Extremism

 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Familiar Road to Extremism

This is the second piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

Cabo Delgado, the northernmost region of Mozambique, has been plagued by a radical Islamist insurgency since 2017. But it is only in the last couple of months that the conflict has become a staple of the international news cycle. This relatively low-level insurgency has been carried out by Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ), locally known as al-Shabaab (the youth).

The dramatic siege of Palma, where they terrorized a large district capital for four days in March, and the growing identification of ASWJ with the Islamic State, has prompted a recent whirlwind of pledges and policy responses from international actors.

Though next week’s piece will discuss the methods and missteps of the government and its foreign partners in handling the crisis, we must first understand this seemingly rag-tag group that has evoked such a mass mobilization of troops and resources from around the world.

Identities Along the Coast

Islam has a long history in Mozambique, dating to the 8th century when Muslim traders and conquerors began traversing much of the Indian Ocean, including East Africa. For centuries, Sufism, or mystic Islam, was dominant among Cabo’s Muslims. But the global expansion of traditionalist Salafism and Saudi-oriented Wahhabism in the 1950s and ‘60s produced greater antagonism towards older forms of Islam in Cabo. The new imams and cadres criticized Sufism for allegedly deviating from Islamic doctrine and being too accepting of Western vices and values. 

Three such mosques became staples of the community in Mocímboa da Praia, a district in Cabo Delgado. There, preachers and coastal youth were put in touch with the larger transnational network and ideology of Salafism. Particularly, the teachings of the late Sheikh Rogo. Rogo, sanctioned by the US and UN for supporting Somalia’s al-Shabab, sought the creation of an Islamic State. Upon his death, several of his students immigrated to Cabo. Even though the three mosques have since been shuttered by authorities, many of their adherents became foot soldiers for the nascent ASWJ.

But the at-risk youth who populate Cabo Delgado, are just as vulnerable to socioeconomic pressures as they are to the ideological. ASWJ’s mixture of fundamentalism and banditry offers a sense of belonging, alongside material gains to Cabo’s youth. These young people have been largely disengaged and disillusioned with Mozambican politics, living under the same party their whole lives, with very little economic opportunity even when a trove of natural gas is discovered right in their community.

Relative deprivation theory, elucidated in Ted Gurr’s 1970 classic Why Men Rebel, holds that social upheaval occurs when communities see opportunities that they can’t access. One then understands the path connecting long-abandoned youth to an insurgency eager for recruits.

Identities Exploited for Violence

The March 2021 siege of Palma, capital of Cabo’s northernmost district, can be seen as the culmination of four years of skirmishes and terror across the Mozambican-Tanzanian frontier. ASWJ’s structure and membership originally came from the three mosques in Mocímboa da Praia. It was there that they first declared war. Since their two-day occupation of Mocímboa da Praia in 2017, ASWJ has rapidly increased the scale and number of attacks. This was from 110 attacks between October 2017 and June 2019, to 357 in the first nine months of 2020 alone.

Similar economic woes and shared communal identities have also caused many Tanzanians to come across the border and fortify ASWJ’s numbers and resources. Adding to their momentum, in 2019 the Islamic State (IS), claimed ASWJ as a branch of its Central Africa Province. Consequently, observers have noted that ASWJ uses similar tactics to IS and sometimes waves its notorious black flag during raids.

In what seems like death by a thousand cuts, the people and infrastructure of Cabo Delgado have been bled dry by hit-and-run tactics and cruel, destructive violence. Over 4,000 have died and 600,000 have been displaced thus far. Consequently, the UN recently warned that almost one million people face severe hunger in the region.

Barely able to regain Palma, Mozambican forces will likely be unable to determine the death toll from this bold assault. As a result, the government believes it will take at least $114 million to rebuild Palma. Now the government, much like the Portuguese half a century ago, is left to deal with an insurgency in a region where outside involvement has rarely been constructive or peaceful, and guerrillas are able to sustain themselves for years on end.

A great deal of troops, guns, and finances will be siphoned into the area, but blind violence will likely be unable to dislodge the insurgency. This insurgency is dually rooted in the spiritual conceptions the people have of themselves and the very real experiences they live through every day. Only by understanding this can effective policy be made.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Azov Battalion – Guardian Angels or Notorious Extremists?

History

Civil unrest took place across Ukraine during the 2014 revolution. This resulted in an overthrow of the elected government led by Viktor Yanukovych. Following the riots, Russia decided to send military units to Crimea and declared the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as the 84th and 85th federal subjects of Russia. Since then, collisions between pro-Russian separatists and pro-Ukrainian militias have continued.

The Azov Battalion is one of the most well-known military units that emerged during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. It was initially founded as a voluntary militia in the Azov Sea coastal area. In October 2014, it formally became a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine. The Battalion was first observed on the battleground in Mariupol. Here, they recaptured the town from pro-Russian separatist forces in June 2014. With its rapid growth, Azov Battalion has become an unignorable military force and a tangible icon of Ukrainian patriotism. 

Ideology

The Azov Battalion faces accusations claiming its close ties with neo-Nazi ideology when it was first recognized by the international society. In 2014, a German public broadcaster named ZDF released videos showing Azov soldiers wearing helmets with the Nazi Swastika and SS symbols.

The Guardian describes Azov’s symbol as “reminiscent of the Nazi Wolfsangel”, while the battalion denies it by saying it simply represents the letter N and I crossing over each other, implying “National Idea” in the Ukrainian language. Some of Azov’s leaders have been linked to neo-Nazi ideology. Andriy Biletsky, the battalion’s first commander, also leads neo-Nazi organizations “Patriot of Ukraine” and “Social-National Assembly”.

Members of Azov Battalion have attempted to separate themselves from Nazi stereotypes. Instead, they have claimed that the organization is founded upon Ukrainian patriotism. Some of them even take a more “Robin Hood alike” approach, legitimizing their gathering by saying that “the police are ineffective, corrupt or drunk.”

Andriy Diachenko, a spokesman for the Azov Battalion, stated in an interview with USA Today that ‘only 10% to 20% of the group’s members are Nazis’ and it’s all about ‘personal ideology [that] has nothing to do with the official ideology of the Azov.’

The designation of Azov battalion has been controversial internationally. In April 2021, U.S. Representative Elissa Slotkin sent a list of “Violent Extreme Right Wing” (vXRM) organizations to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, pressing the Biden administration to recognize these groups as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs). The Azov Battalion is included within this. Kacper Rekawek, an affiliated researcher at Counter Extremism Project, denied such an accusation and stated that Azov “does not engage in terrorist activity.”

Furthermore, former FBI officials called members of Azov Battalion “white supremacists” and compared them to “jihadists,” as enemies of the U.S. in a New York Times op-ed. In response, the Atlantic Council published an article written by Anton Shekhovtsov to deny such a claim. Shekhovtsov states that the nature of Azov Battalion has changed over time. This makes it simply a military unit controlled by the state. He also disproved the connection between the American bomber and the Ukrainian organization, claimed by the New York Times op-ed authors.

Recruitment

When Azov Battalion was first formed, it used extremist ideology and comparatively high pays to attract new members. Evolved over time, it has employed multiple new methods to recruit both domestically and internationally. According to published news pieces, foreign fighters from Sweden, Croatia, the United Kingdom, and even Russia joined Azov Battalion.

In an interview with TIME, an Azov recruiter named Joachim Furholm attributes Azov’s successful propaganda efforts to its pervasive use of social media, especially Facebook. Azov recruiters track potential members and support other right-wing organizations on Facebook. Facebook reacted quickly that it announced to ban Azov’s homepage and related accounts first in 2015 over “hate speech”. However, an article published by Buzzfeed News pointed out that advertisements related to Azov Battalion were still observed on Facebook in November 2020.

Additionally, Azov Battalion also run military summer camps domestically. Here, they taught children aged 9-18, military skills such as shooting rifles, practicing combat poses, and patrolling. Kyiv post reported that strict rules and nationalism ideology are practiced in these camps. In a documentary filmed by the Guardian, trainers at the camps teach children to salute to the Azov flag and shout “Ukraine above all”. Geopolitika, an organization based in Russia, accused such camps of ‘inciting hate by innocent children against ethnic Russians as well as opponents of the Kiev regime.” It also states that such acts are “broadly supported by US military aid”.

Conclusion

As a branch of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov has transformed from a paramilitary organization to a national force. Its efforts to separate itself from the stereotype of “neo-Nazis” have convinced some. However, it still draws a significant number of critics. The designation of the group should be exercised deliberately and apolitically.

 

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 by Stefan Bakumenko

The Crisis in Cabo Delgado: A Region that Perseveres

This is the first piece in a series examining the ongoing extremist threat in Mozambique.

On March 24th, Islamist insurgents besieged the district capital of Palma in northern Mozambique, leaving dozens dead and a town in ruins. Tens of thousands were uprooted, and Mozambican security forces barely managed to retake Palma, though some believe the insurgents abandoned it willingly. Particularly important for international observers were the hundreds of foreigners residing in Palma. These included those who were primarily there to work at the massive natural gas plant of French multinational Total SA.

Several foreign nationals were killed when they tried to escape a hotel they had been trapped in for days. Consequently, over a hundred others were rescued by private contractors with the South African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). Locals were largely left to fend for themselves or scramble to nearby settlements.

This dramatic four-day assault renewed attention on a conflict that has been simmering for years. But the Cabo Delgado region, where Palma is located, is no stranger to protracted insurgency and the societal rifts that accompany (and facilitate) it.

The first piece in a series, this article plots the fractious history of Cabo Delgado, both a center of conflict and creative energy in southern Africa. Subsequent articles will dive deeper into the insurgency. This will include what can and is being done to combat it. Intervention by international actors in the region will also inform this discussion. At times, this will be understood as part of the problem, not the solution. Ultimately, the conflict in northern Mozambique goes deeper than War on Terror narratives of Islamist fundamentalism, and must instead be looked at as a series of societal grievances and geopolitical facilitators of violence.

What Colonialism Took

Mozambique’s modern history, as a colony and as a country, is rife with international interference, proxy conflicts, and porous borders through which various insurgencies have spawned. “Discovered” by Vasco de Gama in 1498 and subjected to various forms of Portuguese exploitation in the centuries since, Mozambique was one of the oldest remnants of European colonialism by the era of decolonization in the mid-1900s. The Portuguese were detached, brutal, and extractive in their relations with Mozambique, providing little by way of infrastructure or institutions. Virtually all literate, economically stable Mozambicans (of which there were few) lived in or near the capital of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in the south. 

Cabo Delgado, the farthest north province, thus was historically one of the most underdeveloped and disconnected from the Portuguese economy, and between 1894 and 1929 was a concession of the royal British Niassa Company. After Niassa, poorly-run peasant cooperatives were undermined and exploited by the Portuguese, who crushed solidarity movements and rounded up locals for forced labor (chibalo). 

The tipping point for anti-colonial consciousness and radicalization came with the Mueda Massacre of 1960 in Cabo Delgado, when the Portuguese killed over 500 locals protesting against economic exploitation and mismanagement. Portuguese repression forced a great many Makonde refugees and migrant workers north into Makonde-majority Tanzania, and Mueda became a cause célèbre for the expatriate independence movement which they would join there. The people of Cabo Delgado thus developed a legacy. This was both as highly mobile people and the rank-and-file of Mozambique’s anti-colonial insurgency. They were largely fighting for independence and community control over resources.

Organized and supported by newly independent Tanzania and its charismatic leader Julius Nyerere, the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) initiated an agrarian, anti-colonial insurgency against the Portuguese on September 25th, 1964. Led by southern Mozambican students and dissidents, but composed mostly of Makonde migrants-turned-soldiers, FRELIMO streamed across the jungles and plateaus of northern and northwestern Mozambique to raid Portuguese patrols and take over rural villages.

Cabo Delgado would become FRELIMO’s main stronghold in this decade-long war for independence, its dense jungles, underdeveloped infrastructure, and largely rural population acting as textbook facilitators of guerrilla warfare. As will be shown later, these factors persist into the present day. Thus, allowing an Islamist insurgency to evolve and barring the Mozambican government from mounting a proper response. 

What Independence Gave

The insurgents finally achieved independence in 1975 but were immediately pulled away from improving the lives of their rural Mozambican supporters by a pro-apartheid, Western-supported insurgency in the center of the country. With the Mozambican Civil War engulfing communities and subjecting the nascent state to a myriad of foreign influences, the hopes of Cabo Delgado and its youth, perhaps the most crucial support system for FRELIMO over the previous decade, would be extinguished. 

In the years following independence, poverty and inequality in Cabo worsened, alongside increases in government corruption and external control of key mining and oil industries. The 2010 discovery of oil in Cabo Delgado did not bring jobs or wealth to its struggling youth. Extractive foreign companies brought their own gas workers from abroad. The corruption, rent-seeking, and inequality that followed became one of the major sources of resentment and radicalization. This was leading up to the 2017 initiation of hostilities by local Islamist insurgents.

Understanding extremism in Cabo Delgado, like in many parts of the world, requires more historical, structural insight than much of today’s security discourse would have it. As we will explore later in the series, strategies of kill and capture, militarization, and repression will merely leave destruction in their wake.

To truly “combat” extremism in Cabo, policy-makers must recognize the traditions of struggle and adaptability among its people. This is essential amongst the youth. War and disappointment have painted their history for a half-century. Nonetheless, an informed development policy and a serious commitment to it would be vital in changing their fortunes.

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 by Rise to Peace

Reciprocal Radicalisation – What Is It And How Do We Fight It?

With the tragic deaths of five and injury to over 150 people during the storming of the Capitol Building, ISIL propaganda channels became predictably awash with posts hailing the crowds as “great symbolism”. 

The Capitol Insurrection provided us with a recent reminder of the need to explore reciprocating narratives between extremists of differing ideology. Whether Islamist as in the example above or between the predominantly domestic movements of far-right and far-left groups, and how these narratives can aid one another, allowing us to better understand how to counter the threat.

Definitions

Reciprocal radicalisation refers to the purported reliance of terrorist organisations upon one another, sharing and feeding in narratives. According to the organisation CREST, based in Lancaster, U.K., the concept emerged initially during analysis of the 2001 Race Riots in England, and further embedded following the establishment of the EDL, a far-right Islamophobic movement. The EDL itself had formed in response to controversial protests by Ahle Sunnah al Jamah, an Islamist offshoot publicly opposing parades for soldiers returning from Iraq. 

Similarly, when the Finsbury Park Mosque was targeted in June 2017, the perpetrator shouted “this is for London Bridge”, referencing an attack that occurred three weeks prior. The resulting investigation found he was directly influenced by far-right material which called for retribution for those prior attacks. This is where the crux of the argument for drawing parallels presents itself; whilst a range of terrorising motives may exist mutually exclusive in terms of their ideological background, they often share in the modus operandi of their actions, to cause and sow division.

Challenges

Widely understood amongst academia, the term has held less recognition within political circles where support for counterterrorism policy can often fall along partisan lines, rather than out of altruistic concern for best practice. Critique has been applied to the extent to which these acts are linked, viewing a natural source of conflict between extremists of differing motivations rather than any premeditated or implicit interoperation. Supporters argue such analysis is valuable beyond the actual acts of terror, in assessing a movement or individual’s propensity towards violence – thereby evaluating the ‘powder-keg’ type incidents which do not necessarily constitute attacks, but which may be utilised to further radicalise those involved.

Whilst a reluctance to empirically adopt such processes as the norm is understandable, there are strong denominators which explain why such prevalence is apparent. After the Christchurch attacks, ASPI argued there were a number of pervasive, “eerie similarities” in the perpetrator’s far-right manifesto with Jihadist propaganda preceding and following the attack. These include the terrorists portraying their actions as a defence mechanism against ‘foreign invaders’, seeking revenge for previous attacks (further continuing the spiral of violence) and an apparent ‘restoration of glory’, drawing on historical narratives of conflict between East and West and a wish to preserve the status quo ante. Hence where the far-right position themselves in opposition to immigration, Islamists view themselves at war with ‘infidels’ and external forces, whether non-believers or other Muslims who do not subscribe to their brand of fundamentalism.

Conclusions

The road towards committing acts of terrorism is influenced by a range of factors. Rather than spreading panic in the aftermath of attacks we need legislators to take stringent action and provide measured responses. We should look to those in a position of power to reassure communities, irrespective of personal opinion.

This duly applies to any in a position to do good, for it is only with cooperation and education on a much wider scale that we can hope to defeat terrorism. The truth is no single approach will ever work in preventing extremism or the dynamics underlining it, but by raising awareness of these issues and setting a firm example of how best to respond to terror, we can progress towards stymieing these movements from gaining further traction. 

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The Taliban in Afghanistan
 by Rise to Peace

The Taliban And Mujahideen: Comparisons And Lessons Learned

At the time of the Soviet invasion, those fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan were one of the largest refugee populations in the world. They flooded border towns like Peshawar and Quetta. These locations aided mujahideen leaders in recruitment efforts from growing refugee camps, for their militias. Hundreds of madrassas indoctrinated these refugees to justify their holy war against Soviet forces. Twenty years later, the Taliban utilised the same infrastructure to radicalise their followers against the Americans. 

Lessons To Learn

Parallels can be drawn between the anti-Soviet resistance in the 1980s and the mujahideen and Taliban. The ideas that advanced American policies in Afghanistan during the 1980s can provide useful lessons concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Although the Taliban and mujahideen have different adversaries, their origins and ideology remain rooted in Islamic teachings.

The same actors of the 1980s are still actively influencing local politics today. For this analysis, mujahideen will refer to the Afghans who drove the Red Army out of Afghanistan in 1989. The refugee crisis served to fuel both groups’ objectives and many of the poor conditions from the 1980s remain today. Policy makers can learn valuable lessons from the Taliban and mujahideen’s resistance and address the conditions that lead to violent extremism.

The same names from the Soviet resistance appear frequently in current Afghan politics and in the Taliban’s leadership. Abdullah Abdullah, Abd Rasul Sayyaf, and Amrullah Saleh, were vital in military successes against Soviet forces. They also currently hold senior political or governmental positions. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was one of the most effective rebel commanders during the resistance, also leads the Jamaat-Islami party. Although much about senior Taliban leaders like Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Ghani Baradar are unknown, their estimated birthdays put them in their teens or early twenties during the Soviet occupation. This would have made them impressionable to years of anti-Soviet, anti-occupation ideology.

Indoctrination in Pakistan

Afghan asylum seekers in Pakistan have bleak prospects because there is no path to Pakistani citizenship. Persistent, dismal conditions during the 1980s and 2000s were prime recruitment opportunities for armed groups, providing religious purpose and money. According to Ahmad Shah Mohibi, many young Taliban fighters are children of former mujahideen and refugees indoctrinated in Pakistan. Additionally, disenfranchised Islamist leaders in the current government could inspire their relatives to join the Taliban or other militant groups.

Radical mujahideen-era commanders like Hekmatyar and Jalaladdin Haqqani did not achieve their political visions for Afghanistan and may retain motives to undermine the government. After the 1996 fall of Kabul, many in Hekmatyar’s circle joined the Taliban after he was exiled to Iran. After two decades of foreign occupation, why would Hekmatyar change his 1980s-era anti-American sentiment? Some in his party support the Taliban and call their victories against NATO forces, “the pride of Afghans.”

Pakistan was and remains the most important actor for the mujahideen and Taliban. During conflict, Islamabad covertly supplied both groups with weapons and money to increase costs for their respective adversaries. As conflict subsided, Pakistan manipulated aid to favour proxies and increase the prospects of a Pashtun government, friendly to Islamabad. It seeks the same goals with the Taliban. Its madrassas and training camps in the semi-autonomous regions prepare fighters spiritually and physically, using decades of experience fighting Soviet and American forces. Its territory also provides both movements sanctuary to recruit and direct combat operations without fear of assassination. To understand how issues from the Cold War impact the current peace process, leaders must familiarise themselves with Afghanistan’s past.

Comparisons And Future Recommendations

Policy makers must simultaneously address the plight of refugees and work to limit Pakistan’s influence. The conditions and corruption of today, that force refugees to join terror groups, were also present after the Soviet withdrawal. They actually facilitated early support for the Taliban, who provided long-absent social and civil services after the civil war. Leaders in the region must facilitate refugees’ return to Afghanistan because they will continue to deteriorate in Pakistan with poor education and job insecurity.

Violent spoilers will complicate their return but relying on kinetic strikes only treats the symptoms of poor living conditions. More funds must be utilised to solve issues for counterterrorism methods like reforming children’s education, de-radicalising and integrating former Taliban. Other methods include creating a more inclusive political systems, and providing stable employment. With improved standards of life, Afghans are less likely to be less radicalised or resort to the Taliban to make ends meet or fulfil “religious” duties.

Pakistan’s role in covertly assisting armed groups and indoctrinating fighters must be also curbed. Solving only one of these issues would allow people to continue crossing the Pakistani border to fight or continue suffering in conditions that motivate extremism. In Islamabad’s constant rivalry with Delhi and its closer relations to China, how U.S. leaders can achieve cooperation after years of attempts is unclear. Islamabad’s security apparatus must reform internally for optimal results but this is unlikely because it uses religion to justify violence in Kashmir. Critics would argue that these steps are unrealistic, however, in a conflict with diverse actors and regional rivalries like Afghanistan’s, there are no easy steps. In addressing the underlying factors contributing to the Taliban’s growth can the U.S. help the Afghan people achieve peace.

Ending American Involvement

The United States learned the consequences for disengaging with Afghanistan too quickly in 1992. The environment that they left caused a civil war and an emerging Islamist movement. These circumstances provided sanctuary to terror groups. American presence in Afghanistan is a complex topic but the costs of their disengagement are far greater. America should not  back out after more 2-decades of investing in partners, aid, and losing thousands of lives. Our leaders must know Afghanistan’s history and what conditions created and destroyed peace. Many are recurring themes throughout the world’s conflicts. It is the only way to invest resources effectively to stop terrorism.

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