Terror’s New Form

Source: The East African (2014)

Author: Caleb Septoff

Perhaps one of the greatest scientific achievements in human history is the invention of the internet, which landmarked the beginning of the digital age in the modern era. Its uses span multiple fields and in large part is responsible for the high levels of rapid globalization we have become accustomed to today. Although it has improved humanity in many facets, it has also led to the increase in the susceptibility of nations’ and individuals to cyber-attacks. The internet has evolved over the last decade with the inception of social media and cyber currency, but with this evolution comes a new wave of terrorism in the form of cyber-attacks, propaganda, hacking, and online recruitment. The threat has grown substantially – enough for even university institutions, namely New York University (NYU), to offer cyber security majors and courses solely to deter these types of attacks.

Before venturing into the subject of digital terrorism, it is important to explore something less widely known to the average internet user; this being the deep web and dark net. The internet is composed of two main points of access; the surface web and the dark web. The surface web is most common to everyday users and comprises mainly of search engines, like Google and Bing, and the information found is unrestricted. Comparatively, the deep web differs mainly in size, estimated at four to five hundred times bigger than the surface web, accounting for 90% of the internet. In comparison to the surface web, the wealth of information stored on the deep web is gigantic. Most of the deep web is restricted by applications, which grant access to databases or password protected sites. Anything from social media, such as Facebook or Instagram, to online banking are considered part of the deep web. In addition to its size, the dark web differs  in its accessibility. Despite popular beliefs, the deep web and dark net are not synonymous. Rather, the dark net exists hidden below the surface web. The dark net is almost entirely unregulated and is even harder to access than the deep web. To date, the dark net hosts an unknown number of websites, but the content ranges from people sending messages who wish to maintain anonymity to underground drug dealing, sex trafficking, weapons dealing, and the focus of this article, terrorists and extremists’ sites.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh, was the first terrorist organization to truly maximize their outreach using the internet. When Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate, a wave of propaganda and recruitment media took social media by storm. While destructive, authorities and the companies themselves were able to mitigate much of the content since it took place on the more accessible surface web. However, the organization consistently found new ways to respond to authorities’ crackdowns. First, they began attracting people through social media and other corners of the surface web and then slowly moved them towards more difficult protected places like domains and chat rooms on the dark net. In addition, the use of messaging applications that offered heavy encryption, like Telegram, were core ways for them to communicate. The use of these cyber tools aided in attracting over 20,000 foreign fighters from more than 10 different countries to flock to Syria to fight on ISIL’s behalf, and even more followers aided the organization from remote positions around the globe. In early 2018, New York Times’ reporter, Rukimini Callimachi, released a podcast by the name of “Caliphate.” The podcast goes into detail about one Canadian man’s experience of being recruited through multiple steps, starting on social media and eventually moving into private chat rooms. Callimachi’s reporting highlights how effective ISIL’s extensive reach was, not only technologically, but by simply creating effective connections with people, especially the youth.

Thus far, terrorists’ groups have not been able to do much more than the defacement of webpages and execution of minor cases of hacking. For example, a series of attacks in 2015, all claiming ties to Daesh, were executed in various countries. Most notably, a self-titled group called Cyber Caliphate managed to hack Malaysia Airlines’ main website, deface the French TV5 broadcast station, and hack the US military Central Command’s YouTube and Twitter accounts. Technology is continuously growing and it gets more sophisticated every year. As greater attention turns to digital recruitment and terrorism, these “small” attacks will grow larger in scope and harm. The possibility of cutting electric to hospitals or inciting mass riots through the spread of false media is very real and dangerous. The need to find adequate responses to the rising dangers of cyber terrorism is crucial to the future of counter terrorism. Perhaps most conspicuously, the important question becomes how to best be proactive in thwarting attacks and rather than simply being reactive.

The international community has a plethora of different third-party watch dogs when it comes to war and terrorism, whether they come in the form of global entities like the United Nations (UN) or International Non-Profit Organizations (INGO). In addition, a multitude of international treaties and agreements exist to set standards for war and outline what is not acceptable. The Geneva Convention, one of the most important and widely known, is comprised of four treaties and three protocols that establish standards for humanitarian rights and treatment during times of war. Yet, something these organizations don’t cover adequately is how to respond to cyber warfare and digital terrorism. One of the greatest challenges in dealing with these online threats is attribution, or ascribing blame to those who have committed the crime and proving it. According to a RAND Corporation video on the subject, they identify three main types of attribution: political (dealing with diplomatic knowledge and political actors’ objectives), technical (IP addresses, log file analysis, etc.), and clandestine (classified information and political insights).

Categorizing makes it easier to decide how to interpret the crime and, thus, how to assign punishment. However, it is not simple to prove digital crimes without access to data that, for the most part, is private, anonymous and not easily tracked. Citizens’ right to privacy and the level of privacy that is entitled has become a topic of high contention in the debate for higher cyber security. Although these are difficult issues to deal with, the international community needs to step up and begin to take action before cyber warfare reaches a level with much higher stakes. Like the UN, there needs to be a large international organization that can specialize in cyber security and cyber terrorism. It would require the nonexistence of any political affiliation to be effective and act on behalf of any country that requires its services to increase its credibility. Perhaps, most important, would be its role in providing international laws on cyber warfare and attacks to clearly and concisely build a foundation or framework for security agencies to work from. It would also be responsible for developing the mechanisms for freedom of expression and privacy; although this would most likely fall to the specific countries rather than the independent watch dog organization.

Social media platforms have done relatively well at combing through their users and content to locate possible terrorist activities, but this is not enough. Further action needs to be taken regarding regulation. Systems need to be devised to adequately monitor both the surface web content and the deep and dark web to locate, deter and respond to these threats before they can implement harm to critical infrastructures, governments, businesses, and even the psyches of viewers. Creating measures to regulate data and prevent data mining for terrorist activities is crucial to preventing the attacks in the future. There is no easy answer to the rising threat of cyber terrorism and warfare, but it’s imperative that solutions and international cooperation begins sooner than later.

The Defeat of ISIS’s “Caliphate” Does Not Mean the Defeat of ISIS’s Ideology

What Does the Future Look Like for ISIS?

Though the international coalition in the war against ISIS has experienced more gains than losses over the past few years, by no means is the enemy defeated. However, ISIS remains a fragment of what it once was and its goals appear even more unattainable. ISIS will never fully disappear. Its ideology is just as dangerous as its fighters, and while fighters can be physically defeated, an ideology cannot. This is especially true in the era of the internet, where an entity does not need to control a territory and its people to espouse ideas and maintain a following. While ISIS, as a physical organization, may become greatly diminished to the point it seems non-extinct, radical extremist ideology will prevail.

Background

ISIS formed out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a splinter group of Al-Qaeda central that emerged after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and aimed to entice a sectarian war and establish a caliphate [1]. In 2006, AQI was rebranded as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). They held a large swath of territory in Western Iraq, but in 2008, U.S. troops and Sunni tribesman significantly degraded the group [2]. As the Syrian Civil War ramped up in 2011, ISI used this state of turmoil in which the government was distracted by rebel groups, to try and govern land, led by their Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi [3]. After U.S. combat forces withdrew, a vacuum was created that allowed the Islamic State to exploit the “weakness of the central state” and the “country’s sectarian strife” [4]. After growth in Syria, in 2013 the group began seizing land in Iraq leading to the adoption of the name Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [5].

In June 2014, ISIS seized Mosul and announced the creation of a caliphate. This move prompted military action from the U.S. in the form of Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Department of Defense, as of August 2017, the Coalition had conducted 13,331 airstrikes in Iraq and 11,235 airstrikes in Syria. As of May 2017, ISIS has lost 70% of the territory it controlled in Iraq in 2013 and 51% in Syria [6]. ISIS is rapidly losing its seized territory, and with it goes its dreams of a global caliphate.

Iraq and Syria: May 2017 (Source: theglobalcoalition.org)

Why Won’t Traditional Counterterrorism Work Against ISIS?

ISIS’s goal is to establish a caliphate and enact Sharia law. The counterterrorism tactics used against ISIS did little to degrade them initially. According to David Kilcullen of the book Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla, ISIS does not hide out in rural deserts like past terrorist groups; they live in urban areas amongst civilian populations. This means drone strikes are difficult because of the almost guaranteed collateral damage. Furthermore, killing leadership will not harm the group because of its cell-like structures. Attempts to cut off funding did very little to degrade the group because the land they held sustained them with oil fields, banks, and antiquities. Countering their propaganda remains difficult because young, susceptible men find the ideology incredibly inviting. Pure military strength has taken most of the physical caliphate away from ISIS, but their ideology remains and their ability to inspire attacks is an enduring threat. Thus, the answer to the question is such – traditional counterterrorism did not work against ISIS because ISIS is an insurgency, not just a terrorist group.

Will ISIS be Defeated?

According to Audrey Cronin, Professor of International Relations at American University, ISIS is not a terrorist organization; it is an insurgent group that uses terrorist tactics [7]. This is important to keep in mind when attempting to discover what the future may hold for ISIS, as well as figuring out what are the best ways to respond to the continued threat. It is still absolutely vital to respond to the terroristic aspects of the organization, but it is important to keep in mind that the end of terrorism does not mean the end of its other elements.

Cronin has explained six ways in which terrorism ends – success, failure, negotiation, repression, decapitation, and reorientation [8]. ISIS will not succeed in establishing a global caliphate; it has lost too much territory and it was never a truly achievable goal. It will not fail or self-destruct because it functions in a cell-like structure, so while one cell may struggle, another cell can still operate unaffected. Negotiation is not feasible as the group’s demands are simply too ludicrous. Decapitation, in which a leader is killed or arrested, will do nothing to degrade ISIS because, while Baghdadi is a powerful symbol and well versed in Quranic studies, he is just that; a symbol of the movement, but not a real leader [9].

SEAN CULLIGAN/OZY

Reorientation is how ISIS will end; they will transform into a different type of group. It is important to note that the end of terrorism does not mean the beginning of peace [10]. ISIS will no longer remain an insurgent group that uses terrorism as a tactic, but they will continue to pose a threat in terms of sporadic attacks via its cells. Daniel Shapiro, professor of International Affairs at Princeton, does not think ISIS “has significant prospects for renewed growth anywhere” but does agree that the threat of attacks do remain [11].

What Will Work Against Radical Ideology?

The threat of terrorism will never fully go away. Diminishing ISIS’s territory has hindered their ability to finance themselves, coordinate, and plan large-scale attacks. However, taking away their physical caliphate does not mean ISIS cannot continue to propagate on the internet in the form of a virtual caliphate. We cannot win a war on ideology with weapons. The threat of a global caliphate is no longer existent, but the dangerous ISIS-inspired mindset will remain. As Scott Atran argues in his book Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (un)Making of Terrorists, de-radicalization, just like radicalization, works from the bottom up, not the top down [12]. This begs for continued advancement of community programs, including those that stress education and reinterpreting theology, to ensure susceptible young men and women do not radicalize via the internet, as well as collective vigilance to stop homegrown attacks.

Sources:

[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/19/AR2007111900721.html

[2] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html

[3] The ISIS Apocalypse. William McCants 2016.

[4] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group

[5] http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html

[6] http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/maps_and_stats/daesh-areas-of-influence-may-2017-update/

[7] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group

[8] How Terrorism Ends. Audrey Cronin. 2009.

[9] http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/30/can-the-islamic-state-survive-if-baghdadi-is-dead/

[10] How Terrorism Ends. Audrey Cronin. 2009.

[11] https://www.princeton.edu/news/2017/10/20/shapiro-what-fall-raqqa-means-future-isis

[12] Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (un)Making of Terrorists. Scott Atran. 2010.