Plan Colombia

Strategies to Combat Narco-Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Plan Colombia

During the 1990s, the U.S. and Colombian governments entered into a security and counternarcotics assistance agreement, known as Plan Colombia.

The strategy has been criticized both in favor and against due to its multiple impacts on security conditions in Colombia. For this reason, it is worthwhile to analyze its development and results in order to show how the strategies against drug terrorism have been implemented and what their effects have been.

What is the Plan Colombia?

At the end of the 20th century, the security situation in Colombia was extremely complex. The presence of drug traffickers, communist guerrillas, and the enormous extensions of coca hectares made it difficult for the Colombian State to guarantee territorial control and security throughout the country.

That is why in 1999, Colombian President Andres Pastrana and his U.S. counterpart, Bill Clinton, entered into a bilateral agreement called Plan Colombia. According to the Colombian National Planning Department, the Plan was an integral strategy of bilateral cooperation. The general objective is to combat illicit drugs and organized crime, in order to contribute to economic reactivation and the achievement of peace in Colombia, while strengthening control over the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. streets.

Plan Colombia had a 15-year duration and its initial budget was $7.5 billion, of which $1.6 billion was contributed by the United States. Between 2001 and 2016, the United States has reportedly provided an average of $404 million per year, prior to 2001 it was $262 million per year on average, to Plan Colombia.

However, in 2016, following a meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the transformation of the program and its nature was announced. Former President Obama stated that the new chapter of the U.S.-Colombia partnership would be called “Paz Colombia”, whose economic aid would be more than $450 million during 2017, in order to support human rights and victims’ rights in the framework of the Colombian peace process.

Plan Colombia’s Achievements

The implementation of Plan Colombia had considerable achievements and successes, which explain its continuity for 15 years. Some of its positive results include an improvement in special operations, intelligence, professionalism of the Armed Forces, respect for human rights, strengthening of the means to fight drug trafficking, and state presence with social investment in remote regions. Likewise, in terms of coca hectares, in 1999 there were about 200,000 hectares of coca cultivated, while in 2016 there were only 60,000 hectares.

Other positive impacts of the program were the continued strengthening of the country’s military forces as never before in history, advances in social policy, and improvements in security conditions.

In fact, according to the INDEPAZ foundation, Plan Colombia allowed the government to go on the offensive, retake initiatives, neutralize the guerrilla advance and change the correlation of forces in Colombia. Under the shadow of Plan Colombia and the Southern Command, the military and police forces in Colombia were restructured. Mountain brigades and battalions were reorganized. The army was professionalized and sustained tactical operations were defined in previously forbidden territories. The war and national defense budget tripled as a share of GDP and the force level reached the highest level in the history of six decades of counterinsurgency.

Likewise, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Philip Goldberg, pointed out that Plan Colombia was a successful strategy that should now be a beacon to solve the multiple problems still burdening Colombia. This is due to the fact that the Plan had positive effects such as the improvement in the supply and logistics systems, communications, intelligence planning and military and police equipment, resulting in more effective operations against the guerrillas.  Between 1999 and 2014 Colombia went from having 35 military helicopters to more than 200 and the number of professional soldiers increased from 23,000 to 88,000 in the same period of time.

In addition, the FARC guerrilla weakened from 25,000 men in 2002 to about 6,000 in 2013 and went from maintaining a presence in 555 municipalities to only 103 by the end of 2014.

The improvement in security conditions was reflected in the reduction of coca crops, the fact that violent actions by illegal groups decreased 66% between 2002 and 2015, and that attacks on physical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, energy towers, bridges and roads plummeted by 85%.

Finally, the program had a social investment component, as social policy programs such as Familias en Acción, Jóvenes en Acción and Empleo en Acción were created.

Critics of Plan Colombia

Despite its achievements and successes in improving security conditions in Colombia, Plan Colombia has also been criticized.  The Plan’s implementation has had negative consequences, such as that drug trafficking deepened and fragmented during the Plan Colombia, making it more difficult to combat, and there was a marked increase in the number of victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, with more than 800,000 people said to have been victimized in 2008.  In addition, there was an increase in illegal mining, which allows for the financing of illegal groups.

However, the greatest criticism of Plan Colombia has to do with the aspect of respect for human rights during its execution. The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination (CCEEU) noted that Plan Colombia had serious human rights costs, such as since the beginning of the Plan, more than 6 million people were victimized, more than 4 million people were displaced, more than 4,300 civilians were allegedly killed by government military forces to increase the number of casualties, more than 1,000 trade unionists and 400 human rights defenders were killed, and countless women suffered sexual violence.

Some additional criticisms point out that Plan Colombia gave priority to military assistance over social programs, the lack of resources allocated to programs for the substitution of illicit crops, attention to the vulnerable and displaced population, reform of the judicial system and environmental protection, and that the fight against drugs in Colombia transferred the problem of drug trafficking and increased the levels of violence in several countries of the continent.

Balance of Plan Colombia: A Successful Strategy?

The figures show that Plan Colombia was a decisive factor for the Colombian State to overcome the critical public order situation at the end of the 1990s and to exponentially improve its capacity to confront the guerrillas, reduce coca crops and improve security conditions in a large part of the national territory.

In fact, the results achieved by Plan Colombia allowed the program to evolve and become “Peace Colombia”, since, thanks to the advances in military capabilities resulting from Plan Colombia, the Colombian State weakened the FARC guerrillas so much so that they had to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On the other hand, Plan Colombia also had negative consequences, especially in such sensitive aspects as the violation of human rights. Therefore, it is worth evaluating the achievements, vulnerabilities, lessons learned and failures of such a program in order to implement similar strategies in Colombia’s future or in other countries struggling in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism.

Finally, it must be understood that Plan Colombia is a strategy that was specifically designed to Colombia’s needs. Therefore, the implementation of similar programs in other regions must take into account the particular characteristics of their countries in order to achieve optimal results and impacts.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Armed Strike

Three Days of Terror: The ELN’s Armed Strike and its Implications for Colombia

The National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla announced the beginning of an armed strike in Colombia occurring from February 23 – 26, 2022. Multiple terrorist actions have been registered throughout the nation’s territory, primarily affecting civilians.

The ELN’s armed strike demonstrates the revitalization of this guerrilla group and its capabilities to carry out attacks in Colombia. It is likely that this is the first of many strikes and that guerrilla terrorism in Colombia will increase in the future.

The Statement

On February 20th, the ELN published a statement announcing an armed strike with the aim of completely paralyzing Colombia’s commercial activities. The goal of the strike is to protest against the government and the policies of the current Colombian president, Iván Duque.

In addition, the document published by the ELN states that the population will only be able to mobilize for humanitarian reasons related to funeral activities or hospital emergencies. The ELN recommends, for security reasons, that individuals stay in their homes or workplaces and avoid displacements.

A few hours after the announcement, the Colombian Minister of Defense, Diego Molano, stated that the Colombian Public Forces are prepared to face the threats of the insurgent group and that the statement seeks to generate fear among Colombians.

Three Days of Attacks

On February 23rd attacks began throughout Colombia.  Approximately 18 terrorist actions were registered, especially in the department of Norte de Santander.

One attack on the first day of the armed strike included an explosion in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander, which caused the death of Jelly, an anti-explosives dog, and injured her caretaker.

A few kilometers away, in the municipality of Los Patios, Norte de Santander, a suspicious package with a red and black ELN flag was reported, which was successfully detonated.

Likewise, a truck painted with the colors of the ELN flag was found blocking the road between Cúcuta and the municipality of Sardinata.

In the municipality of Pailitas, Cesar, the ELN detonated a bomb on the Los Trujillos bridge that connects Pailitas with the municipality of Curumaní. In the same municipality, three trucks were incinerated in a village.

On the Pan-American highway between Popayán and Cali, men armed with rifles, wearing camouflage and ELN armbands created a roadblock and set fire to a truck, blocking the road for several hours.

Another relevant attack on the first day of the armed strike occurred in San Gil, Santander, where an explosive was detonated on a road, injuring six workers of the National Roads Institute (Invías).

Terrorist attacks continued into the second day of the armed strike.  In Fortul, Aracuca, ELN militiamen attacked the town’s police station with rifle fire and grenades, while at the same time taking pictures to spread propaganda.

Moreover, in Ricaurte, Nariño, the ELN incinerated the car of a villager and left banners alluding to the organization along the road. Additionally, ELN members killed Julio Victoria Cárdenas, a social leader in Litoral San Juan, Chocó.

During the third day of the armed strike the unrelenting attacks continued. On the Cúcuta-Ocaña road, two alleged ELN members blew up a stretch of the road by leaving an explosive device inside a culvert.  Also, in  Neiva, the capital of the department of Huila, an ELN flag  was found hanging from a bridge.  Finally, in Pelaya, Cesar, the ELN destroyed part of a bridge with explosives.

The Implications and the Future of the ELN in Colombia

The ELN guerrilla armed strike represents a challenge for Colombian authorities, especially since the attacks were strategically carried out a few days before the country’s legislative elections.

It is likely that the armed strike is a show of force by the ELN, a terrorist group which remains in an armed confrontation with FARC dissidents. More importantly, these attacks demonstrate the ELN’s logistical and weapons capacity, allowing them to carry out terrorist acts simultaneously in several departments throughout Colombia.

With imminent political elections, more attacks may occur in the near future. Some hypothesize that attacks may even occur on election day, in order to generate as much terror as possible among Colombians.

Additionally, the attacks may be an attempt to consolidate the ELN’s power in the Colombian territories and force negotiations with the Colombian State, like the government previously did with the FARC.

However, despite the ELN’s possible objectives and short and long term goals, the Colombian State must ensure the reestablishment of public order in the territories most affected by terrorist attacks, especially on election day.

Troop deployments are needed in the departments with the greatest ELN presence in order to confront the guerrillas and reestablish territorial control, and more importantly the population’s confidence.

It is recommended that the Colombian State efficiently employ its counterinsurgency and counterterrorist warfare capabilities to mitigate the impacts of ELN attacks, at least until a permanent solution to the conflict is developed.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Arauca

A Fight for the Border: Clashes Between the ELN and the FARC in Arauca

At least 27 people have been killed over the previous days in Arauca, Colombia. The authorities indicate that the deaths are due to clashes between militiamen from the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC’s) 10th Front. The situation of violence in the department of Arauca has already left several civilian victims.

The Clashes

Clashes between the two terrorist organizations began at the beginning of January. The dispute occurred in the Arauca Department, which is located on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

While initial reports indicated that 23 people died as a result of the fight on January 6th, the Colombian Prosecutor’s Office stated that the death toll rose to 27.  Likewise, it is likely that this number will continue to grow in the coming days.

Additionally, the investigations discovered that of the 21 identified bodies, 14 are Colombian while seven are Venezuelan. Thus, it is likely that both Colombians and Venezuelans comprise these criminal organizations.

Furthermore, regarding the damage caused against the civilian population, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office pointed out that in municipalities of Arauca such as Tame, Fortul, and Saravena, 2,000 individuals are at risk of being displaced and seek to escape the armed confrontations.

The Colombian Defense Ministry indicated that among the deceased are high-ranking members of the FARC dissidents. For example, one of those identified is “Flaco Freddy,” a leader of the FARC dissidents, who had two arrest warrants, one for extortion and kidnapping and the other for illegal arms trafficking.

Some sources indicate that the conflict began due to the murder of Álvaro Padilla Tarazona, alias Mazamorro, second commander of the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáez front, in the town of El Nula, on the border of Apure state. Colombian authorities have also revealed that many of those killed were apparently taken from their homes and shot at close range as revenge for the murder of Padilla Tarazona. However, the reasons for the confrontation stem from further back.

Historical Relationship and Rivalry Between the Two Guerrillas

The war between the ELN and the FARC has been reinvigorated with new actors. The clashes between the two guerrillas in Arauca between 2004 and 2010 left at least 500 civilians and 600 subversives dead and more than 50,000 people displaced.

Eventually, in 2010 the FARC and the ELN agreed to a truce in Arauca. The pact was known as “no more confrontation between revolutionaries” and put an end to the confrontations between the two guerrillas, and they divided the territory. In 2013, both guerrillas formally agreed to undertake a joint offensive against the Colombian Security Forces.

However, after the peace process with the FARC, several dissident groups emerged and called off the truce. The new FARC groups, especially the 10th Front, began to expand to control the regional illicit markets, such as drug trafficking and oil exploitation. Furthermore, Arauca is characterized as a strategic zone for the guerrillas due to its geographic location on the border and weak state presence.

To this day, the dispute for control of Arauca continues as the void left by the extinct FARC has not been filled and there is no clear winner for control of the region.

The State’s Response

In response to the increase in homicides and forced displacements in the Arauca Department, the Colombian Government implemented new measures. Two battalions with 680 army men have already been deployed to the Arauca Department, to strengthen security in Saravena, Arauquita, and Tame. Furthermore, checkpoints were installed on the roads of the affected municipalities, since some residents were confined to their homes for fear of clashes.

The Venezuelan Government also announced the dispatch of the military to the border. The Defense Minister of Venezuela, Vladimir Padrino López, reported that the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB) is deployed in the municipalities bordering Arauca.

Although it is true that the presence of the military will likely decrease the homicide rates in Arauca, a comprehensive approach is required to deal with the events that occurred in Arauca. Situations such as forced displacements require the intervention of public entities to guarantee the protection of human rights in the area.

Finally, to reduce the risk factors for sustained conflicts, it is necessary to increase the institutional supply on the border with Venezuela. Moreover, it is necessary to confront the terrorist organizations that operate there and attack their sources of financing, such as drug trafficking.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Bomb

Bomb Attacks Terrorize the Colombian-Venezuelan Border

On December 14th, two bomb explosions were registered in Colombia at the border city of Cúcuta. The explosions occurred near the Camilo Daza Airport and left two police officers and one civilian dead.

These attacks add to the wave of violence in the Norte de Santander Department, located on Colombia’s border. In recent months, the civilian population and the security forces have been victims of criminal and terrorist actions by various groups that operate on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

Wave of Violence at the Border

The explosions at the Cúcuta Airport are just one example of the terrorist actions affecting the border area between Colombia and Venezuela. Two factors can explain the disarray of public order at the border. First, this region of the world has the highest concentration of illicit crops, according to the United Nations, such as the enormous production of cocaine in the region of Catacumbo.

Secondly, public order is affected by the presence of dissidents of the FARC and the ELN; Venezuela is a safe haven for terrorist organizations and there is a lack of presence by the Colombian State. In fact, according to the Colombian authorities, 14 criminal organizations dispute the trade in illicit drugs, human trafficking, the sale of weapons, and the smuggling of merchandise in the region.

One of the most relevant terrorist attacks in recent months in Norte de Santander was the car bomb attack against Brigade 30 of the Colombian National Army. The explosion occurred on June 15th and injured 34 soldiers and two civilians. This attack was extremely worrying for the Colombian authorities, given that the vehicle carrying the bomb easily entered the army’s facilities. Although it is not completely clear who ordered the attack, it was likely the responsibility of local ELN cells.

Additionally, another recent terrorist act was the attack against Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez. The attack occurred on June 15th in the municipality of Sardinata, Norte de Santander.

The president was attacked with rifle bursts while boarding his helicopter; however, the attack did not result in any injuries. The mastermind of the attack, a former Colombian military man who joined as a member of the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents, was captured. In addition, the Colombian authorities indicated that the attack was planned and organized from Venezuela.

Violence and crime do not seem to end in Norte de Santander. According to Brigadier General Fabio Cancelado, there are 1,500 armed men in the department, divided into illegal groups such as the ELN, the “Gulf Clan,” the dissidents of the 33rd Front of the FARC, the “Tren de Aragua,” the “Pelusos,” and “Rastrojos.”

These organizations are financed by illegal activities, such as cocaine trafficking, and are responsible for the murder of 22 social leaders and the displacement of 448 people in 2021.

The Two Explosions 

The explosions on December 14th were attacks that once again terrorized the population at the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The first explosion occurred when an individual attempted to jump over an airport gate. The individual fell, and the device exploded. Minutes later, a suspicious device was found near the area of the first explosion. When two police officers from the explosive’s unit examined it, the bomb exploded.

The Colombian defense minister emphasized that these terrorist attacks are being planned from Venezuela by terrorist groups. The Colombian authorities believe the ELN and the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents are responsible for the attack.

How to Stop the Violence?

Despite the fact that the problem of crime, violence, and terrorism at the Colombian-Venezuelan border area is of immense proportions, some actions can, and must, be taken.

Due to the significant amount of illicit crops, coca production and trafficking, and the income generated from this activity, it is necessary to spray coca crops with aerial and targeted herbicides. This will reduce the crops, and subsequently the income, of the terrorist organizations that operate in Norte de Santander.

Furthermore, it is necessary to protect the social leaders who live in this area and mitigate massive forced displacements.

Finally, it is necessary for the Colombian Armed Forces and the National Police to strengthen their intelligence, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics capabilities. This is of the utmost importance to anticipate terrorist attacks and effectively combat illegal armed groups in the region.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Romaña

Disintegration of the Second Marquetalia: The Death of “Romaña” and “El Paisa”

Two of the most important ex-commanders of the extinct FARC guerrilla were assassinated in Venezuela. Dario Velásquez, known as “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos, known as “Romaña,” died in ambushes last week, which is a great blow to the FARC dissidents, known as the Second Marquetalia.

The death of Velásquez and Castellanos, who were signatories in the peace process, but later abandoned it, reveals the struggle being wedged between dissident groups of the FARC for control of the illicit economies in Venezuela and Colombia.

Background

Hernán Darío Velásquez, better known as “El Paisa,” began his criminal career in the FARC at the age of 19. He joined the eastern bloc of the FARC and was under the orders of the historical commanders of the guerrilla, the “Mono Jojoy.” “El Paisa” rapidly rose through the ranks of the FARC, specializing in activities such as drug and arms trafficking and extortion, especially in his hometown of Antioquia.

Years later, “El Paisa” led the Teófilo Forero mobile column, which was a special operations force within the FARC known for its combat expertise and bloody terrorist attacks.  Notable attacks include the bomb attack on the El Nogal Club in Bogotá, in which 36 people died, and the mass kidnapping of the deputies of Valle del Cauca.  These events led “El Paisa” to become one of the most wanted and feared men in Colombia, and one of the most important members of the FARC.

On the other hand, Henry Castellanos, better known as “Romaña,” commanded the 53rd front of the FARC, one of the most important in areas such as the Department of Meta. “Romaña” was also known as “the kidnapping czar” because of his specialty in random kidnappings on national roads, popularly known as “miraculous fishing.”

These kidnappings were carried out with the intention of financing the FARC’s guerrilla activities and occurred mainly in the Departments of Villavicencio, Cundinamarca, and Boyacá.

Castellanos also participated in the bloody takeover of the city of Mitú, where 43 people were killed and 61 members of the security forces were kidnapped. “Romaña’s” efficiency in kidnappings, extortion, and guerrilla takeovers led him to become a member of the FARC’s secretariat, the leadership of the terrorist organization.

Signing the Peace Agreement and its Abandonment

Both “El Paisa” and “Romaña” participated in signing the peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016, and both were part of the FARC negotiating team despite being late additions to the negotiating table. The agreement sought to demobilize more than 32,000 guerrillas, reincorporate them into civilian life, and bring an absolute end to hostilities between the Colombian government and the FARC.

In July 2018, “El Paisa” left the Territorial Training and Reincorporation Space (ETCR) in Caquetá, where he was worked alongside other ex-combatants. Velásquez argued that the government betrayed the agreement since the terms were not being fulfilled and the capture of another FARC leader, Jesus Santrich, was a trap.

As for “Romaña,” he decided not to appear before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) in 2019, arguing that he had received death threats.

Months after the disappearance of “Romaña” and “El Paisa,” the former commanders appeared in a video with Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich, and other deserters from the peace agreement announcing the creation of the Second Marquetalia. In the video, Márquez points out that the ex-guerrillas were forced to create a new organization because the government did not comply with the prior agreements. Thus, a new terrorist organization with a significant presence in Colombia and Venezuela was created.

The Killings and their Implications

On December 8th, the Colombian Defense Minister confirmed that both “Romaña” and “El Paisa” died in isolated events in Venezuela. The Minister also emphasized that the members of the second Marquetalia were protected by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, which significantly facilitated their illegal operations.

Although it is not possible to fully confirm who was behind the death of two of the most feared FARC dissidents, there are varying hypotheses. Some sources indicate that “El Paisa” was assassinated by the men under his command due to their mistreatment and that they wanted to seize his hidden fortune of millions of dollars.

However, the most viable hypothesis is that “El Paisa” was assassinated in an ambush by the 10th front of the FARC. Gentil Duarte leads the 10th front and disputes for control of drug trafficking routes, the illegal exploitation of minerals, and other activities from criminals in Colombia and in some areas of Venezuela, such as the State of Apure.

“Romaña’s” situation appears similar in nature. A Colombian news portal revealed that the photo where “Romaña” appears dead was taken by the FARC dissidents who ambushed him.

In addition to the deaths of “Romaña” and “El Paisa,” Jesús Santrich was also assassinated this year. The conditions of his death were very similar; there is no clear party responsible, it occurred on Venezuelan soil, and it is suspected that he was murdered due to drug-trafficking disputes.

The deaths of the leaders of the Second Marquetalia represent a great blow to this criminal and terrorist organization. The only relevant leader still alive is Iván Márquez, who is suspected to be hiding in another country.

In the event that “Romaña” and “El Paisa” were indeed killed by Gentil Duarte’s dissidents, this would demonstrate that Duarte’s group is winning over the Second Marquetalia. Meaning that Gentil Duarte’s dissidents are taking over a vast amount of territory in Colombia and Venezuela and that they are increasing in economic and arms power.

Finally, to stop the violence between the dissident groups of the FARC, it is necessary that both the Colombian State and the Venezuelan State confront narco-terrorist groups and gain control over their territories, especially near the borders. However, this is especially difficult since the two countries do not have diplomatic relations, which makes cooperation difficult, especially considering that the Venezuelan regime sponsors and protects some of these organizations.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow