Boko Haram Archives - Rise to Peace

May 9, 2022 by Joan McDappa

Examining Militancy in Nigeria: Mistakes of the South and Lessons for the North

On June 25, 2009, then President of Nigeria, Umaru Musa Yaradua, made a proclamation granting amnesty and unconditional pardon to everyone who directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences, including those facing prosecution at the time, associated with militancy activities in the Niger Delta region. The requirement for this pardon to be effected was dependent on simply: the surrender of weapons and renunciation of militancy forms by concerned individuals at collection centres established for this purpose by the government. For about sixty days only, this proclamation stood valid, and in that time, over 20,192 individuals had accepted the terms of this amnesty offer.

In the same year, Boko Haram began an armed rebellion against the Nigerian government with multiple attacks across parts of northern Nigeria. Years later, Boko Haram became categorized as a terrorist group both in Nigeria and internationally, launching several attacks within Nigeria and neighbouring countries. For the last 12 years, Nigeria’s government steadily increased its responses to counter-terrorism, albeit widely perceived as counterproductive. More recently, the Nigerian government’s execution of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program raises questions about its effectiveness.

The Identical Problem

The Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency are two main threats Nigeria has dealt with since its independence in 1960; both cases led to significant economic losses. Although the ideologies behind the two conflicts differ, the basis on which these ideologies come to be is very similar. In both scenarios, there is an ongoing deprivation of some sort, whether it be a functioning system where communities have access to basic amenities, or perceived injustice and marginalization, resulting in grievances that then form the ideological structure of these groups.

For the Boko Haram insurgency, endemic corruption is often cited as a menace in the Northern region that deprives the communities of even the basic needs that the government should provide. Widespread unemployment, lack of primary health care, massive poverty, and a general absence of the State all served as drivers for Boko Haram’s campaign in the North, especially in attracting recruits.

Similarly, unemployment, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic and political marginalization are unfortunate realities that communities in the Delta region face, leading to overwhelming amounts of militant activities. Between 2007 and 2009, the agitations in the Delta region worsened so much that Nigeria recorded an estimated daily loss of $58 million. The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) was an attempt to salvage the economic crisis and deteriorating security situation in the region.

Lessons for the Nigerian Government

A decade after PAP, security in the Delta region seems to be taking a new turn with the high rise of illicit markets, such as oil bunkering, as a means of survival. The underlying issues that fueled agitation in the area remain; unemployment rates have worsened, the perceived marginalization is still very much present, and the environment continues to suffer. By and large, the goal of the Amnesty program was bound to fail the moment it didn’t prioritize addressing the grievances that led to the agitations in the first instance.

With the surrender of over 37,000 repentant Boko Haram members thus far, and the ongoing DDRRR program, one can only hope that there is a plan to address the underlying issues that have fueled the Boko Haram campaign to avoid a repeat of the situation in the Niger Delta. Presently, there is a worsening insecurity dilemma due to the noticeable rise in illicit markets in the northern region, including those not linked to Boko Haram. In effect, it may be the worst of its kind should the government fail to be deliberate in preventing a recurrence of the northern conflict.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

January 16, 2022January 16, 2022 by Joan McDappa

ISWAP’s Impact on Nigeria’s National Interests

More than half a decade ago, the now dominant faction in Nigeria’s conflict, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), split from Boko Haram, pledging allegiance to ISIS. Formerly led by the late Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the former Boko Haram leader and founder, Mohammed Yusuf, the group is said to have disapproved of Boko Haram’s extremist strategies.

Most of its attacks have targeted the Nigerian Army and its close allies. With a robust weaponry base, steady flow of funding, and exploitable societal gaps that aid its recruitment and expand its membership, ISWAP has successfully launched several attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

A Growing Threat

Recently, ISWAP resumed its quest to both overthrow and expand into Boko Haram’s territory in north-eastern Nigeria. Since 2016, both rival groups have clashed severely, often leading to many deaths of its members and innocent civilians. Over the years, these infightings occurred intermittently.

The recent fights in 2021 resulted in the death of several individuals, including the former Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. ISWAP’s conquest over the region seems to be on track, even with the killing of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and his successor Malam Bako by the Nigerian Army.

Until They Struck

ISWAP has long constituted a high risk to the ongoing conflict in north-eastern Nigeria. With a membership base that is more than double the size of Boko Haram’s and a strategy that appeals to the locals, one would expect that curtailing the expansion of ISWAP would be prioritised. Unfortunately, these expectations have remained unmet as the group continues its offensives against the Nigerian military.

In December 2018, ISWAP attacked a Nigerian military base in Baga, a town reclaimed by the Nigerian army in February 2015. On February 23, 2019, while Nigeria held its general elections, ISWAP launched its first-ever attack on Borno state’s capital, Maiduguri, firing rockets at military targets.

In December 2021, ahead of the Nigerian president’s visit to Maiduguri, ISWAP launched multiple rocket attacks in the city and neighboring towns, perhaps their way of informing the president that the war with ISWAP was far from over. The attacks spurred reactions from the government, as the president called for an emergency meeting with his service chiefs 24 hours after the rocket attacks. Stressing the need to be firm and proactive in the fight against terrorism, the president urged the service chiefs to ensure that terrorists, especially ISWAP, be left with no room to escape.

The Culture of Silence

Nigeria has seen several democratic administrations come and go, one common trait among all is a culture of silence. Some internal conflicts and crises in Nigeria usually start as a minor problem that receives little to no attention from the concerned authorities. Before long, these problems manifest into grave issues that overwhelm the government; it appears as though if the situation fails to disrupt government activities, it is less of a priority.

At its initial stage, the conflict in north-eastern Nigeria received little attention from the government. For a long time, what is now known as terrorism was not seen as a Nigerian problem but a minor northern problem; it took the disruption of activities in Abuja to provoke a response from the government. A similar trend occurred in the Niger Delta crisis, where a brief response only came after the country’s economy experienced a downward dive.

National Interests?

The safety of an impoverished citizen should mean as much as those in privileged and leadership positions. The culture of silence until resources and special interests are at risk questions the definition of the nation’s interests.

Although the concept of national interests remains ambiguous, whatever constitutes a nation’s interest should be collective and not individualistic. The culture of silence until a low-level issue is of consequence is dangerous and needs to change.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

January 9, 2022 by Joan McDappa

Ending Insurgency in Nigeria

October 1, 1960 was a significant moment in the history of Nigeria; finally, this nation would become an independent, self-governing entity. Accepted with a remarkable mix of hope and doubts, Nigeria set off on a journey that thus far has been characterized by many pleasant and unpleasant events.

Regrettably, the unpleasant events continue to reoccur on this journey, becoming a definitive part of Nigeria’s identity. One such event was the over-a-decade-long insurgency in the northeast. From 2009 until today, the expenses of the Nigerian government on defence are well more than six trillion Naira. Despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the country continues to face diverse threats from various groups, spiraling its development in a downward plunge.

Take Them Out?

“Those who are behind this insurgency will be taken out. They are being taken out one after the other, and it will get to a point that the last of them will be taken out, and then we’ll get to the end of it. It can be done within 17 months, that remains for this institution,” declared Femi Adesina, Media Adviser to the President of Nigeria.

The recent statement by Femi Adesina in response to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria is quite revealing. Interestingly, his view on taking the insurgents out to end the menace is not foreign to the government and has hitherto fueled its defence efforts.

Nothing short of an illusion is the premise that eliminating the insurgent group members is the solution to ending the bane of insurgency in the country. The current strength of the insurgency in Nigeria emanates from the same error of the government to eliminate members of the group in 2009. The lessons from the outcome of the government’s devastating error are still not learned, hence the repetition of the same failed strategy.

A Complex Situation

Considering the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria, it is not solely a matter of eliminating those behind it. Its sustainability thus far is mainly a function of the platform and the existing gaps in society it thrives on; so long as that platform exists, it is only a matter of time before another wave of insurgency awakens. Besides, the conflict in Nigeria is far too complex for the current proposed strategy.

The multifaceted nature of the insurgency poses a dire challenge to counterterrorism efforts. For instance, the famous terrorist group, Boko Haram, is highly defragmented with numerous cells, operating independently from various bases across Nigeria and other neighbouring countries in the West African region.

The continuity and the progression of Boko Haram’s operations and activities are clear indicators of the complexity of the problem. With the support and funding from other international terrorist groups, the activities of terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, in Nigeria continue to grow. Attempting to end insurgency in Nigeria without considering this essential aspect is more or less illogical.

The Way Out

The only way out of the problem Nigeria faces lies in a simple statement ascribed to the Chinese general Sun Tzu, “know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.”

Until Nigeria understands itself first and then its enemy, its efforts in achieving any progress in security and development will only meet setbacks. The weak structures and system failures are areas that the government must urgently monitor. The diversity of Nigeria, which underlies many of Nigeria’s conflicts, is a potential strength for its unity if rightly harnessed.

The insurgency in Nigeria feeds off the weaknesses and gaps present in the country. Identifying these gaps and sealing them off is key to ending the insurgency. The government must be wary in developing strategies to avoid conflict with other efforts. A take-them-out approach raises many questions on the purpose of governance and directly opposes the de-radicalization efforts that the government accords a high success rate.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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December 30, 2021 by Joan McDappa

Understanding the Drivers of Radicalization in Nigeria

Violent extremism in modern-day Nigeria dates back to pre-colonial days; from the far north to the deep south, historical records show the presence of violent extremism that lingered on to the colonial era and continues to date.

A unique point to bear in mind is the multifaceted nature of violent extremism, especially in Nigeria, where multiple criteria usually form the cause of extremism. Like many other closely linked concepts, defining extremism remains somewhat difficult, mainly owing to the varying perspectives of what may or may not be considered extreme.

Regardless of the existing disagreements in conceptualizing extremism, certain key factors appear to be comparable. Extremism is an ideological phenomenon that vehemently opposes a widely accepted, usually age-long, belief or perception, conceiving the views as wrong and seeking to replace them with a preferred alternative. Violent extremism is the attempt to fulfill extremism by an intended use of violence.

After the conception of an extremist ideology and subsequent goal, furthering that goal involves a process often referred to as radicalization or also known as a violent extremist social trend.

According to a UNHCHR Report, “the notion of ‘radicalization’ is generally used [by some states] to convey the idea of a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations.”

Violent Extremism and Radicalization in Nigeria

While violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, the recent phase of extremism, religious extremism, is not specific to Nigeria. It is, in fact, a global challenge that managed to find a footing in Nigeria and continues to gain ground, threatening security while also hampering development in the country and the entire region.

In Nigeria, the goal of extremist groups is to replace the present democratic system of government, which is viewed as Westernized, and thereby infringing on and directly challenging the tenets of their Islamic faith with a Sharia style of governance. Most proponents of this extremist view have, at one time or another, attempted to impose these views on other Nigerians, radicalizing as many as possible to join in the efforts to achieve their goal.

Boko Haram, which is more or less the face of terrorism in Nigeria, was inspired by such an extremist movement and continues to grow its base throughout the region. The majority of the members of extremist groups come from youth and children, both within and outside northern Nigeria. Researchers, stakeholders, and the government of Nigeria continue to seek to understand the factors that aid radicalization in Nigeria, and as expected, there is much confusion on the possible cause.

Ahmed and Many Others

Some schools believe that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures are drivers of radicalization in Nigeria. However, other schools object to this premise, as members of extremist groups also include wealthy, influential, and educated people. Besides, much of the population of Nigeria fall into these categories, yet they do not directly or indirectly support the extremist ideologies of Boko Haram.

Ahmed, an alias, is an illiterate Muslim youth from a poor background in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram had made attempts to recruit him, which he declined. During one of the many attacks and attempted forced recruitments by Boko Haram, Ahmed watched as his father was gruesomely murdered. Eventually, Ahmed found his way to the country’s capital, Abuja, where he began a new life as a bus driver, staying focused on living a peaceful and crime-free life. Like Ahmed, when many Nigerian youth face challenging conditions they continuously refuse to accept the extremist views forced upon them by extremist groups.

The Principle Driver of Radicalization in Nigeria

Regardless of the disagreements on the drivers of extremism in Nigeria, one key element that continues to resound in schools of thought is the government’s unintended role in fostering extremism. The failure of the government to execute its duties creates several conditions and grievances that enable extremist ideologies to thrive.

The government’s inappropriate response widens existing gaps, giving extremist groups a campaign tool and an added advantage to garner support from susceptible individuals. Beyond these factors is the state’s alleged role in aiding the longevity of extremist groups, like Boko Haram, by political actors, in hopes that they would garner public support.

Conclusion

Poverty, illiteracy, and a lack of religious teachings are not the cause of extremism in Nigeria, as some research claims. A survey by the Pew Research Centre showed that 94% of Nigerian Muslims hold a negative view of Boko Haram. Unfortunately, most assertions on the drivers of extremism are founded upon stereotypes fuelled by actors on and behind the scenes.

Ultimately, the principle driving force of extremism in Nigeria remains the state; and, many other push factors for individuals can be attributed to state failures.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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December 12, 2021 by Joan McDappa

Abubakar Shekau: His Many Deaths and Lasting Impact

Very little is known about Abubakar Shekau, the late leader of the group Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-jihad. The little we know is that he was a one-time deputy to Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the group commonly referred to as Boko Haram.

Following Yusuf’s execution by the Nigerian forces in 2009, Shekau assumed leadership until his death on May 19^th, 2021. In the almost 12 years of Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram witnessed a steady rise in global recognition, media attention, and publicly acknowledged partnerships with other international terrorist organizations.

Boko Haram’s activities significantly transformed over the years, including a change in its targets, the nature of its attacks, and the weapons it used. Year after year, the group’s choices and standards of weapons continued to improve and the question of funding became louder and more critical to decipher. Additionally, while Boko Haram’s recruitment strategy continuously evolved, it nonetheless continued to produce its desired results.

Regarding Shekau’s leadership, even though deeply flawed and occasionally challenged by top group members, it would be wrong for any counter-terrorism strategy to make light of the capabilities of such an individual.

His Deaths

Conceivably, the Nigerian government may not have thought too lightly of Shekau, due to their many attempts to eliminate him. Since 2009, the Nigerian military, on at least four occasions, declared Abubakar Shekau dead before being debunked by Shekau’s typical video statements.

With such back history, it was no surprise that many would question what may now seem accurate, the announcement of the death of Abubakar Shekau on May 19^th, 2021. Although, this time, the Nigerian military did not take credit for his death; rather, ISWAP, a rival faction, accepted responsibility for the events that led to his death, death by suicide.

Some have described the “mystery man” to be a psychopath and a joke. Regardless, Shekau remains an integral part of the group’s expansion. Psychopath or insane, joke or not, was he a dangerous person? Yes. Did he take advantage of the loopholes the Nigerian system graciously afforded him? Yes. Did he get what he wanted? Most definitely.

If his goal was to undermine the Nigerian military and destabilize the country as a whole, then Shekau found success. From influencing, whether directly or indirectly, the current violent crisis and criminalities on multiple fronts, the group’s desire is being fulfilled in the nation.

The growing unrest, much of which receives minute media coverage and security responses, is having a far-reaching effect on the entire nation. One of those many ways that is quite relatable is in the area of heightened food prices resulting from food scarcity.

A Hungry Nation

Northern Nigeria, which is home to numerous crises, such as farmers’ versus herdsmen, bandits, and kidnappers, is a key player in the agricultural sector and contributes significantly to the nation’s entire crop and livestock production output. Indeed, it is not beyond the expectation, that the Nigerian government highly prioritizes the region’s development.

The failure of the nation’s leadership to consider simply this grave consequence over the years has now put the entire nation in an avoidable struggle for daily survival. A more worrying knowledge is the projection of the hardship that awaits the country in the coming years.

In Conclusion

Unless something is done, and quickly, the present, increasing criminality among citizens will only be the tip of the iceberg. With the grave damages brought about by one “mystery man” and the ripple effect of the actions of Boko Haram, alongside the response or nonresponse of the Nigerian government, a greater problem awaits.

While the Nigerian government continues to do its best to deal with the multiple fixes, perhaps unmasking the man, the group, and the truth behind them all, may lay a solid foundation to winning this blind war against an unknown enemy.

Joan McDappa, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

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