Counterterrorism

 by Rise to Peace

The Islamic State of Khorasan and the Afghan Peace Process

The recent attack on the girl’s school in a Hazara neighborhood warrants discussion concerning the threat of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 and wounded over 100. However, IS-K has conducted similar operations in the past. The Hazara Shia are particularly threatened because IS ideology considers them to be more problematic than foreign actors. The group challenges the implementation of the delicate peace process between the Taliban and Afghan government. IS-K can also strain trust within the Taliban as more radical factions join the group to continue a successful insurgency. Due to the challenges of controlling territory, more civilian attacks are likely as the group struggles to maintain relevancy amid the American withdrawal. Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will also serve as a recruiting bed for the group to make inroads in the border region. The future of the Afghanistan after US troops leave is unclear, but IS-K may unify Taliban and government forces against a shared threat. To understand where IS-K fits into Afghanistan’s recent history, we must explore its beginnings.

IS-K History

Like other IS franchises, IS-K gained disaffected members of other terror groups. These groups operated autonomously until several high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. These initial defections created a domino-effect of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan joining the group. IS’s increasing notoriety in Iraq and Syria catalyzed its expansion. The Taliban and IS-K eventually declared war on each other because of ideological differences and competition for resources. From its stronghold in Nangarhar province,, IS-K began a campaign to overrun Taliban positions to consolidate its power. At one point, it controlled over one-third of the province. By 2015, the group began losing popularity because of its policies banning poppy cultivation and harsh interpretation of Sharia Law. Taliban, US, and Afghan offensives have weakened IS-K control over Nangarhar. Despite this, the group has responded with horrific suicide bombings on minorities and election centers around the country. Although it has little support in Pakistan, TTP defectors in the group have utilized Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus to increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan. 

Challenge to the Peace Process

Although IS-K is a mid-level threat in Afghanistan, it still poses challenges to the implementation of a peace settlement, fostering trust between the Taliban and Afghan governments, and maintaining 2-decades of progress for women and minorities. For radical Taliban who disagree with peace negotiations, IS-K represents an alternative in order to continue their campaign against the central government. They will not negotiate a settlement, especially if the opponent approaches defeat. Tragic attacks on minority communities like Hazaras and Sikhs, women, and schools undermine public confidence in the government to maintain safety. Little faith in government motivates Afghans to join terror groups as well. These attacks reduce trust between the government and Taliban leaders if the latter provided support to IS-K. Although the two groups are technically at war, IS-K attacks provide Taliban leadership plausible deniability when they conduct attacks on security forces or “illegitimate” institutions. The recent attack on a girls’ school highlights the danger of losing hard-fought gains. The resilience of these institutions is unclear, but these attacks will quicken their deterioration. If a group threatens political rights, a civil war between ethnic militias jostling for influence could occur. A disenchanted public could prevent Afghanistan from overcoming its challenges and reaching its economic and social potential. Education is important to increase mobility and de-radicalize, but Afghanistan’s decades-long problems will persist without addressing these concerns. 

Future Cooperation

The sincerity of the Taliban in peace negotiations is debatable, but IS-K presents an opportunity to fight a mutual threat. Beyond prisoner exchanges, the two parties do not trust each other. However, cooperating on this issue could set the foundation for greater security cooperation in the future. It would also mitigate radicalization concerns because people will not join extremist groups out of concern for safety. Here, the government will cooperate with an extremist group to counter an even greater threat. Like Afghanistan in the 1980’s, both sides must put aside differences to defeat a common enemy that complicates their negotiations. After each group deal with the external threat, a compromise in achieving their respective goals in Afghanistan becomes possible.

Link for Photo

مركز المستقبل – Is ISIS-Khorasan Province Seeking to Consolidate its Role in Afghanistan? (futureuae.com)

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Boko Haram in Nigeria
 by Rise to Peace

Are Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Operations Boko Haram’s Biggest Ally?

For the last decade, Nigeria’s deadliest threat has undoubtedly and consistently been Islamic group Boko Haram. The terror group would see the Nigerian government overthrown to allow Islamic law to replace it. Although established in Northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram’s operations have spread beyond Nigeria’s borders. Its occupancy has overflowed into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Despite countless counterterrorism initiatives and overwhelming expenditure, the Nigerian government has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to control Boko Haram’s spread and malicious actions. As Boko Haram continues to threaten national security, it is important to evaluate the efforts of the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism measures in their attempt to counteract the group.

Boko Haram’s Violent Actions

Since the beginning of their insurgency in 2009, the group has killed more than 30,000 people and 2 million others have been displaced from their homes across Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is not the only terrorist group operating in Nigeria, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is the regional affiliate of the Islamic State. ISWAP have claimed credit for the killing of 30 soldiers in northeast Nigeria this week.

Boko Haram’s name, translated from Hausa, means ‘Western education is forbidden’. And this message has been no more true than in April 2015 when members of the terrorist group executed one of their most shocking attacks. Despite authorities being alerted to the possibility of the threat, Boko Haram were able to abduct 276 young girls from a secondary school in Chibok in the State of Borno. Ill-equipped to manage and respond to threats of this nature, Nigeria’s military were acting on the back foot. The kidnapping caught global attention and sparked outrage not only in Nigeria but worldwide, with the campaign #BringBackOurGirls trending. Since then, Boko Haram have executed a number of kidnappings, bombings and massacres, resulting in Nigeria being ranked third for the impact of terrorism. 

Nigeria’s State Of Emergency

Since Boko Haram’s inception, the Nigerian government has used a range of techniques in an attempt to combat the terrorist group. During Boko Haram’s most lethal period, the Nigerian government attempted to implement a range of operations focusing on Boko Haram bases. However, this only led to the group retaliating by launching attacks on vulnerable communities across the country. In January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency against Islamic insurgency. He made the decision to temporarily close borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, all areas of Boko Haram operations. This temporary measure was put in place to address the security challenges that Nigeria was facing, which consequently led to the establishment of a special counter terrorism force.

By 2013, Jonathan made the decision to clamp down on military excesses and launched an offensive on Boko Haram’s insurgency. The result was Boko Haram’s loss of control in Maiduguri. However, soon after this operation Boko Haram stormed military barracks and government buildings killing 55 people and freeing 105 prisoners. The failure of these operations was clear in Boko Haram’s continued spread to the south of the country, creating a feeling of anxiety and panic throughout Nigeria.

In 2014 the Nigerian government shifted their tactics to a soft approach through their National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). It was established to counter the Boko Haram’s operations and target the roots of terrorism. In this regard, elements such as radicalisation prevention, stronger community integration and economic development were imperative. The initiatives were somewhat effective but their success did not survive long term. To this day, Boko Haram continues to enact terror, causing a divide between civilians and the government.

Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Failings

A consistent theme of Nigeria’s failing efforts against Boko Haram has been a lack of communication. On various occasions poor inter-border communication has led to many challenges. These include: the loss of resources, uncertainty across troops and ineffective and untimely information sharing. This has resulted in generally a poor response to Boko Haram’s operations. The lack of effective communication has inevitably inflated regional tensions across Nigeria’s borders where military bases meet.

Research into the counterterrorism institutions in Nigeria has uncovered that they are generally counter-productive in their work. This due to poor funding, staffing and poor managerial methods. Despite these challenges, the Nigerian military has been successful in some of its operations. For instance, the rescue of 26 humanitarian aid workers, who had been abducted by Boko Haram in recent weeks. The government has also worked to return and reintegrate 5,000 civilians that had fled the country due to ongoing violence. With Nigeria and Cameroon working together to ensure safety in some parts of the State of Borno. This has enabled some communities to return.

Future Recommendations

Moving forward, it is crucial for the Nigerian government, and their counterterrorism team to understand the importance of effective communication. This communication must take place between the government, the military, national institutions and counterterrorist organisations. It is also important that communication is consistent on both a national level and on a regional level. The Nigerian government is strict in enforcing the law and punishments for any form of terrorist behaviour. The integration of these laws and investigations must also remain consistent. The brutal attacks from Boko Haram will not end if nothing changes.

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 by Caitlin Hopwood

Gender Analysis and Representation of Women as a Counterterrorism Approach

At a time where women can be victims, violent actors, and agents of positive change, the consideration of gender analysis in peace building is increasingly important. A gender analysis involves the representation of women in the security sector. It also means acknowledging the different experiences of men and women in extremism, as a direct result of the gender stereotypes exploited by violent extremists.

Women are vulnerable to becoming victims of terror from both inside the organisation and outside the extremist group. Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) recruited for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are constituted of a significant number of women. Violent extremist organisation groups manipulate gender stereotypes for their recruitment purposes, highlighted in a report published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2019.

A defining feature of the group Boko Haram is the group’s kidnapping of women, seeking women as wives for extremists within the group, and using them as suicide bombers. In an attack in the northeastern Borno state of Nigeria, 10 women were among those missing in the massacre.

Gender roles established and adhered to at ground level, perpetuate gender-based violence and oppression, meaning that women’s rights are abused by extremist ideologies. Traditional familial structures incorporating gender roles have a myriad of influences on extremism. Evidence surrounding the roles which women are ascribed in the familial structure suggests women have influence, only through the role ascribed to them as ‘teacher’, within their families to dissuade their family members from violent extremism, through dialogue and education.

To counter these means of violent extremism, there must be gender analysis and representation of women at the policy level, in order to debunk these stereotypes. It is important this happens at ground level, within communities and law enforcement, as well as in police and law-making, to strengthen tolerance and prevent violent extremism.

Gender stereotypes which lead to the polarisation of gender in the household, further perpetuates violence and oppression in the culture of the state. There is therefore greater chance of gender-based violence being experienced by women and girls in the national violence and militarisation of that state. Masculinity, rooted in patriarchy, situates itself well in extremism. Violent extremists are labelled as heroes, presented as the honorary thing to do for men. These roots start from the ground up, in what has been called ‘pathological narcissism’, linked by psychologists to violent extremism and terrorism.

In order to combat terrorism, policy and lawmakers in the security sector, and education and community at ground level, must take into consideration a gender analysis. This may be unsupported at present, but the importance of the role of women is becoming increasingly supported. Therefore approaches to countering violent extremism must be gender sensitive. Approaches must prioritise the underlying causes of violence which lead to women becoming victims of extremism.

It has been found that women are in a position to recognise signs of extremism and violence, due to the roles ascribed to them in the home, due to their gender. Women are also more inclined to recognise violent extremism, as they are often direct victims of those ideologies themselves. The restriction of women’s rights has a direct correlation to the rise of extremist groups, leading the United Nations to recommend increased women’s participation in policies and measures in countering violent extremism. Including women in peace negotiations addresses the root of the violence. Violence in homes and negative attitudes towards women, is the precursor for social violence and tolerance of gender-based violence.

Extremism is not a natural ideology. It is bred from hatred, intolerance, and bias at ground level. It comes from a culture of internalised and accepted gender norms, in which women are given an oppressed familial role. In turn, society is divided, which becomes a means of production for the patriarchy, which then leads to one part of society being oppressed by another. The social subordination of women by men is perpetuated from the ground up, from the family home, to the community, to the militarisation of the state. It then feeds into the legal arena in the form of violent extremism.

But women are not simply a consequence of gender norms, to be subsequently used to the state’s benefit in countering terror through recognising violent tendencies or to dissuade their family members from extremism. Gender Perspective Training in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), supported by the European Union, focuses on legal empowerment and women’s rights and gender equality. TAF also incorporate a Gender Advisor, who addresses a gender analysis in peacekeeping missions. These policies surmount to achieving the TAF’s goals of having female personnel in all task fields, as well as in senior positions.

Women are underrepresented in the security sector at the highest level. Women need to be elevated to roles in policy making and in the legal sector. There needs to be further data research and collection about women in extremism, carried out by women, to further understand their roles and to create policies to build peace, incorporating women in the process. Women, as those directly affected, need to be involved in the gender in extremism discourse. Addressing cultural bias from the ground up, leading to a change in policy through gender analysis, is imperative to countering terrorism and achieving peace in the global arena.

–Caitlin Hopwood

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Rise to Peace Tik TOk
 by Rise to Peace

What Role Does TikTok Play in Radicalization?

TikTok is the fastest growing social media application currently available. It has surpassed two billion downloads globally and despite its typical lighthearted content, TikTok has not been immune from extremist content.

As an example, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has actively used the application since 2019 as a recruitment tool as another element in its social media networking. This development requires analysis in regard to questions of national security.

Per the Social Contract Theory, states are responsible for the implementation of measures meant to protect its citizenry from conditions that threaten their human rights.

TikTok and social media in general present unique challenges to national security policies and legislation, such as managing the risk of radicalization across demographics. For example, according to Statista 32.5% of TikTok users range from ten to nineteen years old while 29.5% range from the ages nineteen and twenty. This data is significant once placed into the context of a recent study in which the authors concluded that users of the social media platform are more likely to be manipulated by the content they see.

Per Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, internet companies are not legally responsible for the content they host if it was published by someone else. The act allows users to post about controversial political topics online.

With an increase of users on social media platforms, amendments need to be made that ensure social platforms such as Tik-Tok can be held responsible if there is evidence of negligence in the removal of terrorism-related content. Tik-Tok has addressed the use of its platform by terrorist organizations and will ban any accounts and associated devices as soon as they are identified.

It is important that social media companies implement policies and technologies that identify extremist accounts especially on fast-growing and extremely popular ones like TikTok.

Confronting terrorist organizations and stemming their propaganda will markedly impact their radicalization networks and in turn, limit the number of successful recruitments to the cause. Therefore, weakening these networks as part of a wider digital counter-extremism effort upheld by private and public sectors is vital.

The use of TikTok by terrorist organizations, such as ISIL, to spread propaganda is evident of two key issues. Firstly, they are not going anywhere anytime soon, and secondly, obtaining access to social media platforms is not an issue for them.

TikTok’s ‘no-tolerance’ response to terrorist organizations utilizing their social media platform as a recruitment and indoctrination tool provides a level of trust with TikTok’s creator ByteDance, despite other privacy concerns.

Combatting terrorism domestically and internationally is a lofty enough task for the United States government as well as for its allies.  The additional strain digital terrorism poses adds another level of concern.

Extremism on social media networks, and on the Dark Web for the matter, is even more complex as it is harder to confront unseen threats that cannot be contained. This is why it is so vital that the implementations of new policies and the amendments to old ones must include technological developments if they are to provide security for citizens of the state. It is, after all, the responsibility of the state to combat terrorism in all forms that threaten the well-being of citizens.

In conclusion, past policies that have been implemented prior to the increased variety and usage of social media platforms, such as the Communications Decency Act, should be re-examined. Amendments should be discussed, especially in the context of the fast-developing digital world.

–Clarissa Lopez

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 by Arman Sidhu

Do Civilian Self-Defense Groups Help or Harm Counterterrorism Efforts?

After enduring what may be considered one of its most violent years, the West African nation of Burkina Faso has taken a new approach to countering the proliferation of armed insurgent groups that have traversed the country’s rural peripheries. Back in January, the country’s parliament sanctioned a program designed to equip and train civilian volunteers. Known as the “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act”, the intent of the program is to deter and fend off the increasingly brazen attacks carried out by armed groups in remote areas, in addition to reducing the workload burdened by the country’s underfunded and overstretched military.

Although Burkina Faso’s decision to train and arm civilians is neither novel nor surprising, the program does call into question the broader implications surrounding safety, efficacy, and authority. As one of several countries located in the heart of the Sahel region that spans West Africa, Burkina Faso is not alone in its struggles to contain and combat violent extremist groups, many of which operate as affiliates of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

Instead, the relatively lawless and remote geographic setting of the Sahel has allowed armed groups to ravage the region with attacks, kidnappings, and the trafficking of humans, arms, and drugs. Such conditions led to the formation of the G5 Sahel, a joint force that includes the militaries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. Established in 2014, the G5 Sahel has also received support and/or training primarily from France, which is currently engaged in the Sahel through an anti-insurgency campaign known as Operation Barkhane, and the United States, which has maintained a presence in the region for over 13 years.

Nevertheless, the decision to use civilian volunteers as an auxiliary to any military must be evaluated in the specific context of the conflict. These include assessing the following criteria: the quality of support & training given to the groups, and the level of state supervision and authority of said groups.

Quality of Support & Training

Throughout history, the use of state-sanctioned militias was designed to address shortcomings in the capacity of official forces, particularly in rural and remote communities. Militias offer a relatively cheaper solution for security and surveillance of the enemy. Though mandates vary, these groups typically do not participate in any offensive campaigns, and their tactical goals are confined to a specific geography.

Given the number of attacks that occur in Burkina Faso’s periphery (specifically its northernmost borders), civilian militias could be useful as a temporary deterrent to stave off enemy forces. However, mounting a successful defense normally necessitates a prompt response by professional forces, which must be located close enough to assume the reins from self-defense groups.

The sophistication of a fighting force, whether professional or amateur, is correlated to the quality of its resources, support, and training. Burkina Faso’s “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act” accommodates just two weeks’ worth of training for civilians, coupled with basic armaments and communication equipment. Although Burkina Faso’s military expenditures (as % of GDP) have nearly doubled in the last few years, its professional forces remain outgunned and ill-equipped to confront the insurgents. Thus, the prospect of civilian forces, which receive a substantially smaller share of investment in training and equipment, repelling an attack are unlikely. In the absence of high-quality, rigorous training and nearby support from professional forces, civilian forces may only end up attracting more attention to themselves from insurgents, resulting in additional bloodshed, while decimating confidence in the civilian program.

Though successful civilian auxiliary forces exist and have proven instrumental in conflicts throughout Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, none of them have succeeded in a unilateral fashion. Rather, the success of such groups remains dependent on continuous improvement, capacity-building, and adequate linkages with professional forces.

State Supervision & Authority

Among the oft-cited issues regarding armed civilian forces is the level of accountability and control by state actors (i.e. police, military). In the case of Latin America, autodefensas have started out as autonomous vigilante groups, but eventually were absorbed into official designated police or military units. In the case of Mexico, negotiations between the autodefensas and the federal government have often been long drawn out. In states with poor security institutions that are perceived to be subject to graft, skepticism is likely to emerge and persist between civilians and the government. A well-defined command structure and lines of communication that incorporate voices from central and local authorities is often overlooked in this regard, but can be effective in a post-conflict transition.

Whether civilians arm themselves or procure arms through government mechanisms, there exists a need to ensure these empowered groups do not evolve into autonomous organizations that either perpetuate crimes they were designed to prevent, or begin to clash with other militias, insurgents, and official military forces. For countries with significant ethnic or religious divisions, the issue of oversight is even more imperative to ensure unity and alignment between self-defense groups and the military.

Like many post-colonial African states, Burkina Faso’s borders were drawn in haste, and not necessarily in consideration of the varied demographics of its population. With nearly 60 different ethnic groups, Burkina Faso is no stranger to ethnic-based violence. Given the fact that such groups often cluster geographically, the risk of a state-sponsored program evolving into raised militias that operate independent of any official chain-of-command remains significant. While the government has attempted to get in front of this issue by assuring checks of moral conduct and proper vetting of recruits will be implemented, disarmament and demobilization remains subjective and tricky in many instances.

Conclusion

In spite of their domestic or foreign support, the Sahel’s armies remain woefully inadequate in their fight against insurgent groups. The region’s infestation of militants has further been complicated by the droves of Islamist militants fleeing Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. As a result, the region has become a popular spot of refuge, while allowing transnational terrorist organizations to regroup.

Given West Africa’s proximity to Europe, and the lack of a formidable military to confront them, concerns of the Sahel evolving into a permanent safe haven and operational base have only risen in recent years. Containing the spread of these insurgent groups will require additional funding, equipment, and capacity for any and all participating forces. Evidence of further coalition-building, spearheaded by France, remains promising. The most effectual defense will require an alignment in objectives between foreign, national, and local forces.

– Arman Sidhu

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