Colombia

ELN
 by Rise to Peace

The Rise of Urban Terrorism in Colombia? ELN Involvement in Citizen Protests

During the last few years, there have been multiple protests in Colombia against the government. Thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest against issues such as tax reforms, government management, and police performance. However, although the ability to protest is a legitimate right, there have also been events that have affected security conditions in the country.  Colombian authorities have indicated that the National Liberation Army (ELN), one of the oldest terrorist groups in the country, is likely participating in the protests.

The Protests

Colombia had serious episodes of protests and riots throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021. Their objectives and motives were distinct, but they shared in their international recognition for their levels of violence and destruction.

The first major protest during the government of President Iván Duque was the national strike of November 21, also known as 21N. Some of the reasons that led to these protests included economic proposals, such as eliminating the state pension fund Colpensiones and increasing the retirement age. Also, protesters demanded more investment in public education, combating corruption in several universities, effective protection measures for indigenous and social leaders, as many have been assassinated, and the full implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, which was reached in 2016. The protests lasted until the beginning of 2020 and left approximately 769 people injured, more than 100 arrested, and six dead.

The next major series of protests in Colombia were those against the death of Javier Ordoñez in September 2020. The main reason for the protest was the murder of Javier Ordoñez by members of the national police in Bogota. Throughout September, there were clashes between protesters and police and multiple burnings of police stations, known as CAI. The protests resulted in 13 deaths, 72 CAI affected, and 581 injured, 75 of which were the result of firearms.

Finally, the most recent wave of protests occurred in April 2021 and was labeled the National Strike. These protests were primarily against a tax reform promoted by the government. The protests were characterized by their levels of violence and destruction. In fact, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), between April 28 and July 31, reports attributed 63 deaths to the protests. To date, the UN has verified 46 deaths, of which 44 were civilians and two were police; 76% of victims died from gunshot wounds.

The Infiltration of the ELN

Colombian authorities have indicated that there is a high possibility that ELN militants infiltrated the protests to destabilize the country, attack members of the security forces, and cause damage to private and public property.

According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the protests against police brutality in September 2020 were infiltrated by the ELN and other terrorist groups. The then Minister of Defense, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated that the acts of violence were systematic and aimed at destroying public property and citizen infrastructure dedicated towards security.

A few days after the Defense Ministry’s statements, the ELN acknowledged its participation in the protests against police brutality. Through a video on social networks, alias “Uriel,” an ELN leader, stated that the group sought to “put an end to the torture and death centers called CAI (Immediate Action Commandos) of the police”; also that the ELN’s urban militancy actively participates in protests and incites the use of homemade explosive devices.

ELN involvement in protests was also registered in the 2021 National Strike. In June 2021, ELN member alias “Fabian” was captured and storage devices were seized. The devices contained instructions from the ELN central command to inspire acts of vandalism, instructions to attack the police, and money transfer orders for individuals to attack security forces.

Eventually, the Colombian Ministry of Defense indicated that the ELN and FARC dissidents continue to act with the intention of financing violent and criminal activities, including vandalism and violence across Cali and Bogota. Also, reports indicate a potential presence of ELN members at the anti-government protests on July 20th, 2021.

Finally, in 2021 the Colombian National Police found evidence that the ELN had given protesters $70 million to organize attacks against the police and execute riots.

Urban Terrorism: A Challenge that Must be Addressed

The evidence that the ELN was involved in the protests in Colombia seems conclusive. Financing, infiltration of riots, incitement to cause destruction, and the distribution of propaganda are just some of the actions carried out by the ELN.

The ELN’s actions are of particular relevance as they demonstrate the existence of a challenge for the country’s authorities: urban terrorism that can be executed in Colombia’s main cities.

This modality of terrorism is particularly dangerous for the security of cities due to its characteristics. Urban terrorism can be carried out by a small number of people, its perpetrators can camouflage themselves among other demonstrators, it causes great damage to security forces for a low cost, and terrorists can use their propaganda to legitimize it because it occurs within citizen protests.

For this reason, it is necessary that Colombia, and other countries in the region with similar situations, strengthen their intelligence, terrorist identification, terrorist financing, and anti-riot capabilities to mitigate the risk posed by the presence of guerrillas and terrorist groups acting within citizen protests. State action must protect the lives of demonstrators, and public and private property, and avoid the deterioration of security conditions across the country.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Colombia / Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Plan Colombia
 by Rise to Peace

Strategies to Combat Narco-Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Plan Colombia

During the 1990s, the U.S. and Colombian governments entered into a security and counternarcotics assistance agreement, known as Plan Colombia.

The strategy has been criticized both in favor and against due to its multiple impacts on security conditions in Colombia. For this reason, it is worthwhile to analyze its development and results in order to show how the strategies against drug terrorism have been implemented and what their effects have been.

What is the Plan Colombia?

At the end of the 20th century, the security situation in Colombia was extremely complex. The presence of drug traffickers, communist guerrillas, and the enormous extensions of coca hectares made it difficult for the Colombian State to guarantee territorial control and security throughout the country.

That is why in 1999, Colombian President Andres Pastrana and his U.S. counterpart, Bill Clinton, entered into a bilateral agreement called Plan Colombia. According to the Colombian National Planning Department, the Plan was an integral strategy of bilateral cooperation. The general objective is to combat illicit drugs and organized crime, in order to contribute to economic reactivation and the achievement of peace in Colombia, while strengthening control over the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. streets.

Plan Colombia had a 15-year duration and its initial budget was $7.5 billion, of which $1.6 billion was contributed by the United States. Between 2001 and 2016, the United States has reportedly provided an average of $404 million per year, prior to 2001 it was $262 million per year on average, to Plan Colombia.

However, in 2016, following a meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the transformation of the program and its nature was announced. Former President Obama stated that the new chapter of the U.S.-Colombia partnership would be called “Paz Colombia”, whose economic aid would be more than $450 million during 2017, in order to support human rights and victims’ rights in the framework of the Colombian peace process.

Plan Colombia’s Achievements

The implementation of Plan Colombia had considerable achievements and successes, which explain its continuity for 15 years. Some of its positive results include an improvement in special operations, intelligence, professionalism of the Armed Forces, respect for human rights, strengthening of the means to fight drug trafficking, and state presence with social investment in remote regions. Likewise, in terms of coca hectares, in 1999 there were about 200,000 hectares of coca cultivated, while in 2016 there were only 60,000 hectares.

Other positive impacts of the program were the continued strengthening of the country’s military forces as never before in history, advances in social policy, and improvements in security conditions.

In fact, according to the INDEPAZ foundation, Plan Colombia allowed the government to go on the offensive, retake initiatives, neutralize the guerrilla advance and change the correlation of forces in Colombia. Under the shadow of Plan Colombia and the Southern Command, the military and police forces in Colombia were restructured. Mountain brigades and battalions were reorganized. The army was professionalized and sustained tactical operations were defined in previously forbidden territories. The war and national defense budget tripled as a share of GDP and the force level reached the highest level in the history of six decades of counterinsurgency.

Likewise, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Philip Goldberg, pointed out that Plan Colombia was a successful strategy that should now be a beacon to solve the multiple problems still burdening Colombia. This is due to the fact that the Plan had positive effects such as the improvement in the supply and logistics systems, communications, intelligence planning and military and police equipment, resulting in more effective operations against the guerrillas.  Between 1999 and 2014 Colombia went from having 35 military helicopters to more than 200 and the number of professional soldiers increased from 23,000 to 88,000 in the same period of time.

In addition, the FARC guerrilla weakened from 25,000 men in 2002 to about 6,000 in 2013 and went from maintaining a presence in 555 municipalities to only 103 by the end of 2014.

The improvement in security conditions was reflected in the reduction of coca crops, the fact that violent actions by illegal groups decreased 66% between 2002 and 2015, and that attacks on physical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, energy towers, bridges and roads plummeted by 85%.

Finally, the program had a social investment component, as social policy programs such as Familias en Acción, Jóvenes en Acción and Empleo en Acción were created.

Critics of Plan Colombia

Despite its achievements and successes in improving security conditions in Colombia, Plan Colombia has also been criticized.  The Plan’s implementation has had negative consequences, such as that drug trafficking deepened and fragmented during the Plan Colombia, making it more difficult to combat, and there was a marked increase in the number of victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, with more than 800,000 people said to have been victimized in 2008.  In addition, there was an increase in illegal mining, which allows for the financing of illegal groups.

However, the greatest criticism of Plan Colombia has to do with the aspect of respect for human rights during its execution. The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination (CCEEU) noted that Plan Colombia had serious human rights costs, such as since the beginning of the Plan, more than 6 million people were victimized, more than 4 million people were displaced, more than 4,300 civilians were allegedly killed by government military forces to increase the number of casualties, more than 1,000 trade unionists and 400 human rights defenders were killed, and countless women suffered sexual violence.

Some additional criticisms point out that Plan Colombia gave priority to military assistance over social programs, the lack of resources allocated to programs for the substitution of illicit crops, attention to the vulnerable and displaced population, reform of the judicial system and environmental protection, and that the fight against drugs in Colombia transferred the problem of drug trafficking and increased the levels of violence in several countries of the continent.

Balance of Plan Colombia: A Successful Strategy?

The figures show that Plan Colombia was a decisive factor for the Colombian State to overcome the critical public order situation at the end of the 1990s and to exponentially improve its capacity to confront the guerrillas, reduce coca crops and improve security conditions in a large part of the national territory.

In fact, the results achieved by Plan Colombia allowed the program to evolve and become “Peace Colombia”, since, thanks to the advances in military capabilities resulting from Plan Colombia, the Colombian State weakened the FARC guerrillas so much so that they had to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On the other hand, Plan Colombia also had negative consequences, especially in such sensitive aspects as the violation of human rights. Therefore, it is worth evaluating the achievements, vulnerabilities, lessons learned and failures of such a program in order to implement similar strategies in Colombia’s future or in other countries struggling in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism.

Finally, it must be understood that Plan Colombia is a strategy that was specifically designed to Colombia’s needs. Therefore, the implementation of similar programs in other regions must take into account the particular characteristics of their countries in order to achieve optimal results and impacts.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
GTI
 by Rise to Peace

The Global Terrorism Index: Results and Implications in Latin America

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2022 was recently published. Terrorist attacks in Latin America, the terrorist groups that perpetrate the attacks, and the relationship between terrorism and conflict are highlighted within the GTI.

The results of this document can provide valuable information for decision-makers to address terrorist threats in the region and mitigate their impact.

The GTI Report

According to the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the GTI is a comprehensive study that analyzes the impact of terrorism in 163 countries covering 99.7% of the world’s population. This report is compiled using data from Terrorism Tracker and other sources.

The GTI produces a composite score to provide an ordinal ranking of countries in terms of the impact of terrorism. The GTI scores each country on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing no impact of terrorism and 10 representing the highest measurable impact of terrorism.

A notable finding from the 2022 GTI includes that despite the increase in attacks, the impact of terrorism continues to decline. In 2021, deaths from terrorism decreased by 1.2%, while attacks increased by 17%, highlighting that terrorism’s lethality is decreasing.

Two-thirds of countries recorded no terrorist attacks or deaths, while 86 countries recorded an improvement in their GTI score.

The number of deaths has remained roughly the same over the past four years. The GTI also notes that terrorism remains an ongoing threat and is becoming increasingly concentrated, compounding in countries already suffering from violent conflict.

Latin America’s GTI Results

The GTI revealed that there are challenges in Latin America’s terrorism and security.  Although some countries have improved compared to 2021, some countries have worsened, which is a risk factor for their national security.

According to the report,  five South American countries improved their GTI score, four worsened, and two countries had no change.  Additionally, terrorism-related deaths declined by 41% between 2020 and 2021.

“However, the overall level of terrorism remains much higher than a decade ago, with Chile, Peru and Argentina significantly increasing their levels of terrorism in 2021, compared to 2011. In total, there have been 1,835 deaths from terrorism in South America since 2007, the fourth lowest total of any region.”

Also, common actors involved in the terrorist acts include Mapuche extremists and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN).  In fact, the GTI notes that Colombia has the highest impact of terrorism in the region, a position it has held for the past decade, despite a minor improvement between 2011 and 2021.

Whereas Peru recorded one terror attack in 2021, which killed 16 people.  The attack was perpetrated by the Shining Path, a communist terrorist organization.

Finally, Colombia ranks 14th, Chile 18th, Peru 37th, Venezuela 46th and Ecuador 56th in their global GTI rankings.

Implications for the Region

The GTI report provides valuable information to analyze the number of terrorist attacks, impacted regions, casualties, annual changes, trends, and improvements or deteriorations in a country’s status.

Therefore, with the information from the GTI policymakers can make decisions focused on the challenges of their country or region.

In the case of Latin America, countries such as Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela must implement security policies focused on reducing the impact of terrorism in their states and reducing the capacity of terrorist groups operations.

Countries such as Brazil and Bolivia should continue to implement their existing practices and improve on their current vulnerabilities, in order to not drop in ranking.

Multilateral organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) should focus their efforts to provide assistance to the most affected countries.

Additionally, some of the countries most affected by terrorism have already taken action.  Colombia has taken counter-terrorism measures such as increasing the security footprint in cities like Cali, In Peru, President Castillo urged to prioritize the fight against terrorism and pandemics. Also, the recently elected President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, seeks to improve on counter-terrorism efforts in southern Chile.

In conclusion, Latin America faces threats from various terrorist groups, yet the threat level and impact varies between each country. Ultimately, terrorism is still an ongoing challenge in in Latin America and although efforts have been made to combat terrorism, it continues to affect the lives of countless innocent Latin Americans.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Armed Strike
 by Rise to Peace

Three Days of Terror: The ELN’s Armed Strike and its Implications for Colombia

The National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla announced the beginning of an armed strike in Colombia occurring from February 23 – 26, 2022. Multiple terrorist actions have been registered throughout the nation’s territory, primarily affecting civilians.

The ELN’s armed strike demonstrates the revitalization of this guerrilla group and its capabilities to carry out attacks in Colombia. It is likely that this is the first of many strikes and that guerrilla terrorism in Colombia will increase in the future.

The Statement

On February 20th, the ELN published a statement announcing an armed strike with the aim of completely paralyzing Colombia’s commercial activities. The goal of the strike is to protest against the government and the policies of the current Colombian president, Iván Duque.

In addition, the document published by the ELN states that the population will only be able to mobilize for humanitarian reasons related to funeral activities or hospital emergencies. The ELN recommends, for security reasons, that individuals stay in their homes or workplaces and avoid displacements.

A few hours after the announcement, the Colombian Minister of Defense, Diego Molano, stated that the Colombian Public Forces are prepared to face the threats of the insurgent group and that the statement seeks to generate fear among Colombians.

Three Days of Attacks

On February 23rd attacks began throughout Colombia.  Approximately 18 terrorist actions were registered, especially in the department of Norte de Santander.

One attack on the first day of the armed strike included an explosion in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander, which caused the death of Jelly, an anti-explosives dog, and injured her caretaker.

A few kilometers away, in the municipality of Los Patios, Norte de Santander, a suspicious package with a red and black ELN flag was reported, which was successfully detonated.

Likewise, a truck painted with the colors of the ELN flag was found blocking the road between Cúcuta and the municipality of Sardinata.

In the municipality of Pailitas, Cesar, the ELN detonated a bomb on the Los Trujillos bridge that connects Pailitas with the municipality of Curumaní. In the same municipality, three trucks were incinerated in a village.

On the Pan-American highway between Popayán and Cali, men armed with rifles, wearing camouflage and ELN armbands created a roadblock and set fire to a truck, blocking the road for several hours.

Another relevant attack on the first day of the armed strike occurred in San Gil, Santander, where an explosive was detonated on a road, injuring six workers of the National Roads Institute (Invías).

Terrorist attacks continued into the second day of the armed strike.  In Fortul, Aracuca, ELN militiamen attacked the town’s police station with rifle fire and grenades, while at the same time taking pictures to spread propaganda.

Moreover, in Ricaurte, Nariño, the ELN incinerated the car of a villager and left banners alluding to the organization along the road. Additionally, ELN members killed Julio Victoria Cárdenas, a social leader in Litoral San Juan, Chocó.

During the third day of the armed strike the unrelenting attacks continued. On the Cúcuta-Ocaña road, two alleged ELN members blew up a stretch of the road by leaving an explosive device inside a culvert.  Also, in  Neiva, the capital of the department of Huila, an ELN flag  was found hanging from a bridge.  Finally, in Pelaya, Cesar, the ELN destroyed part of a bridge with explosives.

The Implications and the Future of the ELN in Colombia

The ELN guerrilla armed strike represents a challenge for Colombian authorities, especially since the attacks were strategically carried out a few days before the country’s legislative elections.

It is likely that the armed strike is a show of force by the ELN, a terrorist group which remains in an armed confrontation with FARC dissidents. More importantly, these attacks demonstrate the ELN’s logistical and weapons capacity, allowing them to carry out terrorist acts simultaneously in several departments throughout Colombia.

With imminent political elections, more attacks may occur in the near future. Some hypothesize that attacks may even occur on election day, in order to generate as much terror as possible among Colombians.

Additionally, the attacks may be an attempt to consolidate the ELN’s power in the Colombian territories and force negotiations with the Colombian State, like the government previously did with the FARC.

However, despite the ELN’s possible objectives and short and long term goals, the Colombian State must ensure the reestablishment of public order in the territories most affected by terrorist attacks, especially on election day.

Troop deployments are needed in the departments with the greatest ELN presence in order to confront the guerrillas and reestablish territorial control, and more importantly the population’s confidence.

It is recommended that the Colombian State efficiently employ its counterinsurgency and counterterrorist warfare capabilities to mitigate the impacts of ELN attacks, at least until a permanent solution to the conflict is developed.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
Bomb
 by Rise to Peace

Bomb Attacks Terrorize the Colombian-Venezuelan Border

On December 14th, two bomb explosions were registered in Colombia at the border city of Cúcuta. The explosions occurred near the Camilo Daza Airport and left two police officers and one civilian dead.

These attacks add to the wave of violence in the Norte de Santander Department, located on Colombia’s border. In recent months, the civilian population and the security forces have been victims of criminal and terrorist actions by various groups that operate on the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

Wave of Violence at the Border

The explosions at the Cúcuta Airport are just one example of the terrorist actions affecting the border area between Colombia and Venezuela. Two factors can explain the disarray of public order at the border. First, this region of the world has the highest concentration of illicit crops, according to the United Nations, such as the enormous production of cocaine in the region of Catacumbo.

Secondly, public order is affected by the presence of dissidents of the FARC and the ELN; Venezuela is a safe haven for terrorist organizations and there is a lack of presence by the Colombian State. In fact, according to the Colombian authorities, 14 criminal organizations dispute the trade in illicit drugs, human trafficking, the sale of weapons, and the smuggling of merchandise in the region.

One of the most relevant terrorist attacks in recent months in Norte de Santander was the car bomb attack against Brigade 30 of the Colombian National Army. The explosion occurred on June 15th and injured 34 soldiers and two civilians. This attack was extremely worrying for the Colombian authorities, given that the vehicle carrying the bomb easily entered the army’s facilities. Although it is not completely clear who ordered the attack, it was likely the responsibility of local ELN cells.

Additionally, another recent terrorist act was the attack against Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez. The attack occurred on June 15th in the municipality of Sardinata, Norte de Santander.

The president was attacked with rifle bursts while boarding his helicopter; however, the attack did not result in any injuries. The mastermind of the attack, a former Colombian military man who joined as a member of the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents, was captured. In addition, the Colombian authorities indicated that the attack was planned and organized from Venezuela.

Violence and crime do not seem to end in Norte de Santander. According to Brigadier General Fabio Cancelado, there are 1,500 armed men in the department, divided into illegal groups such as the ELN, the “Gulf Clan,” the dissidents of the 33rd Front of the FARC, the “Tren de Aragua,” the “Pelusos,” and “Rastrojos.”

These organizations are financed by illegal activities, such as cocaine trafficking, and are responsible for the murder of 22 social leaders and the displacement of 448 people in 2021.

The Two Explosions 

The explosions on December 14th were attacks that once again terrorized the population at the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The first explosion occurred when an individual attempted to jump over an airport gate. The individual fell, and the device exploded. Minutes later, a suspicious device was found near the area of the first explosion. When two police officers from the explosive’s unit examined it, the bomb exploded.

The Colombian defense minister emphasized that these terrorist attacks are being planned from Venezuela by terrorist groups. The Colombian authorities believe the ELN and the 33rd Front of the FARC dissidents are responsible for the attack.

How to Stop the Violence?

Despite the fact that the problem of crime, violence, and terrorism at the Colombian-Venezuelan border area is of immense proportions, some actions can, and must, be taken.

Due to the significant amount of illicit crops, coca production and trafficking, and the income generated from this activity, it is necessary to spray coca crops with aerial and targeted herbicides. This will reduce the crops, and subsequently the income, of the terrorist organizations that operate in Norte de Santander.

Furthermore, it is necessary to protect the social leaders who live in this area and mitigate massive forced displacements.

Finally, it is necessary for the Colombian Armed Forces and the National Police to strengthen their intelligence, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics capabilities. This is of the utmost importance to anticipate terrorist attacks and effectively combat illegal armed groups in the region.

 

Daniel Felipe Ruiz Rozo, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

in Latin America / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments