Afghanistan

 by Ahmad Mohibi

Can the Taliban Balance Their Wants with Lasting Peace?

Taliban

Officials, including Afghan former President Hamid Karzai (2nd R, front), Head of Political Office of Taliban Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai (R, front) and Taliban chief negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (3rd R, front), attend peace talks in Moscow, Russia May 30, 2019. REUTERS/Evgenia Novozhenina

On May 28th, the Taliban’s co-founder and head of its political office, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, attended events commemorating 100 years of Afghanistan-Russia diplomatic relations in Moscow. Baradar’s appearance remains noteworthy as it was his primary outing as a public representative of the Taliban and his lone media appearance since his rise to prominence in the 1990s. Peace talks occurred on the sidelines.

Baradar’s Impact

Participation of a senior member of the Taliban, like Mullah Baradar, could feasibly result in positive developments for ongoing peace talks. He was the right-hand of leader Mullah Omar and led large army of the group in many operations for the Taliban until he was caught in 2010. He held key positions in the Taliban regime and consequently involved in major decisions at the highest levels.

For instance, in an interview with BBC Pashto, the former governor of Balkh province Ata Mohammad Noor remarked, “Mullah Baradar is a thoughtful person and can play a significant role in brokering and discussion with members of the Taliban because he is the second person in command and during the Taliban regime, he was an influential figure who had helped to make major decisions for the Taliban leadership.” Noor expressed hope for future discussions by adding, “we are looking to an Afghan lead process so we can work to reach a deal in the future.”

While hope surrounds Baradar’s presence in the peace process, his demands remain high. For example, an end to the “invasion of Afghanistan.” He regards the United States and the international community as invaders occupying Afghanistan against its will. Mullah Baradar expressed this view when he remarked, “the Islamic Emirate wants peace but the hurdles on the way to peace should be removed.”

Complicated Relations

Uncertainties over actual Taliban willingness to sincerely engage in a peace process permeate any dialogue. According to a participant who attended the meeting, “Taliban do not have freedom of mindset and they are being steered by an authority behind the scene. They can only speak pre-made statements and answers and do not answer more than that.” For instance, when asked a question concerning American activities in the Gulf countries, Mullah Baradar laughed and walked away.

At a later press conference, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the political chief of the Taliban, conveyed reluctance to engage in an organized framework. Stanikzai explained that “we control over 70% of Afghanistan…and I do not see any reason for opening a Taliban office in Afghanistan for negotiations.”

“How a ceasefire will be possible when the country is ‘occupied’?” asked Suhail Shaheen, a spokesman of the Taliban.

Both Mullah Baradar and Stanikzai have valid points. The Taliban wants the global community to understand the strength of the organization and to not underestimate their clout. They are a resilient force that cannot be treated as a small group of militants that will easily concede two decades of resistance and a mission to build an Islamic Emirate. It is unrealistic to perceive an exchange of influence in order to submit to a government installed by the United States and its allies.

Taliban Hesitation to Negotiating with the Afghan Government
The Taliban continually reject negotiations with the Afghan government because they continue to enjoy a strong reputation amongst the status quo of Afghan politics. They perceive authorities in Kabul as illegitimate and weak. Therefore, Taliban leadership have said numerous times that “we will negotiate with the United States.” To the Taliban, the United States is the actual powerbroker in an Afghan resolution and Washington can do so much to make this happen.

Past LessonsBetween the 1980s-90s, Mujahidin viewed the Afghan communist regime as illegitimate and lacked authority to make substantial decisions. As a result, they refused to negotiate with Kabul and engaged in direct discourse with the Soviet leadership in Moscow. Three years after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, thus ending the decade long Soviet-Afghan War, the communist government collapsed. Subsequent divisions stemming from the 1989-92 Afghan Civil War provided the Taliban with opportunities to expand their influence.

Should the United States Leave Afghanistan?

The current Islamic Republic of Afghanistan — popularly referred to as a capitalist regime —will meet a similar fate if the United States disengages. This decision will have detrimental effects on nearly two decades of achievements combatting terrorism and the establishment of infrastructure. Recent research conducted in 14 Afghan provinces (450 participants) by the non-profit organization Rise to Peace revealed that 90% of respondents prefer that the United States remain in Afghanistan to prevent another civil war and a cruel regime.

Ahmad Mohibi is Founder and Director of Counter-terrorism at Rise to Peace, a non-profit organization, and a national security expert. He is a published author, journalist and news commentator on TOLONews, and an alumnus of George Washington University and George Mason University. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi

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 by Ahmad Mohibi

Advocates push for additional visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program

Photos courtesy: GettyImages. Afghan local interpreter is interpreting for the US military in Afghanistan

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2019, as enacted on February 15, 2019, authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014.

What is the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program? 

The current visa program for the Afghans who were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government is called Chief of Mission (COM). Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters who have worked directly (not as contractors) for U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul are considered to have been under COM authority. Anyone (interpreters, chefs, contractors, guards who have worked directly for the U.S. government programs and projects in Afghanistan are eligible to apply for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) under Chief of Mission (COM).

In the beginning, visas were only allocated to the Afghan and Iraqi translators who worked with the U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission authority as a translator or interpreter in Iraq or Afghanistan. In 2009, the program expanded to all Afghan nationals who provided faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government, while employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan and continues until the present day.

Visas and Obstacles?

Visas are limited for the Afghans and it depends on Congress to continue or end the program. But this Fiscal Year (FY), the Congress authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014. There are thousands of cases pending to COM approval, waiting for interviews and hundreds waiting to receive visas. Although it seems a big figure, is not enough for thousands of Afghans who courageously supported the United Staes Global War on Terror in Afghanistan risking theirs and families lives.

Legislative History of SIV

FY 2006: Under section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163), up to 50 Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters who worked for the U.S. Armed Forces to receive special immigrant visas (SIVs) each fiscal year (FY). This law was later amended and now provides SIV status for eligible Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters who have worked either directly with the U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission (COM) authority at U.S. Embassy Baghdad or U.S. Embassy Kabul.

FY 2007 and 2008: Public Law 110-36 and Public Law 110-242 in which then-President Bush signed on June 15, 2007, amended the law above by expanding the total number of SIVs issued to Iraqi and Afghan translators/interpreters working for the U.S. military to 500 a year for FY 2007 and FY 2008 only.

FY 2009: The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Section 602(b) of Division F, Title VI, of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, (Public Law 111-8), This law allowed up to 1,500 Afghan nationals who provided faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government, while employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan after October 7, 2001, for not less than one year, and who have experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of that employment, to receive special immigrant visas (SIVs) annually through FY 2013, with the allocation of any unused visas from FY 2013 to FY 2014. The period of qualifying employment was later extended under subsequent legislation. See law above.

FY 2014: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Section 7034(o) of Division K, Title VII of Public Law 113-76, This law, signed on January 17, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 3,000 visas to principal applicants in fiscal year (FY) 2014 and allowed that any unissued visas from FY 2014 be allocated to FY 2015.

FY 2014: Emergency Afghan Allies Extension Act of 2014, Section 1 of Public Law 113-160, This law, signed on August 8, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 1,000 visas to principal applicants by December 31, 2014.

FY 2015: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015, Section 1227 of Public Law 113-291, This law, signed on December 19, 2014, extended the Afghan SIV Program. It authorized the issuance of 4,000 visas to principal applicants by September 30, 2016.

FY 2016: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, Section 1216 of Public Law 114-92, This law, signed on November 25, 2015, extends and amends the Afghan SIV Program. It authorizes the issuance of 3,000 additional visas to principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2017: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017, Section 1214 of Public Law 114-326, This law, signed on December 23, 2016, extends and amends the Afghan SIV Program.  It authorizes the issuance of 1,500 additional visas to principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.  It also extends the date by which applicants must apply for Chief of Mission approval from December 31, 2016 to December 31, 2020.

FY 2017: Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2017, Section 7083 of Public Law 115-31, his law, signed on May 5, 2017, authorizes the issuance of 2,500 additional visas to Afghan principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2018: National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, Section 1213 of Public Law 115-91, This law, signed on December 12, 2017, authorizes the issuance of 3,500 additional visas to Afghan principal applicants with no end date by which they must be issued.

FY 2019: The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2019, as enacted on February 15, 2019, authorized 4,000 additional SIVs for Afghan principal applicants, for a total of 18,500 visas allocated since December 19, 2014.

The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program is a great way to appreciate those who have served faithfully alongside the brave American troops abroad to begin a new life in the United States and bring innovative ideas for growth and success.

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 by Sakhi Naimzada

Gulf Rivalries and the Afghan Peace Talks

Major players in the Afghan peace talks. Image credit: Reuters/AP.

There are doubtless domestic factors behind the crisis in Afghanistan, from ethnic problems to low levels of education. Afghanistan’s geographic position is one of the main obstacles to a lasting peace. Surrounded by neighbors with different ideologies and regional interests, Afghanistan is seen as a geostrategic key to future power in the region. Afghanistan’s importance in the eye of rival countries has historically attracted the Soviet Union to the country, with American expertise and support offered through ISI to stand by the Afghans.

Nowadays, foreign intervention in Afghan internal affairs has become a usual part of almost every peace effort. Arab countries- particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, thanks to their shared ideology with the Taliban- are major players in Afghan peace. Saudi Arabia was certainly the most influential foreign actor in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. It raised the idea of Jihad which has since recruited young fighters from North Africa to European city suburbs to the war in Afghanistan.

The ten year Soviet occupation ended in 1989, but the Arab influence still remains. Saudi Arabia continued financing radical Wahhabist ideology during the devastating civil war in Afghanistan until the Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban regime called itself an Islamic Emirate and was recognized by Saudi Arabia. In recent years, however, things have changed. Now other countries have emerged as mediators in the Afghan peace talks. Qatar is on the top of this list.

Qatar, with a fast rising economy in the Gulf, already influences Muslim countries such as Sudan and Lebanon. Now its influence is extending to Afghanistan. Doha hosted a few intra-Afghan meetings on peace and currently is the city where the Taliban has a political office. Doha benefits from a privileged position to be a conflict resolution actor when it comes to the Afghan peace talks: it has a strategic security and economic partnership with Pakistan and enjoys a friendly relationship with Iran. Iran supplied Qatar with necessary food items and gave airspace access to Qatari air traffic during the Saudi-led Blockade. Iran also hosts the largest American military base in the region, Al Udeid, which is the main source of airpower and logistics for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, does not benefit from Qatar’s international prestige but it is ready to pay billions of dollars to buy the loyalty of other countries. The crowned Saudi prince, King Salman, recently went on a tour of the region where he promised to invest more than $4 billion in Pakistan. Rumors are that King Salman is going to buy the Premier League football club, Manchester United, where Sheikh Mansour, an Emirati royal, owns the Manchester city football club.

The rivalry of these two oil exporters is going to shape a new bloc in the region. They both have sufficient resources to direct relations in their own national interests. Saudi Arabia, losing its influence over the Taliban, is being replaced by Qatar. According to a Taliban official, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are trying to block the Afghan peace talks in Doha while Taliban are happy with Qatari mediation in the process.

The fight between Gulf countries leaves Afghanistan with no saying on its future. With all said and done, would a peace deal brokered by Saudis and Qataris bring peace to Afghanistan? That is the real question, and Afghans do not have a solid answer.

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 by Sakhi Naimzada

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks in the Absence of Afghan Government

Members of each delegation in Moscow beside Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Image credit: Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters.

Afghanistan has a long history of participating in local and international conferences on peace. The Bonn Conference was the start of a series of other conferences on peace and stability hosted in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has put together or at least sent a delegation to myriad conferences to gain international support for their peace efforts with opposition groups in the country.

Despite this trend, the last Moscow Peace talks were held in Russia without the presence of an Afghan government delegation. Organized by an Afghan-Russian Association, the conference took place six days after successful talks between the US and the Taliban occurred in Doha, according to US Special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. The Taliban refused any direct conversation with the Afghan government, but agreed to sit down with delegations from the United Sates, India, Pakistan, China, and prominent Afghan political figures including Hanif Attmar- a favorite to take over as president in the upcoming presidential elections- to talk peace. In the meantime, the Afghan government, the main absentee of the conference, called them traitors and urgently called for direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

After two days of negotiations in Moscow, an agreement was reached. The Taliban, accusing the Kabul government of being an “American puppet”, asked for a withdrawal of American forces from the country, the release of detainees, and the inclusion of the principle of Islamic Religion in the constitution. Former president Hamid Karzai, leading the Afghan delegation, declared the talks a “big achievement” that would bring peace and stability in an “Afghanistan free of foreign forces”. Current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared the Afghan delegation in Moscow illegitimate to represent Afghanistan in the conference.

Russia has been a low-key player in Afghan affairs since the beginning of the War on Terror. The Russian government, concerned about  security in the Central Asia, keeps a close eye on Afghanistan. The latest peace talk in Moscow was a step by Russia towards taking a major role in influencing Afghan governmental affairs, and sets precedent for future Russian involvement in Afghanistan.

Seeing the Taliban sitting at the table with decades-old political enemies to talk peace is the long-awaited desire of all Afghans, but it certainly poses risks. The Taliban went to Moscow demanding what seems to be the return of the Taliban regime of the 1990s, the withdrawal of foreign forces, Sharia Law, and no sign of womens’ appearance within the government. The Afghan delegation, on the other hand, was comprised mainly of political figures who fought on the front lines of the fight against the Taliban. Thanks to differences  between these two parties and the disparity in their motivations for negotiating, the fear is that an agreement between them would be more of a political move to grasp power in Kabul than a long-term solution for peace.

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 by Kristyn Hartwyk

Afghanistan: What Does Peace with the Taliban Mean for Women?

Source: PRI (2016)

The United States and leaders of the Afghan Taliban are currently in the process of discussing peace talks and negotiations to end the 17 years of conflict. For many, this is a signal of hope that deadly violence and war will finally come to an end. For others, the peace talks have stimulated fear and uncertainty.

Her name is Laila Haidari. She is an Afghan woman, who owns and operates a rather unruly cafe in Kabul. Ms. Haidari is not your typical woman living in Afghanistan. In fact, she drives her own car, owns her own business, and chooses not to wear the required hijab.

The cafe she runs, “Taj Begum”, allows men and women to eat and drink together, even if they are not married. In addition, within the walls of her cafe, women can choose whether or not they dine wearing the hijab; a decision woman don’t typically have in Afghanistan.

Ms. Haidari is an example of an Afghan who isn’t completely convinced on the Taliban-U.S. peace process. Despite the progress of the talks, she insists the Taliban and their severe rulings are coming back. For Ms. Haidari and many other women living in Afghanistan, the peace talks have provoked fear and worry of what will happen in the aftermath of the withdrawal of western troops. Ms. Haidari states, “We are face to face with an ideology, not a group of people.” Ms. Haidari and the many other women in Afghanistan feel optimism at the possibility of peace, but they remain concerned at the distrust of what their lives and freedom will be like in the future.

When the Taliban seized the Afghan capital in 1996, life under the militants was brim, especially for women. The implementation of a brutal version of Sharia Law meant that women had very little to no independence or basic rights. They were forced to wear burkas, covering essentially every inch of their body.

Women of all ages were banned from schools and public life. Their lives were constantly under a magnifying glass. Everything they wore, everything they said, and everywhere they went was under supervision. Ultimately, it was the women in Afghanistan who paid the highest price under the Taliban and their government.

During the peace talks in Moscow, the Taliban seemed open to addressing the rights and concerns related to women. For example, the Taliban promised “that Islam guaranteed women’s rights to education and work”, but on the other hand, the Taliban also “attacked women’s rights activists for spreading immortality and indecency.”

These contradictory messages have given ammunition to the fears and concerns of women in Afghanistan that the Taliban is making false, empty promises to expedite the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, only to eventually regress to old laws and rules that severely affect the daily lives of Afghans.

The fact that the Afghan government and its citizens have been excluded from the peace process is frightening for them. Many women fear that a peace deal giving power to the Taliban will result in a war on women and their rights. All of these concerns only solidify the notion that Afghans, especially women, should have a seat at the negotiation table.

Without their presence, the likelihood that women’s basic rights will be forgotten is painfully high. Their biggest fear is that women and all the freedoms they have achieved will fall victim to the peace process.

Afghanistan has made tremendous progress over the past decade in terms of women’s rights, independence and quality of life. Today, there are young girls being educated in many disciplines and pursuing careers in medicine, government and education.

But still today, there are provinces within the country that impose barbaric laws and treatment of women and girls. This brutality and oppression cannot be ignored and there is still significant headway ahead. For Afghans, the time has come to rebuild their country and continue to move forward. Peace, stability and happiness are all things the people of Afghanistan yearn for, but peace in Afghanistan should never come at the cost of women and their rights.

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