China

India
 by Rise to Peace

Insurgency in India’s Northeastern Frontiers

The far northeastern frontier of India is infamous for insurgent activities which have been functioning for decades. The region is notorious for hoarding numerous insurgent outfits. With 13 active insurgent groups in Manipur alone, and with over 14 factions within the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in Nagaland, violent faceoffs between the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) and insurgents are frequent. Hence, the region has been marred as a sensitive location for India’s national security.

The region serves as a strategic geopolitical location for India and its neighboring countries, such as China, and has continued to serve as a strategic gateway for insurgents to carry out their activities. Accordingly, the IAF had been tackling not only the insurgents, but the Chinese troops as well, the Doklam incident is one of such encounters. In addition, the insurgents have operated between countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, and others, by setting up camps, hideouts and training centers.

Coupled with cross-border insurgencies and China’s geopolitical interest in the region, India’s national security measures were intensified by maximizing military presence and enacting stringent laws throughout the region. However, insurgent activities continue to thrive despite the counteractive measures taken by the Indian government.

Northeast Insurgency and China’s Impact

On November 13th, 2021, Colonel Viplav Tripathi, his wife, their six-year-old son, and four other personnel were murdered by insurgents from the Northeast. Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) took responsibility for the attack.

The attack was linked to smuggling cases in Mizoram where Colonel Tripathi had been in command and was curtailing the insurgents from carrying out their activities; this was likely the motivating factor leading the insurgents to assassinate Colonel Tripathi.

All the while, China had been accused of backing the insurgent groups since the responsible militants were suspected to have had connections with the Chinese PLA. This is supported by past instances where certain militants were apprehended and admitted to their connections with the Chinese.

China has frequently been accused of training and arming the insurgent groups in the Northeast. This goes as far back as the preformation of the NSCN, when the Naga homeland movement was sustained and led by the Naga National Council through the Naga Home Guards. The medelling of the Chinese in India’s internal affairs has been an age-old concern for India ever since the Sino-Indian war took place in 1962.

Recently, reports have indicated that China still has close ties with the NSCN and other regional groups by providing arms and ammunitions. This continues amid the ongoing peace talks between the insurgents, namely the NSCN-IM, which is one of the most prominent groups amongst the insurgents in the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s northeastern frontiers are often viewed as a ‘gateway’ to Southeast Asia; however, with the ongoing insurgency and the tense Sino-Indian relations developmental prospects are often curtailed. Hence, it demands India’s persistent effort in paving the path towards bridging not only India, but also the rest of the global south with Southeast Asia. This, however, needs to be done through India’s adherent commitment and consistent effort towards the Naga political dialogue.

This can occur by addressing the political will of the insurgents and by bringing all of the insurgent groups under one unified umbrella. Given, that the Northeast’s insurgency is political in nature, accordingly, it should be addressed in a political manner. By which, the approach should encompass less use of force and stringent laws such as AFSPA and more developmental approaches and peaceful mediation with the insurgents.

If the insurgency can be addressed and a political solution can be met, New Delhi can gain the confidence of the people from the region. This can further secure India of its border tensions with China by actually affirming its territorial integrity through the voice of the people.

 

Vetilo Venuh, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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 by Arman Sidhu

Progress or Plight?: CPEC & Baloch Separatism in Pakistan

With a valuation pegged between $50-60 billion USD, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, most commonly referred to as CPEC, presents Pakistan with one of its greatest developmental opportunities in the country’s 73-year history. Despite US backing during the Cold War, and early economic liberalization efforts in the 1980s, Pakistan’s economy has floundered in the era of globalization in large part due to two tenets that remain extant today: ubiquitous insecurity and political instability between the state’s civilian and military authorities

While much of South Asia has seen its political and economic clout grow in international relevance over the past three decades, Pakistan has lagged its regional neighbors on a number of socioeconomic indicators. In addition to the growth witnessed in India, the likes of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal have also eclipsed Pakistan in average GDP growth over the past 5 years. Chronic debt woes have compounded problems related to tax revenue collection, a dearth of foreign direct investment (FDI), and soaring unemployment that has increased nearly fivefold over the last decade.

Nevertheless, much of Pakistan’s economic revitalization ambitions remain pinned on the projects that comprise CPEC’s portfolio, most notably the construction of overland and maritime transport networks, coupled with the urgent need for quality energy infrastructure. Financed by a mixture of Chinese loans and Sino-Pakistan joint ventures, CPEC’s success is not only a priority for Pakistan but a crucial harbinger of China’s vaunted Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) that promises to scale similar initiatives throughout Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Such improvements, if implemented, will undoubtedly alter the commercial landscape within Pakistan. However, given the poor quality of Pakistan’s institutions and the present power dynamics that favor the country’s military and security establishment, CPEC’s fruition depends on far more than capital or manpower. The country’s chronic security woes continue to hinder developmental efforts in all 4 provinces, with the province of Balochistan, Pakistan’s poorest province, particularly salient for the viability of CPEC’s construction and operating efforts.

In addition to being one of 2 Pakistani provinces with a coastline, Balochistan’s abundance of natural resource wealth figures prominently into CPEC’s plans. The maritime port of Gwadar, located in Balochistan, is seen as a linchpin for CPEC given its proximity to markets in Central Asia as well as Iran, with which the province shares a border.

Yet, Balochistan’s restive history with separatism remains a considerable threat, not just to the port of Gwadar, but to all CPEC projects within its provincial borders. A perfunctory review of conflict history in Balochistan offers a microcosm into a similar group of issues that defined, and continue to inform, political challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The gradual accession of the province to Pakistan in 1947-1948 by princely rulers has since been complicated by the intricacies of tribal politics, the desire for autonomy from central authorities, and the preservation of ethnic identity, in a fashion not too dissimilar to other regional areas of contention like Kashmir. Attempts to channel these grievances in the Baloch context has largely relied on engaged conflict with the Pakistani military.

At present, active armed groups in Balochistan view CPEC as an attempt to further relegate ethnic Balochs to an inferior economic, political, and social position in Pakistan. The significant involvement of the Pakistani military in the management of CPEC has confirmed such sentiments in the eyes of Balochs, who have subsequently targeted military convoys, the Karachi Stock Exchange, and even Chinese workers, who have filled the majority of CPEC jobs as per the financing arrangements cinched between Pakistan and China. The extraction of Balochistan’s natural resources has further irked militant groups, who claim the resources should be harnessed to generate Baluchi wealth instead of benefiting Pakistani or Chinese entities.

Much of the ire expressed by these groups view the Pakistani government as representing the agenda and interests of the Punjabi population, whom make up over 40% of Pakistan’s total population. Once more, regional parallels can be seen in the accusation of Punjabi majoritarianism, whether through the religious brand of Hindutva in India, or through latent anti-Pashtun sentiment in Afghan provinces that have a sizable population of minority ethnic groups. Following its inception, CPEC had and continues to be widely heralded by the civilian government as an opportunity to reinvigorate industrial activity to generate jobs, tax revenue, and improve the provision of public services. Yet, the opacity surrounding CPEC’s financing terms, tenders, and job growth has yet to enact the transformational change

Thus far, kinetic efforts by the Pakistani government to resolve the insecurity has led to accusations of human rights abuses by the military, which controls much of the oversight bodies and exerts significant influence on the project when compared to provincial, or even federal, civilian authorities. Pakistan’s characterization of the Baluch separatist movement tends to concentrate on allegations that Baluch militants enjoy political and financial backing from India, dismissing genuine grievances and regarding their actions as a foreign plot to subvert the nation-state.

Given CPEC’s stature and the strategic value of Balochistan, attacks by Baluchi militants are likely to go unabated in the absence of reforms that address the demands delineated by both armed and non-armed organizations based in Balochistan. By incorporating more local participation by Balochs, either through dialogue and/or job quotas in the CPEC initiative, both Pakistan and China can begin to allay these concerns before they escalate and evolve into a full-scale conflict, a scenario that portends less progress, low growth, and high insecurity for all Pakistanis.

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 by Arman Sidhu

A Road to Everywhere: Afghanistan’s Role in the Belt and Road Initiative

Nearly seven years after it was first announced, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to endure a barrage of setbacks that have called into question the feasibility of President Xi Jingping’s signature economic plan. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, criticism of the BRI included accusations of “debt trap diplomacy”, environmental concerns, and the lack of benefits for local populations in the form of no-bid contracts and job opportunities.

Furthermore, among the defining moments of the BRI’s short history was the fallout associated with Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, a maritime port that was largely constructed and financed by China. At a cost of nearly $1.5 billion USD, the port struggled to generate the level of financial return needed to service the debt to China. With few options available, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to enter an agreement with a partially state-owned Chinese firm, which granted the company a 99-year lease on the port, essentially ceding Sri Lanka’s control and day-to-day management of the port.

The Hambantota debacle has increased the level of scrutiny paid toward other BRI projects, which span parts of Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America. Yet, for many developing nations, the BRI presents an intriguing opportunity to access the requisite financing to establish and upgrade infrastructure networks.

For a landlocked country like Afghanistan, overland infrastructure remains a core priority within the government’s economic agenda. Incessant conflict has eroded what was once Afghanistan’s natural advantage: its geographic location. By constructing transportation networks, such as roads, railways, airports, etc., Afghanistan would be well-positioned to benefit as a conduit for transporting physical goods and natural resources in a region that features some of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Thus far, attempts to include Afghanistan in the BRI have been frustrated by the vagaries of the country’s internal conflicts. The results of the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban will provide investors, donors, and state entities with the necessary signals and guidance needed before launching additional economic programs in or near territories contested or controlled by the Taliban.

In particular, the Sino-Afghan Special Railway Transportation project is one of a handful of infrastructure initiatives that could bolster Afghan exports of minerals and agricultural products to China, via Central Asia. The ability to transport high-value input commodities, such as copper and rare-earth elements, safely and securely, is crucial to China’s decision-calculus when choosing where to invest in Afghanistan.

Supplementing the BRI is the “Made in China 2025” plan, which envisions Chinese production evolving toward advanced industries like semiconductors, which necessitate consistent access to a specific set of raw materials, many of which Afghanistan is heavily endowed with.

A favorable outcome in the peace talks with the Taliban could also extend Afghanistan’s BRI participation to its southernmost regions, where it shares a border with Pakistan. As one of the more active nations in the BRI, Pakistan has pinned its hopes of economic revitalization through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a microcosm of the broader BRI strategy.

Valued between $50-$60 billion USD, CPEC’s portfolio of massive infrastructure projects includes power and transport projects, the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs), and Gwadar Port, the deepest seaport in the world. Extending Afghanistan’s connectivity with CPEC projects would be pivotal to expanding export destinations for Afghan goods. This in turn could create a productive business climate in Afghanistan, one that is conducive for job creation and economic diversification away from subsistence agriculture.

However, reversing Afghanistan’s status from a bottleneck to a transit hub will involve far more than the accession of policymakers in Kabul or Beijing. The looming question regarding the prospect of lasting peace is still the greatest hurdle in Afghanistan’s reconstruction plans. The Taliban’s tendency to intentionally target infrastructure or other foreign projects has given pause to plenty of investors in sectors like oil & gas, construction, and mining.

Even if peace can be attained, the track record for foreign investment in Afghanistan is littered with corruption, graft, and cronyism as a consequence of poor institutional capacity. In addition, other stakeholders and key Afghan partners such as the United States and India continue to view the BRI with suspicion, and the prospect of a trilateral partnership between Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan is likely to arouse concern.

Lastly, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the appetite for Chinese-led investment has hit a significant snag. Local attitudes toward the BRI have become polarized, and vocal opposition has risen as a consequence of China’s lending practices, which are often characterized as predatory, and its management of projects on the ground, which have gained a reputation elsewhere for environmental destruction, forced relocation of residents, and an unwillingness to engage local contractors and/or labor.

In an optimal set of circumstances, Afghanistan’s BRI projects could help restart growth and diffuse benefits to the local population. Yet, given the murky track records of both the BRI and Afghan investment at-large, the consequences of overpromising and underdelivering could enable greater unrest, without providing tangible benefits for the broader Afghan population.

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 by Jack Ryan

What Does a Chinese Invitation to the Taliban Mean for Afghan Peace Talks?

In a sudden development, China invited the Taliban to a two-day intra-Afghan peace conference in Beijing. This is a peculiar development as Beijing demonstrated little interest towards the prior peace process and Afghans remain critical of any potential for peace with the Taliban. Peace talks resumed weeks ago in Islamabad, Pakistan, however, the addition of Chinese interests reflects the international nature of what is at stake with stability in the region.

The Taliban publicly announced that they would travel to Beijing to initiate another round of peace talks.  Suhail Shaheen, a Taliban political spokesman, said on September 23 that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s co-founder, met with Chinese diplomats in Doha, where the group has a political office.

This is concurrent with information received by Rise to Peace. A source from Kabul stated that there will be another round of talks with the Taliban soon. They expressed that,

[pullquote]“It’s going to be different to before, stating that the conditions of peace would be different now. Thus, it would appear that the Taliban are open to a new round of peace talks, but not only with the US.”[/pullquote]

China’s abrupt involvement in the Afghan peace process will undoubtedly impact the US counter-terrorism strategy in the region. Recent visits to Afghanistan by United States Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Defense Secretary Mark Esper already reveal the differences of opinion offered by US foreign policy decision-makers.

Trump’s growing impatience with the presence of American armed forces still entangled in the Afghan conflict — fueled by the 2020 presidential election — is matched by Pelosi’s urgency to maintain a presence in the region. Pelosi counters that US troops are needed for the sake of stability and the possibility that Afghanistan might return to its previous role as a haven for terrorism.

Despite multiple stakeholders in the Afghan conflict — including multi-national organizations and numerous nation-states — China’s active interest in the region reveals the vast reach of regional instability and as a result, could provide an alternative to the peace talks that have already failed.

Beijing has cooperated with Kabul over the years in regard to economic development and trade, therefore Chinese interests in a stable Afghanistan are easily identifiable. As one of the co-heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China — along with Russia — considers Afghan concerns as innate to discussions on security in the Central Asian space. It is logical that they would pursue a proactive stance in regard to inviting the Taliban for peace talks, as well as meetings with Chinese diplomats, due to ongoing diplomatic efforts between the two states.

Mainstream media coverage of Afghanistan has faded since the end of a turbulent election period and the rise of conflict along the Turkey-Syria border. However, July 2019 witnessed the highest number of civilian casualties that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has ever recorded in a single month. The third quarter of this year saw an unprecedented spike in civilian casualties, with 1,174 civilian deaths and 3,139 injured.

It appeared that a revival of peace talks between the United States was possible last week despite hostile rhetoric between the two camps and an increase in violent attacks. Zalmay Khalilzad, the top US envoy for Afghan reconciliation, met with the Taliban in Pakistan. Each side is alleged to have discussed confidence-building measures that could include a possible prisoner swap or a reduction in violence to help with the peace process.

The EU Perspective 

Tadamichi Yamamoto, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, has decried “the tragic uselessness of such death in the face of widespread recognition that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.” His words were echoed by Khalilzad and EU envoy Roland Kobia, among other representatives from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations. All acknowledged that “a sustainable peace can only be achieved through a negotiated political settlement.”

Aftermath of US-Taliban Peace Talks Collapse

The breakdown of talks between the US and Taliban earlier this year led both pro-government troops as well as other insurgencies within the region to step up attacks. Last week, Afghan forces performed a clearing operation in Baghlan province.

The operation took place in the areas of Dand-e-Shahabuddin, Dand-e-Ghori and the Kela Gai areas where at least 16 Officers were killed. A Ministry of Defence spokesperson justified the military action by citing previous successes in which dozens of Taliban insurgents, including commanders and shadow district governors, had been killed during operations in Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces.

US-Afghan Relations  

Given the nature of the relationship between the US and Afghan security forces, it is clear that the US was aware of the provincial ‘clearing’ campaigns and likely provided support. This emphasizes their stance as being currently committed to military action in the region despite the fact the Pentagon released a plan for an abrupt Afghan withdrawal. Officials cautioned, however, that the planning is a precaution and there is currently no directive from the White House to pull American troops out of Afghanistan.

Taliban Military Action

In addition to US and Afghan government military action, the Taliban have also increased attacks. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, confirmed in a statement that fighters used a large truck packed with explosives in an attack near a police headquarters, leaving dozens of Afghan security forces dead and wounded. The attack occurred during a relative lull in violence in the post-presidential election period that saw a surge in attacks by the Taliban, who denounced the vote as a sham. Severe attacks continue as sixteen police officers were killed in attacks on security checkpoints in Northern Kunduz province this week.

US-Taliban Relations

The New York Times reported that “a news website with deep access to senior Taliban officials reported that Mr. Khalilzad had met “repeatedly” with the Taliban during his time in Islamabad,” suggesting it was more than one meeting. This, in addition to the EU/UN urging immediate steps to reduce violence and civilian casualties, resulted in a call for a ceasefire while intra-Afghan peace talks take place.

Peace Talks vs Violence: The Challenges Facing the New Afghan Government 

The Taliban and the Afghan government remain in a cycle of violence where one attacks and the other retaliates, sometimes with foreign support. This continues to happen despite demands for peace from Afghan civilians, hints towards resolution from the Taliban, US interests and now China in favor of the resumption of peace talks.

The key factor influencing the cycle is the lack of intra-Afghan dialogue. Talks between the Taliban and the US did not lead to discussions between the Ghani administration and the Taliban. Therefore, it could be argued talks produced little progress, if it all, and the two remain more divided than ever. This is a result of the state of limbo faced by the government as they await the results of the September 2019 election.

Engaging in dialogue with the Taliban will be one of the major challenges facing the victors of the Afghan presidential elections. However, it is integral that such lines of communication are opened to maintaining peace in Afghanistan whilst allowing a US withdrawal.

As China readies itself to engage, President Trump remains confident in his relationship with Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, and in the ability of the Pakistani government to play a positive and productive role in the negotiations between the United States and Taliban stakeholders.

Conclusion

As Afghanistan awaits the results of the September election, it will be crucial for political parties to ensure they are represented at the Beijing talks and in any potential talks between the US and the Taliban. This ensures that the winning party is able to open up direct discussions between the government and the Taliban.

However, if efforts in Beijing or with the US are successful — subsequently transitioning to intra-Afghan dialogue — the US must maintain a presence and military support in the region, as peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government does not necessarily mean peace for the other 21 active terror organizations in the region. Afghanistan’s fragility due to terrorism means that foreign support for counter-terrorism campaigns remains crucial for the foreseeable future.

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 by Billy Baker

China’s Perspective on Ethnic Detention: The Ends Justifies the Means

Source: BBC (Dabancheng, April 2018)

While not broadly reported, the detention of Uighur Muslims in China has developed into what BBC reporter John Sudworth Calls “one of the most pressing human rights concerns of our age”. Reports emerged in 2017 that China was operating a system of internment camps for Muslims in Xinjiang. This began after the adoption of “Regulations on De-extremification”, which banned the following: growing an “abnormal” beard, wearing a veil or headscarf, regular prayer, fasting or avoidance of alcohol, or possessing books or articles about Islam or Uighur culture. Since then it has been estimated that at least one million Uighurs (as well as some other foreign citizens) into what China has labelled as “vocational education” camps, where they are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese and Communist party rhetoric. Those sent to the camps have no legal right; they have no access to lawyers are not subject to a trial.

After growing criticism of these detention camps, China is presenting the detention of Muslim citizens as a contribution in the fight against terrorism internationally. The topic came up recently when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Friday. The Chinese foreign ministry published the following in part of its account of the meeting: “China has the right to take antiterrorism and de-extremisation measures for safeguarding national security. The Saudi side respects and supports that and is willing to strengthen cooperation with China.”

The fear based tactic of detaining individuals specifically due to ethnicity has led to countless atrocities throughout history. There has been growing international criticism of the camps, specifically from UN panels, Turkish and Malaysian politicians, and Muslim civic groups. Despite this, there is evidence that these camps are steadily growing in population. It is unlikely that this issue will be resolved any time soon.

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