Foreign Investment impact on Afghanistan peace process

The Role of Foreign Investment in the Afghan Peace Process

Previous efforts to invest in Afghanistan’s economic future have had poor results. But, the role of foreign investment in the Afghan Peace Process has never been more important. Afghanistan has made little progress in terms of economic development, despite the United States having spent over $24 billion on economic development and another $30 billion on reconstruction programs. Approximately 90% of the Afghan economy takes place within informal sectors. They are primarily attached to the drug trade, and over half the population lives below the national poverty line. However, the signing of Afghanistan’s peace agreement, will make it is more important now than ever before to create a vibrant economy. Economic growth would reduce poverty, a huge factor in the growth of violence or the drug economy. If Afghanistan’s economy is to develop, responsible investment is the only path forward. 

Past Investment

Past attempts to invest in Afghanistan have been largely unsuccessful. The country’s systemic corruption, lack of infrastructure, ongoing insurgency make operating even the most simple businesses a challenge. The few American companies willing to work in Afghanistan were those that received lucrative contracts from the federal government. Often, these companies caused more problems than they solved. They would frequently hire cheap Afghan subcontractors instead of doing work themselves. They would make protection payments to the Taliban to gain access to roadways and ensure their safety from attacks. And they would often leave behind poor quality work that would crumble within the next few years. A few large symbolic projects have been completed – the luxurious Aino Mina neighbourhood in Kandahar and Afghanistan’s first Toyota dealership – these are token projects of Afghanistan’s elite, not the emergence of a real economy.

What Needs To Be Done?

While the end of the Taliban insurgency will provide a more stable environment in which economic development can take place, Afghanistan will retain many of its previous challenges. To avoid the waste and failures of the past, actors seeking to invest must be hyper-sensitive to the political and economic limitations that come with doing business in the country.

The most successful development projects will be those that can reduce their reliance on subcontractors and middlemen and must provide training and a living wage to Afghan workers. They will also need to foster a workplace environment that promotes a sense of community and civic responsibility. Projects will need to begin on a small scale and will need to engage with district and provincial governors. These is needed to provide an economically feasible alternative to insurgency and the drug trade.

While meeting all of these demands simultaneously will prove challenging, there is no alternative. The Afghan economy has incredible potential for growth. If all elements of society can share in that growth, then a long-lasting peace is within reach. Alternatively, if a peacetime economy fails to support Afghan families, another outbreak of violence will be inevitable. We must invest in Afghanistan’s future but invest responsibly. 

 

 

A Road to Everywhere: Afghanistan’s Role in the Belt and Road Initiative

Nearly seven years after it was first announced, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to endure a barrage of setbacks that have called into question the feasibility of President Xi Jingping’s signature economic plan. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, criticism of the BRI included accusations of “debt trap diplomacy”, environmental concerns, and the lack of benefits for local populations in the form of no-bid contracts and job opportunities.

Furthermore, among the defining moments of the BRI’s short history was the fallout associated with Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, a maritime port that was largely constructed and financed by China. At a cost of nearly $1.5 billion USD, the port struggled to generate the level of financial return needed to service the debt to China. With few options available, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to enter an agreement with a partially state-owned Chinese firm, which granted the company a 99-year lease on the port, essentially ceding Sri Lanka’s control and day-to-day management of the port.

The Hambantota debacle has increased the level of scrutiny paid toward other BRI projects, which span parts of Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America. Yet, for many developing nations, the BRI presents an intriguing opportunity to access the requisite financing to establish and upgrade infrastructure networks.

For a landlocked country like Afghanistan, overland infrastructure remains a core priority within the government’s economic agenda. Incessant conflict has eroded what was once Afghanistan’s natural advantage: its geographic location. By constructing transportation networks, such as roads, railways, airports, etc., Afghanistan would be well-positioned to benefit as a conduit for transporting physical goods and natural resources in a region that features some of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Thus far, attempts to include Afghanistan in the BRI have been frustrated by the vagaries of the country’s internal conflicts. The results of the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban will provide investors, donors, and state entities with the necessary signals and guidance needed before launching additional economic programs in or near territories contested or controlled by the Taliban.

In particular, the Sino-Afghan Special Railway Transportation project is one of a handful of infrastructure initiatives that could bolster Afghan exports of minerals and agricultural products to China, via Central Asia. The ability to transport high-value input commodities, such as copper and rare-earth elements, safely and securely, is crucial to China’s decision-calculus when choosing where to invest in Afghanistan.

Supplementing the BRI is the “Made in China 2025” plan, which envisions Chinese production evolving toward advanced industries like semiconductors, which necessitate consistent access to a specific set of raw materials, many of which Afghanistan is heavily endowed with.

A favorable outcome in the peace talks with the Taliban could also extend Afghanistan’s BRI participation to its southernmost regions, where it shares a border with Pakistan. As one of the more active nations in the BRI, Pakistan has pinned its hopes of economic revitalization through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a microcosm of the broader BRI strategy.

Valued between $50-$60 billion USD, CPEC’s portfolio of massive infrastructure projects includes power and transport projects, the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs), and Gwadar Port, the deepest seaport in the world. Extending Afghanistan’s connectivity with CPEC projects would be pivotal to expanding export destinations for Afghan goods. This in turn could create a productive business climate in Afghanistan, one that is conducive for job creation and economic diversification away from subsistence agriculture.

However, reversing Afghanistan’s status from a bottleneck to a transit hub will involve far more than the accession of policymakers in Kabul or Beijing. The looming question regarding the prospect of lasting peace is still the greatest hurdle in Afghanistan’s reconstruction plans. The Taliban’s tendency to intentionally target infrastructure or other foreign projects has given pause to plenty of investors in sectors like oil & gas, construction, and mining.

Even if peace can be attained, the track record for foreign investment in Afghanistan is littered with corruption, graft, and cronyism as a consequence of poor institutional capacity. In addition, other stakeholders and key Afghan partners such as the United States and India continue to view the BRI with suspicion, and the prospect of a trilateral partnership between Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan is likely to arouse concern.

Lastly, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the appetite for Chinese-led investment has hit a significant snag. Local attitudes toward the BRI have become polarized, and vocal opposition has risen as a consequence of China’s lending practices, which are often characterized as predatory, and its management of projects on the ground, which have gained a reputation elsewhere for environmental destruction, forced relocation of residents, and an unwillingness to engage local contractors and/or labor.

In an optimal set of circumstances, Afghanistan’s BRI projects could help restart growth and diffuse benefits to the local population. Yet, given the murky track records of both the BRI and Afghan investment at-large, the consequences of overpromising and underdelivering could enable greater unrest, without providing tangible benefits for the broader Afghan population.