Daesh

 by Ondrej Palicak

How Terrorist Organizations Could Exploit the Idlib Crisis

The Russian-led offensive in the Idlib province has already displaced at least 800, 000 people in three months. Many of them have been displaced multiple times during the Syrian Civil War and are now fleeing towards Turkey, seeking refuge in camps on the closed border. In addition to the grave humanitarian crisis it prompted, the campaign gives terrorist organizations an opportunity to exploit the current situation.

There are fears that Daesh could take advantage of the chaos to regain some of its strength, which is something that occurred in northeast Syria after the Turkish offensive last October. Although the Idlib province does not face the challenge of keeping thousands of Daesh members in prisons and camps, there are fighters, who relocated to the region from other areas of Syria, as well as Daesh linked groups. Despite little concern that the group would be able to seize territory compared to what it once held, it was still able to mobilize thousands of members and it is in possession of a considerable sum of money, making it a potent security risk. In addition, there are other groups present in the region, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which could exploit the crisis in different ways.

Terrorist groups could take advantage of the new refugee wave and head for Turkey. Idlib is home to around 3 million people and Turkey, which already hosts the largest refugee population in the world, is afraid of the new refugee influx. President Erdogan stated that Turkey will not carry such burden on its own and that all European countries will feel the negative impact of this pressure.

Besides the possibility of thousands of refugees pouring in both Turkey and Europe, there is a risk of terrorists and foreign fighters joining the wave and travelling back home or elsewhere. Syria has been known for attracting a huge number of foreign fighters who pose a security risk to their home countries. Although Turkey sealed its border, diplomats say that the country will not be able to prevent all the people from crossing to its territory. Moreover, as the offensive is continuing and the territory under rebel control is shrinking, there is a question of what will happen if advance of the operation is not halted. But, even if terrorists were not able to enter Turkey, they could benefit from their presence in refugee camps.

Refugee camps on the Turkish borders might become a hotbed of radicalization and a pool for recruitment. The majority of people fleeing to refugee camps are women and children. With a lack of security, terrorists are met with ideal conditions to spread their ideology to children, often lacking proper education, and arguably more susceptible than adults. However, as many people fled the fighting multiple times, their grievances could be exploited more easily than before, pushing them closer to the decision to join an armed group. Furthermore, refugees are living in dire conditions and poverty therefore becoming a member of an organization might be the only way to provide for their family. All in all, terrorists might take advantage of people’s situation in refugee camps in a number of ways.

As there are thousands of fighters, it is highly unlikely that the Syrian army will be able to eliminate or capture all of them. Thus, some of the terrorists might decide to hide in the camps with the aim of surviving the government’s operation and launching terrorist attacks in the future.

Currently, the only possible solution to the crisis seems to be a stop to the government offensive and a resort to diplomacy. At the same time, this scenario seems unlikely. Turkey stated that the situation will not be solved until Syrian forces withdraw. Soon after, the Syrian army consolidated control of Aleppo and pledged to eradicate all militant groups. A Turkish delegation visited Moscow on February 17 to engage in ongoing talks; however, efforts to broker a lasting ceasefire have failed in past weeks. Therefore, prospects for stoppage of the offensive and a relief to the crisis look rather dim.

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 by Vasileia Kioutsouki

New ISIL Leader Officially Named and Confirmed

It was recently officially confirmed by two intelligence services that Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi is the new head of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Prior to the reveal of his identity, Al-Salbi was known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi: a name implying that he is of Qurayshi descent and thus legitimizes his role as a new ‘caliph’.

Early Years and ISIL Roots

Al-Salbi — alias Hajji ‘Abdallah — was born in the small northwestern Iraqi city Tal Afar; a city once under Al-Qaeda control from 2004 to 2006 and a subsequent strategic base for the Islamic State. He graduated with a degree in Sharia law from the University of Mosul, was a religious scholar in al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and is believed to be a founding member of ISIL.

Like most of the Islamic State’s leading fighters, he is a former officer who had served under Saddam Hussein and played a prominent role in the fight against the United States and its allies. In 2004, he was captured by American troops for associations with al-Qaeda and placed in Camp Bucca detention center where he met al-Baghdadi.

It was only natural that al-Baghdadi took advantage of his period of detention to indoctrinate as many inmates as possible and set up a common vision, namely the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Within Camp Bucca, Baghdadi created a network of hardline fighters that he destined for positions of leadership in the Islamic State.

The new ‘caliph’, nicknamed as the ‘Professor’, is one of those fighters connected with Baghdadi and adopted his unwavering commitment to the Islamic State. He appears to have led many of their international operations and he is considered to have played a decisive role in the enslavement of thousands of Yazidi women and children, as well as the murder of an equal number of Yazidi men in Iraq, started in 2014.

Current Situation

Although the succession of Baghdadi by al-Salbi was only recently confirmed, he is likely to have taken over the day-to-day operations of the terrorist organisation well before the former’s death. Being wounded and suffering from a chronic illness, al-Baghdadi had already designated a successor since last August. During that time, the Rewards for Justice Program (RFJ) of the US Department of State announced a reward up to $5 million for information regarding al-Salbi, placing him on the list with the most wanted terrorists. There is no doubt that he will be an efficient leader that will attempt to reinvigorate the Islamic State. What remains to be seen is whether he will be as inspiring as his predecessor who had been admittedly very successful in recruiting fighters from all around the world and inciting them to fight for a common cause.

Recent discussions around its new leader indicate that the Islamic State is indeed regenerating and confirms fears about a possible re-emergence. The situation both in Iraq and Syria has created a favourable environment for ISIL to rebuild its strengths and organise its operations. This is certainly not a simple task without any territory under their control, however, regional instability has disrupted security and reduced the effectiveness of the security services.

If tensions and conflict are not addressed soon, intelligence gathering will be extremely challenging, and attempts to prevent the Islamic State from breaking their imprisoned fighters out and retaking territory will be even less likely to be successful. Consequently, prisons where IS fighters are held should be properly guarded, in order to avoid a mass break out, and a particular attention must be focused on monitoring desert regions around the Iraq-Syria border, and other areas which are beyond the control of the central government.

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 by Rejeanne Lacroix

Bosnia Needs a Smooth Repatriation Process to Benefit Counterterror Efforts

Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated significant steps recently toward repatriation of its citizens accused of being foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict. Security matters in the small Balkan nation are already complex, however this development highlights the need for deradicalization and reintegration programs, especially in a state that struggles to achieve cohesive unity. It is only through these measures that Bosnia can challenge any new allegations that it is a key source of foreign fighter recruitment in Europe.

A Short History

Bosnia is no stranger to the sensationalism of violent acts for terrorist recruitment. Barbarous events committed against Bosnian Muslims during the 1992-95 Bosnian War — part of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — compelled those at home to take up arms, but provided terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, with an opportunity to usurp a domestic tragedy and turn it into a transnational recruitment campaign too. The foreign Bosnian mujahideen rose from this situation. Arrival of foreign fighters from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the United States provided violent extremists with a preliminary foothold in the Balkan nation.

For the most part, Bosnian Muslims were immune to radicalization efforts because they follow a tolerant version of Islam. However, those that were continued to espouse extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. They retreated to mountain villages in the north and detached from wider Bosnian society. It is in these villages that children are instructed in an extremist curriculum organized by private entities, such as clerics linked to terrorist organizations.

These factors led Bosnia to be considered a terrorism hotspot in Europe and a security failure on the brink. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron recently expressed, “If you’re concerned about this region, the first question is neither Macedonia, nor Albania, it’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time-bomb that’s ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem of returning jihadists.”*

Leaving Home

By 2015, it was widely reported that approximately 300 Bosnian citizens left to fight in Iraq and Syria. This was an alarming number for a country with a relatively small population of 3.3 million. Analysts highlighted that this ranked the Balkan nation as the top exporter of foreign fighters per capita in Europe. Further, continued political instability and a government often in deadlock led many to believe that the security situation would quickly deteriorate in Bosnia — as well as the wider region — were these foreign fighters to return home.

Daesh recognized the unique qualities inherent in recruitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Villages that purposely disconnected with Bosnian society provided recruiters with ample young minds. Extremists breathed new life into past injustices of the Bosnian War to remind confused youth that only a caliphate would protect Muslims. Some religious leaders went so far as to command that defending the caliphate was the only proper path. Fighting for a greater cause offered young Bosniak men an occasion for “self-validation, self-respect, group belonging, and purpose” in a nation struggling with ethno-nationalist divisions, economic development and unemployment. Propaganda emerged that directly targeted Bosnian citizens to travel as foreign fighters or engage in attacks at home.

To further complicate matters, many women joined to become wives of fighters. Many claim that they were manipulated whilst others fully embraced the radical ideology of Daesh. Nonetheless, it is the children of these unions that are often considered to be the most problematic, as they are stateless, as well as raised in a questionable system of beliefs.

Countering the Threat

Despite these developments, it would be unfair to deduce that Sarajevo has done little to address extremism. The country passed legislation in the early 2000s that outlawed participation in terrorist organizations and their funding. In 2014, Bosnia amended its Criminal Code to extend prison sentences for those convicted of terrorist recruitment to ten years. Those condemned for fighting overseas faced a three-year prison term. It became the first country in Europe to implement such severe penalties.

Further, Bosnian intelligence and law enforcement agencies actively conduct investigations and raids on those suspected of engagement in terrorist organizations. Extremist clerics face conviction in the courts, as demonstrated by the widely covered trial of Husein ‘Bilal’ Bosnić. These combined efforts contributed to the collapse of the number of individuals that left Bosnia to fight in foreign lands by 2015.

Repatriation Problems

As it currently stands, approximately 260 Bosnian citizens remain in detention camps holding those that travelled to be a part of the Islamic State. On November 11, Bosnian Security Minister Dragan Mektić announced that Sarajevo would accept all confirmed Bosnian citizens accused of involvement with Daesh and initiate legal proceedings against them. The Bosnian initiative to transfer these individuals spurred Macron to utter his prior statement and highlighted the need for Sarajevo to pursue specialized deradicalization and reintegration schemes once again.

A number of issues must be addressed so that Bosnia can have a smooth repatriation process for all foreign fighters returning home. Such an effort would extend into a broader counter terrorism endeavor that would benefit the entire country. First and foremost, Sarajevo must invest heavily in the development of deradicalization programs, especially in the prison system. Foreign fighters that return home — without psychological supports — will find their kin with others incarcerated and consequently remain active in terrorist movements. Additionally, clerics that speak out against extremism should be supported, consulted and their messages applied to those seeking non-extremist interpretations of Islam in Bosnia. These are more common than the loud voices of extremism.

Reintegration programming is key, however Bosnia has not exerted much effort in regard to these objectives. The fact remains that even lengthy prison sentences come to an end and former fighters must reengage with the community around them. It is a difficult task, especially for youth, that entered the battlefield young and with little life experience. Therefore, reintegration of children of Daesh fighters and wives is of paramount need. They must be exposed to common social interactions, education and civic opportunities to ensure their futures do not involve extremist rhetoric or violence. It is the only way to quash such tendencies in the future.

In general, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces significant domestic problems separate from the return of foreign fighters. The country remains chronically economically stagnant, therefore social programming in this regard may not have been high on the agenda, especially under the spectre of weak government institutions. Nonetheless, it is palpable that Sarajevo comprehends the wider consequences of mishandling the repatriation of fighters, their wives and children. Rather than a focus on the issue being a ‘ticking time bomb’, it is best to present it as an avenue towards development of a strong deradicalization and reintegration strategy, with lasting effects.

  • While a contentious term, jihadist was kept to retain the integrity of the direct quote.
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 by Rise to Peace

Prevention and Redemption Initiatives Are Key to Countering Terrorism in Russia

The mountains of Chechnya where “going to the forest” is a colloquial term for joining an extremist group. Photo Credit: eTurboNews.

A series of recent incidents validate the Russian Federation’s concerns over the rise of internationally-linked terrorist groups active within its territory. This security matter is heightened by the presence of battle-hardened fighters who returned from fighting in the Middle East and North Africa. The main query that emerges is whether Russian authorities will amend their counterterrorism tactics, or continue to engage in a framework simplified as a nexus of a military-bureaucratic-judicial instruments.

Russia has long contended with the dilemma of homegrown terrorism, especially in the North Caucasus region. Radicalization and the development of terror cells were intrinsically linked to the Chechen independence movement that expanded into neighboring Dagestan. Ayman al-Zawahiri (the current head of Al- Qaeda) once called the region ‘a shelter’ for fighters from across the globe. It is little wonder then that Daesh capitalized on homegrown ethnic grievances in Russia’s ‘inner abroad’ for recruitment.

Russian officials estimate that approximately 4000 citizens fought as militants in the armed conflicts in Syria. The state of affairs shifted domestically too. Militants that once operated under the banner of Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate) transferred allegiances to Vilayat Kavkaz —  a branch of Daesh in the North Caucasus. Russia identifies the pan-Islamist political movement Hizb ut- Tahrir (Party of Liberation) as a terrorist organization, and deems it culpable in the recruitment of foreign fighters as well. It is undoubtedly a case where international groups seized upon already active movements to franchise ideologies.

As a consequence, recent terror-related events in Russia are linked to the international moniker of Daesh, although the actors are domestic agents. The Federal Security Service (FSB) conducts operations across Russia linked to Daesh through a perpetrator’s affiliation, but few links to the umbrella organization. For instance:

• April 13: two suspected members were killed in a raid in Tyumen; an oil rich town in Siberia.
• June 26: a declared member who created explosives and sought to carry out attacks in the name of Daesh was neutralized in Saratov; a city in the southwest.
• July 1: police in Khanty-Mansi (a region in western Siberia) sent out an alert of a woman suspected of membership in an international terrorist organization being in the area.
• July 12: Moscow District Court sentenced seven members of Daesh to 15-21 years of incarceration for planning to attack the Sapsan train in Saint Petersburg in 2017.

These cases exhibit a Russian reliance on strict legislation and applications of force as primary counterterror tactics. Numerous laws have been passed, including the revocation of citizenship for naturalized citizens, life sentences for some terror-related crimes, and guidelines aimed to counter proliferation of extremist ideology, especially the contentious Yarovaya package.

A preference for the military-bureaucratic-judicial nexus and intelligence collection means psychological rehabilitation and cultural efforts receive less attention. Up until 2013, Russia applied such methods until preparations for the Sochi Olympics required hardline policies. However, emphasis on these two spheres provide Russian authorities with a humanitarian method to prevent radicalization before it takes root, and to counterbalance extremist teachings post-indoctrination, to those willing to relent. This is a key recommendation that needs to be met at many levels.

Those at risk of radicalization must be exposed to civil society organizations that promote tenets of inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue. Exposure to educational and employment prospects, tolerant views amongst peers, and wider community solidarity provide numerous opportunities for exchange.

Preservation of cultural traditions that display a wider understanding of ethnicity and religion — that have not been manipulated to advocate extremist or political views — teach at-risk youth they are already part of an important community, rather than a terrorist cell or a linked international organization. Sports provide additional occasions of solidarity, especially those that prioritize strength of character. For example, combat sports widely practiced across the region place the historic mindset of a ‘Caucasian warrior’ in a positive context, at the same time young girls practicing tightrope walking in Dagestan are taught to be ‘fearless’.

Psychological supports and deradicalization initiatives are of vital importance in the current context. These programs are especially beneficial to returnees willing to shun extremist views as they are offered a path towards redemption, as well as chances to inform at-risk peers of the realities of membership in such groups. The Comprehensive Plan of Counteraction of Ideology of Terrorism 2019-2023 reveals provisions covering this matter. As well, a member of the Russian State Duma announced the development of a rehabilitation center focused on individuals influenced by Hizb ut- Tahrir in annexed-Crimea, though it is viewed as politically motivated.

The Russian Federation strongly relies on military-bureaucratic-judicial methods as violent extremism and terrorism are serious infractions under the criminal code, as they should be. It seems easier to manage the localized and decentralized nature of domestic extremism in that framework. However, such hardline measures should be employed concurrently with softer methods aimed at prevention and redemption. They offer broader social advantages in totality.

Réjeanne Lacroix is the Editor-in-Chief at Rise to Peace.

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 by Ali Almullaali

Iraq after Daesh

After years of conventional, media, and cyber warfare, Daesh has lost most of the areas that it seized in Iraq and Syria in 2014. The post-Daesh phase will be filled with new priorities. [1]

Amir Hassan Fayyad, the Dean of the Political Science College at Iraq’s Al-Nahrain University, says that the defeat of Daesh, “…should not be understood [to mean] that the time of confrontation is over” [2]. Fayyad pointed out that Iraq will now be confronting the “…long-term battle,” to eradicate extremist ideologies.

Iraqi PM Declares Victory Over Daesh After Control of Border With Syria Restored

According to Abdul-Karim Ali al-Jubouri, a member of the Iraqi parliament, Iraq will have to deal with four priorities in the wake of the military elimination of Daesh. Al-Jubouri explained that Iraq’s top priority will be securing the border and, “…returning the situation to what it was before,” Daesh’s seizure of large swathes of Iraq in the summer of 2014. The other priorities, according to Al-Jubouri, will be the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure, the organization of elections, and reconciliation of national entities. Al-Jubouri said that the Iraqi government should begin rebuilding the affected areas, returning the displaced people, and compensating those who have been physically and morally damaged” [2] Al-Jubouri stressed the importance of reconstruction and compensation of those affected by the war on Daesh, “to provide an environment suitable for [fair] elections” [2] The elections will take place in May 2018.

Kuwait hosted conferences from February 12th, 2018 to February 14th, 2108, in search of aid for rebuilding Iraq. Iraqi officials explained to international donors that the reconstruction of Iraq following its three-year war on Daesh will cost an estimated $88.2 billion Providing homes for the displaced will be the main priority [3].

Most importantly, internally, the Iraqi government must discourage sectarianism. It must ensure stability and security in the liberated areas, create a suitable environment for dialogue between sects and promote the spirit of patriotism. On a global scale, the Iraqi government must establish good relations with its neighbors based on common interests and arms-control, it must comply with the rule of international law, and it must fight corruption in all of its forms. It’s a tall order, but the key to keeping corruption at bay lies in restructuring, rebuilding, and reforming the country’s institutions.

Sources:
[1] http://www.post-gazette.com/news/world/2018/02/12/A-88-2B-price-tag-is-offered-at-the-Kuwait-conference-for-rebuilding-Iraq-after-the-Islamic-State-war/stories/201802120175
[2] https://www.alhurra.com/a/Iraq-what-after-defeat-of-Isis/403021.html
[3] https://www.arab48.com/أخبار-عربية-ودولية/أخبار–الوطن-العربي/2018/02/12/إعادة-إعمار-العراق-بعد-داعش-ستكلف-88-2-مليار-دولار

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