by Arman Sidhu

Intra-Afghan Talks: What Does Pakistan Want?

Among the prevalent foreign actors involved in Afghanistan’s peace process, few have as a large of stake as Pakistan. The ascension of General Zia Ul-Haq, who served as Pakistan’s President from 1978-1988, was followed by an assertive foreign policy that sought to protect, and enlarge, Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Long-standing issues, ranging from territorial disputes across the Durand Line, to Afghanistan’s historically friendly ties with India, had come to define what was, and remains, a testy relationship between Kabul and Islamabad.

Yet, in the backdrop of the Cold War, the opportunity for Pakistan to redefine its interests coincided with the arrival of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Buttressed by political support from the United States, coupled with financial support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan served as the primary conduit with the Mujahedin throughout its war with the Soviets.

Through the flow of aid and provisions of training and supplies, Pakistan’s relationship with the Mujahedin evolved beyond the original mission to oust the Afghan government and defeat the Soviets. Instead, Pakistan’s influence increasingly took on an ideological nature, with the political stylings of General Zia’s religious nationalism serving as inspiration for the Taliban and its fundamentalist movement.

The emergence of a Taliban government in Afghanistan represented a rare and significant victory for Pakistan’s sphere of influence, much of which had gradually eroded within South Asia throughout the Cold War. Among other objectives, a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan created opportunities to curb India’s influence and even use Afghan territory to provide training, logistical support, and safe haven to militants from Indian Kashmir.

While pressure from the international community may have forced Pakistan into a far more muted relationship with the Taliban, its strategic objectives and interests in Afghanistan has not undergone much change from its original position. For Pakistan, the intra-Afghan talks present an opportunity to shape the post-peace trajectory of Afghanistan. Within this stage of negotiation, Pakistan’s core aims are as follows: Political legitimacy for the Taliban, tempered Indian influence, US approval for a peace agreement, subsequently followed by a very gradual US troop withdrawal.

Having earned plaudits for its efforts to mediate and bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, Pakistan’s next moves will increasingly focus on integrating the Taliban into Afghanistan’s political fabric. Doing so, under a peace agreement, would legitimize the Taliban as a political entity and give Pakistan more flexibility in openly lending its support to pro-Pakistani elements across Afghanistan.

If the Taliban is to accede to a genuine DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) process, it will likely demand the opportunity to participate politically as a formalized party in all levels of Afghan elections. An alternative route to sustaining the Taliban’s political influence may come in the form of a power-sharing arrangement, where the Taliban embeds itself more deeply into the Afghan state, through the presence of its members in the civil service and key ministries. In either case, such a scenario would be a boon for Pakistan, providing an avenue for which elements of the Taliban would be able to legitimately obtain power, and represent Pakistani interests.

In addition to transitioning the Taliban into a legitimate political entity, Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives remain heavily driven by its animosity with India. Since the Partition of India in 1947, Afghanistan has been a staunch ally of the Indian government, with the Taliban’s brief tenure serving as an anomaly. While it is unlikely to rid Afghanistan of pro-Indian influence, the integration of the Taliban would at the very minimum, modulate India’s influence. Thus, ensuring Afghanistan’s neutrality in any future Indo-Pakistani conflicts would represent a win for Pakistan.

Finally, the principal objective of any forthcoming peace agreement will necessitate the approval of the United States. The US approval would grant Pakistan peace of mind to pursue its interests in Afghanistan openly without fears of punitive sanctions by the US, or additional scrutiny from intergovernmental organizations like the Financial Action Task Force, which is charged with curbing terrorism funding and helps inform the policies of state actors. Having brokered the US-Taliban peace deal in February, Pakistan remains cognizant of America’s fatigue with the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, halting a hasty withdrawal by the Americans is critical to Pakistan’s own security concerns across the Durand Line. Fears of resurgent Pashtun nationalism seeping into Pakistan’s borders would pose an endemic threat in its restive northernmost provinces.

The past two years have featured some of the most momentous events in Afghanistan’s peacebuilding process. Having long been beholden to direct and indirect influence by foreign actors, Afghanistan will not only have to balance the interests of its internal parties, but also the interests of external players, like Pakistan’s military and security establishment. In the absence of a peace deal that meets its criteria, Pakistan may instead find itself in favor of the status quo, an outcome that would represent a devastating blow to the prospect of peace in Afghanistan.

Arman Sidhu
risetopeace.org
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 by Anja Apfel

Problems in the Way of Progress: Uncertain US Troop Withdrawal and New Challenges Facing the Afghan Peace Process

On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace agreement, widely referred to as the ‘Doha Deal’, which is considered to have provided a foundation upon which a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan can be built.

One of the primary tenets of the ‘Doha Deal’ focuses upon the gradual reduction of the remaining 12,000 US troops currently stationed in Afghanistan, with plans for an eventual full-withdrawal. Throughout the first half of 2020, the US has already significantly reduced the numbers of its troops in Afghanistan to 8600, therefore greatly surpassing the agreed upon reduction (as defined in the Doha Deal) to 12,000 remaining troops. However, whilst this major tenet of the deal has been accomplished seemingly with no major complications, the satisfying of other primary elements of the Doha Deal can be seen to have experienced various considerable setbacks.

Even days after the agreement was originally signed, the progress was largely overshadowed by issues arising from each constitutive party. The Afghan government immediately raised concerns regarding another of the deal’s primary components: the numbers and time-span of the agreed upon release of 5000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government. These concerns regarding the prisoner swap have not only caused major problems in developing the peace process further in the last months, but the anticipated nation-wide reduction in violence (which was expected to arise as a direct result of the agreement) has also failed to occur.

Although there have been notable periods since the signing of the deal within which the violence between parties can be seen to have subsided (e.g. The Eid Ceasefire), the country has still experienced regular sparks of conflict. In fact, this conflict has escalated to such a point that, in mid-June 2020, the deadliest week for Afghan government forces in Afghanistan’s 19 years of conflict was recorded.

Alongside the multitude of issues which have arisen as a direct consequence of the Doha Deal’s signing, Afghanistan’s stabilization, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process, has been largely stunted by the Afghan state’s attempted resistance to the global COVID-19 pandemic. With over 34,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (14.07) and over 1000 deaths in Afghanistan alone, the resolution of the Doha Deal, and the progression of the Afghan Peace Process as a whole has been largely inhibited by the national prioritization of a new kind of challenge for the Afghan state.

However, aside from this aforementioned environment, which presents an array of complex new challenges and concerns for the Afghan government, trepidation surrounding the potential negative consequences of the US withdrawal of troops has retained focus in the midst of this climate. These concerns have especially been raised in relation to the remaining presence of various violent-extremist groups in Afghanistan, particularly Al-Qaeda. It has been argued that, without the support and presence of US troops, Afghanistan is vulnerable to both continued attacks from the Taliban itself and from the other aforementioned violent-extremist groups.

This concern is also not entirely unfounded as, despite the fact that under the Doha Deal the Taliban agreed to not allow extremist groups (Al-Qaeda in particular) to operate in Taliban controlled areas, recent information suggests that the Taliban has not been working towards challenging the presence of such groups. Therefore, a scenario in which violent extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, will re-establish/strengthen their footholds throughout Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan following the US withdrawal of troops is not inconceivable. In fact, a recent United Nations report specifically warned of the remaining active links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to the report, “The Taliban regularly consulted with Al-Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered guarantees that it would honor their historical ties.”

This information, as presented by the UN, clearly states that the Taliban is failing to fulfill this particular component of the peace deal, as they have seemingly failed to sever their bonds with Al-Qaeda. This perhaps consequently suggests that, upon acknowledging this continued relationship between the Taliban and violent extremist groups, the US will consider halting the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan until the Taliban has evidently severed such relationships, which would subsequently also fulfil one of the Taliban’s key commitments to the Doha Deal.

However, the decision of the US in this case not only depends on the actions of the Taliban, but also on US domestic interests. Some US officials are concerned that, regardless of the shortcomings of the Taliban in absolutely fulfilling their agreed upon components of the Doha Deal, all US troops are going to be withdrawn before the US presidential election in November 2020. This is a direct consequence of statements made by President Trump during his 2016 election campaign and throughout his ongoing 4-year administration, in which a full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, prior to the on-coming 2020 presidential election, was promised.

Although these aforementioned challenges are obstructing progression of the Afghan Peace Process, there is hope for the change which the long-awaited intra-Afghan talks may bring for the dynamics of the implementation of the overarching peace deal. However, due to the interdependent nature upon which each of the constitutive parties’ commitments rely, it can be reasoned that until a greater degree of dedication to satisfying key components of the Doha Deal from each party is established, the intra-Afghan talks may fail to bring the long-awaited constructive solutions which they are hoped to result in.

Anja Apfel
risetopeace.org
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 by Arman Sidhu

Indo-Afghan Ties and the Prospect of Peace

As one of several external stakeholders that have taken a keen interest in the affairs of Afghanistan, India ranks among one of the more reticent partners of the Afghan government. In spite of losing their shared border over 70 years ago, due to the results of the Partition of India and the subsequent First Kashmir War, Indo-Afghan ties remain strong. India’s steadfast support for Afghanistan’s state entities has evolved considerably, from recognizing and supporting Afghanistan’s contentious Cold War-era governments, to aiding the present-day Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

In return, India’s status as the largest regional donor and supporter of Afghan statecraft and reconstruction has endeared the country to numerous Afghan leaders. Beyond provisions of material support and developmental assistance, India’s higher education institutions, which counts former President Hamid Karzai as an alumnus, remains a popular destination for Afghan students, many of whom return to positions in the nascent public and private sectors. Two of India’s most prominent military academies, namely the Indian Military Academy, and the National Defence Academy, enroll a significant intake of Afghan soldiers, aiding in the capacity-building process of Afghanistan’s security forces.

Behind India’s soft power investment in Afghanistan is a desire to retain existing influence in Kabul, while curbing similar ambitions by arch-rival Pakistan. Unlike the other original sponsors of the Mujahideen, such as the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s stake in Afghanistan did not wane at the conclusion of the Afghan Civil War.

Instead, the five-year period of Taliban rule from 1996-2001 showcased the potential potency of a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan. Seminal events like the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight by a pro-Taliban group based in Kashmir, accelerated India’s coalition-building of anti-Taliban forces, which featured a mix of both internal and external entities.

In addition, throughout their tenure, the Taliban hosted numerous anti-Indian organizations, several of which have been linked to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (IS) agency. The most notable of these organizations was Lakshar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group that would later be responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Given the proximity of Kashmir to Afghanistan’s northeast borders, the notion of a contiguous corridor that could supply Indian Kashmiri separatists with training, safe haven, as well as material and logistical support from Pakistan and/or the Taliban is a crucial security concern for India.

Memories of the subsequent damage inflicted upon Indian interests during the Taliban’s tenure continues to inform New Delhi’s present-day objectives. While its contributions to the Afghan state have enlarged in scope, India still remains fixated on curtailing Pakistan’s influence, which is primarily wielded through the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan’s security establishment.

Although portraying Afghanistan’s situation as a microcosm of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry may come off as a slight toward Afghan sovereignty, alignment between the goals of India and the Afghan government remain strong. India remains one of the more active participants in development and infrastructure projects designed to boost Afghanistan’s connectivity and increase its participation in the global economy. The Iranian port of Chabahar is one example, as the port remains a key conduit of trade between India, Afghanistan, and Iran, through a route that deliberately avoids Pakistan.

Furthermore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought a more vocal and active role for India’s engagement in foreign affairs, with developments in Afghanistan at the forefront of this initiative. Indian officials have been frequently sighted and quoted during pivotal moments in the Afghan peace process, including during the US-Taliban deal that was signed in Doha, Qatar earlier this year.

In its most recent observations of the Afghan peace process, India’s foreign policy establishment has tempered expectations, preferring to instead focus on the schematics of a deal signed between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

In particular, the unresolved question of how the Taliban will integrate into Afghanistan’s civil society is pertinent to India’s posturing. In the event that the Taliban and its members convert to willing democratic participants, India’s interests would then evolve into preventing radical elements and individuals from ascending to the highest levels of government. A scenario in which Afghan political parties begin to orient themselves as strictly pro-India or pro-Pakistan remains plausible and would likely fuel further competition between the two powers, with the concomitant effect of tainting Afghanistan’s political culture.

The spectrum of possibilities in a potential peace deal presents newfound challenges to the Indo-Afghan relationship. India’s reluctance to engage with the Taliban stems from its characterization of the group as a stalwart client of Pakistan, rather than an independent entity.

Thus, any peace deal outcome that grants some level of legitimate political authority to the Taliban would present the greatest threat to India’s strategic ambitions in Afghanistan, which includes fostering closer political and economic ties with Central Asia and the Gulf region. As a result, the next few phases of the intra-Afghan peace process, set to resume in Doha, will carry significant political, economic, and security ramifications for India’s broader foreign policy strategy.

– Arman Sidhu

Arman Sidhu
risetopeace.org
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 by Arman Sidhu

Eid Ceasefire Offers Cautious Optimism for Peace Process

After enduring a spate of violent attacks carried out by the Taliban over the past two months, Afghanistan received a much needed respite from conflict during the Eid al-Fitr holiday. In recognition of this sacred time, the Taliban announced a 3-day ceasefire, marking the third instance of a temporary truce since 2018.

In its announcement, the Taliban’s leadership commanded its fighters to refrain from launching any offensive operations, but did not rule out the possibility of needing to defend against assaults carried out by government forces. Such sentiments signal that the level of trust between both parties remains shaky, threatening any momentum that has been garnered over the past two years toward a substantive and inclusive peace deal.

Like previous periods of ceasefire, this round proved to be short-lived, with recent attacks attributed to the Taliban following the expiry of the ceasefire. Nevertheless, such measures are considered integral to facilitating the ongoing talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, who are currently meeting in Kabul while fighting continues unabated.

In spite of the challenging circumstances regarding the conflict, and the sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Afghan peace process has shown resilience through 2020, with promising signs of headway emerging both between, and within, both parties.

For its part, the Afghan government responded to the Taliban’s unilateral declaration with its own peace offering, by promising to accelerate the release process for imprisoned Taliban fighters. The significance of such a move cannot be understated, given that terms for the prisoner release remain a contentious sticking point within the government. As well, the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government has also been utilised as the primary tool for encouraging the Taliban’s initiation of a ceasefire, demonstrating that the Afghan government is willing to take the ‘next steps’ towards intra-Afghan dialogue.

Furthermore, a power-sharing arrangement cinched earlier this month between President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah will undoubtedly strengthen the government’s legitimacy, while improving its position of leverage during the reconciliation process. Prior to the deal, both Ghani and Abdullah had claimed victory in last year’s presidential election, even after an appeal process had declared Ghani as the victor.

The political feud and rivalry had even gone as far as encouraging Abdullah to form a parallel government, precisely at the time when the Trump administration had signed a conditional peace deal with the Taliban, putting the ball in Kabul’s court to advance the peace process. As a result of the difficulties associated with managing a pandemic and brokering a peace deal, resolving the internal crisis of leadership within the Afghan government has proven advantageous by presenting a united front between the two factions of leadership in their talks with the Taliban.

Having resolved their differences, the terms of the deal designate Abdullah as the government’s lead in talks with the Taliban, leaving administration of state affairs to Ghani. As a conservative politician of mixed heritage with historical ties to the Mujahideen movement, Abdullah has assiduously crafted an image and narrative of his willingness to negotiate with the Taliban.

In recent months, Abdullah has often critiqued Ghani’s approach as impractical, believing that the imposition of demands as a prerequisite to intra-Afghan dialogue has only dissuaded the Taliban’s participation.The Ghani-Abdullah rivalry had also been used to advance the Taliban’s rhetoric, by describing Ghani’s government as fractured and unrepresentative of the Afghan population.

Despite their previous discrepancies, both Afghan leaders can be seen to understand the importance of working together on behalf of taking the peace negotiations with the Taliban further. By agreeing to the ceasefire and to the subsequent release of an additional 2000 Taliban prisoners, the Afghan government has shown its willingness to continue peace talks with the Taliban.

However, it is not only the Afghan authorities who have taken significant steps towards satisfying the Doha Deal, but also the Taliban who have demonstrated their great commitment to the peace talks through the recent initiation of the ceasefire arrangement over the course of the Eid holiday period. Even though violent clashes continued directly after the ceasefire concluded, the hope for finally reaching peace has not entirely vanished, as both parties have clearly indicated a higher degree of willingness to move forward with the Doha Deal and collaborate towards establishing a more stable Afghanistan.

– Arman Sidhu and Anja Apfel

Arman Sidhu
risetopeace.org
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 by Cameron Hoffman

Could US Retaliation for ISIL Strike Influence Afghan Peace Talks?

On April 9, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant -Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) claimed responsibility for rocket strikes on an important United States airbase. The strikes resulted in zero casualties, but have the potential to spark retaliation from the US while it negotiates troop withdrawl as part of their deal with the Taliban. This could derail already fragile negotiations.

ISIL-KP has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks targeting the Taliban, Afghan citizens, and the US-backed Afghan government in the past few years. Though they control little territory, their strength has been assessed at approximately 2,000 fighters limited to North-East Afghanistan. Stalled peace talks and the recent prisoner release debacle offer ISIL-KP a window of opportunity and indicate why the group chose to strike now — nearly six months since its last claimed major attack. Simply put, ISIL-KP is trying to disrupt the peace talks to keep the US in Afghanistan.

Terrorist groups like ISIL-KP thrive on instability and chaos as they develop in the shadows of larger players and conflicts. These groups utilize destruction and economic disparity to increase their numbers and influence. However, if the US leaves Afghanistan, ISIL-KP lose the cover of the US-Taliban conflict to hide their actions.

The Taliban can focus on dismantling smaller insurgent and terrorist organizations as a consolidation of power in the case that the US leaves Afghanistan. ISIL-KP is not an exception to this rule as they are unable to match the strength of the Taliban. Therefore, it is assumed that the ISIL-KP attack was an attempt to keep the US in the region by destabilizing the peace talks.

If the Taliban and the US continue to fight each other — in the battlefield or the negotiation table — then ISIL-KP survival is expected. It is very likely that violent attacks of some kind will continue because deterioration of the peace talks is crucial to the longevity of ISIL-KP. Now is not the time for the US to be sidetracked and fall into a trap set by ISIL-KP.

Any strikes in Afghanistan can be used as pretext for the Taliban to retaliate as well as lose whatever little trust they have in the US. The Taliban could pull out of the already fragile negotiations and this is not something the US can risk. Too much is at stake and too much can go wrong.

In order to demonstrate that the US will keep its troop withdrawal commitments, now is not the time to retaliate against ISIL-KP. Energy must be focused toward the present negotiations and building trust with the Taliban. The strike on the US airbase may be cause for concern, but it cannot be a distraction from the mission at hand: leaving Afghanistan.

– Cameron Hoffman

Cameron Hoffman
risetopeace.org
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