations must remain vigilant and active.

U.S. Forces are stationed in Syria as part of the United Nations, however, all countries must work with them in the fight against ISIS. In particular, countries should also support the United Nations Global Framework for Refugee Assistance in Syria and Iraq, which was launched in 2021.

While the Russian Federation representative said ISIS fighters raided al-Sina’aprison, ultimately, anyone responsible for the crimes against innocent Syrians should be held accountable. The United Nations and humanitarian partners must demand a full account of any civilian casualties. Syrian forces backed by Moscow will continue to search and attack terrorist groups in Syria.

For 2022, we should anticipate a response from the U.S. and a general, more drastic change of tactics from the previous ones. Now, it is the time to systematically focus and help solve Syria’s dramatic conditions and future threats.

 

Katerina Rebecca Paraskeva, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Rise to Peace blog / Syria 0 comments