Africa

 by Rise to Peace

The Sahel Region: Current Crisis and Challenges

Context

Over the past fifteen years, the Sahel and West Africa have become the hub of clandestine trafficking and the heart of the fundamentalist terrorist network. The proceeds of illicit trafficking (migrants, drugs, weapons, etc…) and the generous ransoms given by European governments to obtain the release of their citizens, victims of kidnappings, (mostly concentrated in the central-western Sahel), are fundamental sources of financing for terrorism.

The movements linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) and to Daesh are concentrating their tactical projection capacity in the Sahara and the Sahel, territories among the most difficult to manage on the planet in terms of size and climatic conditions, in order to establish an Islamist caliphate from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

AQIM forces are currently present in Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania, but the terrorist network is also easily gaining ground in other states such as Algeria and Tunisia due to successful recruitment drives. Their expansion is based on a strategy articulated in two phases. First, they’ve tried to progressively root themselves in the central-western Sahel. Second, following the gradual extension of their power into neighboring countries, they aim to attract greater finances and greater international media attention, attention only set to increase as Western countries continue to pump resources into stabilizing the area.

A Sahel caught between today’s structural weaknesses and future challenges

The most dramatic effects of recent extremist campaigns are suffered by the local populations, of whom the majority are far from radical in their beliefs. Two coups in Mali, in August 2020 and May 2021, have only accentuated the lack of local administration, the different governments’ inability to unite the country and its ethnic groups, the structural corruption, and the failed attempt to secretly negotiate with extremist parties.

Several factors have also caused great concern not only in Chad but throughout the Sahel region, exponentially increasing the perception of further regional instability. One factor is the recent death of the President of Chad Idriss Déby at the hands of militant forces on April 20, 2021. The other is the unreliability of governments like those of Mali and the Central African Republic, both of which are now witnessing the recent, drastic French decision to suspend years-long military cooperation.

Over the years, major powers such as the United States and Russia, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, have created different task forces and coalitions to liberate and stabilize the Sahel region, but largely without success.

How is it possible that such a concentration of forces, funds, and efforts has failed to assist the region in building more transparent and effective administrative management? The above-mentioned weaknesses, combined with corruption and lack of state services in local communities, water the increasingly fertile ground for extremist growth and strategic success.

The “multidimensional” international stability operations led by the United Nations, in theory certainly positive, have had negative effects causing instability and scandal. Missteps grew to the point of generating popular protests, in Congo and Mali for example, by the same population to be protected. They have done little to address the problems of local administration, overall security, societal inclusion, and community development.

Conclusion

In the future, the crisis in the Sahel could become increasingly serious in light of the previously-listed structural weaknesses and the growing fatigue of international allies. How should interested parties move forward? There are several hypothetical action plans at both the national and regional levels that could guarantee greater stability for the countries of the Sahel plagued by extremist violence.

First, following coalition failures and the withdrawal of France from Malian soil, the security community should encourage an increase and a change in peacekeeping commitments by organizations such as the UN and the EU, as well as the G5-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad) and the African Union.

At the regional level, it is essential to underline the fact that up to now military responses have not been sufficient for defeating terrorism, a phenomenon that is primarily social rather than military. Indeed, one might first focus on problems such as unemployment, health care, education, infrastructure, water access, and agricultural support. This is the best way to weaken extremist influences in the Sahel before eradicating them militarily.

Further failure of the various sub-regional, regional, and international organizations involved would allow for greater destabilization and violence, with the potential to expand into even more countries in the region.

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 by Rise to Peace

Recent Attacks in the Ethiopian Tigray Region and its Implications for Peace

Context

Ethiopia is a federation, made up of a federal government and nine member states. However, this social fragmentation is considered a source of conflict due to the political and economic inequality consolidated in the institutional and cultural fabric of the country.

The regional political parties, representing local ethnic groups, are often in opposition to the central government, as in the case of Tigray. The state-region of northern Ethiopia, under the control of the “Front for the Liberation of the Tigrinya People” (TPLF) Party, recently refused to participate in the merger of the various ethnic governments. This was on the basis that they did not lose their autonomy. Such dissensions have ignited armed clashes between the Ethiopian armed forces, and the armed militias of the TPLF. They are the best trained and equipped in the nation.

A few days ago, the Ethiopian air force struck the market of Togoga, a village located in Tigray. The attack caused the death of many civilians and as a result, placed a spotlight on the crisis, underlining its gravity.

Challenges to the peace process

The recent attacks as well as the non-stop heated conflict, affect the already precarious security and peace of the Horn of Africa region. How? By analyzing the conflict, it can be understood that the four main aspects of security are not guaranteed to the Tigray population. These are listed by academic, P.H. Liotta. 

First, human needs such as access to food resources are denied, as militias have looted and destroyed crops, stolen, and killed livestock, thus causing severe famines.

Secondly, is the little respect for human rights. Since the start of the clashes, there have been millions of internally displaced people and thousands of rapes against women. This includes the elderly and young females.

The third aspect concerns the social sector and development. To the security-development nexus, the more secure a country is, the more it has the possibility to improve. This is from an economic, political, and social viewpoint. This is likely due to the fact that the development will lead the state not to fight again. At the moment, Ethiopian authorities’ energies are concentrated mostly on power struggle, rather than the development of infrastructures or the education of the population.

The last point focuses on environmental issues. The upheaval of the ecosystem has threatened the environmental security of Tigray. This is caused both by the actions previously liste, and by the countless fires that have burnt many Tigrinya fields. 

How to act? The ceasefire requests, the access to humanitarian assistance, and the national dialogue. In reality, if they are not accompanied by concrete measures to safeguard the Ethiopian civilian population, they risk being ineffective. 

More active diplomacy is necessary. This includes the opening of negotiation channels between the federal government and the TPLF authorities. This is necessary to gradually and proportionally encourage the use of all means available to interrupt the cycle of violence and reach first a negative peace. Or, in the absence of any act of violence, to reach a positive peace with global well-being.

Conclusion 

Peace and security go hand in hand. However, the situation in Tigray is far from seeing positive implications. Hopefully, the political actions that can restore peace in the Horn of Africa region, will prevail as soon as possible. 

The UN and the EU are studying the heated conflict, with the well-being of the population at heart. With this, the pillars of international law come into play. This includes the right of non-interference and the responsibility to protect. However, this is another story.

 

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 by Rise to Peace

What Can Afghanistan Learn from Rwanda?

When the war in Afghanistan finally ends, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Taliban fighters will have to be reintegrated into Afghan society. The current generation of Taliban fighters has known little besides war for the majority of their lives. For many, their opposition to the Afghan government and life as an insurgent has formed a key element of their identity. While this might at first cause anxiety about the possibility of reintegrating these fighters into civilian life, the example of reintegration in Rwanda provides a reason for optimism.

Context

The Rwandan genocide was one of the bloodiest events of the twentieth century. Beginning in April of 1994, Hutu militias, indoctrinated into a genocidal ideology by demagogic politicians and “hate radio,” murdered their fellow Tutsi citizens without mercy. Within a mere hundred days, 800,000 people were murdered.

Over 300,000 Rwandans have spent time in prison for their crimes during the genocide. While Rwanda Correctional Services’ main responsibility was overseeing these incarcerated Rwandans, they also provided services useful to the reintegration process. Prisoners were advised to be honest with their loved ones about the crimes they committed, to be understanding if their partner had entered a new relationship, and to work to embrace their identity as a citizen of Rwanda. Some prisoners were provided preparation for employment while incarcerated.

Other participants in the genocide who admitted their guilt and expressed remorse for their crimes chose to participate in TIG (a French acronym for “works of general service”). In exchange for staying out of prison, these citizens have agreed to complete unpaid work to repay their debt to society. TIG participants have been involved in building roads, constructing houses, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.

Many former genocidaires have only recently been released from prison and allowed to return to their communities. Many have received a warm welcome. They are greeted by neighbors who are eager to reconnect and given small gifts like soda pop and beer. Some former genocidaires even manage to have meaningful relationships with the families of their victims.

Rwandan society has chosen to move forward. Recently released Rwandans often comment on the nation’s economic development since their incarceration. Government investment has provided livestock to farmers and helped boost Rwanda’s growth rate to an average of 8% over the last two decades. It is now the second-best place to do business in all of Africa. While powerful commemorations are held every April 7 to remember the genocide’s victims, daily life in Rwanda is now concerned with more simple economic issues: home construction, the agricultural season, and employment.

While reintegration in Rwanda may at first appear to be a niche issue, it makes apparent the possibility of reintegration and forgiveness after even the most extreme instances of violence. Rwanda’s example can provide lessons that are applicable to the case of Afghanistan.

Lessons

Reintegration is a difficult and painful process but it is far less costly than continued fighting. The Afghan government and the foreign powers financing both sides of the war will have to make a serious investment in the reintegration process. This process must be pragmatic and not just symbolic. While truth and reconciliation processes can be psychologically beneficial for ex-combatants, they will not deter another outbreak of violence. Given the influence of money in driving the Afghan war and Afghanistan’s general culture of impunity, it must be in the self interest of Afghanistan’s ex-combatants to accept peace.

Like Rwanda, Afghanistan must successfully foster a spirit of citizenship among participants on all sides of the conflict. While Afghanistan’s long history of decentralized governance makes this difficult, it is a necessity if there is to be a long-lasting peace. A commitment to reconstruction, economic development, and small business projects would be a significant start.

However, these projects must steer clear of the corruption and connections to poppy cultivation and trafficking that plagued previous development initiatives. Pursuing simple programs consisting of only small transfers of cash —like the Rwandan government’s “one cow” program— could help avoid these problems. These programs must not discriminate against ex-combatants. The Taliban must have a stake in Afghanistan’s future if they are to be reintegrated into society.

When a peace agreement is signed between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, the Taliban will be free men. Compelling them to take part in the sort of reintegration programs and commemorations that Rwandans do will be near impossible. Instead, they must voluntarily rejoin their communities. Through the construction of economic, social, and religious interdependence, Taliban fighters could find peace to be in their self interest. While reintegration will prove a difficult task, it will certainly be far less difficult —and less costly— than another outbreak of war in Afghanistan.

— Connor Bulgrin

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 by Arman Sidhu

Do Civilian Self-Defense Groups Help or Harm Counterterrorism Efforts?

After enduring what may be considered one of its most violent years, the West African nation of Burkina Faso has taken a new approach to countering the proliferation of armed insurgent groups that have traversed the country’s rural peripheries. Back in January, the country’s parliament sanctioned a program designed to equip and train civilian volunteers. Known as the “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act”, the intent of the program is to deter and fend off the increasingly brazen attacks carried out by armed groups in remote areas, in addition to reducing the workload burdened by the country’s underfunded and overstretched military.

Although Burkina Faso’s decision to train and arm civilians is neither novel nor surprising, the program does call into question the broader implications surrounding safety, efficacy, and authority. As one of several countries located in the heart of the Sahel region that spans West Africa, Burkina Faso is not alone in its struggles to contain and combat violent extremist groups, many of which operate as affiliates of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

Instead, the relatively lawless and remote geographic setting of the Sahel has allowed armed groups to ravage the region with attacks, kidnappings, and the trafficking of humans, arms, and drugs. Such conditions led to the formation of the G5 Sahel, a joint force that includes the militaries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. Established in 2014, the G5 Sahel has also received support and/or training primarily from France, which is currently engaged in the Sahel through an anti-insurgency campaign known as Operation Barkhane, and the United States, which has maintained a presence in the region for over 13 years.

Nevertheless, the decision to use civilian volunteers as an auxiliary to any military must be evaluated in the specific context of the conflict. These include assessing the following criteria: the quality of support & training given to the groups, and the level of state supervision and authority of said groups.

Quality of Support & Training

Throughout history, the use of state-sanctioned militias was designed to address shortcomings in the capacity of official forces, particularly in rural and remote communities. Militias offer a relatively cheaper solution for security and surveillance of the enemy. Though mandates vary, these groups typically do not participate in any offensive campaigns, and their tactical goals are confined to a specific geography.

Given the number of attacks that occur in Burkina Faso’s periphery (specifically its northernmost borders), civilian militias could be useful as a temporary deterrent to stave off enemy forces. However, mounting a successful defense normally necessitates a prompt response by professional forces, which must be located close enough to assume the reins from self-defense groups.

The sophistication of a fighting force, whether professional or amateur, is correlated to the quality of its resources, support, and training. Burkina Faso’s “Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland Act” accommodates just two weeks’ worth of training for civilians, coupled with basic armaments and communication equipment. Although Burkina Faso’s military expenditures (as % of GDP) have nearly doubled in the last few years, its professional forces remain outgunned and ill-equipped to confront the insurgents. Thus, the prospect of civilian forces, which receive a substantially smaller share of investment in training and equipment, repelling an attack are unlikely. In the absence of high-quality, rigorous training and nearby support from professional forces, civilian forces may only end up attracting more attention to themselves from insurgents, resulting in additional bloodshed, while decimating confidence in the civilian program.

Though successful civilian auxiliary forces exist and have proven instrumental in conflicts throughout Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, none of them have succeeded in a unilateral fashion. Rather, the success of such groups remains dependent on continuous improvement, capacity-building, and adequate linkages with professional forces.

State Supervision & Authority

Among the oft-cited issues regarding armed civilian forces is the level of accountability and control by state actors (i.e. police, military). In the case of Latin America, autodefensas have started out as autonomous vigilante groups, but eventually were absorbed into official designated police or military units. In the case of Mexico, negotiations between the autodefensas and the federal government have often been long drawn out. In states with poor security institutions that are perceived to be subject to graft, skepticism is likely to emerge and persist between civilians and the government. A well-defined command structure and lines of communication that incorporate voices from central and local authorities is often overlooked in this regard, but can be effective in a post-conflict transition.

Whether civilians arm themselves or procure arms through government mechanisms, there exists a need to ensure these empowered groups do not evolve into autonomous organizations that either perpetuate crimes they were designed to prevent, or begin to clash with other militias, insurgents, and official military forces. For countries with significant ethnic or religious divisions, the issue of oversight is even more imperative to ensure unity and alignment between self-defense groups and the military.

Like many post-colonial African states, Burkina Faso’s borders were drawn in haste, and not necessarily in consideration of the varied demographics of its population. With nearly 60 different ethnic groups, Burkina Faso is no stranger to ethnic-based violence. Given the fact that such groups often cluster geographically, the risk of a state-sponsored program evolving into raised militias that operate independent of any official chain-of-command remains significant. While the government has attempted to get in front of this issue by assuring checks of moral conduct and proper vetting of recruits will be implemented, disarmament and demobilization remains subjective and tricky in many instances.

Conclusion

In spite of their domestic or foreign support, the Sahel’s armies remain woefully inadequate in their fight against insurgent groups. The region’s infestation of militants has further been complicated by the droves of Islamist militants fleeing Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. As a result, the region has become a popular spot of refuge, while allowing transnational terrorist organizations to regroup.

Given West Africa’s proximity to Europe, and the lack of a formidable military to confront them, concerns of the Sahel evolving into a permanent safe haven and operational base have only risen in recent years. Containing the spread of these insurgent groups will require additional funding, equipment, and capacity for any and all participating forces. Evidence of further coalition-building, spearheaded by France, remains promising. The most effectual defense will require an alignment in objectives between foreign, national, and local forces.

– Arman Sidhu

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 by Mathew Tyris

Digital Repression Keeps the Crisis in Sudan Hidden from the World

Photo Credit: Photographer Ahmed Mustafa of Agence France-Presse

“How Come My Heartbreak Isn’t Loud Enough?” This message signifies the calls of the Sudanese people who yearn for democracy. The issue is, few in the international community are aware as Sudan’s authoritarian regime restricts citizens’ access to the internet to deter pro-democratic demonstrations, and hide government actions against its own people. Sudan has many challenges to overcome to secure its democratic freedom and in order to do so, Khartoum must restore its digital freedom to share its struggle with the world.

Authoritarian regimes such as Gabon, Zimbabwe, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all blocked internet access to its citizens in the first three months of 2019. Sudan takes this repression a step further.

On April 3, a council of generals assumed power in the country against the wishes of democratic demonstrators who sought civilian rule. As a result, Sudan’s government shut down internet access to its citizens as a means to stop pro-democratic movements from mobilizing. Democratic movement activists are reduced to using text messages and secret meetings in order to organize and share information. This alternative process seems primitive compared to the share power of Twitter and Facebook.

Demonstrators engaged in a sit-in protest in Khartoum on June 3. The world did not seem to notice that this public activism turned violent when government forces used deadly force against protestors. Reports state that 30 anti-government protesters have been killed. Twitter users began to use and share the tag #BlueforSudan to spread awareness of the violent repression and support the Sudanane pro-democratic movement. Currently, Twitter users report closer to 500 deaths and 623 injured.

The blackout in the country appears to be working. With no video, pictures, or other forms of media coming from Khartoum, these atrocities are only verified by witness accounts. Major international media outlets seem weary to pick up the story.

Greater media coverage on the situation in Sudan is needed. Reporters and journalists are barred from entering the country however, there are additional means of information gathering. Al-Jazeera and NPR have both spoken to people about the occurrences, but additional coverage is required to increase awareness globally.

The United Nations Security Council recently debated the situation in Sudan and attempted to forward a unified bid condemning Sudanese actions. The draft was vetoed by China, with the backing of Russia and Kuwait, claiming it needed amendments. China claims it is an “internal issue”, while Russia asserts that the situation needed to be handled with extreme caution. Eight European nations condemned the actions by Sudan’s security forces, but as it stands, no formal action has been taken.

China typically defends Sudan’s government and its atrocities. An interest in Sudanese oil is linked to this stance. Since the discovery of oil in 1997, China invests heavily into the northeastern African nation and subsequently, defending it at the UN, even when action is needed. A transfer to a democratic framework puts Chinese oil imports in danger.

Following the coup this past April, Sudan announced that they will have a three year transfer to democracy.  On June 4th, Sudan’s government said they will have a ballot box election in nine months. The fear is that this mode of election will be rigged to favor the current administration.

The UN conducts election monitoring, when assistance is specifically requested, and this presents an opportunity to ensure a fair election in Sudan. This mechanism is beneficial if citizens doubt the integrity their national electoral process and seek outside assistance. A UN representative from the particular state, a mandate from the Security Council or General Assembly (GA) can initiate this process also. A GA mandate would be ideal, seeing the Security Council’s recent blocking to condemn Sudan’s actions.

International media outlets must report on Sudan’s current democratic struggle so that the country can have free and fair elections. These actions are only possible if the Sudanese government lifts its restrictions on civilian media, primarily internet access, so that interest builds in the situation. Media organizations must seek additional means, such as establishment with reliable sources, despite information blocks. The global community would devote greater attention to the crisis in Khartoum, and create a unified front, if they knew the state violence conducted by the Sudanese government.

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