Ethiopia

 by Rise to Peace

Recent Attacks in the Ethiopian Tigray Region and its Implications for Peace

Context

Ethiopia is a federation, made up of a federal government and nine member states. However, this social fragmentation is considered a source of conflict due to the political and economic inequality consolidated in the institutional and cultural fabric of the country.

The regional political parties, representing local ethnic groups, are often in opposition to the central government, as in the case of Tigray. The state-region of northern Ethiopia, under the control of the “Front for the Liberation of the Tigrinya People” (TPLF) Party, recently refused to participate in the merger of the various ethnic governments. This was on the basis that they did not lose their autonomy. Such dissensions have ignited armed clashes between the Ethiopian armed forces, and the armed militias of the TPLF. They are the best trained and equipped in the nation.

A few days ago, the Ethiopian air force struck the market of Togoga, a village located in Tigray. The attack caused the death of many civilians and as a result, placed a spotlight on the crisis, underlining its gravity.

Challenges to the peace process

The recent attacks as well as the non-stop heated conflict, affect the already precarious security and peace of the Horn of Africa region. How? By analyzing the conflict, it can be understood that the four main aspects of security are not guaranteed to the Tigray population. These are listed by academic, P.H. Liotta. 

First, human needs such as access to food resources are denied, as militias have looted and destroyed crops, stolen, and killed livestock, thus causing severe famines.

Secondly, is the little respect for human rights. Since the start of the clashes, there have been millions of internally displaced people and thousands of rapes against women. This includes the elderly and young females.

The third aspect concerns the social sector and development. To the security-development nexus, the more secure a country is, the more it has the possibility to improve. This is from an economic, political, and social viewpoint. This is likely due to the fact that the development will lead the state not to fight again. At the moment, Ethiopian authorities’ energies are concentrated mostly on power struggle, rather than the development of infrastructures or the education of the population.

The last point focuses on environmental issues. The upheaval of the ecosystem has threatened the environmental security of Tigray. This is caused both by the actions previously liste, and by the countless fires that have burnt many Tigrinya fields. 

How to act? The ceasefire requests, the access to humanitarian assistance, and the national dialogue. In reality, if they are not accompanied by concrete measures to safeguard the Ethiopian civilian population, they risk being ineffective. 

More active diplomacy is necessary. This includes the opening of negotiation channels between the federal government and the TPLF authorities. This is necessary to gradually and proportionally encourage the use of all means available to interrupt the cycle of violence and reach first a negative peace. Or, in the absence of any act of violence, to reach a positive peace with global well-being.

Conclusion 

Peace and security go hand in hand. However, the situation in Tigray is far from seeing positive implications. Hopefully, the political actions that can restore peace in the Horn of Africa region, will prevail as soon as possible. 

The UN and the EU are studying the heated conflict, with the well-being of the population at heart. With this, the pillars of international law come into play. This includes the right of non-interference and the responsibility to protect. However, this is another story.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

Potential Risks and Rewards of the Impending Mass Taliban Prisoner Release

As a primary development arising from the United States-Taliban peace deal (now earmarked as the ‘Doha Deal’), on February 29, Afghanistan’s government agreed to the release of 5000 Taliban fighters from prison, coupled with the Taliban release of 1000 Afghan National Security Force soldiers. The approaching mass release of political prisoners is being heralded as a major step towards the relieving of extreme tensions between the Afghan government and the Taliban across the region, as well as a precondition for future intra-Afghan peace talks. However, questions arise regarding the potential consequences of such a substantial development in the Afghan Peace Process.

Concerns Regarding the Release of 5000 Convicted Taliban Fighters

The agreed upon mass release of the imprisoned Taliban fighters has raised major concerns throughout Afghan society, frightened at the potential threat that could be posed to national security upon their release. This is especially relevant when considering that, in the case of the Doha Deal, it is not only the release of the Taliban prisoners that has been agreed upon, but also the steady withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan, which could leave a growing security vacuum in its wake.

As a measure to prevent the feared threat of post-release violence, Afghan authorities demand a written, pre-release statement from each convicted Taliban fighter, which acts as an assurance that they will not return to the battlefield. However, the signing of an agreement, of course, does not produce an absolute guarantee that the released prisoners will not ultimately go back to fighting. This issue has been further accentuated as it also seems as though no clear strategies have been developed to counter this possible eventuality, meaning that the Afghan government’s only insurance is the written promise of 5000 convicted Taliban fighters.

Regardless of these overarching issues, the whole deal has already been overshadowed with concerns from the Afghan government regarding the time-span and numbers of the eventual release of prisoners; arguing that the release of the prisoners must be a major element of the intra-Afghan negotiations, instead of acting as a precondition.

All of these aforementioned points have one thing in common; concisely, there is major concern regarding the trustworthiness of the Taliban in this deal.

Is the Mass Release of Convicted Taliban Fighters a Major Step Towards Peace?

Certain historical comparisons can be made to illustrate the potential positive outcomes that could arise from the utilization of the mass release of political prisoners as a tool for establishing peace; a lesson that can be learnt from Ethiopia’s recent mass release of political prisoners in 2018.

Throughout the latter half of 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed pardoned 13,000 political prisoners that had been charged with terrorism or treason. Many of whom were affiliated with the secessionist groups the ‘Oromo Liberation Front’ (OLF) and the ‘Ogaden National Liberation Front’ (ONLF), both of which were previously considered to be terrorist organisations.

One of the primary intentions of this decision was to establish more peaceful relations with the OLF & ONLF groups. And in this regard specifically, the benefits of this decision turned out to be highly successful. Alongside the pardoning of many of its convicted-members, and the legalization of the two secessionist groups, major steps towards peace transpired. The widespread disarming and reintegration of previously convicted prisoners, ceasefires, and an eventual peace agreement between the Ethiopian state and the OLF & ONLF subsequently came almost directly after the widespread pardons.

This example can be used in many ways, especially when compared to that of the current ‘Doha Deal’ of the Afghan Peace Process, and allow the development of certain predictions as to how the events following the mass release of prisoners may transpire. This is just one of many comparisons which can be made in order to highlight that the mass release of political prisoners in Afghanistan could result in the immediate easing of tensions between the Afghan state and the Taliban. With the agreed upon disarmament of released Taliban prisoners, ceasefires and further peace agreements would simply follow-suit if one is to draw comparisons between the Afghan situation and that of other similar cases in modern history.

However, when considering the differentiating situation in Afghanistan, in which the Taliban have violently responded to the Afghan government’s failure to immediately release all prisoners, the current instability is potentially extremely detrimental to the future progress of the deal. Steadily increasing violence, and political bartering between the parties of the agreement, could spell disaster for future negotiations; and in the midst of such turmoil, the idea of the establishment of ceasefires and further agreements between the parties seems almost too far beyond reach.

What Conclusions Can Be Drawn from the Current Situation?

The mass release of political prisoners in Afghanistan as a component of the ‘Doha Deal’ can be considered to be a major step in the Afghan Peace Process. When looking for answers from comparable historical cases, one can suggest that this could be one of the most important decisions for the pursuit of an eventual peaceful conclusion to one of the most controversial and influential conflicts in modern history.

However, considering the extreme violence and tension already arising from the newly conceived deal, and the need for mutual trust and flexibility for the success of this agreement, a predictable outcome to this prisoner release perhaps seems farfetched. Or perhaps it is all too predictable when considering the various collapses which have plagued the many attempts at peaceful negotiation throughout the ever evolving Afghan Peace process.

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 by Liam Timmons

On Africa’s East Coast, Two Reformers Work to Keep the Peace

Ethiopia’s President, Mulatu Teshome

Political rallies in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe were disrupted by grenade attacks on June 23, shedding light on the dangers that the political opposition represents to politicians in these countries. In Ethiopia, a grenade attack killed two and wounded more than 150 at a rally featuring the country’s new prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

The rally took place in Addis Ababa’s Meskel Square and was attended by tens of thousands of people. Thirty were arrested after the attack, but the culprits are yet unknown. Abiy’s office claimed the attack was part of a larger disruption of the economy: power and telecommunications outages occurred and government agencies have been prevented from delivering services.

Abiy’s office said in a statement in the week following the attack that the attack stemmed from anger at reforms implemented by Abiy in April. Abiy, who replaced former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn after he resigned in February, is the first prime minister from the Oromo ethnic group in 27 years. Abiy found support from young Ethiopians after he released jailed dissidents, liberalized the economy by opening state-owned companies to private investment, and allowed for greater media freedoms.

He has also asserted his willingness to implement a peace deal with Ethiopia’s neighbor, Eritrea, to end their two-year war. But Abiy still faces political opposition from within the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, the dominant party in Ethiopia’s governing coalition.

Ethiopia has created a committee to investigate plots against the reforms, which include efforts to sabotage infrastructure and increase inflation. According to Ethiopian scholar Mohammad Girma, if Ethiopia is to continue to liberalize, Abiy must continue spreading his message in the face of “anti-peace elements” who are attempting to halt progress and damage his narrative.

Zimbabwe’s President, Emmerson Mnangagwa

In Zimbabwe, two people died and nearly 50 were injured in a grenade attack at a Zanu-PF rally in Bulawayo. President Emmerson Mnangagwa described the attack as an attempt on his life. On July 1, two men were arrested on suspicion of carrying out the attack. Both suspects were from Bulawayo despite Mnangagwa’s claims that they were assassins from another province. The men are being held on charges of insurgency, banditry, sabotage, or terrorism.

Just as Ethiopia’s Abiy faces internal political opposition, Mnangagwa’s party control is being questioned by the Generation 40 faction lead by Grace Mugabe, wife of former president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe. Mnangagwa’s Lacoste faction has seen the internal rivalry with Generation 40 since battling them for succession in 2016.

Mnangagwa blamed members of Generation 40 for carrying out the grenade attack, although there is no conclusive evidence as yet. With national elections taking place in Zimbabwe on July 30, it is yet to be seen how Zanu-PF’s squabbles will impact the political landscape. Mnangagwa is running against Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change, and more than five million Zimbabweans have registered to vote. Like his neighboring reformer, Abiy, Mnangagwa will allow international observers into the country to ensure it is a fair election.

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