Civilians

 by Ahmad Mohibi

The Emergence and Expansion of ISIS-K and the Taliban

The Taliban blamed ISIS-K for the Kabul explosion on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul, killing at least 30 people and wounding dozens this Tuesday. Though there is no immediate claim of responsibility, it’s more likely that IS-K is behind the attack. IS-K has carried out some of the deadliest attacks since its appearance in 2015.

This included the August 26 suicide bombing that killed 13 US service members and 180 Afghans at Kabul airport. Hundreds have been killed and wounded in two separate suicide bombings this past month, in Kundoz and Kandhar at two Shia mosque gatherings.

One of the group’s greatest strengths and factors that sets them apart from the Taliban is not only their ability to leverage the local expertise of its fighters, but also the funding they have.

There is substantial evidence that the group has received money, exceeding $100 million, along with training and advice from the group’s core organizational body in Syria and Iraq. With their funding and expertise, IS-K has launched numerous attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, creating chaos, uncertainty, and fear – one of their main goals.

Background

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest and well-known terror groups the world has known. Emerging in the Middle East due to inter-state fragility, failed foreign policy, and instability in the region, ISIS emerged as a force to be recognized and feared. ISIS is present in Afghanistan under the name the Islamic State Khorasan, also known as IS-K. It was formed in Pakistan in 2014 and later appeared in Afghanistan in 2015 at the height of ISIS’s power in Syria and Iraq.

Moreover, they are known as the most extreme and violent of all the jihadist militant groups in Afghanistan and one of the top four deadliest terrorist organizations in the world.

The group recruits both Afghan and Pakistani jihadists, especially members of the Taliban who do not see their own organization as extreme enough. Throughout its history, IS-K has carried various attacks on different targets. This has included Afghan security forces, the Taliban, US and NATO forces, religious monitories, Afghan politicians and ministries, international organizations, and many more. Consequently, there will be an increase in activity by IS-K due to the instability of Afghanistan.

 Different in idea, same in nature

IS-K and the Taliban are two different sides of the same coin. Both are extremist groups, fighting for the same idea, but with different goals, both voicing their disdain for each other. However, ISIS and the Taliban are not as different as IS-K claims to be. One of the reasons is that IS-K is essentially copying attacks and tactics that the Taliban deployed in the past. One example is in the northern part of Afghanistan in the Balkh Province, IS-K is expanding in the eastern and northern provinces with their night operations and coordinated terror attacks, while in the day they are dormant. This draws a parallel to the Taliban who has and is doing the exact same thing.

Moreover, as IS-K and the Taliban are strategic rivals with IS-K branding the Taliban as “filthy nationalists” who only want to form a government within the borders of Afghanistan and therefore contradicts the IS’s goal of establishing a global caliphate, one would assume that IS-K would adhere to different strategies. But, IS-K is following similar patterns that the Taliban launched against the government over the past 20 years. For example, almost a year ago on the 12th of May 2020, the Taliban attacked a maternity ward of a hospital in Kabul. On the 2nd of November 2021, IS-K launched an attack on Afghanistan’s largest military hospital near Kabul.

The only thing that really sets the groups apart is that the Taliban is struggling against ISIS as they do not have the same training and resources to enable them to maintain their power. To further emphasize the similar patterns, ISIS knows that in order to obtain power for political objectives, violence is the key.

Therefore, ISIS is taking the same measures that the Taliban took to gain the same power in the name of jihad. Consequently, the method of their attacks and strategies are very similar to those of the Taliban. IS-K simply justifies their tactics as being better, even though most of the attacks and methods are the same as the Taliban.

What is next for ISIS-K and Afghanistan?

Since its emergence in 2015, IS-K is continually growing and expanding. Not only is this because IS-K is conducting more attacks and gaining more territory, but also because Afghanistan is a country ridden in poverty. Most people think that people join ISIS or IS-K due to religious causes, but it is quite the opposite.

Many people, especially youth join ISIS to get out of poverty. Furthermore, it is a historical fact that poverty has determined the fate of many Afghans. So, while the Taliban struggles to maintain power in Afghanistan with the financial crisis along with the fact that half of the country is facing starvation before the winter, there is and will be a rapid increase in IS-K fighters because they will have the opportunity to gain money when joining to provide for their families.

Additionally, it is a researched fact that one of the main incentives for people to join extremist groups is economic hardships and poverty. For example, CNN reported an Afghan father selling his daughter in order to take care of the rest of his family. The money being offered to new recruits with or without experience is a huge reason for the increase in IS-K soldiers. Moreover, this is occurring while the Taliban cannot afford to pay their own soldiers. This tells us that the trajectory of the number of IS-K fighters in Afghanistan will increase because there is more money involved.

Looking Forward

With more and more attacks occurring, it is not senseless to expect even more. It will be important for international players and organizations to actively aid the civilians caught in the middle, who are being treated as collateral damage. There is a lot to be done in order to stabilize an increasingly fragile and hostile area. Relative peace is not on the horizon, but there must be steps in motion to aid in the facilitation of some sort of coordination in the nation.

in Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Stefan Bakumenko

The United Nations in Africa: Mali’s Challenging Future

The Long Road Ahead

The UN’s peacekeeping operation in Mali faces an uphill battle to stabilize the country, made even more difficult by recent events. The peace that this operation hopes to keep stems from a 2015 peace agreement between northern Tuareg and Arab rebels and the government of Mali. But the civilian government was deposed in an August 2020 coup, hampering mission goals and further destabilizing the country. This article highlights three challenges to the mission mandate and how best to respond to them. 

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in April 2013 by Security Council resolution 2100, has become the UN’s most dangerous current peacekeeping operation. To date, there have been 253 fatalities out of the 15,209 authorized personnel in-country. On April 2nd, four peacekeepers were killed and nineteen wounded in a direct assault on their camp in Kidal region. Significant challenges abound for this mission aiming to implement its transitional roadmap and seven-part mandate. Its main goal since June 2015 has been safeguarding and implementing an Algiers peace agreement signed between the government and the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA) rebel coalition. Further complications come from jihadist insurgents such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as brutal communal violence in central Mali. Understanding these hurdles, concrete strategies must follow. 

Dual Military Coups

The most immediate challenge facing MINUSMA’s mandate is the August 2020 coup, which saw the resignation of President Keïta and Prime Minister Cisse after they were detained by the Malian Armed Forces. On January 18th, 2021, the military junta’s transitional National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) was disbanded, with interim president Bah Ndaw supervising an 18-month transition back to civilian rule. This promise of civilian rule gave cause for optimism, but the second coup in late May saw the removal of Ndaw by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who also organized last year’s coup. Goïta has since become Mali’s new president while maintaining that elections and the release of Ndaw and his prime minister will eventually occur. 

Both coups have demonstrated the militarization of politics and the weakness of government legitimacy in Mali, and have significantly undermined item 2 in MINUSMA’s mandate; to support “national political dialogue and the electoral process.” Though protestors before and during the first coup had been calling for Keïta’s resignation due to economic woes and ongoing violence, a coercive resolution to an unpopular administration undermines national stability. Credibility has been damaged twice now among key allies of both Mali and MINUSMA, with the African Union (AU) suspending Mali twice, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposing sanctions for the first coup, the United States cutting off military aid, and the UN Security Council condemning the military’s actions all throughout.

Close coordination with the government in Bamako is required for MINUSMA’s continued operation. Mission policymakers have the unenviable task of cooperating with the self-preservationist military regime while simultaneously upholding item 1’s ideals of “constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” The strategy moving forward must be one of continued pressure on and agreement with Goïta’s government on the timeline and specifics of a transfer back to civilian rule. The real power brokers in Mali must be identified and engaged, and the UN must not be satisfied with easy promises from the military. Together with AU, EU, and US partners, MINUSMA’s liaisons must extract from the military firm dates for elections and guarantees that they will be “inclusive, free, fair, and transparent,” as per the mandate.

Protection of Civilians

Alongside the tragic loss of 253 UN peacekeepers since 2013, MINUSMA has also witnessed a great deal of civilian casualties in areas outside of government control. Peacekeepers have been patrolling and expanding social services in these areas, in line with items 1 and 3 of the mandate; supporting “reestablishment of State authority throughout the country” and “protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.” But as peacekeepers navigate deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes, the multitude of violent actors, vast expanses of contested land, and complicated communal dynamics have allowed thousands of civilian casualties to slip through their fingers since 2013. Atrocities and possible war crimes have been well documented, further driving a wedge between hostile communities in central Mali. This continued violence against civilians undermines mission legitimacy and the 300+ development projects it has carried out.

Protecting civilians is often an issue of policing. Protecting them from separatists requires greater policing of the vast, contested northern regions, while population centers must be protected from jihadists. Communal violence in central Mali must be lessened by policing the boundaries between feuding communities. The number of police on mission should be increased, as MINUSMA has a 13-2 split of soldiers and police. More importantly, peacekeepers should step up technical assistance and recruitment drives for local police; this is a classic method to build peace and is included in the mandate. 

A new, complex frontier in peacekeeping

The final challenge concerns a relatively important shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine. Of sixteen active UN missions, MINUSMA is the only one authorized to conduct counterinsurgency. Its mandate allows it to use “all necessary means… [to] deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” Resolution 2164, an update to the mission, identified “asymmetric threats” as spoilers of peace; military jargon for insurgent groups. This has created challenges on the ground and great debate in the policy world. Strategically, peacekeepers appear not to have been deployed to keep the peace, but to reach peace through force, conducting counterinsurgency alongside France and the G5 Sahel (soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Tactically, counterinsurgency requires specialized training and equipment, two things that are far from standardized or even guaranteed in the UN system. Mission effectiveness is hampered by the unique challenges and confusions presented by this dissonance between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. And with France recently announcing the end of its eight-year campaign in the Sahel, now is the time for MINUSMA to take up the mantle with clear and confident policy.

Any good counterinsurgency must clearly lay out its strategy. An understanding of the insurgents and of one’s own capacities is essential in choosing how to train soldiers and allocate resources. The 9 experts on-mission and 514 staff officers need a proper division of labor and understanding, including programs for intelligence, search-and-destroy, and public relations. All of this can only come from a unified, top-down doctrine. That is why this new arena for UN peacekeeping needs a field handbook that systematically demarcates tactics and limitations of action. This also lowers MINUSMA’s high death rate: training troops not for pitched battles but for countering IEDs and ambushes is vital, as argued by former mission commander Michael Lollesgaard.

Overall, much needs to be done. Two coups in under a year, the protection of civilians, and counterinsurgency strategy must be addressed through diplomatic pressure, increased police efforts, and tactical guidance, respectively. Relative peace is not on the immediate horizon, but these strategies will push the situation in Mali in a constructive direction.

 

in Africa / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments
 by Rise to Peace

The Islamic State of Khorasan and the Afghan Peace Process

The recent attack on the girl’s school in a Hazara neighborhood warrants discussion concerning the threat of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack that killed 85 and wounded over 100. However, IS-K has conducted similar operations in the past. The Hazara Shia are particularly threatened because IS ideology considers them to be more problematic than foreign actors. The group challenges the implementation of the delicate peace process between the Taliban and Afghan government. IS-K can also strain trust within the Taliban as more radical factions join the group to continue a successful insurgency. Due to the challenges of controlling territory, more civilian attacks are likely as the group struggles to maintain relevancy amid the American withdrawal. Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will also serve as a recruiting bed for the group to make inroads in the border region. The future of the Afghanistan after US troops leave is unclear, but IS-K may unify Taliban and government forces against a shared threat. To understand where IS-K fits into Afghanistan’s recent history, we must explore its beginnings.

IS-K History

Like other IS franchises, IS-K gained disaffected members of other terror groups. These groups operated autonomously until several high-ranking Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. These initial defections created a domino-effect of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan joining the group. IS’s increasing notoriety in Iraq and Syria catalyzed its expansion. The Taliban and IS-K eventually declared war on each other because of ideological differences and competition for resources. From its stronghold in Nangarhar province,, IS-K began a campaign to overrun Taliban positions to consolidate its power. At one point, it controlled over one-third of the province. By 2015, the group began losing popularity because of its policies banning poppy cultivation and harsh interpretation of Sharia Law. Taliban, US, and Afghan offensives have weakened IS-K control over Nangarhar. Despite this, the group has responded with horrific suicide bombings on minorities and election centers around the country. Although it has little support in Pakistan, TTP defectors in the group have utilized Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus to increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan. 

Challenge to the Peace Process

Although IS-K is a mid-level threat in Afghanistan, it still poses challenges to the implementation of a peace settlement, fostering trust between the Taliban and Afghan governments, and maintaining 2-decades of progress for women and minorities. For radical Taliban who disagree with peace negotiations, IS-K represents an alternative in order to continue their campaign against the central government. They will not negotiate a settlement, especially if the opponent approaches defeat. Tragic attacks on minority communities like Hazaras and Sikhs, women, and schools undermine public confidence in the government to maintain safety. Little faith in government motivates Afghans to join terror groups as well. These attacks reduce trust between the government and Taliban leaders if the latter provided support to IS-K. Although the two groups are technically at war, IS-K attacks provide Taliban leadership plausible deniability when they conduct attacks on security forces or “illegitimate” institutions. The recent attack on a girls’ school highlights the danger of losing hard-fought gains. The resilience of these institutions is unclear, but these attacks will quicken their deterioration. If a group threatens political rights, a civil war between ethnic militias jostling for influence could occur. A disenchanted public could prevent Afghanistan from overcoming its challenges and reaching its economic and social potential. Education is important to increase mobility and de-radicalize, but Afghanistan’s decades-long problems will persist without addressing these concerns. 

Future Cooperation

The sincerity of the Taliban in peace negotiations is debatable, but IS-K presents an opportunity to fight a mutual threat. Beyond prisoner exchanges, the two parties do not trust each other. However, cooperating on this issue could set the foundation for greater security cooperation in the future. It would also mitigate radicalization concerns because people will not join extremist groups out of concern for safety. Here, the government will cooperate with an extremist group to counter an even greater threat. Like Afghanistan in the 1980’s, both sides must put aside differences to defeat a common enemy that complicates their negotiations. After each group deal with the external threat, a compromise in achieving their respective goals in Afghanistan becomes possible.

Link for Photo

مركز المستقبل – Is ISIS-Khorasan Province Seeking to Consolidate its Role in Afghanistan? (futureuae.com)

in Afghanistan / Rise to Peace blog 0 comments