Counterterrorism

Yemen
 by Hannah Brown

Strikes Against Terrorist Leaders in Yemen Have Little Impact on Peace Efforts

Last week, the White House confirmed that a United States missile strike killed the top Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen While the assassination of Qasim al-Raymi, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) official eliminated a terrorist whose roots stretch beyond 9/11, it is unlikely that it will impact violence in the country or the overall effectiveness of the terrorist group.

Reporting from several sources recount that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tracked al-Raymi and executed an unmanned drone strike against him — the second drone attack against the leadership of a US-government classified terrorist group. In recent years, his leadership was even characterized as detrimental to the AQAP’s operations and a successor, likely the reported external operations leader Khalid Batarfi, could provide the group with a sense of renewal.

Nonetheless, operations to neutralize AQAP leadership remains an ineffective way to combat the cyclical violence in Yemen. Fighting between separatist and government forces compound to create an atmosphere that breeds instability and terrorist groups like the AQAP. Prior to al-Raymi’s death, a soldier and a civilian were killed in an ambush linked to the AQAP whilst fighting between the two groups in Yemen’s civil war resulted in the loss of over 100 lives at a military training base around the same time.

American counterterrorism efforts have a long and complex history in Yemen. Since 9/11, the US has utilized everything from drone strikes, surveillance and special operations in the country. The outbreak of the Yemeni civil war in 2011 did not compel the US to shift their tactics or move towards their stated mission to “build the capacity of the local government forces, working by, with, and through these partners to accomplish our common counterterrorism objectives” in a way that proliferates the least amount of violence.

Civilians and ground forces in the Yemeni conflict face the brunt of the lack of policy development. Streets and hospitals are encompassed in the dangerous warzone. These types of situations allow terrorist groups like the AQAP to find a safe haven as those engaged in counter efforts on the ground are preoccupied with daily missile exchanges and the problematic task of sourcing enough medical supplies to treat the wounded.

The United States has suffered the consequences of its lack of amended counterterrorism policy in Yemen too. For instance, the AQAP claimed responsibility for the terror attack on the Pensacola Naval Air Station. It is evident that the war in Yemen pushed all of the players in the conflict to new levels of violent action.

The US needs to participate in peace efforts to deal with terrorism in Yemen. By leaving peace talks to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, the power imbalance of the negotiating bodies propagate mistrust and devolve into violence. With seasoned diplomats, extensive experience in peace negotiation and a relationship on both sides of the conflict, the US has tools at its disposal to bring peace to Yemen while making the world a safer place for everyone in the process.

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baghdadi ISIL
 by Rise to Peace

Death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Consequences and the Future of the Islamic State?

On October 26, United States special forces conducted a raid in Barisha, in northwestern Syria, that concluded with the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Fear of capture made him detonate a suicide vest while being pursued in a tunnel. According to US officials, the death of ISIL’s former Caliph is the result of five intense months of investigation by intelligence services.

Therefore, there is no doubt that Baghdadi’s last video in April – five years after his last appearance – may have been the catalyst towards his death. Coincidence or not, thirteen years ago, US strikes that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, happened just one month after he appeared in a video in May 2006.

Baghdadi’s death is a turning point and marks the end of ISIL as experienced by the international community. After having lost most of its territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL has now lost the last link of its so-called Caliphate originally founded by Zarqawi during the US intervention of Iraq.

The short-term success of this unique ideological position could only function through the destruction of communities and the killing of countless lives. However, ISIL under Baghdadi’s authority will always be remembered as the terrorist group that first used new technologies to achieve its goals: drones, propaganda videos worthy of Hollywood movies, and use of the Internet to recruit many foreign fighters.

Despite the lack of information about his real role and powers within ISIL, killing al-Baghdadi still remains truly symbolic as he was the public face and voice of the most pro-active contemporary terrorist organization.

Terrorist attacks across the Middle East and in Europe, heinous crimes such as executions of journalists, aid workers, and a Jordanian pilot, and broadcasting decapitations of civilians were all results of his preaching. He was also the link and the best interlocutor with other affiliate groups throughout this region.

ISIL will experience a period of uncertainty in the short term. Indeed, due to the qualifications of the former, the Islamic State cannot afford to have a leader known solely as a fighter, but a combination of war experience and religious knowledge is a must.

Moreover, the new leader will have to be well known and respected, otherwise, some groups’ leaders may not pledge allegiance. For example, Aboubakar Shekau, leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria, could negotiate strongly his allegiance to the new Caliph.

De facto, this could result in a dispersion of different ISIL branches and a lack of coordination between them. However, ready-made biographies with family trees and organizational charts were found on a number of ISIL leaders who were killed. This is a sign that the Caliphate may have prepared a scenario for the future.

Nevertheless, the death of the former Caliph does not mean the end of ISIL. The terrorist group is now a “brand” and will persist in Iraq and Syria as an insurgency and a franchise in many parts of the world.

Franchises are to be found in Yemen, Libya, West Africa and in Afghanistan. These countries represent a big threat because they possess multiples factors (political, criminal and terrorist) that helped ISIL rise in the first place. This is besides the ongoing threat of the return of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe. It still remains the biggest challenge for intelligence services.

In a short-term vision and from a counter-terrorism perspective, it is always good news that al-Baghdadi has been neutralized. But for occidental governments, they need to be prepared for the next step, as they fear vengeance and revenge from radicalized people within their home countries.

They could be willing to follow orders from al-Baghdadi’s last video in which he stressed the importance of spreading terror worldwide at all costs.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not as infamous as Osama bin-Laden, but the aftermath of his death is undetermined. It could, however, produce graver consequences.

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ISIL
 by Suleyman Ozeren

Decapitation of the Leader of ISIL and Its Potential Implication?

In a successful operation on October 26, United States special forces killed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) in Idlib, northwestern Syria. What could be the implications of this very critical operation for the actors in the conflict and the impact on ISIL itself?

From a strategic perspective, this operation could be a sample of the model that the US applies to Syria in the coming years. The United States coordinated the operation with the parties in the conflict, including Russia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Syrian Kurds. Given Russia’s dominant role in Idlib, the Assad regime’s presence and Turkey’s control over the northern Idlib, the United States notified them about the US military presence in the area.

The US military launched the operation from Erbil in the Kurdistan Regional Government. Although the Incirlik military base in Turkey is closer to Idlib (around 100 miles) than Erbil in northern Iraq (more than 400 miles), the US military chose Erbil over Incirlik which indicates the United States’ distrust of Turkey given Turkey’s long-time involvement with al Qaeda and ISIL affiliates.

According to President Trump, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were involved in the operation by providing intelligence. Although Turkey has been trying to push the United States against the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), it seems that Turkey’s move has not proved successful at all. On the contrary, SDF and the Syrian Kurds will continue to stay as partners of the United States. In short, although the US military pulled out of northeastern Syria, it will continue to be actively involved in the country.

As for the impact on the group, of course, the operation could trigger a chain of events that could affect ISIL in several ways. Because the group emerged in Iraq as the Islamic State in Iraq and then became ISIL under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership, his death would be a devastating blow for its members. However, given the decision-making structure of ISIL, they could survive this.

Decapitation or targeted killing of a leader of a terrorist organization is considered an effective counterterrorism tactic in the short term. On the one hand, as a short-term effect, it could disrupt activities of the group, create panic and mayhem among the members, resulting in intra-group conflict.

On the other, it could mobilize group members toward more actions and pursuing new attacks against their targets. When the target is a highly charismatic leader, then this could act as a catalyst for future attacks. In fact, research showed that the decapitation of leaders of ISIL may not lead to the intended results unless other steps are taken.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was not the founder of ISIL and had not been as charismatic as Osama bin Laden, the founding leader of al Qaeda, nevertheless, he has been the most important figure in the organization. Since the founding leader of IS — then it was al Qaeda in Iraq — Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, ISIL transformed itself into a hybrid organization under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s leadership between 2010 and 2016.

Unlike his three predecessors, under al Baghdadi’s leadership, ISIL’s impact on the region exceeded the boundaries of Iraq. ISIL became the leading terrorist group that created its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria and attracted thousands of foreign fighters from more than 100 countries.

However, given the continuing decline, loss of territory and recruitment, his death may not create significant repercussions among current membership. But, the fact that he detonated a suicide vest and killed himself could be seen as a sacred sacrifice by other ISIL followers in the region and around the world, which might act as a catalyst for future attacks.

In Syria, between 2013 and 2015, ISIL had been the focal point for those who wanted to join the ‘jihad’ in Syria. Now a reverse trend might be seen in which ISIL members could leave the group and join other local groups in Syria.

According to some sources, al Baghdadi nominated Abdullah Qardash as his successor in August, but his death could lead some members to leave the group and trigger fragmentation within the group, especially if the leadership position is not filled soon. Because of the nature — what I describe as — of the transitivity character of these members, it would not be a surprise to see some of these members joining in the ranks of the al Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria.

Localized ISIL affiliates could take further steps to fill the vacuum and emerge as the dominant group. However, this will all depend on the territory where they are active. For example, IS in Khorasan Province could become the more prominent group within IS.

Successful targeted killings could provide states with the window of opportunity to inflict further damage against organizations like ISIL operationally. But more importantly, such developments could also enable governments and other concerned parties to spend more time and energy on prevention and de-radicalization efforts, reaching out other countries to strengthen cooperation and collaboration to tackle the underlying causes that terrorist organizations have been exploiting.

Regardless, from a counterterrorism perspective, the death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is a success. While it is critical, the true definition of success in counterterrorism is not just about the decapitation of the leadership.

Like the previous examples, including al Zarqawi and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi will be succeeded by another leader. The real challenge is to come up with policies, strategies, and tactics that address the underlying causes, terrorist organizations exploit.

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 by Carola Angelino

19th Edition of the World Summit on Counter Terrorism in Israel

The 19th edition of the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism was held from 9th to 12th September 2019 in Herzliya, a small maritime city just north of Tel Aviv, Israel.

I had the pleasure to live this unique opportunity, which gathers distinguished professionals working in the field of counter-terrorism under one roof, to facilitate the chance to exchange views and ideas on this very pertinent topic. The first two days of the Counter-Terrorism Summit are reserved for plenary sessions where members of the academia and policymakers set the scene for the Summit and illustrate how the issue is being dealt around the world.

During the 19th edition of the Summit, among the variety of aspects discussed, the growing issue of cyber terrorism, one which has become of very high concern in current times for many Western governments such as the United States, especially in terms of online radicalization.

In today’s times, many terrorist recruiters have moved to social media platforms (exactly the ones we use daily e.g. Telegram or Twitter) to target vulnerable subjects and attract them to join extremist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). For this reason, platforms such as Facebook have recruited over three hundred people to ensure that terrorist content of all kind does not appear on their platforms.

On the second day, the most remarkable and touching event took place as part of the Memorial for the victims of the 9/11 attacks. American Congressmen, Military Personnel and Secretaries of States and all the attendees joined in a minute of silence for the victims followed by both the American and Israeli anthems.  This was an emotional moment where everybody put aside their personal identities to join a unique battle, winning over terrorism worldwide.

The third day marked the start of multiple workshops at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. Here, numerous topics related to various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism were discussed and recommendations were put forth by professionals, research fellows and members of the academia on ways to deal with this worldwide security threat.

Radicalization is among the most compelling issues, stressing the need for more policies able to detect subjects undertaking processes of radicalization. During the workshops, there was a repeated assertion regarding the need to control websites and social media platforms to identify extremist content and push it away from the access of youngsters and vulnerable subjects, a way of countering radicalization by denying terrorist the platform to access their audience.

The last day saw an interesting session on returning foreign terrorist fighters, an issue that demands more focus than it currently gets. However, it should not surprise how this phenomenon involves a variety of different aspects: from fueling the risks of radicalization to questions related to their integration in the society, but the most critical concern in this entire scheme of things is regarding children and women as foreign terrorist fighters often return with their families.

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years

During the discussion, it was highlighted that besides the traumatic experience lived by the children, significant attention needs to be given to the role women have begun adopting over the past few years. In this regard, Miss Devorah Margolin provided a thorough explanation on how the role of women has shifted from “staying at home” as wives of the fighters to “fighting on the field”, thus falling into the radar of many extremist organizations. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to remember that women have always been seen part of any conflict, though this role was previously limited to the domestic environment, with women being mothers and wives of the soldiers, but also nurses taking care of the casualties in a conflict.

The closing keynote address of the Summit highlighted on how the Islamic State might have been defeated geographically, but the challenge now is to remove its remaining signs around the world, as remnants of the group are still operating in the Middle East and some other parts of the world.

Finally, the Summit drew the attention to other emerging extremist organizations that are expanding their activities and gaining power in Africa and Lebanon, including Hezbollah and Boko Haram.

The stunning memento of this Summit is definitely the presence of a large number of people from different backgrounds, who gathered together with a sole goal of winning the global fight against terrorism.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

Not only is the Summit an opportunity to keep updated on counter-terrorism measures being applied around the world, but also the presence of students, professionals, policymakers or retired fellows suggests that counter-terrorism is not only a job but a mission to share among countries and regions of the world.

Everybody can do something about terrorism, even a single word can help millions of people and we shall not forget this.

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 by Simone Matassa

Exclusive Interview with Phil Gurski on Female Extremism

Image courtesy of Shutterstock.

As a part of The Women in Extremism Program, Rise to Peace’s Simone Matassa had the privilege of interviewing Phil Gurski to talk all matters of female terrorism. Phil Gurski, who is the President/CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting, has over 30 years experience as a strategic intelligence analyst specializing in radicalization and homegrown Islamist extremism with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Public Safety Canada, and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP). The interview with Phil focused on the gender side of radicalization, female motivations for extremism, and women’s role in counter-terrorism initiatives.

What gender differences are present in radicalization processes and what do you think are the main differences between how women are radicalized compared to men?

Phil Gurski: I think the answer to this question is that there are a lot of unfortunate stereotypical myths that there are significant differences, and hence that women either have to be treated differently or [and this is more important and more dangerous] that somehow women’s roles are minor and not as serious. And, therefore, in instances where women have traveled to join terrorist groups that we tend to think it’s not nearly as serious and tends to treat them with kid gloves.

We certainly saw that especially with Islamic State, where a lot of women played that card and claimed they were coerced by their male companions and actually had no real part in terrorist activity – that they took more of a background-position. I think this myth has had an effect on how people look at female terrorists [female jihadis]. Agency is the key issue here as there has been this unfortunate assumption that women don’t have agency and have somehow been forced or duped.

People often assume that Muslim women don’t have choices, as it’s a male-dominated faith, and that the women actually never agreed to do anything and were actually just following their husbands. The cases I was involved with women were very much as devoted to the cause as their husbands, brothers, boyfriends, etc. so I think we have to be very suspicious when women try to deny they had any role to play and that they were somehow innocent victims of a terrorist movement. From that perspective, the penalties and approaches should be the same – I don’t see a gender distinction.

Do you think gender roles play a big part in how women are viewed in terrorism? Are women just as equally capable of carrying out terrorist attacks compared to men or do gender roles prohibit them? 

Phil Gurski: Historically, women played incredibly important roles in terrorist groups i.e. IRA, Baader–Meinhof in Germany, LTTE in Sri Lanka. So there is no question that women have and are capable of carrying out active roles in terrorist groups up to and including carrying out attacks and killing themselves in suicide attacks. When looking at Jihadis early on, there certainly was a gender division within most groups which saw women as the support role.

Leaders such as Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri would say this. They would say we welcome our female members, but this is very much a man’s job. Then Islamic State came along and really reversed the paradigm. They very much stated that isn’t actually true; women are capable of carrying out activities on our behalf and this is – I think – why you probably saw a larger percentage of women actively going to join Islamic State with or without partners.

We had a famous case in Canada in 2015 where three young women in high school sought to join the Islamic State and got as far as Cairo before they were turned back by authorities. But this was completely on their own accord. I do not think that there is inherently a different role or paradigm for women terrorists. There may be some physical differences in strength etc. but when we try to maintain this while saying women are the weaker sex, we do a disservice to women who are terrorists and I think we also underestimate the role they can play.

What are women’s motivations for joining a terrorist organization- do they differ from that of a man joining a terrorist group?

Phil Gurski: I do believe they are one and the same. Using the Islamic State as an example: the Islamic State was remarkably successful in doing a couple of things. First of all, establishing the Caliphate as the ideal Islamic homeland that had appeal for an awful lot of people.

I know from the investigations we carried out people would talk about this; that they finally have a real Islamic State where Islamic law will be practiced and everything would be great. Secondly, they appealed to people to help build this State. And thirdly, they were very successful in pointing out atrocities that true Muslims have to reverse, whether these were atrocities carried out by the West or carried out by dictatorships.

This appealed to any believing Muslim who wanted to make a difference, so I think the motivation would be the same for both men and women. There is also a sense of adventure and an intense hatred for the societies in which they live. We saw a lot of people turn their backs on Western society saying they can’t live in this apostate regime anymore and that they have to go to where Islam is being practiced. I definitely saw this as much with the women as I did the men, so I would say there is not a major distinction between the motivations as to why either gender would choose to join a terrorist group.

What part can women play in countering terrorism and preventing the processes of radicalization?

Phil Gurski: The fact that more women have joined terrorist groups means you have more women coming back, and women who have abandoned the cause and can talk about the experience in the sense that it wasn’t what they originally thought. A small percentage of those women want to go public, but the vast majority want to leave it behind them due to the repercussions.

I think there is room for women who do come back to say here is what I saw, here is what I believe to be the case, and here is how it proved to be a complete lie. I think they can play the same role as former men could, I don’t see any difference in that respect given the fact we are seeing more of them they could maybe appeal to a different audience then the men could. We are in a time now where we have greater numbers than we have had historically in terms of women who have gone to fight or gone to support Islamic State as members and have got out. But I do think women could have something to say especially to children – kind of like the scared straight programs in prisons where they basically use their own experience to show others that it’s not worth it.

Conclusion

What can be taken from this interview with Phil Gurski is that there is an undeniable relationship between gender and extremism that is largely unexplored. While current societal stereotypes halter women’s roles in terrorism, there is still a need to be vigilant while looking at the female side of extremism.

As Phil alluded, when people underestimate the power and role of women, it becomes dangerous and creates an environment where women can go unnoticed for their violent actions.

More research and demonstratable interest in female extremists is needed to pave the way to preventative measures in helping tackle the gender issues in terrorism and to shaping policy in how female extremists are prosecuted.

View the full interview below:

Simone Matassa, a counter-terrorism writer and Head of the Women in Extremism Program at Rise to Peace.

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