Afghanistan

 by Rise to Peace

A Tale of Two Withdrawals: What the U.S. Can Learn from the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon

On August 15th, 2021, Taliban fighters captured Kabul without firing a shot, sending shock waves across the world and expediting the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like the Afghanistan withdrawal, the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was long expected and planned. Nevertheless, the events on the ground shifted quickly and forced Israel to complete the withdrawal overnight. With events in Afghanistan still unfolding, the U.S. can learn from Israeli experiences in Lebanon and prevent a humanitarian disaster from occurring at the Kabul airport.

The Invasion

Israel and the U.S. invaded Lebanon and Afghanistan, respectively, in order to eradicate the havens these countries had become for terrorist organizations. Since the 1970s, the PLO has used southern Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and successfully removed the PLO from Lebanon. Israel subsequently supported the establishment of a friendly regime in Beirut led by the Phalanges.

Following its initial success, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon and created a security zone in southern Lebanon. The military rationale underlying the establishment of the security zone was to prevent Hezbollah, another anti-Israel insurgent group, and its terror cells from entering Israel, and to deflect fire away from Israeli territory toward the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a local militia fully funded and equipped by Israel.

Similar to the haven Lebanon provided the PLO and Hezbollah, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 7th, 2001, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and with local anti-Taliban forces routed Al-Qaeda and ended the Taliban regime. On May 1st, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat” in Afghanistan.

The Withdrawal

For over fifteen years, Israelis believed that their presence in southern Lebanon and the casualties associated with it were necessary. As their presence drew on, however, Israeli consensus shifted, leading to broad public support for a unilateral withdrawal and the election of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, a vocal supporter of the withdrawal. Barak tried to tie his plans for a withdrawal from Lebanon to a peace agreement with Syria. But this plan failed, leading to his decision to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally and reject the advice of his senior military leaders that advocated against it. Consequently, the withdrawal from Lebanon didn’t go according to plan and what unfolded on the ground was described as chaos.

When Israel began to transfer its military outposts to the SLA in mid-May, the SLA proved unable to hold its ground, deciding to abandon its outposts and disband rather than continue fighting. Barak had to advance the timetable for the IDF’s withdrawal from July to May 24. The collapse of the SLA and Hezbollah’s lightning advance initiated a massive flood of SLA members and their families to the Israeli border, fearing Hezbollah’s retribution.

Unlike the Israeli withdrawal, the U.S. withdrawal was an integral part of the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban. While the Taliban has overwhelmingly violated the agreement, President Biden remained committed to the withdrawal, ignoring the warnings of his top military generals and diplomats. Emboldened by the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban launched its major summer offensive. Once the first provisional capital fell, the Afghan Army collapsed in days, often surrendering to the Taliban without firing a shot. On August 15th, 2021, the Taliban entered victoriously into Kabul.

Conclusions

Every day we bear witness to the unfolding events in Afghanistan. Similar events were unfolding on the Israeli-Lebanese border in 2000. Then, Israel was overwhelmed with the rapid collapse of the SLA and the flood of refugees towards its border. Israel opened its borders and allowed Israel’s allies and their families to enter Israel. Nevertheless, it took Israel 20 years to officially honor the SLA fighters and their sacrifice.

The U.S. shouldn’t wait 20 years to honor its Afghan allies. The U.S. has a moral obligation of not leaving them behind, regardless of whether they are citizens or allies. The U.S. can still do the right thing and open Kabul’s airport gates, its aircraft’s doors, and most importantly its heart, to the fleeing Afghan allies.

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 by Sydney Neuman

Views from Washington: How US Troop Withdrawal Will Affect the Taliban

On October 7th, 2001, former president George W. Bush launched the war in Afghanistan, following the 9/11 attacks. 20 years later, current President Joe Biden says, “it’s time to end America’s longest war,” as he announced that the United States is pushing for a full withdrawal of troops by September 11, 2021. The 3,500 troops remaining in Afghanistan will be withdrawn, regardless of whether progress is made in intra-Afghan peace talks or the Taliban reduces its attacks on Afghan security forces and citizens. NATO troops in Afghanistan will also leave.

Leaders in Washington will continue to assist the Afghan security forces and do all that can be done to support the peace process. However, the Taliban has stated that it will not participate in “any conference” on the future of Afghanistan until all foreign troops leave.

There are very mixed responses to this announcement. This is likely due to the Taliban’s psychological and military momentum in the country. The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, following the U.S.-led invasion. Since then, it has waged an insurgency against the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. Many experts are concerned that the Taliban is stronger now than ever. They currently control over half of Afghanistan’s districts.

The first direct peace negotiations with the Afghan government began in 2020, signing an agreement with the United States. However, little progress has been made.

Former President Bush called the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan a mistake and predicted that the consequences, especially for Afghan women and girls, will be “unbelievably bad.” Former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton has also voiced her concerns about the Taliban regaining control if the US withdraws its troops. She has stated that:

“This is what we call a wicked problem. There are consequences both foreseen and unintended of staying and of leaving. The US government has to focus on two huge consequences: the resumption of activities by extremist groups and a subsequent outpouring of refugees from Afghanistan.”

Clinton furthermore highlighted that the potential collapse of the Afghan government and a possible takeover by the Taliban, could result in a new civil war. On the flip side, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont does not think the troops should be there. Former President, Donald Trump, advocated for US troops to return home and subsequently criticized the US military interventions for being costly and ineffective.

When the war began in 2001, the public largely supported it. In early 2002, 93%, a record high, of Americans supported the war. As time went on and troops remained, majorities continued to hold these beliefs between 2004 and 2013. Then for the first time in 2014, an equal amount of people believed that it was a mistake. More and more people began believing that it was a mistake and the war made the US less safe. In 2021, 47% say U.S. military involvement was a mistake; 46% say it was not. From a political party standpoint, the recent polls show that 56% of Democrats and 29% of Republicans now say it was a mistake.

There is no military path to victory and peace talks are believed to be the best way to resolve the insurgency. Many U.S. security experts remain concerned that under the Taliban’s rule, Afghanistan would remain a safe haven for terrorists, who could launch attacks against the United States and its allies.

In its 2021 report, the United Nations team that monitors the Taliban has gathered significant data. This has demonstrated that the group still has strong ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban continues to provide al-Qaeda with protection in exchange for resources and training. Between 200-500 al-Qaeda fighters are believed to be in Afghanistan, and its leaders are believed to be based in regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Biden is optimistic that the withdrawal will be completed by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The current United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, said the Biden administration was “very focused on a deliberate, safe and orderly” withdrawal of troops, but that the US would continue to assist the Afghan government. “Even as our forces are pulling out of Afghanistan, we are not withdrawing – we are not disengaging.” Also adding that if US troops were attacked before leaving the country, “decisive action” would be taken.

Biden and those who support the drawdown made this decision based on the U.S. accomplishing its main goals in Afghanistan: finding the terrorists who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks, killing Osama bin Laden and trying to limit the country’s base of operations for terrorists. Nation-building was not part of the original strategy, and this is a war that has dragged on for too long, costing the U.S. far too many lives and money.

 

 

 

 

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 by Rise to Peace

The World Needs to See the Taliban for What It Is: A Hybrid Terrorist Organization

Over the last weekend, the Taliban continued its country-wide offensive, successfully capturing several Afghan provincial capitals. While the U.S. continues to pin its hopes on a Taliban-Afghan government peace deal to halt the country’s relentless violence, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The Taliban’s offensive casts serious doubt on its supposed desire to reach a peaceful resolution. The U.N. special envoy for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, has questioned the Taliban’s commitment to a political settlement.

The statements of the Taliban’s Doha-based political office regarding their willingness to negotiate are no more than smoke and mirrors, maintaining a glimpse of hope for the West for a peaceful resolution while at the same time continuing the offensive. It represents a conceptual failure of the West in understanding the organizational nature of the Taliban. The Taliban, with all of its branches, is a terrorist organization, or more precisely, a hybrid terrorist organization.

Definitions

Terrorism is the deliberate use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political ends. The terrorist has political goals, whether nationalistic, separatist, socioeconomic, or religious. The Taliban’s end goal, for example, is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. Terrorism is differentiated from criminal violence by its deliberate use of violence against civilians for political ends.

A hybrid terrorist organization is one that stands on multiple legs. First, it has a military or paramilitary leg that engages in terrorist acts. Second, it has a political leg that allows the organization to operate and win in both the “illegitimate” arena of terrorism and the “legitimate” arena of the media. Third, it acts as an alternative provider of welfare services through seemingly innocent organizations serving a potential or actual constituency. Among jihadist organizations such as the Taliban, this activity is known as da’wa and subsumes a combination of religious services, educational services, ideological indoctrination, and welfare services.

The Taliban as a Hybrid Terrorist Organization

The Taliban’s operations today are divided between its three legs: military, political, and social welfare-da’wa.

Its military forces are advancing on all fronts, seizing provincial capitals, and increasingly utilizing terror tactics against civilians and governmental installations. In recent weeks, the Taliban kidnapped and executed a popular Kandahari comedian Nazar Mohammad, apparently because he ridiculed Taliban leaders.  The Taliban tried to assassinate the acting defense minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi in a bombing attack, leaving dozens dead but failing to kill the minister. The Taliban shot and killed the director of Afghanistan’s government media center, Dawa Khan Menapal, after ambushing him in Kabul. In its overall strategy, the Taliban has been conducting summary executions, beating up women, shutting down schools, and blowing up clinics and infrastructure.

Its political office presents a different face. From its seat in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban’s political office maintains its commitment to negotiation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Taliban has dispatched delegations to Russia, China, and Iran in hopes of gaining international legitimacy. Finally, the Taliban has also emphasized its willingness to grant rights to women.

As part of its da’wa efforts, the Taliban has created a network of Islamic religious schools, called madrasas, all across the country. These schools attract many poor families because the Taliban cover all expenses and provide food and clothing for the children. On some occasions, the Taliban has encouraged families to send their children to their schools by offering families cash. These schools are used as recruitment and training sites for the Taliban.

Conclusions

Despite what it may say, the Taliban has not changed and holds the same views as it did before. The only difference is that it has become more sophisticated in its use of technology and is better integrated within the jihadi universe. In order to successfully confront the Taliban, the world must first conceptually understand the nature of the organization. Second, it must designate all of the Taliban’s operational legs as part of the same hybrid terrorist organization. Finally, this designation will enable the world to use counterterrorist strategies to better confront all of the Taliban’s legs.

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 by Rise to Peace

Special Report On Youths’ Views on the Afghan Peace Process

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This report sought to explore the youth of Afghanistan’s views and perspective on the Afghan peace process. 187 respondents between the ages of 18-39 responded to the questionnaire and provided data for this report. Overall, the report highlighted youth concerns regarding women’s role following peace agreements with the Taliban, but are of the opinion they have an effective role in these talks. Consequently, the youth expressed mixed feelings regarding negotiations with the Taliban, which following the increase of violence, leaves little optimism for peace.

Policy recommendations will follow the report, which will suggest investment in education for the youth. Moreover, recommendations will be offered to neighboring countries, including Pakistan and Iran. This report suggests that more research is necessary to ensure inclusivity in the peace process, in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops.

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 by Rise to Peace

Afghan Interpreters, the Peace Process, and the Future of Indigenous Support for US Combat Operations

As the United States prepares for its withdrawal from Afghanistan, discussions have continued about the fate of Afghan interpreters who played a vital role in US combat operations. These interpreters not only served as bridges to language barriers between soldiers and Afghan communities but also as cultural advisors to US soldiers. Their area knowledge and translations saved numerous US lives during the two-decade presence in Afghanistan.

The Current Challenge:

Because of insufficient awareness about interpreters, international media outlets have played a vital role in spreading the plight of those still in Afghanistan. After weeks of dialogue and advocacy, the first group of Afghan interpreters and their families arrived at a Virginia military base. This was to await the final process of their Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) and escape likely retribution from the Taliban. The Department of Defense has planned additional emergency airlifts to evacuate approximately 3,000 more interpreters and their families. 

The success or failure to evacuate most Afghan interpreters has great strategic implications for the United States. Consequently, it will affect its future combat operations in the long term. The Biden administration must not betray these local heroes, as it will compromise the United States’ reputation as a force for good at a time of global consternation about democratic legitimacy. In understanding the historical role of Afghan interpreters, it becomes evident that their fears of abandonment have persisted for years and that preserving their trust will require policymakers to make difficult decisions.

A Rocky History:

The phrase “winning hearts and minds” underscores the importance of local support during the war. For many conflicts like the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, French operations in Vietnam, and even the American Revolution, lack of support for invading forces by the local populace foreshadowed inevitable failure. Indigenous support is so important in winning conflicts, that the US military has a unit dedicated to strengthening these partnerships, the US Army Green Berets. Local support from interpreters was crucial in the United States’ toppling of the Taliban. Local support also helped lay the foundation for a political solution to the conflict.

Although there is little data about the first interpreters who began working for US forces, it is highly likely that demand for their language abilities began and continued shortly after conventional troops began deploying to Afghanistan. Even before conventional forces, Green Beret and CIA officers relied heavily on translators to coordinate airstrikes, understand enemy maneuvers, and map partner forces to begin the initial offensive against the Taliban.

But interpreters and their families faced increased threats from Taliban retribution as coalition operations surged in 2007. The Obama administration’s 2014 initiative to withdraw the remaining US forces from Afghanistan foreshadowed the bureaucratic hurdles and anxieties encountered by interpreters during the drawdown. Many felt betrayed by the lengthy visa process, especially by unexplained rejections when they satisfied all requirements. Their families were constantly threatened by the Taliban, eventually forcing them to abandon wives and daughters during the lengthy visa process.

Their journeys to escape death were often unpredictable and expensive, relying on smugglers to ferry them to Iran, Greece, and Western Europe. Those who did not have funds to cover the entire journey were left in countries with nothing but false documents, eventually becoming homeless as countries failed to support them with refugee status or jobs. Those who suffered the most in escaping Afghanistan started to regret serving US troops, setting a dangerous precedent for the future of local cooperation in the age of major power competition. This is particularly concerning because local support will become more crucial as major powers like the US, China, and Russia rely on proxies in various countries to achieve their foreign policy goals.

The Need to Do More:

The newest arrival of the Afghan SIV applicants is a welcome development. However, this is insufficient because some reports indicate that the Defense Department would have to conduct 16 evacuation flights per day leading up to the August 31 deadline to account for all SIV applicants in Afghanistan. The US and Coalition governments are moving far too slow and risk sending a message to the world that they will not fulfill promises to local partners in conflict. Maintaining the reputation of democracies around the world has become increasingly important if the West hopes to combat a rising China.

If the US government fails to secure the safety of interpreters and leaves them marked for death by the Taliban, local allies in strategically important countries are less likely to work with American forces in the event of a conflict. Peace in these regions will be less attainable without this robust local support for US or allied forces.

It is not logistically possible to evacuate all SIV applicants, but the State and Defense Departments need to allocate more planes, diplomats, and locations to process at least 40-50% of SIV applications and ferry them from the Taliban retribution. They should also increase transparency regarding why applicants are denied. These actions would enhance American soft power and foster trust in the local population crucial to the success of a military campaign. Biden administration should look at evacuating interpreters as a strategic imperative, one that may play a driving factor in an era defined by state competition. Afghan lives and successful US strategy hang in the balance.

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