Colombia

FARC
 by Rise to Peace

FARC Removed from Terrorist List – What’s Next for Colombia’s Peace Process?

On November 30th the United States announced plans to remove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from its list of foreign terrorist organizations. The decision to redesignate the terrorist status of the former guerrilla group follows the signing of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.  In a statement following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the FARC “no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.”

Background

The FARC was founded in 1964 by a group of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in response to anti-communist repression across Colombia. The group waged a half-century war to overthrow the government, funding its operations through extortion, taxation, kidnappings, illegal mining, and the drug trade. At its height, the FARC counted 20,000 men and women under its command, controlled around 70% of Colombia’s coca crop, and generated well over 1 billion dollars in annual income.

The conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government represented the longest-running war in the western hemisphere, having cost the lives of over 220,000 people and displacing over five million civilians. After decades of meetings and negotiations, Colombia’s 2016 peace accord was signed. The deal was celebrated as one of the most all-encompassing peace agreements in modern history. The FARC agreed to demobilize, and the Colombian government promised to address poverty and inequality across the country’s rural regions.

Why is the FARC Being Removed from the Terrorist List?

The State Department’s decision to revoke the FARC’s terrorist designation comes five years into the deal’s 15-year time frame and represents the United States’ continued support for the country’s peace process. Whilst the move has been criticized by some U.S. politicians, including a number of senior Republicans, many Colombians have lauded it as a necessary step that will allow the United States to play a more central role in the country’s peace-building efforts.

Since the signing of the 2016 peace deal, 13,000 former FARC combatants have laid down their arms, and many of these former members now play crucial roles in the country’s peace process. Indeed, the FARC has been succeeded by a legal, registered political party, and many of the guerilla group’s former commanders now serve as prominent politicians. However, under the FARC’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization, U.S. officials were prohibited from meeting or working with former FARC militants and were unable to fund important peace-building programs, such as a formerly FARC-led campaign to destroy land mines across the country. Mr. Blinken’s statement said that delisting the FARC would allow the United States to “better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.”

Preserving the Peace Process

The United States’ decision to redesignate the FARC comes at a pivotal point in the peace process. The Colombian government’s promise to tackle poverty in rural regions was at the heart of the peace accord, but experts are increasingly warning that these efforts are moving too slowly. As of 2020, just 4% of the deal’s rural reform measures are complete and security experts warn that the slow implementation of the promised reforms risk undermining the trust of rural communities and the return of armed conflict.

Colombia is already seeing a worrying surge in mass violence directed at rural communities. The government has been slow to seize control of the territory once held by the FARC, and a number of violent criminal organizations have moved in. The measures of the peace agreement, including the establishment of a national transitional justice court, threaten these groups’ illegal operations, and mass killings are increasingly used to let civilians know the high cost of supporting the deal.

Colombia’s peace process is at a precarious point. Five years have passed since the signing of the 2016 accord, but the peace remains delicate. The State Department’s decision to remove the FARC from its list of terrorist organizations will allow the U.S. to increase its support for the implementation of the 2016 deal by working alongside former members of the FARC and funding important peace-building programs across the country.

However, this alone will not be enough to secure the long-term success of the peace process. Colombia must accelerate the rollout of its rural development program. These promises were central to the peace deal, and failure to honor them will deeply damage the trust of rural communities, exacerbating the same frustrations that fueled the conflict for decades. Colombia must also work to protect communities from violent criminal organizations, providing rural Colombians the security to participate in a democratic society and supporting the efforts of the country’s transitional justice court.

The 2016 peace agreement gave Colombia the chance to move beyond its violent past, but its success is not yet guaranteed. The United States should continue to work with its Colombian partners to advance the cause of peace. The removal of the FARC from its terrorist list is an important step, but the U.S. must remain cognizant of the broader threats to the peace process. It should work with those in the government and those on the ground in rural Colombia to restore trust, promote economic development, and prevent the influx of armed criminal groups.

 

Oliver Alexander Crisp, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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Otoniel
 by Rise to Peace

The Capture of Colombia’s Most Wanted Man Ignites a Series of Terrorist Attacks and Violence

Dairo Antonio Usuga, better known as Otoniel and the leader of one of Colombia’s most feared narco-terrorist organizations, was captured on October 23.  Otoniel is the head of the Clan del Golfo or the Gulf Clan, an armed terrorist and drug trafficking group that poses a serious threat to the Colombian State.

Colombian authorities captured Otoniel, however, his capture generated retaliation from the Gulf Clan against the Colombian security forces. In recent days, armed forces members have suffered terrorist attacks in revenge for Otoniel’s capture.  Additionally, this event will likely start a wave of violence between the factions of the organization as they seek to seize power.

BACKGROUND

The Gulf Clan is a drug trafficking organization that stems from the demobilization of paramilitary forces. They currently operate in areas such as the Gulf of Urabá and the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. It is estimated that the group currently has about 6,000 troops and is present in more than 211 municipalities throughout the Colombian territory. Their primary income comes from illicit drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The financial power of this organization has allowed them to increase military capabilities, expand into new territories, strengthen alliances with other criminal groups and grow their income. Today, the Gulf Clan presents one of the most significant barriers to the stability and security in many of Colombia’s territories.

Consequently, the strengthening of the Gulf Clan in recent years represents a rising threat to the Colombian State and the civilian population.  As a result, the Gulf Clan will continue its narco-terrorist activities until action is taken against them.  While Otoniel’s capture is a major blow to the organization, there is still much work to be done to defeat it.

OTONIEL’S CAPTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

After several months of tracking and intelligence, Otoniel was captured in Antioquia, a rural area in the municipality of Turbo. His capture created a power vacuum in the Gulf Clan, so it is to be expected that there will be internal disputes for control of the organization, mainly among its mid-level leaders.

However, the most worrying implications of Otoniel’s capture are the current retaliations his organization is taking against the Colombian military.  On October 26, army soldiers were attacked by members of the Gulf Clan in the department of Antioquia with explosives and gunfire. In the terrorist attack, three soldiers were killed and three others were wounded.

A few hours later, another military platoon was ambushed by the Clan, leaving one soldier dead and another wounded.

For this reason, it is feasible to affirm that retaliations against the Colombian armed forces will continue in the coming days. It is also highly likely that an increase in homicides and displaced persons will result from disputes within the organization’s factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the demanding public order and security situation in Antioquia, which will likely escalate, in the short term it is recommended that the Colombian State deploy more troops in the area. This is necessary as greater territorial control is required, and operational results are needed to reduce regional violence.

On the other hand, in the medium and long term, more effective intervention strategies are needed against this narco-terrorist group due to the risk level it represents. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is necessary to attack its sources of financing, such as illicit crops, strengthen intelligence capabilities to anticipate terrorist attacks, and prevent this organization from forcibly recruiting young people from vulnerable populations.

Finally, in terms of public policy, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of the populations in areas such as the Urabá region of Antioquia.  This can be achieved through the generation of formal employment, the provision of public goods and services, and an improvement in the health and education systems. In other words, comprehensive state action is required to guarantee security, but also better living conditions, so risk factors, such as the emergence and strengthening of these groups, disappear or are considerably reduced.

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace

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Reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia discussed at UN meeting
 by Itzel Courtez

Lessons To Be Learnt From Colombia’s Economic Reintegration Programs

A successful peace agreement does not guarantee lasting peace. The successful reintegration of ex-combatants back into society, while it does not guarantee lasting peace, is essential if peace is to stay. Afghanistan is at a crucial moment in its history. If a peace agreement is negotiated, ex-Taliban fighters must be reintegrated back into Afghan society. This will be achieved by implementing a sound reintegration project. Afghanistan might find success by looking at what other countries have done in the past. In particular, Columbia and its economic reintegration programs that have been implemented in recent years. 

Economic Reintegration In Colombia

Decades of war has led to several cease-fire agreements between the Colombian government and its guerrillas and paramilitaries. As a result, there have been demobilisation efforts which have resulted in the need for reintegration programs. During President Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, the economic programs that were created were centred around the integrity of the free market. Thus, the government had a program whereby ex-combatants would receive a 1.5 million Colombian Pesos (COP) grant to start their own businesses or to invest in housing or education. However, the program was not as successful as the government hoped. The grant allowed the ex-combatants to start their own businesses, but it did not prevent them from experiencing severe income insecurity. Moreover, the Colombian government, in the early stages of reintegration, seemed to put more stock into entrepreneurial programs.

Entrepreneurship In Colombia

Alongside the grant program, the government implemented an entrepreneurial program that gave ex-combatants a one-time 8 million pesos (COP) seed capital. The idea was for the recipients of this capital to invest and create their businesses. This program was a success for some but not all. The main problem stemmed from the fact that the ex-combatants simply did not have the entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The government then shifted its focus away from entrepreneurial programs to employability programs.

The 2010 Law of Formalization and Job Creation (Ley 1429) marks this shift. Ley 1429 gave businesses incentives to hire ex-combatants partaking in reintegration programs by granting them a tax exemption. Despite the government’s attempts to increase employability through vocational training and Ley 1429, there has not been an increase in employment opportunities. Even those that are employed earn less than minimum wage. With some ex-combatants earning less than COP 200,000 per month. Moreover, there is wide stigma that prevents ex-combatants from finding and keeping jobs. Although these programs have not had wide-reaching success, there are a fair number of individuals that have benefitted and succeeded through these programs.  

Entrepreneurial programs should only be implemented for those that possess the sufficient entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The Afghan government, if it intends to implement these types of programs, should provide individuals with entrepreneurial training. It should also implement a loan-based program that should run parallel to any grants that they might provide. If Afghanistan is to implement a loan program, it must supply the individuals with loan management training. Businesses that are created must also fill a need in the community.   

How Can Afghanistan Learn From Colombia?

The Colombian government failed, in the early days of the reintegration process, to prevent the stigma of ex-combatants by the Colombian society. This complicated the reintegration process and made economic reintegration programs less effective. Businesses did not want to hire ex-combatants for fear of being publicly judged. Thus, there was a lack of employment opportunities and the vocational training they received did not increase their employability. The stigma that ex-combatants faced in Colombia will likely be faced by ex-Taliban members and this must be taken into account before implementing an economic reintegration plan. By building trust between ex-Taliban members and the wider Afghan community through community-based programs. 

The Afghan government should also make sure that it provides ex-combatants with adequate vocational training. Which covers a wide variety of skills and professions. However, the training should reflect the community’s needs in order to prevent a lack of employment opportunities. It would be pointless to provide ex-combatants with training for professions that are not in high demand.   

Moreover, Afghanistan should create programs that provide reintegration assistance to ex-Taliban members with disabilities. If not, these individuals run the risk of being excluded and they will be less likely to reap the benefits that untailored reintegration programs will provide. 

Success will depend on the ability of the State to promote a more community-focused reintegration that focuses on both the social and economic aspects of reintegration.  

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 by Rise to Peace

What Can Afghanistan Learn from the Colombian Peace Agreement?

Amidst chaos in Kabul and confusion in Doha, Qatar, the future of the Afghan peace process looks gloomy. The recent wave of attacks on civilians and Afghan armed forces is unprecedented. Despite this, the desirable outcome of peace merits a review of similar peace processes and the chance to draw lessons from other countries’ experiences in reaching a peace accord. Among them, the Colombian government’s peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) offers valuable lessons.

In more than 50-days of intra-Afghan talks, Afghan negotiators and the Taliban have not agreed on a framework and agenda. Multiple meetings between contact groups from both sides have ended with no substantial results. The Taliban maintains their stance to recognize the Doha Agreement as the only basis for talks however the Afghan delegation accepts the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) approved United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration.

With violence reaching 28 out of 34 provinces, hopes for a ceasefire remain distant. The Taliban has been accused of using violence to gain leverage in the peace talks. Moreover, they are also accused of maintaining ties with Al-Qaeda. Recently, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, called on the Taliban to live up to their commitments and “break all ties with Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups.”

Similarities Between Afghanistan and Colombia

Although two very different countries, there are similarities between experiences in Colombia and Afghanistan, especially in regard to peace processes. Both countries have witnessed decades-long insurgency and violence — from the 1970s in Afghanistan and the 1960s in Colombia. Conflict in both countries has been mostly based in rural areas. Drug trafficking has fueled the conflicts and neighbors have supported violence one way or another.

As signs of fatigue and frustration due to the stalemate in Doha begin to emerge, both sides must display strong political will and agree on meeting agendas and discussion frameworks. In order to do so, the following four lessons from the Colombian peace process can be helpful.

1. Maintaining Mutual Trust and Recognition

Despite their commitments to reduce violence, the Taliban have escalated violence — killing 260 civilians in the past 50 days. They have not shown any compromise and have recently demanded further prisoners’ release by the Afghan government. They have not accepted the Afghan-US Joint Declaration as a basis for talks and have publicly stated that they do not recognize the Afghan govenment. All of these undermine trust, leaving little room, if any, for talks to progress.

Humberto De La Calle, the former Colombian government chief negotiator, believes that both parties must acknowledge and recognize each other for peace negotiations to be successful. Similarly, Sandra Ramírez, a senator affiliated with the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) party, states that political will is a critical factor in peace negations. This will not be formed unless parties establish and maintain trust.

On the other hand, Bernard W. Aronson, former U.S. special envoy to the Colombian peace process, believes that the Taliban may lack a strong consensus for peace. Therefore, they should be treated with dignity during the peace process so that they maintain their momentum for peace.

2. Gaining Support of the International Community

During the opening of intra-Afghan talks, about 20 foreign ministers delivered speeches, which is a substantial sign of support for the process. However, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, has stated that “The window to achieve a political solution will not stay open forever.” Therefore, both the Afghan government and the Taliban must not take the international community’s support for granted and agree to choose a ‘guarantor’ or facilitator from the international community.

Dag Nylander, the former Norwegian special envoy to Colombia, who facilitated the peace talks between FARC and the Colombian government, believes that ownership and control of the agreement’s outcome must remain with negotiating sides, and the international community assume facilitating roles.

Recent reports from Doha indicate that both sides have accepted Qatar as the facilitator for the intra-Afghan peace talks; however, this role must not be limited to logistics. The Afghan government and the Taliban must capitalize on Norway’s interest and support for the Afghan peace process. Given Norway’s experience in the Colombian peace agreement and its philosophy on peace and reconciliation, it can play a critical role in reaching a framework, setting the agenda, and beyond.

3. Seeking Internal and Regional Consensus

Pakistan has been repeatedly accused of forming and supporting the Taliban since the 1990s. Iran has also been accused of aiding the Taliban in western Afghanistan. Therefore, the support of neighbors, particularly Pakistan, is essential in the Afghan peace process.

Sergio Jaramillo, the former Colombian high commissioner for peace, states that it is vital to turn the vicious circle of aiding and abating the insurgency into a virtuous circle. As a result, the Afghan government should engage more with neighboring countries and reset its relationship with them.

Recent visits of Abdullah Abdullah, Chairman of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, with representatives from Pakistan, India, and Iran show the importance of the regional consensus on peace. It is expected that he will visit Central Asian countries to earn their support for the Afghan peace process. Equally important is building and maintaining a strong political momentum and consensus internally, which has become more fragile with increased violence by the Taliban.

4. Displaying Power on the Battlefield

The Taliban has dramatically ramped up attacks on Afghan armed forces. In the last 50 days, they have carried out roughly 2000 attacks killing 260 civilians and injuring 602 others. Afghan forces are on the defensive against the Taliban, which can weaken their position on the battlefield. Experts believe “the best opportunity for peace is when your enemy is begging to come to the table, and that generally happens once you have shown your military muscle and might.”

Experts also state that the concept of a “mutually hurting stalemate” in conflict resolution means that both parties realize that military confrontation is not a sustainable solution, and “this is when a conflict is ripe for negotiation.” Therefore, it is crucial for the Afghan armed forces to win on the battleground.

Agreement on peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government may now seem a distant reality. However, taking into account the lessons from other peace agreements in the world, particularly the Colombian peace agreement, can help speed up the process and can lead to a sustainable peace agreement.

–Shabir Eman

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 by Billy Baker

Old Crisis Sparks Anew: The Bogota Car Bombing

Source: The Tico Times (2019) 

Author: Billy Baker

Colombia has a bloody history of political violence (La Violencia, FARC, ELN). But after the peace agreement with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016 and the peace talks with ELN (National Liberation Army), many thought that this would be the end of the bloodshed.

That was until January 17th, 2019, when a vehicle drove into the National Police Academy in Bogota, Colombia. The truck, armed with explosives, sped into the facility until hitting a wall. This triggered the detonation, killing 21 people (including the driver) and injuring 68 others. This marked the deadliest attack in 16 years.

Shortly after the bombing, ELN members in Colombia claimed responsibility for the attack. This has stalled peace talks currently being held in Cuba, although ELN chief negotiator, Pablo Beltran, has denied involvement in the attack. Colombian President Ivan Duque is now calling for the Cuban government to arrest and extradite the ELN negotiators in the country.

The Cuban government has responded by stating that they will follow the previously agreed protocol for a break in the dialogue. The protocol for this situation allows ELN negotiators to travel back to Colombia through Venezuela in a safe manner. It also requires the Colombian military not to engage any identified rebel strongholds for a 72-hour period during their return.

So what does this mean for the future? This single attack has damaged prospects for peace between ELN and the Colombian government, with the possibility of bringing back an escalation of widespread violence that Colombia has not experienced for years. This is unfortunately a possibility for a variety of reasons (low popularity for President Márquez, widespread disgust against ELN’s attack, need to respond to the attack).

It is necessary for the Colombian government to respond to the violence and crime that ELN has committed over the years. Along with the attack in Bogota, ELN has committed numerous attacks since peace talks began. Peace talks have proved difficult due to the group’s decentralized structure. This most recent attack by ELN has caused uncertainty about the future of political violence in Colombia.

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