Failed

Mitigating Failed Counter-Insurgency Operations in India

Recent cases of repeated failed military operations in northeastern India provoked many to question New Delhi’s approach in countering insurgency in the Northeast. Failed operations at Oting and Chasa had once again incited many to question the age-old use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the region.

The Act, which gives excessive powers to the Indian armed forces, had once again come under scrutiny. This time, it’s not just the public but also senior military officials and intellectuals from the armed forces. What lies ahead is New Delhi’s much needed change of approach in countering insurgency in the Northeast: a systematic change with legislative and institutional reforms.

From a mainland perspective, northeastern India is seen as a region infested with insurgency and secessionist movements. However, what is often overlooked is that it is also a region which has been periled by militarization. Under the premise of national security and countering insurgency, numerous civilians succumbed to its fallacious approaches. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 holds accountability for much of the fatality that the public had to been subjected to.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, known as AFSPA, bears a nauseant undertone along with its dreaded powers conferred upon the armed forces. AFSPA, previously known as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance was first enacted by the colonial British in 1942 to contain the Quit India Movement. Also, it was further adopted by Independent India in 1958 to suppress the armed struggle in the Northeast.

The AFSPA granted excessive powers to the Armed Forces which continue to be contested to this date. The special powers conferred upon the armed forces include licenses to kill, destroy, arrest without warrant, shoot based on mere suspicion, and impunity of trials.

M.G. Devasahayam, a retired IAS officer who also served in the Indian Army during the peak of insurgency in the Northeast noted that ‘while exercising such draconian powers, there is bound to be misuse’ and accordingly, it had been misused, with over 1,500 alleged extrajudicial killings by security forces in Manipur alone, the region continues to be tormented.

The justification needed to invoke the Act and confer such powers to the armed forces was highly reliant on the subjective understanding of the concerned head of the state, such that any area deemed as ‘disturbed’ would fall victim to the Act. Hence, with insurgency prevailing in the northeast region for decades, plagued civilians by such an Act as ‘draconian’ as AFSPA.

Cases from Oting and Chasa

The incident at Oting on the 4th of December, 2021, where fourteen civilians were killed by the armed forces adds to the civilian death count under AFSPA. At around 4 pm, the 21st Para Special Forces carried out an offense based on the intelligence they had received, unfortunately, resulting in the deaths of civilian coal miners instead of insurgents.

Various contestations circle around the event as to whether the Special Forces were in an attempt of a ‘fake-encounter,’ which the region is quite familiar with, or if it truly was a botched operation. However, evidence suggests its own answers, this is backed by survivor claims of indiscriminate firing and circulated footage of the armed forces attempting to change the attire of the victims. The incident was however, widely popularized as a case of ‘mistaken identity.’ Subsequently, various protests occurred in the following weeks. The issue of AFSPA was the central concern amid the various protests, and the repeal of the Act was echoed by both the public and politicians.

Of late, New Delhi has decided to partially uplift the Act from certain parts of the region, seven districts from Nagaland, 23 from Assam, and six from Manipur. However, Oting still remains under the Act. Over the past three years the ruling government has been able to resolve a number of insurgent issues in the region by signing several agreements with the insurgents, and the partial withdrawal is seemingly another victory for the party.

However, it is rather too early to celebrate, as with AFSPA, the partial withdrawal makes little to no difference. Given, the central issue concerning AFSPA is with its provisions which continue to be manipulated time and again.

One day after the Act was announced to be withdrawn, two civilians from the Chasa village were shot and injured. It was on the 2nd of April, 2022 when the 12th Para Special Forces carried out a failed operation, another case of ‘mistaken identity.’ Similar instance of indiscriminate firing were reported despite the victims shouting and claiming they were civilians. These repeated instances have unearthed major flaws in India’s national security measures, which require legislative reforms and structural changes in India’s security force deployments.

The Way Forward

Retired Lieutenant Gen H S Panag recommended that the deployment of the Indian Armed Forces is not a necessity to counter-insurgency in the region but is rather a role that needs to be taken by the Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF). He further suggested that the Act be repealed fully and replaced by a more humane act which can serve the interests of both the people and the state.

Accordingly, to reiterate Lt. Gen Panag’s recommendations, the insurgency issues in the Northeast can surely be contained by internal security forces, like the CRPF. Internal security problems can be addressed by internal security forces, which is something they are trained and specialized to do.

In cases of counter insurgency operations, forces accompanied by a commanding officer who is familiar with the topography, culture, and conditions of the region should be deployed so that operations can be carried out, keeping in mind the repercussions of the Act.

Henceforth, AFSPA should be fully repealed and a committee should be formed comprised of retired justices from the Supreme Court along with retired military officials and senior civil society members from the region. This committee would seek to draft an act that can effectively confer power to the armed forces, all the while safeguarding the rights of the people. In this way, ‘security’ in its real sense can be achieved.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

India

Insurgency in India’s Northeastern Frontiers

The far northeastern frontier of India is infamous for insurgent activities which have been functioning for decades. The region is notorious for hoarding numerous insurgent outfits. With 13 active insurgent groups in Manipur alone, and with over 14 factions within the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in Nagaland, violent faceoffs between the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) and insurgents are frequent. Hence, the region has been marred as a sensitive location for India’s national security.

The region serves as a strategic geopolitical location for India and its neighboring countries, such as China, and has continued to serve as a strategic gateway for insurgents to carry out their activities. Accordingly, the IAF had been tackling not only the insurgents, but the Chinese troops as well, the Doklam incident is one of such encounters. In addition, the insurgents have operated between countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others, by setting up camps, hideouts and training centers.

Coupled with cross-border insurgencies and China’s geopolitical interest in the region, India’s national security measures were intensified by maximizing military presence and enacting stringent laws throughout the region. However, insurgent activities continue to thrive despite the counteractive measures taken by the Indian government.

Northeast Insurgency and China’s Impact

On November 13th, 2021, Colonel Viplav Tripathi, his wife, their six-year-old son, and four other personnel were murdered by insurgents from the Northeast. Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) took responsibility for the attack.

The attack was linked to smuggling cases in Mizoram where Colonel Tripathi had been in command and was curtailing the insurgents from carrying out their activities; this was likely the motivating factor leading the insurgents to assassinate Colonel Tripathi.

All the while, China had been accused of backing the insurgent groups since the responsible militants were suspected to have had connections with the Chinese PLA. This is supported by past instances where certain militants were apprehended and admitted to their connections with the Chinese.

China has frequently been accused of training and arming the insurgent groups in the Northeast. This goes as far back as the preformation of the NSCN, when the Naga homeland movement was sustained and led by the Naga National Council through the Naga Home Guards. The medelling of the Chinese in India’s internal affairs has been an age-old concern for India ever since the Sino-Indian war took place in 1962.

Recently, reports have indicated that China still has close ties with the NSCN and other regional groups by providing arms and ammunitions. This continues amid the ongoing peace talks between the insurgents, namely the NSCN-IM, which is one of the most prominent groups amongst the insurgents in the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s northeastern frontiers are often viewed as a ‘gateway’ to Southeast Asia; however, with the ongoing insurgency and the tense Sino-Indian relations developmental prospects are often curtailed. Hence, it demands India’s persistent effort in paving the path towards bridging not only India, but also the rest of the global south with Southeast Asia. This, however, needs to be done through India’s adherent commitment and consistent effort towards the Naga political dialogue.

This can occur by addressing the political will of the insurgents and by bringing all of the insurgent groups under one unified umbrella. Given, that the Northeast’s insurgency is political in nature, accordingly, it should be addressed in a political manner. By which, the approach should encompass less use of force and stringent laws such as AFSPA and more developmental approaches and peaceful mediation with the insurgents.

If the insurgency can be addressed and a political solution can be met, New Delhi can gain the confidence of the people from the region. This can further secure India of its border tensions with China by actually affirming its territorial integrity through the voice of the people.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Insurgency

Insurgency within the United States: Absurd or Inevitable?

“No one wants to believe that their beloved democracy is in decline, or headed toward war,” says Barbara F. Walter, a professor of political science at the University of California. But “the United States, a democracy founded more than two centuries ago, has entered very dangerous territory.” Speculation of a second civil war within the United States was once an outlandish proposition, a fantasy confined to the eccentric fringes of political discourse. Today, the threat of an insurgency within the country has invaded mainstream culture and commentary.

“Headed for Civil War”

Since the start of 2022, headlines that were once unthinkable have been emblazoned across the pages of the U.S.’s most popular news publications. “Is a Civil War ahead?” enquires the New Yorker, “Are We Really Facing a Second Civil War?” reads a column in the New York Times, “Is America Headed to a New Civil War?” asks the Washington Post.

The publication of these stories follows the recent release of two books detailing the looming threat of widespread civil unrest and political violence breaking out within the United States. In “How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them”, Barbara F. Walters describes how American democracy has already passed through phases of “pre-insurgency” and “incipient conflict,” and that the attack on the Capitol may signal its entry into “open conflict.” According to Walters, the U.S. is “closer to civil war than any of us would like to believe.”

Meanwhile, as described in his book “The Next Civil War: Dispatches From the American Future”, Stephen Marche writes “the United States today is, once again, headed for civil war, and, once again, it cannot bear to face it.”

Whilst nearly three-quarters of Americans think that ordinary people rejecting political hostility and divisiveness would be a good thing for their country, less than one in ten believe this will happen. Indeed, with 42% believing it will increase, it is little surprise that polling following the Capitol Hill riot found that 51% of Americans foresaw political violence increasing in the coming years.

Further, a 2021 national survey by pollster John Zogby concluded that 46% believe a civil war is likely, and a new report by NPR/Ipsos published early this year has revealed that 70% of Americans agree “America is in crisis and at risk of failing.”

Discussion of a violent insurrection within the United States has been dismissed as absurd, sensationalist, alarmist, and even irresponsible by some commentators. But, as the immense pressures of collapsing institutional trust, obscene economic inequality, intensifying racial tensions, climate-related crises, and technological disruption push American society to breaking point, ordinary citizens are increasingly vulnerable to radicalization, captured by the allure of extremist narratives that celebrate political violence.

As crisis and strife shake the country and as citizens come to see violence as their only means of political expression, the question must be asked: could an armed insurgency really emerge within the United States?

Democracy in Decline

“Civil wars ignite and escalate in ways that are predictable; they follow a script,” writes Walters, a member of the Political Instability Task Force (P.I.T.F), a C.I.A. advisory panel that predicts outbreaks of civil war.

By law, the task force cannot apply its evaluative models to the United States, but in her new book Walters applies the same predictive criteria used to assess the emergence of political conflict within countries such as Ukraine, Northern Ireland, or Rwanda to the United States. “I’ve seen how civil wars start, and I know the signs that people miss. And I can see those signs emerging here at a surprisingly fast rate” Walter says. She concludes that the U.S. is on the threshold of “open insurgency,” an outbreak of sustained political violence involving terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

In her book, Walters outlines the strongest predictors of civil conflict. The first is whether a country is moving toward or away from democracy. When a country becomes an “anocracy”–that is, a country that is not a full democracy or autocracy–its likelihood of descending into civil violence significantly increases.

Despite the powerful mythologies surrounding American democracy, a majority of its citizens express skepticism. According to a 2018 report by the Pew Research Center, 63% believe the U.S. government does not reflect the views of most Americans, 69% do not believe the government is open or transparent, and 72% believe that campaign contributions lead to greater political influence.

These views are supported by extensive research. In December 2021, a report by the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance designated the United States a “backsliding democracy.” Further, a widely reported 2014 study from two prominent U.S. political scientists, drawing data from over 1,700 policy initiatives across a two-decade period, concluded that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interests have little or no independent influence.” According to the authors, the U.S. can now be described as a “civil oligarchy.”

Indeed, according to analyses cited by Walters from the Center for Systemic Peace’s “polity score” index, which rates countries on a scale from +10 (fully democratic) to -10 (fully authoritarian), the U.S.’ score of +10 in 1974 has steadily declined, reaching +5 in 2020. Any country between -5 and +5 on the polity scale can be considered an anocracy, says Walters. Here, countries are three times more likely to experience civil war than full democracies. According to Walters, “a country standing on this threshold–as America is now, at +5–can easily be pushed toward conflict.”

Ethnic Factionalism

The second major risk factor for civil conflict is what the P.I.T.F. calls “factionalism,” a specific form of political polarization wherein identity becomes the dominant feature of party affiliation. According to Walters, “countries that factionalize have political parties based on ethnic, religious, or racial identity rather than ideology, and these parties then seek to rule at the exclusion and expense of others.”

According to Walters, the United States is currently undergoing a process of ethnic factionalization. “As late as 2008, white Americans were equally likely to vote for Democrats as they were to vote for Republicans”, Walters says. “That changed when Obama was elected and the white working class began to gravitate towards the Republican party.”

“Today, the Republican party is 90% white”, says Walters. “That is, by the task force definition, a country with an ethnic faction.” These factions become particularly dangerous during a phenomenon known as “downgrading” wherein a dominant group loses social status and political influence. According to Walters, “the groups that tend to start civil wars are the groups that were once dominant politically but are in decline. They’ve either lost political power or they’re losing political power.”

Walters points to the downgrading status of white Americans as a powerful risk factor for civil conflict. For many, the election of President Obama represented the emergence of a multiracial democracy that threatened the long-standing political hegemony of white America. Indeed, based on their demographic trajectory, white Americans are destined to become a minority within the United States over the next 20 to 30 years.

“We know historically that these types of groups tend not to go down without a fight,” says Walters. Given her analysis, it is little surprise that the number of armed militia groups within the United States surged from just 42 prior to Obama’s election, to over 300 within his first two years in office.

“A Party That Doesn’t Benefit from Democracy”

As the social and political status of white America continues to downgrade, with the country on course to becoming majority non-white within the coming decades, the ethnic factionalization of the Republic party could represent a serious threat to American democracy.

“It’s going to get harder for [the Republicans] to win elections as long as they embrace only this one subset of the population,” says Walters. “Suddenly we have a party that doesn’t benefit from democracy anymore, that doesn’t want democracy, that’s doing everything they can to cement in advantages that will lead to minority rule.”

These efforts to retain political influence in spite of the huge demographic shifts reshaping the United States have led Republicans to embrace various policies that have been criticised as anti-majoritarian, and even anti-democratic, by some commentators, such as electoral reforms that disadvantage non-white citizens, the redrawing of voting districts, and the packing of federal courts.

However, perhaps most concerning is the Republican party’s growing distrust in the electoral system itself. Nearly three-quarters of Republicans doubt the legitimacy of President Biden’s election victory, with 57% saying they will not vote for any future candidate who even recognises his victory. Further, whilst 90% of Democrats say they have trust in the 2024 election, this is true for just one in three Republicans.

Claims of election fraud have become a feature of mainstream Republican rhetoric. Regarding election integrity, Republican Rep. Madison Cawthorn of North Carolina has said, “if our election systems continue to be rigged, then it’s going to lead to one place and that’s bloodshed.” Whilst other Republican lawmakers, such as Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, has called for a “national divorce” between Republican and Democratic states, providing an outline for a breakup of the United States.

With faith in American democracy in freefall amongst Republicans, political violence is becoming increasingly normalized. In describing the actions of the Capitol Hill rioters, 56% of Republicans said they were “defending freedom,” 46% said it was “patriotism,” over a quarter expressed direct approval. Indeed, Republicans (30%) are almost three times as likely as Democrats (11%) to agree that “true American patriots might have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”

“It’s Really Unlikely to Happen”

However, there are strong reasons to think that the U.S. may not be headed for widespread civil conflict. “One important thing to know about civil war is that it’s very rare,” says Jay Ulfelder, a former P.I.T.F. research director and a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School.

“Onsets of new civil wars are quite rare, especially in the last several decades. We’re usually talking not more than a few around the world in any given year. And, very importantly, almost never in very wealthy countries, and certainly not in very wealthy democracies — that almost never happens. One of the rare exceptions is the conflict in Northern Ireland. But that kind of thing is virtually unheard of in wealthy, ostensible democracies in the last half-century. My knee-jerk reaction is that it’s really unlikely to happen [in the United States].”

Even if there were to be an outbreak of civil conflict within the U.S., it would bear little to no resemblance to the symmetrical, state-backed conflict of the 1860s. “One of the reasons most Americans can’t even conceive of a second civil war here is because they’re thinking of the first one,” says Walters. “They’re thinking about two large armies meeting each other on a giant battlefield, men in uniforms dragging cannons.”

According to Walters, “twenty-first century civil wars tend to be more like insurgencies, they tend to be decentralized, fought by lots of small groups, militias, paramilitary groups. Sometimes [they’re] working together, sometimes not, and they’re using unconventional tactics.” Indeed, a Northern Ireland-type insurgency appears the most plausible model for civil conflict within the United States.

These types of insurgencies are almost unseen in wealthy democracies. Indeed, whilst countries that fall into the anocracy zone are at heightened risk of civil conflict, Walter’s list of contemporary anocracies that have collapsed into full-scale civil war consists exclusively of countries shifting from authoritarianism to democracy. “It’s not clear, however, that the move from democracy toward authoritarianism would be destabilizing in the same way”, writes New York Times columnist, Michelle Goldberg. Indeed, as Walter concedes, “the decline of liberal democracies is a new phenomenon, and none have fallen into all-out civil war–yet.”

E Pluribus Unum

In sum, whilst there is reason to be concerned about civil conflict breaking out within the United States, commentators must remain measured and balanced. Inflammatory and hyperbolic language surrounding a potential insurgency can be dangerous.

“The belief that there was going to be a civil war in Ireland made everything worse. Once that idea takes hold, it has a force of its own,” writes Fintan O’Toole, drawing on his childhood experience of the Northern Ireland conflict. “The logic of the preemptive strike sets in: Do it to them before they do it to you…Premonitions of civil war served not as portents to be heeded, but as a warrant for carnage.”

However, whilst commentators must remain cognizant of their role in shaping public discourse, they should not ignore the risk of increasing political violence. The United States meets the two key predictive criteria for civil conflict, and as democracy backslides and racial polarization increases, the threat of insurgency only looms larger.

According to Walters, the multivariate modelling of the P.I.T.F. predicts that any country that meets these criteria is at around a 3.4% annual risk of civil war. Whilst this may seem small, this risk compounds over time; should a country consistently meet these criteria over a 20-to-30-year period, the threat of civil violence is enormous.

Fortunately, these trends can be reversed. The United States must work to protect its democracy, and to restore faith in elections. Further, efforts must be undertaken to prevent the ethnic factionalization of the political landscape. Government, the private sector, and civil society organizations all have an important part to play in this comprehensive effort at restoring trust in American democracy and rebuilding a sense of civic unity. The United States must remember that the reconciling of difference is at the core of its national ethos. Whether those differences be in ideology or identity, there is one truth that this country should never forget: e pluribus unum – out of many, one.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

U.S. Military

An Overview of Extremism in the U.S. Military

On January 6, 2021, a violent mob of Trump supporters launched an attack on the United States Capitol. They tore through the security perimeter, overwhelming police lines and invading the building. As the rioters attempted to break down the makeshift barricades defending the House Chamber, armed guards drew their weapons and members of Congress removed their lapel pins so as not to be identified. For U.S. Representative Jason Crow, a Colorado Democrat trapped inside the chamber, the intentions of the rioters were clear, “they were going to try to kill members.”

One year after the January 6 attack, the identities of those involved are being revealed, exposing a leading role for individuals with ties to the U.S. military. Of the 727 defendants charged in the attack, at least 81 have a record of military service, including Ashli Babbitt, an Air Force veteran fatally shot attempting to breach Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s office suite. Over one quarter of these individuals were commissioned officers, and 44% had a history of deployment.

Of particular concern for security experts is that 37% were associated with violent extremist groups, including the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers, making those rioters with military backgrounds over four times more likely to be part of such groups than rioters without. Indeed, this data reflects previous findings from the Justice Department’s Terrorism Research and Analysis Project, which suggest a significant over-representation of individuals with military backgrounds in right-wing extremist groups, including positions of leadership.

The prominence of these individuals in the attack highlights concerns of an upsurge in right-wing extremism within the U.S. military. Whilst officials attribute this growing extremism to broader social trends, security experts warn that the radicalization of service members, many of whom have undergone specialized military training, represents a critical threat. Indeed, according to Kristofer Goldsmith, former chief investigator at Vietnam Veterans of America, “we’re already in the early stages of an insurgency in the United States.”

Between 1990 to July 2021, at least 354 individuals with military ties committed criminal acts motivated by extremist aims, according to a research brief by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. It was found that between 1990-2010 there was an average of six criminal cases per year, but in the last decade that figure has tripled to 21 cases per year.

Whilst most of these acts are perpetrated by veterans, the “vast majority of [whom] actually became extremist after they were in the military,” according to Mark Pitcavage, a specialist on far-right groups for the Anti-Defamation League, the Department of Defense has also reported extremist activity among active-duty troops, including around 100 substantiated cases in 2021 alone. Indeed, according to a poll by the Military Times, over one third of active-duty troops have witnessed displays of white nationalism or ideologically-motivated racism in the U.S. military.

History of Extremism in the U.S. Military

Right-wing extremism in the U.S. military is far from new, according to Cassie Miller, a research specialist for the Southern Poverty Law Center, “historically, this has been a problem for the military.” In the 1960s, Black soldiers in Vietnam filed reports of white soldiers flying Confederate flags and celebrating the death of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. by parading in Ku Klux Klan-style robes.

In the 1970s, the K.K.K. was found to be operating openly at a U.S. Marine Corps base in California. In 1986, the Southern Poverty Law Center issued its first warning to the Pentagon concerning racially-motivated extremism in the U.S. military. In 1995, Army veteran Timothy McVeigh, an anti-government extremist detonated a truck bomb beneath a federal building in Oklahoma, killing 168 people in the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history.

The January 6 attack, alongside a recent spate of foiled extremist plots, suggests a new surge in right-wing extremism within the U.S. military. These include an attempt by an Army private to orchestrate a murderous ambush on his own unit by passing secret information to a satanic neo-Nazi group; a plan to bomb a Black Lives Matter protest by three Nevada men with military backgrounds; and a failed ploy to kidnap the governor of Michigan involving two former Marines. “There is a crisis issue,” says Representative Jason Crow, a retired Army officer and member of the House Armed Services Committee, “the rise of extremism and white supremacy in the ranks.”

After January 6

Following the Capitol Hill riot, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin instituted a highly unusual military-wide “stand down” to address extremism within the ranks. Mr. Austin ordered that all military commands use this pause in operations to reinforce restrictions on extremist activity and to discuss troops’ views on the issue. After the stand down, a working group was established to support a Pentagon-led review of the prohibitions on extremist activity amongst service members.

“We don’t know the full breadth and depth of this,” said Department of Defense (D.O.D.) spokesman John Kirby at the time, describing the prevalence of extremism within the U.S. military. “It may be more than we’re comfortable feeling and admitting, and probably a lot less than the media attention surrounding it seems to suggest it could be. But where is it? It’s just not clear.”

Last month, following the conclusion of its review, the D.O.D. announced a set of updates to its guidelines on tackling extremism in the ranks. The new policies include strict prohibitions on social media activity. Under the new restrictions, “liking” or sharing extremist material will be considered advocacy and could result in disciplinary action. They also clarify behaviors considered active participation in extremist groups, such as rallying and fundraising.

Moreover, the updates involve enhanced screening of recruits. The military services all apply some degree of screening for extremism among their new entrants, including criminal background checks and the Marine Corps’ “moral qualification screening” forms. The guideline updates will further enhance these procedures. Further, efforts will be made to prepare retiring troops from being recruited by extremist groups.

Shortcomings in the Current Approach

Some experts warn that the guidelines are insufficient for tackling extremism among U.S. troops. The new D.O.D. rules do not prohibit membership of extremist organizations, such as the K.K.K. or the various right-wing militias seen at the Capitol Hill riot. Whilst the armed forces strongly discourage membership of extremist groups, this behavior is difficult to challenge in its protection under the First Amendment.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the enforcement of the new rules. The guidelines on prohibited social media activity do not include a list of banned organizations and have been described as “loosely defined” by a former chief prosecutor for the U.S. Air Force.

Moreover, it is unclear how the new rules will be enacted. “There’s no methodology in there,” said Kirby, announcing the new guidelines. Commanders are expected to be notified of concerns through “various streams of reporting.” Experts are concerned that the near total discretion of commanders to implement the new guidelines will further entrench the scattershot enforcement of counter-extremism procedures.

Further, whilst the D.O.D.’s review recommends the establishment of a dedicated central office for addressing extremism among troops, this proposal has not been implemented, and the Pentagon lacks a dedicated budget for counter-extremism work within the ranks.

“I really think the best option for their side of things would be to kind of create more of a centralized office that is staffed by a bunch of case managers … focusing on nonpunitive measures first,” said Andrew Mines, a research fellow at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. “You can give commanders all the training you want, they’re still never going to be at the point where they have the same kind of competencies and expertise that folks with mental health background, with kind of generalist backgrounds in extremist organizations and extremist ideology”

Conclusions and Recommendations

In sum, the efforts of the D.O.D. in their updated guidelines do not go far enough to address increasing extremism in the armed forces. Whilst “the overwhelming majority of the men and women of the Department of Defense serve this country with honor and integrity,” said Mr. Austin, security experts are concerned by surging right-wing extremism among the ranks of the U.S. Armed Forces. “If leadership is not in touch with the people they’re leading, this kind of thing can happen,” stated Mr. Austin while discussing the January 6 attack before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “I don’t think this is anything you can just put a Band-Aid on and fix.”

The Pentagon also needs to expand support for retired troops. Veterans are key targets for extremist groups, and data suggests that they are particularly vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of these organizations. Indeed, most extremists with military backgrounds underwent radicalization after leaving the armed forces. Therefore, while the new guidelines include some provisions for retiring troops, more work needs to be done in this area, and the Department of Veterans Affair should introduce a dedicated counter-extremism program.

Finally, the D.O.D. must investigate the underlying social and psychological drivers of extremism in its ranks. Officials recognize that surging right-wing extremism among troops can be attributed to broader trends in Western society. Yet the updated approach does little to acknowledge or address these deeper grievances surrounding American democracy, and the various economic and cultural frustrations empowering extremist recruitment efforts. Indeed, according to Mines, if you “don’t focus on the primary prevention side, you’re always going to be playing whack-a-mole.”

Extremism in the ranks of the world’s most powerful military force is a serious security risk, both within the United States and beyond. Tackling this threat will require a more effortful approach than simply restricting social media activity or enhancing screening protocols.

The Pentagon should adopt a comprehensive strategy to address extremism within the armed forces. As social division in the United States continues to grow, with trust in institutions collapsing, and Americans increasingly drawn toward extremist narratives, it becomes ever more important that attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies discordant with American values do not go unchallenged in the armed forces. The task is huge, but it must be undertaken, and it will require far more than a simple Band-Aid.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Insurgency

Ending Insurgency in Nigeria

October 1, 1960 was a significant moment in the history of Nigeria; finally, this nation would become an independent, self-governing entity. Accepted with a remarkable mix of hope and doubts, Nigeria set off on a journey that thus far has been characterized by many pleasant and unpleasant events.

Regrettably, the unpleasant events continue to reoccur on this journey, becoming a definitive part of Nigeria’s identity.  One such event was the over-a-decade-long insurgency in the northeast. From 2009 until today, the expenses of the Nigerian government on defence are well more than six trillion Naira. Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the country continues to face diverse threats from various groups, spiraling its development in a downward plunge.

Take Them Out?

“Those who are behind this insurgency will be taken out. They are being taken out one after the other, and it will get to a point that the last of them will be taken out, and then we’ll get to the end of it. It can be done within 17 months, that remains for this institution,” declared Femi Adesina, Media Adviser to the President of Nigeria.

The recent statement by Femi Adesina in response to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria is quite revealing. Interestingly, his view on taking the insurgents out to end the menace is not foreign to the government and has hitherto fueled its defence efforts.

Nothing short of an illusion is the premise that eliminating the insurgent group members is the solution to ending the bane of insurgency in the country. The current strength of the insurgency in Nigeria emanates from the same error of the government to eliminate members of the group in 2009. The lessons from the outcome of the government’s devastating error are still not learned, hence the repetition of the same failed strategy.

A Complex Situation

Considering the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, it is not solely a matter of eliminating those behind it. Its sustainability thus far is mainly a function of the platform and the existing gaps in society it thrives on; so long as that platform exists, it is only a matter of time before another wave of insurgency awakens. Besides, the conflict in Nigeria is far too complex for the current proposed strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the insurgency poses a dire challenge to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, the famous terrorist group, Boko Haram, is highly defragmented with numerous cells, operating independently from various bases across Nigeria and other neighbouring countries in the West African region.

The continuity and the progression of Boko Haram’s operations and activities are clear indicators of the complexity of the problem. With the support and funding from other international terrorist groups, the activities of terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, in Nigeria continue to grow. Attempting to end insurgency in Nigeria without considering this essential aspect is more or less illogical.

The Way Out

The only way out of the problem Nigeria faces lies in a simple statement ascribed to the Chinese general Sun Tzu, “know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

Until Nigeria understands itself first and then its enemy, its efforts in achieving any progress in security and development will only meet setbacks. The weak structures and system failures are areas that the government must urgently monitor. The diversity of Nigeria, which underlies many of Nigeria’s conflicts, is a potential strength for its unity if rightly harnessed.

The insurgency in Nigeria feeds off the weaknesses and gaps present in the country. Identifying these gaps and sealing them off is key to ending the insurgency. The government must be wary in developing strategies to avoid conflict with other efforts. A take-them-out approach raises many questions on the purpose of governance and directly opposes the de-radicalization efforts that the government accords a high success rate.

 

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow