by Elisabeta Dinu

Does the Groundbreaking Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Go Beyond the Negotiation Table?

After eighteen months of talks and nearly twenty years of war, Afghanistan looks like it has made a step in the right direction: at the end of February, the United States and the Taliban signed a historic peace agreement in Doha, Qatar. The Agreement is undoubtedly a breakthrough, and even critics of US President Donald Trump credit the administration for achieving a deal that both the Bush and the Obama administrations failed to do. Nevertheless, the three part Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan is a crucial step towards peace, but only the beginning of it.

The Agreement signed on February 29 features a commitment to end American presence in Afghanistan and guarantees that the Taliban will prevent international terrorist organizations from growing on Afghan territory. The deal also features a promise that the Taliban will engage in talks with the US-backed government for achieving a ceasefire, and a pledge to find solutions for managing the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners and 1000 prisoners from the other side.

The prospects for Afghanistan are intricate, and the fragile balance faces manifold pressures. The US-backed incumbent was declared the winner of the presidential elections five months after and led rival Abdullah Abdullah to contest results. This left Afghanistan with two de facto presidents, each assigning governors. Furthermore, Afghanistan has confirmed 4 COVID-19 cases. Given its proximity to Iran (which has confirmed over 7000 cases) and potential low detection rates, Afghanistan is adding another precipitating factor to its lengthy crisis.

The Agreement empowered the Taliban, bearing the cost of legitimizing the group by bringing it to the negotiations table. Throughout the Peace Process the Taliban have been seeking to gain back the power they lost, and the deal seems to be giving them the upper hand. Since the agreement was signed, the Taliban resumed operations against Afghan forces and beyond: last week a bomb exploded in the eastern Khost province, leaving three dead and eleven wounded, and at least twenty-nine people were killed in a mass shooting at an event attended by the country’s opposition leader in Kabul.

The US troops withdrawal from Afghanistan brings about “a long, windy, bumpy road to peace”, said  Defense Secretary Mark Esper after approving the withdrawal. The Agreement promises to reduce the number of US forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 from 12,000 within the first 135 days, and a complete withdrawal in 14 months. As the Reduction of Violence Plan fell into the background, President Trump acknowledged “Taliban could ‘possibly’ seize power after US troops leave”, and sources indicate the Taliban are preparing their annual spring offensive.

Trusting the Taliban with safeguarding the interests of the US and its allies against terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda might have been foolish. Commentators point out the Taliban cannot be trusted with putting an end to terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, recalling the Mujahideen civil war and the mistakes made by the US in Iraq, which opened the space for the emergence of the Islamic State. Are the Taliban trustworthy? Or will Islamic State seize the opportunity and grow stronger in Afghanistan? Previous lessons show that when radicals fight against radicals everyone loses.

The intra-Afghan peace negotiations supposed to begin in the aftermath of the Agreement are equally problematic. President Ashraf Ghani refused to accept the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners as a precondition for talks, while US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo dismissed the rejection of the clause by the Afghan government. Furthermore, the list of negotiators is not ready and the Afghan political community does not show signs of compromise. Directions for a prospective power-sharing government are yet to materialize, and the Afghan government remains vague and weakened by the US promise to ‘refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan’.

What Should Be Done?

US presence must be maintained until more progress is achieved in the domestic peace process. The US might have signed a peace agreement, but Afghan parties are still at war and the government is losing ground. The Peace Agreement allegedly contains two classified annexes that include a timeline for the next 18 months, details on prohibited attacks on both sides, and most important, how the US will share information about its troop locations with the Taliban. Many Afghans fear that the Agreement aids the Taliban, as the modalities of permanent ceasefire are not settled by the deal.

The US and its international partners must commit to funding and training the Afghan Army, and develop a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program for the over 60,000 Taliban fighters. The US withdrawal will leave behind a power-vacuum, much like the Soviets did in 1989. The 1988 Geneva Accords provided a framework for Soviet departure from Afghanistan, which commenced in less than a year. The Soviets also called it a ‘gradual withdrawal’ and facilitated a Policy of National Reconciliation. Yet, in the absence of a comprehensive DDR plan, the situation in Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated leading to a fully-fledged civil war. History should not be repeated.

The US troops should not withdraw until third parties such as Pakistan are committed to and included into the peace process, and international terrorist organizations active in Afghanistan are weakened, if not eradicated. Numerous international terrorist groups use Afghanistan as their bases, recruitment centers, support and organizing their fighters, and a power vacuum would give them a boost that will transcend the borders of Afghanistan.

Elisabeta Dinu

Elisabeta is a Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in Public Policy at Central European University in Budapest and Vienna.

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 by Elisabeta Dinu

From Violence to Politics: Will the Taliban Become a Political Party?

The Taliban has rejected engaging in negotiations many times, but President Ghani’s proposal to fully recognize the group as a legal political party in 2018 was a turning point. Terrorist organizations change and many have proven to have the ability to engage in politics. Organizations like Hezbollah or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) changed strategy and came to prioritize politics over violence for advancing their agenda. Perhaps the Taliban too is showing signs of transforming into a political party?

Tapping into politics does not necessarily mean letting go of violence. Estimated to have around 60,000 full-time fighters, the Taliban’s territorial reach does not show signs of pull back. They retain the ability to conduct high-profile urban attacks, demonstrate considerable tactical capabilities, and their attacks have become more effective in the third quarter of 2019.

As security expert Audrey Kurth Cronin points out, many groups that engaged in politics have maintained violent activities. Hezbollah became a fully-fledged political party shortly after the signing of the Ta’if peace agreement in 1989, but like the Taliban showed no signs of slowing down militarily.  Although it has been running in elections since 1992 and has become one of the most important players in the parliament, Hezbollah has not disarmed like other militias in Lebanon. Similarly, the Taliban are unlikely to commit fully to politics.

Perhaps becoming political could be a means to an end. Conflict negotiations are built on the assumption that parties want the conflict to end. However, in the case of the Taliban this is not clear. United States officials assess that the Taliban does not pose an existential threat to the Afghan government at the moment, but signal that the dynamic can change if the US alters its deployments in Afghanistan.

Negotiations could be a vehicle for the Taliban to force US troops out of Afghanistan, so they could defeat the government and other local rivals in order to reinstate the Islamic Emirate by force. Similarly, Hezbollah’s military capacity competes with that of the government of Lebanon, and both analysts and governments have argued the group’s political activity has only been means to their continuous anti-Israel terror campaign.

Engagement in politics could also feature Taliban radical splinters, which may carry on the terrorist campaign. The Taliban may not be a very fragmented organization under the leadership of Haibatullah Akhundzada, but disagreements within the group could occur if the Taliban and the Afghan government strike a deal. Radical factions could be dissatisfied with concessions made during negotiations and carry on terrorist attacks despite opposition from Taliban leadership.

The IRA is such a case – when the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 granted the formation of an Irish Free State, the organization split. The pro-treaty faction grew into the army of the Irish Free State. The anti-treaty faction – under the leadership of Eamon de Valera — carried on the terrorist campaign. Although until the Good Friday Agreement of 1996 the IRA featured multiple radical splinters that carried on terrorist attacks, the factions also engaged in politics, some growing into the most important political parties in Ireland (such as Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein).

Whether the Taliban transforms into a political party is also a regional bid. The creation of the Taliban was catalyzed by Pakistani influence.  Numerous reports have indicated that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency was involved in the creation of the Taliban, and still supports the insurgency as a matter of official policy to contain the influence in Afghanistan of its rival India.  Similarly, Hezbollah surfaced when Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps arrived in Lebanon to provide support for pro-Iranian Shiite militias against Israel, and the political party has been depicted as an outpost of Iranian influence.

Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Hezbollah and the IRA’s changeover to politics.

  • A comprehensive strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Taliban should be formulated. Although the Ta’if agreement called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, and so did several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Hezbollah expanded its military power and did not show signs of integrating into the Lebanese Armed Forces.
  • A plan for moderating Taliban aims for Islamist government is necessary, as they will most likely seek reinstating Islamist rule in Afghanistan. In comparison, Hezbollah’s engagement in politics has been granted by the group’s receptiveness to political pluralism – “we are committed to Islam but unwilling to impose it by force”.
  • Any deals should contain areas of deliberate strategic ambiguity to minimize Taliban factionalization. The Good Friday Agreement was ambiguous enough to enable participants to describe the accord in terms that were palatable to their constituents, and so should be any agreement between domestic parties in Afghanistan.
  • The role of third-party states is crucial. In Lebanon, success and failure of conflict regulation depends on the maintenance of positive exogenous pressures, and Syrian and Iranian interests affected the trajectory of Hezbollah. Similarly, the interests of Pakistan must be considered as a key element of any potential Taliban engagement in politics.
Elisabeta Dinu

Elisabeta is a Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in Public Policy at Central European University in Budapest and Vienna.

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 by Elisabeta Dinu

Will Violence Stop If the United States and Taliban Reach a Deal?

The latest talks between the United States and the Taliban may conclude with a deal. Content of the peace agreement has been finalized in Doha, according to former Afghan ambassador to Pakistan Omar Zakhilwal. Sources indicate the Taliban agreed to a reduction in violence and potential talks with Afghan government if the deal is sealed.

The agreement revives hopes for a long-term solution in Afghanistan’s painful 18 years of war. However, the potential deal must be treated with caution if US negotiators do not look beyond the peace agreement.

The US-Taliban negotiations have been marked by an on and off pattern of violence. In August 2019, the US and the Taliban concluded the 9th round of direct talks and were on the verge of reaching a deal that could allow the pullout of foreign forces from Afghanistan and a ceasefire that would put an end to violence. However, in September the Taliban conducted an attack that killed one US soldier and 11 civilians in Kabul. President Trump responded by calling off a scheduled meeting with the Taliban and abruptly halted the peace efforts for over three months. At the end of November, the US president made an unannounced visit to Afghanistan, met Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, and declared he revived the paralyzed peace talks.  Yet, an alleged US-Taliban prisoner swap failed, and the ‘trust building’ exercise between the parties seemed to also be overwhelmingly weakened.

According to Trump, the Taliban strategy has been to better their leverage in the peace talks through terrorism. On December 11, the Taliban staged an attack on the Bagram military base. An explosive-laden vehicle went off in the vicinity of the airbase and was followed by shooting. One day after, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad announced a ‘brief pause’ in the already intermittent peace talks. Two more US soldiers were killed by Taliban in January, reaching a total of  2,400 U.S. troops killed in the US’s longest war. The US-backed government forces also stroke back through artillery and aerial attacks that killed over 20 Taliban.

Given that both parties have been focused on maintaining power positions during the negotiations, the content of the agreement might be less of a breakthrough than expected. The US approach to negotiations with the Taliban has been modelled on a straight forward logic: if you have more power than the counterparty, you win, otherwise, you lose. The Taliban, on the other hand, have been capitalizing on a different kind of power – that of field knowledge and terror.  However, the release of the ‘Afghanistan Papers’ by the Washington Post has confirmed it is unclear what ‘winning’ means for the US, as there is little consensus among US leadership on the war’s objectives or about how to end the conflict.

Recent developments show talks lost sight of what are the best potential results of a US-Taliban peace agreement.  Taliban’s spokesman Suhaln Shaheen declared that “there had been no discussion on cease-fire since the beginning, but the US proposed reduction in violence.” Whereas US officials praise the Taliban’s decision to accept a violence reduction plan, Afghan government officials are rather concerned: a ‘reduction of violence’ plan does not contribute anything beneficial to the peace process, said Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.  Salam Rahimi, the state minister for peace affairs, called the plan ‘unacceptable’.

The past months show no indication that an agreement will automatically lead to de-escalation. Peace processes often imply strategic and tactical deception and the second half of 2019 witnessed violence escalation. The number of high-profile Taliban attacks increased, indicating that actors willing to negotiate and eventually sign peace agreements may engage in violence in order to undermine their new partners.

Although both the Taliban and the US seem to have a common goal — the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan — on the short term its materialization remains unlikely. In practice, the US will not withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan, and nor will the Taliban stop engaging in violence. Even if the deal is signed, it is unlikely the Taliban would implement a ceasefire, given the fragmentation and lack of discipline within the organization.

Although a potential agreement between the parties revives hopes for a solution in Afghanistan, positive scenarios are likely only if the US looks beyond the current deal during negotiations. A deal between the US and the Taliban is the beginning of a long term peace process, and has little value for the future of Afghanistan unless a clear action plan for the aftermath of the agreement is formulated.  The United States must formulate recommendations and contribute to the negotiations and reconstruction efforts that will follow a deal with the Taliban.

A comprehensive plan for addressing the domestic conflict is necessary.  The conflict has a strong domestic component that goes beyond the US-Taliban conflict. The Afghani Constitution mentions 14 ethnic groups, and the country is subject of a fragile balance. Sustainable bridges must be built for further negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, as the former refused repeatedly to negotiate with Afghan officials because they are part of a “puppet government”. Furthermore, the withdrawal of US troops without a plan for security provision may witness an increase in intra-state conflicts. The power vacuum left behind may benefit not only the Taliban, but any of the 22 terrorist organization currently operating in Afghanistan.

The regional component of the conflict in Afghanistan further complicates resolution and should also be addressed. Pakistan warned thhat tensions in the Middle East following the killing of Iran’s Al-Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani could hit the reconciliation process in Afghanistan: “On the one hand, we have historical and brotherly relations with Iran, while on the other, our millions of people are working in the Gulf States. We have to be very careful. We have to maintain a balance to protect our own interests” said Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi.

Regardless of a potential conclusion of peace talks between the US and the Taliban, observers must remain cautiously optimistic. The potential agreement might be less of a breakthrough than it seems, and the cycle of violence is unlikely to be broken unless a long term plan for the future of Afghanistan is in sight.

Elisabeta Dinu

Elisabeta is a Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow at Rise to Peace. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in Public Policy at Central European University in Budapest and Vienna.

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 by Jack Ryan

The Afghanistan Papers: What Do They Mean for Peace in the Region?

A recent Washington Post investigation — three years in the making — exposed a multitude of falsified positive views and deceptive action directly taken by the United States government and military officials over the course of the war in Afghanistan. Hundreds of interviews with US officials led to condemnation of the war which has cost 3804 Afghan civilian lives in 2018 alone.

“For 18 years, America has been at war in Afghanistan. As part of a government project to understand what went wrong, a federal agency interviewed more than 400 people who had a direct role in the conflict. In those interviews, generals, ambassadors, diplomats and other insiders offered firsthand accounts of the mistakes that have prolonged the war. 

The full, unsparing remarks and the identities of many of those who made them have never been made public — until now. After a three-year legal battle, The Washington Post won release of more than 2,000 pages of “Lessons Learned” interviews conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Those interviews reveal there was no consensus on the war’s objectives, let alone how to end the conflict.” 

In summary, the government deceived American citizens about the progress made during the war. Bob Crowley, a retired Army colonel who served in Kabul from 2013 to 2014 stated,  “The strategy became self-validating. Every data point was altered to present the best picture possible.” The fact that this was allowed to continue covertly for an extended period of time reflects the well-planned nature of the disinformation campaign, especially if one considers its effectiveness through three separate presidencies.

Setting aside the inevitable investigations and questions that will follow, it is important to assess the impact this exposure will have on the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan. This exposure will affect negotiations between the US and the Taliban, bilateral relations between Kabul and Washington and public opinion of the US within Afghanistan.

The Trump administration will need to make changes to their Afghan strategy in an attempt to rectify these mistakes. Conversely, they could seek to divert attention away from the Afghan Papers, but this will have a particularly strong effect on how the peace process unfolds. Speculation in the media that President Trump plans to withdraw additional troops from Afghanistan may be ‘part of the plan’, but it may be a rushed decision to avoid further public criticism. A quick withdrawal will have a major impact on Afghan security and regional stability. It is important that all parties put security above politics, especially in such a fragile region.

In an effort to keep the documents classified, the US State Department argued that the release of portions of certain interviews could jeopardize negotiations with the Taliban and therefore jeopardize efforts to end the war. The Washington Post, however, argued that these documents were classified only after the Post pushed to have them published, indicating a blatant attempt to cover up mistakes.

Despite differences of opinion over the reasons behind the secrecy classification, the release of the ‘Afghanistan Papers’ will undoubtedly influence negotiations with the Taliban, an organization that has been testing the US government long prior to the talks. For example, in an effort to demonstrate strength, the Taliban carried out an attack that killed a US soldier in September. Washington deemed this a step too far and consequently compelled Trump to cancel a secret Camp David meeting. The re-establishment of peace talks — after what can only be described as a cooling-off period — exemplifies that each side pushes the other over acceptable terms and those deemed unreasonable to accept.

Statements within the Afghan Papers that accuse the US of uncertainty and a lack of control over their Afghan strategy gives leverage to the Taliban; an organization so eager to gain power over an enemy that they have struggled to match on the battlefield.

“Was al-Qaeda the enemy, or the Taliban? Was Pakistan a friend or an adversary? What about the Islamic State and the bewildering array of foreign jihadists, let alone the warlords on the CIA’s payroll? According to the documents, the U.S. government never settled on an answer.”

Thus, whilst the US may have tried to keep the Afghanistan Papers hidden for security reasons or to save face, it will undoubtedly affect peace talks with The Taliban as both sides take time to reassess their respective strategies based on the new information available.

In addition to negotiating with the Taliban, the US strategy for peace in Afghanistan has revolved around the development of a close relationship with the Afghan government built on financial and military support. The Afghan government sat patiently at a distance whilst the US negotiated with the Taliban, however, accusations of fraud and corruption within the Afghanistan Papers will provoke the Afghan government to reassess their relationship with the US at the very least.

Sustainable peace in Afghanistan is distant, but it is achievable. It is integral to maintain effective security whilst at the same time allowing Afghanistan to take control of their peace process. As the US slowly relinquishes its duties in the region, they must reassess the outcome of their withdrawal and make assurances that policies and resources remain in place to ensure peace prevails at every opportunity.

Jack Ryan
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 by Rise to Peace

Trump’s Visit to Afghanistan and a Revival of Peace Talks

On November 28, President Donald Trump paid a special Thanksgiving visit to American troops stationed in Afghanistan. It marked his first trip to the country amidst a period of recent developments, including a prisoner swap with the Taliban.

Could Trump’s surprise appearance signal positive developments in the Afghan peace process and progress towards a future resolution, despite stalled talks and sense of hopelessness?

A recent poll conducted by Rise to Peace revealed that respondents did not consider the prisoner swap as an important factor in any further peace negotiations. This result likely stems from the abrupt end of productive peace talks in early September. However, as Thursday’s visit demonstrated, an opportunity for a negotiated peace settlement remains.

“We will see if the Taliban wants to make a deal. If they do, they do. If they don’t they don’t. We were getting close” Trump stated.

Trump’s visit follows unofficial talks in Doha where Sayed Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander, told TOLOnews that discussions began, but “official negotiations were not underway like they were in the past.” Despite the secrecy of the talks and lack of formality in the revival of the process, Trump’s optimism suggests that negotiations will continue.

“The Taliban wants to make a deal,” he told troops stationed at Bagram Airbase.

Whilst in Afghanistan, Trump said he hopes to reduce the number of troops to 8,600 from the current 14,000. This will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the morale of Afghan security forces who rely on US support in the region.

Trump also met with President Ghani and confirmed the potential revival of peace negotiations. However, it was unclear whether the Afghan government would be involved in the resumption of peace talks.

As long as the Taliban and the Afghan government are unable to hold bilateral talks, the US will remain a key player in the peace negotiations. This complicates the process. Firstly, the intervention of foreign actors means that negotiations will no longer be intra-Afghan, but rather focus on ending the war.

It is unsurprising that Trump wants to make good on his promise to bring his troops home, but what does this mean for the Afghan government that struggles to counter the Taliban militarily even with US support?

In conclusion, as long as the peace talks remain informal or ‘secret’, Afghans will continue to be skeptical of the negotiations. Whilst the US will no doubt be looking to bring its troops home, Afghanistan is facing a period of great uncertainty, especially with the fragility surrounding the September 2019 elections.

Support for Afghan security forces will remain integral to the maintenance of peace in the region, even after talks are complete. Thus, if the Taliban remain unwilling to accept anything apart from a total withdrawal of American troops, the potential for successful peace negotiations slips away.

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