deradicalization

 by Ahmad Mohibi

Can John Walker Lindh “American Taliban” Be De-radicalized?

FILE PHOTO: U.S.-born John Walker Lindh (L) is led away by a Northern Alliance soldier after he was captured among al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners following an uprising at the Fort Qali-i-Janghi prison near Mazar-i-Sharif December 1, 2001 REUTERS/STR/File Photo

The United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) is set to release the “American Taliban”, John Walker Lindh, after serving 17 years of a 20-year sentence.

US Special Operations Forces and the Northern Alliance arrested the “American Taliban” in November 2001 in Afghanistan. A plea bargain with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) led Lindh to accept guilt for “supporting militants who harbored al-Qaeda as it planned the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001” in exchange for two decades of incarceration.

Origins of the “American Taliban”

Lindh was raised in California and Maryland. He converted to Islam at age 16 (prior to 9/11) and travelled to study Arabic in Yemen in 1998. All this occurred two months before the establishment of Google.

After Lindh completed Arabic lessons, he moved to Pakistan where encounters with members of extremist groups (al-Qaeda, Taliban) compelled him to settle in Afghanistan. There he received training at an al-Qaeda training camp as a Taliban militant.

In the 1990s, Pakistan served as the birthplace for the Taliban and it acted as the center of further extremist development. Operational planning, recruitment, equipping soldiers and brainwashing of children that were brought from vulnerable communities in Afghanistan occurred there. Pakistan recognized the Taliban regime, harbored Osama Bin Laden and supported the Islamic Emirate legacy until the present day.

Impediments to Reintegration
The US federal prison system has a lack of de-radicalization programs thus it is difficult to predict how well Lindh will adapt to reintegration. Certainly, it will be challenging for a person with radical philosophies, such as Lindh, to let go of his grievances and circulation of the mandate of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban.

Digital technology and communications, such as Google, complicates the scenario for Lindh too. Access to swift and boundless information provides another possible impediment to de-radicalization. Law enforcement and the intelligence community must monitor and regulate his actions. As part of his release, “Mr. Lindh will also be barred from traveling internationally and getting a passport or any other kind of travel document.”

A young American teenager who made his way to Osama Bin Laden and revealed information to al-Qaeda will not cease unless he is de-radicalized. It is foolish to simply trust a loyal member of a terrorist group to renounce those attitudes.

For instance, in 2002, he denounced the 9/11 attacks as “completely against Islam” and tearfully told the judge “I have never supported terrorism in any form, and I never will…I made a mistake by joining the Taliban.” He maintained, “Had I realized then what I know now, I would never have joined them.”

This is in direct opposition to recent statements. In a 2017 report, Lindh “continued to advocate for global jihad and to write and translate violent extremist texts.” Was he further radicalized in the prison system during the US Iraq War in 2003 and later the Arab Spring?

Sober Reality and Solutions

Lindh can be de-radicalized and re-enter society if he is provided with necessary mentoring from those of a similar background while under supervision. If not, two possible reasons foretell why he will not exit his previous life of the 1990s-2000 so easily. First, he accepted his own version of Islam and joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The Taliban view of Islam is harsh, extreme and is not Islamic. So, religiously, he is not going to change unless he is sent to a Muslim scholar to teach him the true Islam.

Second, his loyalty to the Taliban and al-Qaeda may not easily end because one feature that unites membership of terrorist organizations (ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, and Taliban, etc.) is their dedication to the mission. They assert a lawful war “jihad” against the United States and allies is right.

Particularly, after 9/11 and the Iraq War, this concept became significant to justification of their actions. Simple operations such as detonating a bomb in a populated area or maneuvering a bus to kill innocent people contribute to a larger lawful war. To them, this is acceptable because their religion, Islam, is under threat by the “crusaders,” “capitalists,” and “infidels.”

There are 346 people convicted of terrorism since 2001 and 88 have since been released. For every convicted extremist facing release, the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies should devote significant attention to individual files and monitor the person 24/7 to prevent any attempt of violence.

Next, US government agencies should fund and support the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE, PVE) organizations so they can mentor and support Lindh as well as other related cases as part of the reintegration process.

The FBOP, DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and local governments have not yet developed a reintegration strategy to help foreign fighter extremists to reunite with his/her society. There is a substantial need for a comprehensive strategy in the prison system to begin de-radicalization and following programs to aid their reentrance into society.

De-radicalization is the very first step in connecting former extremists to society by helping the individual change his/her ideas and attitudes. It’s a system where the individual receives the opportunity needed to begin a new life, whether it’s granting access to job platforms, libraries, and training, or even an interpersonal or personal relationship to help heal the person’s grievances, beliefs, and confusion. In the case of Lindh, it’s imperative that he gets the support he needs in order to leave behind the radical thoughts and support for groups like ISIS and the Taliban. An engagement as simple as a conversation with a Muslim living in his community can help make a difference in his life.

Jesse Morton, a former extremist, assisted the FBI to arrest more radicals while he was “de-rad”. Jess left his radical thoughts behind as he went through a series of transformations in his life. First, the FBI agents support and non-judgmental demeanor towards him. Later, his employment as a Research Fellow on Extremism at the George Washington University. An finally, today, his organization, Light Upon Light, to counter extremism. Jesse Morton is one of the best examples that de-radicalization is possible and successful. The two individuals share enough similarities and commonalities to suggest that the de-radicalization process for Jesse will work for Lindh.

Ultimately, Lindh needs to understand that the groups (Taliban, ISIS) he advocated and fought for are wrong. To do so, he needs outside help the same way Jesse Morton did. Lindh converted to Islam as a teenager and shortly after joined the Taliban. Soon after that, he was arrested and placed behind bars for 17 years. He doesn’t fully understand the true meaning of Islam or what it means to live in a society where Muslims can pray, protest and work alongside non-Muslim peers in peace, acceptance, and appreciation.

Ahmad Mohibi is Founder and Director of Counter-terrorism at Rise to Peace, a non-profit organization, and a national security expert. He is a published author, journalist and news commentator on TOLONews, and an alumnus of George Washington University and George Mason University. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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 by John Wilson

How Minnesota is Attempting to Combat Radicalization

Abdifatah Ahmed, who travelled to join the Islamic State, posted this image on Facebook with the caption “The return of the khilaafa [caliphate] insha allah [God willing].” Image credit: Facebook.

In 2014, 18-year old Abdullahi Yusuf was about to travel internationally when he was stopped at the Minneapolis airport by FBI special agents. Yusuf was confronted by the special agents about his plans to travel to Syria and join the ranks of the Islamic State.

This encounter soon led to nine members of a loosely connected cell being arrested and charged after it was discovered that all of the men had planned to travel and join the declared caliphate. Pre-dating these arrests, several others linked to the nine young men through various community connections had already travelled to join ISIS.

All of these men were connected through the tight-knit community of Somali immigrants in the Minneapolis area. All of the men had been targeted for recruitment in person (at pick-up basketball games at a local mosque) as well as through social media. Abdifatah Ahmed, one of the men who had managed to travel to Syria and was killed fighting for the Islamic State, confirmed in messages to family members that he had begun to socialize with like-minded individuals at these recreational basketball games and was further radicalized by online recruitment.

Judge Michael J. Davis, who was tasked with overseeing the cases, could see that addressing the issue went far beyond the normal criminal justice system utilized in the United States. After thorough research into deradicalization programs across the globe, Judge Davis contacted Daniel Koehler of Germany to help establish a Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program. Koehler had previous experience in multiple countries, focusing much of his efforts on combating neo-Nazism.

Koehler’s method of deradicalization is unique, as it does not focus on theological re-education or debate. Instead, Koehler suggests that radicalized individuals experience ‘tunnel vision’ which affects how they view life’s problems and potential solutions. Gradually, they begin to believe that all of life’s problems can be solved through violent action- making them increasingly likely to commit terrorist acts.

Koehler believes the key to deradicalization is to introduce alternative, nonviolent solutions to life’s problems. Once a radicalized individual begins considering these options, then other ideas can be introduced to reduce the damage done by radicalization. For example, Koehler suggests introducing hobbies and passions from the individual’s life prior to radicalization. Once these are reintroduced, the individual should arrange contacts with other Muslims who are interested in these activities- ideally ones who are successful and well known.

Not every radicalized individual is eligible for participation in the program. Koehler has developed a psychological profile of individuals for whom he believes the program will be effective. These individuals exhibit specific traits such as being able to disassociate with group-think, and are able to recognize old hobbies and interests as enjoyable.

However, the program does have its limits. First, Koehler believes that each case needs a minimum of four mentors as well as a case coordinator. This staffing plan, while likely justified, is a budgetary concern for those attempting to spread similar programs to new states or cities. Second, the program is relatively new in the United States, resulting in a shortage of data about its successes and failures.

While the program sounds plausible in terms of potential success, gaining widespread acceptance will require supporting data. Third, there is not yet a solution in place to address an individual who begins to relapse into radicalization once they have completed the program.

The program’s staffing issues could potentially be eased by working with universities in the areas it is being implemented in.

These programs could utilize graduate students in the social sciences to ease budgetary restraints. Unfortunately, the lack of data can only be solved with additions of new data; this involves similar programs being spread and studied critically, and there is not much immediate action that can address this issue.

The program in Minnesota may be tested in the near future, as the FBI stated as recently as 2017 that there are multiple open investigations on individuals who want to join the Islamic State. Hopefully it proves a success.

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 by Josephine Neulen

Can Deradicalization Reduce Violent Extremism? This Expert Thinks So

When seeking counter-terrorism explanations and solutions, the focus is generally on why radicalization occurs. What happens after radicalization–deradicalization–is much more complicated. Deradicalisation programs are becoming increasingly important in countries that aim to avoid further violence and rehabilitate those who have been radicalized.

Deradicalization programs vary but can include counseling, theological education, and attempts to deemphasize violence in the radicalized person’s value system. There is much criticism of the programs’ effectiveness, however, since there is little evidence at this point to confirm whether or not these programs work.

The writings of Daniel Koehler, Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, and contributor to George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security are vital to understanding this new path. Despite much of the criticism leveled at deradicalization programs,

Koehler argues that arresting or killing people is not the answer to violent extremism since it leaves its appeal untouched or even strengthened[1]. Koehler argues that deradicalization is not the same as disengagement. Disengagement is a mere behavioral change ensuring that a person no longer commits illegal activities, but it does not imply a change in ideology[2].

It is important to understand what motivates a person to engage in violent extremism in the first place. A  broad survey of the literature regarding radicalization suggests that possible driving forces include lack of professional prospects, education, community support, or simply a person’s attempt to find meaning and honor in his (sic) life. Diverse schools of thought including sociological, empirical and psychological theories are converging to grapple with this problem.[3]

Koehler suggests a broad set of tools could be used to address an individual’s concerns, from vocational training to religious or psychological counseling, and even creative art therapy[4].

It is important, however, to tailor the deradicalization techniques to each individual. The ideology and identity that is ingrained during the radicalization process are deeply personal and difficult for a person to simply forget. This lack of efficiency is one of many legitimate concerns about deradicalization programs. Despite those concerns, more research and development could demonstrate that investing in these programs could significantly alter the way extremist groups operate, and perhaps, diminish their success.

[1] Price, Michael. (2017, May 26). Can terrorists be deradicalized? Science Magazine. 
[2] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 
[3] Koehler, D. (2014). The Radical Online: Individual Radicalization Processes and the Role of the Internet. Journal for Deradicalization, 0(1), 116–134.
[4] Boghani, Priyanka.  “Deradicalization” Is Coming To America. Does It Work? (MARCH 18, 2016 .). 

Click here to learn more about Ahmad Mohibi, Founder of Rise to Peace

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