Economic

Afghanistan’s Economic Crisis Means Rapid Growth for Terrorist Cells

On May 7, 2022, the Taliban enacted a measure stating that women must wear face coverings in public.  This is seen as yet another example in the long line of punitive restrictions on women and religious minorities by the Taliban.  This trend signals the Taliban’s lack of willingness to uphold human rights, which will result in the loss of remaining aid from foreign donors.  The World Bank previously suspended over $600M dollars worth of development projects, citing their obligation to women’s rights.  These cuts in funding come amidst a severe economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, with nearly 95% of families experiencing food insecurity, and mark the loss of one of last lifelines for Afghanistan.  These economic conditions are likely to accelerate the growth and capabilities of terrorist nodes operating in Afghanistan, primarily the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) and Al-Qaeda.

For both organizations, failed economic development creates a larger pool of young individuals that have very few alternative options, or nearly zero opportunity cost.  While this is not a direct predictor of terrorist action, these individuals are natural targets for radicalization.  It is expected that Al-Qaeda and IS-K will enjoy accelerated growth in the coming years, resulting in part from the higher volume of potential recruits.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, which has close relations with the Taliban, is also likely to build new training camps in Afghanistan.  These training camps, bolstered by more recruits, will increase the capabilities of Al-Qaeda.  While it is unlikely that Al-Qaeda is currently capable of an attack on the U.S. homeland, increased capabilities could lead to attacks on U.S. and Western targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, or Africa in the coming months.  U.S. intelligence agencies predict, under current circumstances, Al-Qaeda may be capable of an attack on U.S. homeland within one to two years.

Islamic State-Khorasan Province

IS-K, which is a sworn enemy of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, will receive the same overall increase in recruitment prospects.  However, economic conditions also contribute to increased dissatisfaction with the Taliban.  IS-K is likely to exploit this dissatisfaction and attract individuals that look to oppose the Taliban.  For example, some previous Afghan soldiers and intelligence professionals are turning to IS-K, the only armed group opposing the Taliban.  While the Taliban will apply pressure on IS-K, the organization is expected to grow rapidly.  By some estimates, IS-K has doubled in size in less than a year from two to four thousand operatives. They have already conducted more than seventy-six attacks against the Taliban this year, as opposed to eight the year before.  While an attack against the U.S. homeland is unlikely, an act against the U.S. or Western countries abroad is feasible, as evident by the bombing of Kabul Airport on August 27th.  U.S. intelligence agencies estimate, under current conditions, IS-K will be capable of an external attack on U.S. homeland in as little as one year.

Next Steps

Regardless of future U.S. policy in Afghanistan, each U.S. response suffers from a lack of intelligence in the region.  In an interview with the Associated Press Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said “we’re probably at about 1 or 2% of the capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan.”  The next step for counter-terrorism measures in the region is rebuilding the intelligence infrastructure necessary to monitor terrorist organizations.  This requires a two-pronged approach.

Firstly, The U.S. should reestablish connections with internal, anti-Taliban networks in Afghanistan. These contacts are key for confirming and generating intelligence on the location of terrorist cells, training camps, and activity.  With local partners, the U.S. will be able to conduct counter-terrorism action more effectively in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the U.S. should negotiate access to air-bases within neighboring countries.  These bases will help intelligence and surveillance gathering within Afghanistan.  This will also serve to compliment HUMINT efforts, allowing the U.S. to confirm on-the-ground intelligence.  This may require time and effort, but it remains a necessary step for effective counter-terrorism measures.

As the Taliban continues repression, isolating Afghanistan from the international community, the economic and humanitarian crisis continues to compound.  In this crisis, Al-Qaeda and IS-K are quickly growing their ranks and capabilities.  While both organizations’ capabilities do not yet match their ambitions of a U.S. homeland attack, U.S. intelligence agencies predict this may change within 12 to 18 months, barring intervention.  Without decisive action by the U.S. to rebuild intelligence and counter-terrorism infrastructure, the U.S. will be unprepared and in the dark for the next large-scale attack.

 

Rise to Peace Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

CIA

Looking Back: Al-Qaeda’s Unexpected Attack Against the Central Intelligence Agency

For a decade, an elite team of military and intelligence agents operated in secret around the world with one clear intention: to track down and kill Osama bin Laden. As the investigation into Bin Laden’s whereabouts progressed, it came to a critical and unexpected conclusion. The so-called “informant” assisting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials was an Al-Qaeda ally.

Due to this, Al-Qaeda achieved possibly its greatest success ever against the CIA and its Jordanian partner service on December 30, 2009. Seven CIA officers and one Jordanian officer were killed when a triple agent blew himself up at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a U.S. military base in Khost, Afghanistan.

So, who is the suicide bomber? He was a Palestinian whose parents had fled Beersheva during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, eventually settling in Kuwait. They became refugees once more in 1991 when the Kuwaiti administration evacuated the Palestinian community following Kuwait’s liberation from the Iraqis by an American-led coalition. Humam Khalil al-Balawi grew up in Jordan before moving to Istanbul, Turkey, to pursue his medical degree and marry a Turkish woman. When he returned to Jordan, he found a job bringing medical aid to the needy in the enormous Marka refugee camp.

The CIA agents working on this case were made to assume that the Jordanian doctor had entered Al-Qaeda as a double agent when he provided a video claiming that he had met Al-Qaeda’s senior leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But the truth is, he was a devoted follower of the Al-Qaeda ideology. It was all for show.

Jennifer Matthews, a mother of three and a desk-bound analyst, was the base leader in Khost. She was one of the agency’s top Al-Qaeda analysts, having spent years monitoring the most sought terrorist, Osama bin Laden, but Matthews was thought to lack field experience. In 1989, Matthews decided to join the CIA and was full of potential. A Capitol Hill employee who met Matthews overseas described her as “self-assured” and “able to blend into the atmosphere.”

The Error of the Operation

According to Matthews and other CIA officials, the doctor should be made to feel welcome and not searched. CIA officers formed a circle-like position to meet the “informant,” as seen in Zero Dark Thirty.

Furthermore, the Jordanian doctor was not stopped and searched before being taken to the facility. As al-Bawali stepped out of the car, he detonated his shrapnel-filled bomb in front of Matthews, Elizabeth Hanson, Scott Michael Roberson, Harold Brown Jr., Dane Clark Paresi, and Jeremy Wis, who were among those killed, in addition to Darren LaBonte.  It was also reported that several additional CIA officers were critically injured.

In a letter to CIA personnel in 2009, Barack Obama wrote that their deceased colleagues hailed from a “long line of patriots” who had already helped keep the country safe despite severe dangers. At that moment, President Obama recognized that the CIA had been put to the test “like never before,” since the 9/11 attacks.

Since the bombing of the CIA station in Beirut in 1983, the Camp Chapman attack has been regarded as the agency’s second-deadliest incident. In the Beirut incident, seventeen employees were killed. To summarize the issue, security standards failed because their treatment of al-Bawali was overly gentle.

The CIA officers used a desperate tactic in which they were deceived by false intelligence to obtain information. Again, the fact that they are stationed in a high-risk area serves as a reminder that, no matter how strong or poor their intelligence leads are, they must always put safety first.

Life of the CIA Agents

Jennifer Matthews worked as an analyst for the first seven years of her tenure at the CIA. Matthews was among those who digested intelligence delivered by someone else in the area and then examined what the CIA had acquired from it. She proceeded to the CIA’s counter-terrorist center in the mid-1990s, where she monitored al-Qaeda in a section of the agency that would see its prominence rise after the World Trade Center attack.

Scott Roberson was born on July 3, 1970, in Akron, Ohio, and relocated with his family to Tolland, Connecticut, where he promptly became an active member of the community. Roberson’s travels took him to a variety of countries and states, but regardless of where he was stationed, he was committed to serving his country and society. Working as a detective for the Atlanta Police Department, training police officers for the United Nations mission in Kosovo, safeguarding individuals working throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, and working as an officer for the CIA were among his professional responsibilities.

Darren Labonte served as a law enforcement officer in Libertyville, Illinois, and as a U.S. Marshal. According to his family, he achieved a leadership and shooting award at the FBI Institute in Quantico, Virginia, according to the FBI, and then went to the FBI’s New York district office. The CIA recruited him, and he withdrew from the Bureau in late 2006, moving to Washington, D.C. with his wife. His father was wary of the CIA, but his son always pursued his own path.

Elizabeth Hanson went through the CIA’s basic training at “The Farm” and was among a group of tech-savvy officers employed after 9/11. According to the book, Hanson was spirited as the CIA transitioned from a covert operation to one focused on tracking information on the web, over the broadcast media, or through advanced covert eavesdropping.

Harrold Brown Jr. was a former member of the United States military. He served in the Army as an intelligence officer and as a CIA case officer. When Harold was in town, he was the type of parent who always arrived at Mass when his kids were singing and smiling with delight at how much they could accomplish.

Dane Clark Paresi grew up in Portland and is a former Army Sergeant Major. Paresi matriculated from Marshall High School in Portland in 1982 and enlisted in the Army two days later, undergoing basic training at Fort Dix in New Jersey. As per family members, joining the Army and the CIA was a childhood dream come true.

Jeremy Wise was a former SEAL with eight years of experience who was assisting Operation Enduring Freedom with Xe Services. He completed Westside Christian School in El Dorado, Arkansas, and graduated from Hendrix University in Conway, Arkansas. He was a member of Virginia Beach’s Trinity Church.

The CIA Memorial Wall

“In commemoration of those members of the Central Intelligence Agency who gave their lives in the service of their country.” The Memorial Wall may be seen on the north wall of the lobby of the original headquarters building. The 137 stars on this wall serve as a silent, simple memorial to those CIA officers who have given their lives in the line of duty. The Memorial Wall was commissioned by the CIA Fine Arts Commission in May 1973 and sculpted by Harold Vogel in July 1974.

According to the CIA, “personnel who die while serving their country in the field of intelligence are honored on the Memorial Wall posthumously.” Death can happen anywhere, even in foreign fields and the United States. “Death may occur in the foreign field or in the United States. Death must be of an inspirational or heroic character while in the performance of duty; or as the result of an act of terrorism while in the performance of duty; or as an act of premeditated violence targeted against an employee, motivated solely by that employee’s Agency affiliation; or in the performance of duty while serving in areas of hostilities or other exceptionally hazardous conditions where the death is a direct result of such hostilities or hazards.”

CIA station agents work in both favorable and adversarial nations. When apprehended by an unfriendly nation, a CIA field operative acting clandestinely is typically regarded as a spy and is susceptible to imprisonment, prosecution, and even severe punishment. To not only nurture informants but also escape capture, a CIA spy must be skilled at integrating what the agency refers to as “people and street smarts.” CIA field agents have been imprisoned, tortured, and even executed in hostile territories or countries.

After all, it’s tough to work in a fast-paced workplace while maintaining the highest priority on the goal, which is to ensure people’s safety and security. The Camp Chapman incident served as a stark reminder to the general public that the CIA, and other intelligence officers from throughout the world, have a difficult job. People may think their jobs are “awesome,” but they are putting their lives on the line to give actionable intelligence in the best interests of their countries.

 

Kristian Rivera, Counterterrorism Research Fellow

United Kingdom

The State of Terrorism in the United Kingdom

Terrorism within the United Kingdom, over the past decade, has encountered many critical threats that have challenged its security. While the island nation is not unique in the threats it faces, it serves as a useful case study to analyze upcoming trends affecting its allies for the foreseeable future. By doing so, the United Kingdom and its allies can better understand emerging challenges and better support transatlantic security. To complete this aim, policymakers must investigate the history of terrorism within the United Kingdom and newer hazards to British society.

Challenges of the 20th Century

In the 20th century, one of the United Kingdom’s greatest threats was insecurity derived from Irish separatism threatening its territorial integrity. One of the earliest incidents of this insecurity occurred over a century ago during the Easter Rising of 1916. During this event, a coalition of Irish groups hoped to demand greater autonomy for Ireland while the United Kingdom was preoccupied with fighting the First World War. Although initially taken aback, British forces overwhelmed those involved in the rising. When the dust had settled, hundreds had died from the fighting and the event leaders were sentenced to death.

The Easter Rising would be a pivotal moment in Irish political history because it drew the Irish public’s support for their cause. Consequently, the rising would also inspire future generations of Irish separatists to use violence for a united Ireland.

The most infamous terrorist group which the Easter Rising would inspire was the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The group traces its heritage to the first organization to hold that name which fought the British Army during 1919. Ireland would be partitioned two years later and serve as a backdrop for the worst fighting between the IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups.

The IRA truly became infamous during the period known as the Troubles, which lasted from the 1960s to the 1990s. The sectarian violence claimed the lives of thousands and ended in signing the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The agreement created several integral institutions such as the Northern Ireland Assembly providing lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Critical Threats in the 21st Century

In the new millennium, the United Kingdom’s primary threat to their national security stemmed not from Irish separatism but from Islamic extremism. This was made clear after the July 7th London bombings which killed 52 civilians. For much of the 2000s, al-Qaeda was the group responsible for either perpetrating or inspiring attacks in the United Kingdom. However, this changed with the rise of ISIS, which grew in capability and resources to inspire attacks. By the end of the 2010s, ISIS garnered attention with the 2017 Manchester bombing.

During 2022, the United Kingdom still faces an acute threat from Islamic extremism, but it also faces a rising challenge from right-wing extremism. In January 2022, a 17-year-old in the United Kingdom was arrested on suspicion of wanting to commit violence against members of the Muslim community and kill thousands of others. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, stated that his agency is seeing young teenagers radicalized through the internet.

Policy for the Future

While the rise in right-wing extremism is not exclusive to the United Kingdom, it must understand the conditions causing this rise. In the present century, there has been a proliferation of technology designed to create a global public square and enable democratization of knowledge. Instead, the generations who have grown up with this technology have become increasingly isolated and have fewer friends than previous generations.

Many individuals have scoured the internet in search of companionship and comradery but instead are preyed upon by extremist groups who have grown in capacity to do so. Furthermore, the country which they find themselves in is also expected to become more ethnically diverse over the coming decades. Such conditions have compounded to create an environment rife for British youth to be wrangled into right-wing extremism.

To combat such developments, the United Kingdom should institute initiatives to alleviate the isolation which their youth face. The United Kingdom should also bolster its security through increased engagement in Northern Ireland and its domestic Muslim community; both areas could become sources of unrest.  Brexit and the increased capacity for ISIS recruitment efforts following the withdrawal from Afghanistan are both sources of increased unrest.

Moreover, they should also bolster their cybersecurity capabilities as competition will intensify in the coming decades. The United Kingdom will be subject to attempted penetrations in cyberspace by foreign governments to ascertain sensitive information. Should they back a harder line on authoritarian governments, there will also be efforts to weaken their resolve to do so. By taking initiative, the United Kingdom can be prepared for the upcoming years that will certainly present a challenge to their security.

 

Christopher Ynclan Jr., Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

9/11

This 9/11 Anniversary Brings Afghan War to the Forefront

9/11 is undoubtedly a tragic and disturbing act of terrorism on US soil, but it acted as a wake-up call for American policymakers at the same time. It is a logical conclusion that the horrible events of that day would not have happened had the US not walked away from the region once their interests were victorious after a prolonged proxy war against the Soviet Union (1979-1989).

After 19 years of conflict, Afghan negotiators headed to Doha for the intra-Afghan dialogues, an initiative started by the United States as they act as the catalyst between the two warring parties- the Taliban and the Afghan government being the most prominent third-party mediator.

Two days before 9/11, the National Hero of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda in Takhar-Afghanistan. The legendary fighter who battled the Soviets and later the Taliban, warned months before his death, that a large-scale attack is underway on the US and Europe soil by al-Qaida. Either the US neglected to grasp the full picture of the attack or did not get enough intel to act and prevent the catastrophe.

Since the commencement of the 19-year long War on Terror, the US has played a pivotal role in ending the Afghan conflict, having as many as 100,000 troops stationed there as part of the 2009 surge. Over $2 trillion USD has been spent on infrastructure, counter-terrorism operations, and building the Afghan National Defense Security Forces to reach a 360,000-strong force, as originally envisioned. This combination of nation-building and counterterrorism has cost the US heavily — financially as well as the 2400 American troops who have lost their lives.

Despite the failures to form strong Afghan institutions and violence of the past nearly two decades, tremendous progress has taken place. Today, an estimated 3.5 million Afghan girls are enrolled in school, a stark contrast to the 50,000 that were enrolled during the Taliban’s reign.

The Taliban governed for five years (1996-2001) and instituted barbaric Islamist policies, such as banning girls from school and stoning women to death. In the 1990s, they provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, turning Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorist groups, seeking ‘an entry to heaven.’ Infamous leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the founder and leader of the Islamic State) used Afghanistan as a strategic transit point. Terror groups used Afghanistan as the logistic headquarters for deadly attacks in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the orchestration of 9/11.

The push from the Trump administration to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, with the latest US-Taliban deal reached earlier this year may result in further destabilization. An exit strategy is not always the best strategy. Important questions arise: Will the Taliban remain loyal to their promises? Will there be a guaranteed agreement that the Taliban will no longer harbor terrorism and plan attacks on US soil?

An exit from Afghanistan would result in the creation of another battleground for terrorism. Similar to the vacuum of power created by a lack of American interest in the early 1990s, parallel circumstances would emerge now. The Taliban were enabled to usurp power and consequently turn the country into a safe haven for Islamist extremism back then and thus it remains imperative that the US understands what is at stake if they decide to completely leave Afghanistan now. The Taliban is estimated to have 60,000 active fighters and control roughly 50-70 percent of Afghan territory. They maintain a feared presence across the entire country, and international support for law and order against them is starting to dwindle.

Additionally, the current global political atmosphere commands that the United States adapt its commitments within Afghanistan and focus greater attention towards the East. China continues its ascendance and an ever-stronger India are taking their places on the world stage. Given that the US rivals in the region, primarily Russia, China, and Iran also compete in the region, another regional power may quickly supplant their former position and advance to this strategic location.

The Taliban are not going to cut ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan peace process is unexpected to reach a conclusion soon. Both require time and commitment. It is vital that the next US presidential administration retains a small presence of US troops (as low as 4000) in combination with intelligence operators and diplomats to ensure promises are kept over the next few years. As well, these factors are important in the elimination of terror cells. A new US strategy may also focus on the proper allocation of resources to further avoid wasting US taxpayer money and systematic corruption in Afghanistan.

Finally, as the Taliban are making peace, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISK, ISP, or Daesh-Khorasan) — continues to gain strength through deadly attacks just as the Taliban remain engaged with the Afghan government. It is imperative to devote attention to their rise and activities in this general analysis. Further IS-K has been regrouping and the radical Taliban fighters who opposed the US-Taliban agreement can create a combination of “Islamic Emirate, Caliphate” as their objective.

Given that the Taliban’s main supply route for both personnel and weapons is through Pakistan, the insurgency group can and will continue to fight as long as they have support and safe-havens in Pakistan. They can do so by blocking foreign fighters and state-sponsors of terrorism in interfering in the Afghan peace talks. Further, they can use their diplomatic expertise to ensure that foreign actors, push the Taliban to join the negotiation table.

A stable Afghanistan benefits the region and protects the United States from any potential 9/11 style attacks in the future.


Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace, a Washington-based counter-terrorism organization. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

NeverForget 9/11

9/11

My Reflections on 9/11 Memorial

I distinctively remember the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as I was barely weeks into a yearlong youth exchange program in France. As a young teenager, it was my first solo venture abroad and I was full of excitement.

On that day, my host mother left a Post-It note on the television advising of a documentary on wild horses to watch after school. I would not have turned on the television otherwise! Once it concluded, I switched stations and could not believe my eyes as I tuned into news coverage. The images were stunning, haunting and foreboding all at once. A sense of utter horror while touching on so many aspects of the human condition simultaneously.

We closely watched the news broadcasts late into the evening. As a Canadian, I felt profound sadness for my neighbors to the south. I was a youth obviously lacking in-depth knowledge of nefarious non-state state actors, but the name Al-Qaeda was familiar due to a unit on terrorism in my high school law class months prior. Though the extent of the dramatic shift in history to come was unimaginable to a high school student, I knew significant ramifications would follow that momentous day.

A certain social anxiety rose around those from Muslim countries. This was most certainty due to the conflation between Islam and terrorism linked to the motivation of the organizers and perpetrators of those awful attacks. It was then I understood that misperception of groups of people often came from fear and misunderstanding. Accordingly, the following question was, ‘Well, what set of beliefs could compel someone to do such a thing?’

It would be improper of me to say that 9/11 has impacted my life as I only experienced the discussed emotions in the detached capacity of an external viewer. Each year I take the time to watch the televised remembrance ceremonies in solemnity of all those lives lost and to consider the plight of all the poorly first responders hampered by illness.

However, the attacks of September 11 solidified many invaluable truths, at least in my perception. Just like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there are moments in history that change our understandings of each other and interactions on a global scale. There is a reason why we discuss the ‘post-9/11’ period because it differs from our perception of security prior.

The attacks firmly demonstrated the reach of transnational terrorism and the vast consequences of extremist ideologies when significant resources are in place. The longevity of terrorist organizations —such as al-Qaeda after the attacks— reveals that combatting terror, despite vital resources, sometimes seems like grasping in the dark since halting the spread of an ideology is impossible.

Therefore, a multifaceted approach from sound intelligence analysis, effective cooperation in areas of security and law enforcement, community engagement and knowledgeable policy decisions hopefully reduces the odds of another event and the need to say, ‘Never Forget’ once more.


Réjeanne Lacroix, Editor-in-chief at Rise to Peace is a Canadian independent researcher focusing on international security and the post-Soviet space. She earned her BA in Political Science at Laurentian University and an MA in International Security Studies at the University of Leicester. Her analysis on a wide range of topics was previously featured at the NATO Association of Canada.