Special Report On Youths’ Views on the Afghan Peace Process

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This report sought to explore the youth of Afghanistan’s views and perspective on the Afghan peace process. 187 respondents between the ages of 18-39 responded to the questionnaire and provided data for this report. Overall, the report highlighted youth concerns regarding women’s role following peace agreements with the Taliban, but are of the opinion they have an effective role in these talks. Consequently, the youth expressed mixed feelings regarding negotiations with the Taliban, which following the increase of violence, leaves little optimism for peace.

Policy recommendations will follow the report, which will suggest investment in education for the youth. Moreover, recommendations will be offered to neighboring countries, including Pakistan and Iran. This report suggests that more research is necessary to ensure inclusivity in the peace process, in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Qatar’s Mediation Challenges in the Afghan Peace Process

As NATO’s 20-year campaign in Afghanistan comes to an end and the Taliban escalate their nationwide offensive, Qatar remains the most privileged actor among the Persian Gulf States. This comes as a result of Qatar’s mediation efforts in listening to the different actors involved in the Afghan conflict and the considerable trust earned throughout the past few years.

In spite of Qatar’s long experience as a mediator in disputes and wars, the Gulf country has some challenges and responsibilities to face, in terms of regional and international stability and peace.

Background

Although Qatar did not recognize the Taliban between 1996 and 2001, it maintained “cordial” relations with the group after 9/11. The decision to open a political office hosting Taliban leaders in Doha in 2013, was a major step for the Afghan peace negotiations. Initially, the Afghan government expressed its willingness to provide protection for the Taliban leaders by opening a political office in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. This was largely based on the countries’ historic ties with Kabul. However, the Taliban expressed their preferences over Qatar, which was believed to be a more impartial and balanced power.

In September 2020, peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government took place in Doha. In spite of this, an acute rise in civilian casualties followed. According to OHCHR data, October 2020 marked the highest monthly number of civilian casualties of the year, “with targeted killings of civilians […] included media workers, civil society activists, members of the judiciary and the government administration, as well as relatives of members of the security forces”.

On 17th and 18th of July 2021, peace talks were held in Doha between the Taliban and the Afghan government. However, the Qatari facilitator stated that the two sides had only agreed to “work to prevent civilian casualties”. Despite this, both sides committed to expediting peace negotiations in Doha in the upcoming weeks.

Qatar challenges and potentiality in the peace process

Qatar is known as a power capable of exerting its regional and international influence through the mediation tool. Since 2008, the Gulf country has mediated in more than 10 international disputes. Among them, it is worth mentioning, the Qatari mediation between Fatah and Hamas in 2012, as well as the reconciliation and peace between the rival Tebu and Tuareg tribes in Libya in 2015.

Qatar could also mediate to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia’s regional and ideological tensions and goals in Afghanistan. This could be achieved by highlighting the commitment and efforts to bring peace, reconstruction, and protection of human rights.

However, Qatar will also have to face difficulties. Qatar has lately been approached by NATO concerning the possible use of a base in Qatar, to secure and train the Afghan special forces, following the total withdrawal of US-led troops from Afghanistan scheduled on September 11, 2021. If Qatar accepts NATO’s offer, it will become a strategic channel between Afghanistan and NATO countries. Nevertheless, this could result in the deterioration of Qatar’s ties with the Taliban, who may interpret the move as an attempt to support the Afghan government.

Conclusion

The Gulf country needs to reflect on NATO’s offer. Depending on the result, geopolitical consequences and changes will be inevitable in the Afghan peace process. However, it is relevant to take into consideration the regional and international commitment to empowering the Afghan population and securing sustainable and long-term peace.

A Bleak Picture for Afghanistan: A Weekly Update on Taliban Advances

Source: Long War Journal (control areas as of Aug. 8) By Scott Reinhard

In recent weeks, the Taliban have made unprecedented gains that continue to threaten Afghanistan’s stability. This furthermore increases the likelihood that it will become a haven for international terrorists.

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From strikes against prominent figures to military offensives that have resulted in the capture of three provincial capitals, the situation had become dire. So much so, that the British and American Embassies in Kabul have advised their citizens to evacuate immediately. This is in anticipation of further violence to come.

American and Afghan planes continue to bomb the Taliban in attempts to curbs its advances, with the Ministry of Defence claiming hundreds of fighters dead. Militia fighters, led by former mujahedeen commanders like Ismail Khan from Herat, have augmented government forces and pledged to fight the Taliban for their homeland. While the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, the Taliban continue to stall negotiations in Doha, while spokesman Suhail Shaheen sanctions the violence as the alternative to the current government’s rule.

The four major events of last week have serious implications for Afghanistan and foreshadow serious consequences if the Afghan government fails to counter the Taliban’s gains.

On August 3rd and 6th, the Taliban demonstrated their ability to penetrate deep into Kabul. This was shown with attacks on prominent government officials. Although Defense Minister, Bismillah Khan, escaped unharmed by the two vehicle-borne IEDs and subsequent gunfight that erupted late on August 3rd, eight people were killed and 20 injured in the battle. This is particularly concerning because the Sherpur neighborhood, where the minister resides, is home to other prominent government officials and is one of the most secure areas in Kabul.

As the Taliban make quick gains, these brazen attacks on officials are only likely to increase as the movement continues to gain momentum in the face of US airstrikes and pressure from Afghan soldiers. Unfortunately, the Taliban’s next attack succeeded, killing the top media and information officer in a roadside ambush in Kabul. Dawa Khan Menapal served as Ashraf Ghani’s spokesman and was lauded by US ambassador Ross Wilson as ”a friend and colleague whose career was focused on providing truthful information to all Afghans.”

Although covered little in comparison to these major attacks, the Taliban also killed the district governor in Kabul, Sayed Abad. These successful and failed assassinations highlight the Taliban’s lethal reach and disinterest in achieving a shared political settlement in Afghanistan. They serve not only to highlight the government’s inability to protects its leader,s but also to deter Afghan’s from supporting and participating in the political process. The military gains in Herat, Lashkar Gah, and Nimruz only serve to strengthen their resolve.

Beyond the asymmetric tactic used by the Taliban in Kabul and areas firmly held by the Afghan government, fighting in Helmand, Kandahar, and other provinces has intensified. In the last few days, the Taliban have captured several provincial capitals, Sheberghan, Laskar Gah, Zaranj, Kunduz, Sar-e-Pol, and Taloqan. Their victories at Taloqan are especially surprising because northern Afghanistan provided some of the most brutal resistance to their rule in the late 1990s. Subsequently, it became the launchpad of US operations shortly after 9/11.

Amid these offensives, US and Afghan planes continue to batter Taliban positions, killing hundreds of fighters and causing fires throughout various cities. In a notable strike, a B-52 bomber killed a group of over 200 Taliban fighters in  Sheberghan, Jowzan Province. Many have reported the bodies of women and children in these cities, whose fates may be connected to gross human rights violations by the Taliban. Some have also reported that the Taliban went door-to-door, asking for those who helped coalition forces and killing them. This was in direct contradiction to their commitments of protecting those they saw as traitors of Afghanistan and Islam. 

These extrajudicial killings of former interpreters, without due process and the targeting of civilians, greatly complicates the Taliban’s standing in the world. This furthermore reduces the possibility of peace in Afghanistan.

The international community should hold the Taliban accountable for these actions and deter the movement from similar violations through sanctions and other political measures. The recent victories by the movement appear to prove some intelligence assessments correct, mainly being that Afghanistan could fall in as little as six months to the Taliban.

However, Afghans should continue to fight, lobby for more international support, and work to bring essential services to people to deter them from joining the Taliban. The US should increase the number of evacuation flights and airstrikes in the country. Militia leaders should also mobilize and recruit willing Afghans to help government forces resist Taliban progress and preserve two decades of progress for future generations.

 

Iran’s Ambiguous Role in the Afghan Peace Process

On July 8, Iran hosted talks between delegations from the Afghan government and the Taliban. This effort provided a new venue for Afghan negotiators to engage one another as the Taliban advance continued and the U.S.-backed talks in Doha stalled. The Iranian position toward the Afghan war has been complex and often ambiguous. While the Iranian government is now advocating peace, its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan are much broader.

For the last 25 years, Iranian policy toward Afghanistan has been driven by a dual mandate. Iran has aimed to prevent the rise of Sunni fundamentalism while also contesting American power in the Middle East.

As a Shiite-majority nation, Iranian disdain for Sunni fundamentalism is palpable. Fundamentalist Sunni groups like the Taliban often assert that Shiites are not true Muslims and wage vicious attacks against them. In the last few decades, Iran has branded itself the “protector of Shiites” in the Middle East. At first, this made Iran an adversary of the Taliban. In 1998, Iran nearly declared war against the Taliban after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, in which the Taliban killed many Shiites and 11 Iranian citizens. After the September 11th attacks, Iran, in alignment with American policy, supported the Northern Alliance campaign against the Taliban.

However, Iranian fear of American power has made it an inconsistent ally of America and the Afghan government. Since the initial defeat of the Taliban in December 2001, Iran has played a more nuanced role in Afghanistan, trying to cozy up with Afghan elites while also providing occasional support to the Taliban. Iranian officials fear that if America enjoys too much success in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran might become the next target of American regime change efforts. The numerous American military bases surrounding Iran and frequent calls for regime change in the American media exacerbate these anxieties. While Iran is glad to see the American presence in Afghanistan end, its policy toward Afghanistan must now chart a new course that consists of more than mere anti-Americanism.

Inside Iran, public opinion is divided regarding the ideal policy toward Afghanistan. The reformists have been hawkish regarding Afghanistan, disgusted by the Taliban’s religious fundamentalism and their recent outrageous targeted attacks against Shiite Hazaras. Etemad, a prominent reformist newspaper, recently warned of “unpleasant consequences if extremist and violent movements like the Taliban come to power.”

Iran’s hardliners have the upper hand politically and support a more conciliatory approach to the Taliban. This June, Kayhan, a paper funded by the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, remarked that “The Taliban today is different from the Taliban that used to behead people.” Statements like these are not expressions of political solidarity. While Iran and the Taliban are united in their anti-Americanism, the Taliban has much closer ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rivals. Instead, Iranian hardliners make these statements to signal Iran’s belief in the possibility of a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Lately, Iranian officials have been stressing their hopes for peace. Rasoul Mousavi, leader of West Asia policy in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has stated that: “Opportunities pass like clouds. The opportunity of peace must be taken today, not tomorrow, as it might be late.” Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian special representative to Afghanistan, recently met with the Afghan foreign minister to assure him of Iran’s commitment to peace. A cursory look at The Tehran Times, an Iranian newspaper with close ties to the foreign ministry, reveals an array of headlines promoting “talks” and “peace,” a tact that is strikingly similar to American rhetoric on Afghanistan.

But Iranian policy toward Afghanistan is more interested in stability than peace. Hostilities around Herat are ongoing, and Iran is concerned that the violence could spill into its territory. This July, the Taliban captured many districts in Herat province that are adjacent to Iran’s eastern border. They have also captured the Islam Qala border crossing that leads into Iran.

Fighting in Afghanistan also poses a threat to the Iranian economy, a chief concern for incoming President Ebrahim Raisi, who made economic renewal a centerpiece of his campaign. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan totals over $3 billion annually. Fighting also renders inoperable the newly-inaugurated Khaf-Herat railroad that links Iran and Afghanistan —and which is part of the much larger East-West Railway Corridor project—.

Continued fighting in Afghanistan is also guaranteed to bring more refugees to Iran, which will place a significant economic burden on the country and exacerbate Iran’s already troublesome surge of COVID-19 cases. Iran is already home to nearly a million registered refugees and hundreds of thousands more who are undocumented. Incoming Iranian President Raisi and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a recent telephone conversation, made cooperating to manage the influx of Afghan refugees into their countries one of their primary goals.

The Iranian desire for stability in Afghanistan has led it to hedge its bets on the Taliban. If the Taliban can secure a decisive victory, allowing commerce to proceed and the flow of refugees to slow, the Iranian government will be glad to align with them. If the Taliban cannot win decisively, Iran is likely to promote a power-sharing agreement in Afghanistan that allows it to forego the repercussions of a protracted Afghan civil war.

To maintain a flexible policy, the Iranian government has maintained ties with the Afghan government while also pursuing its own policy, including backing an anti-Taliban Shiite militia called Hashd al-Shi’i. Much like Afghanistan’s other neighbors, Iran has not decided whether Taliban rule or a political settlement is more in line with its national interests. The most crucial factors shaping Iran’s determination will be the success of the Taliban on the battlefield and the vulnerability Iran feels to the threats posed by Sunni fundamentalism and American regime change.

The Impact of the Withdrawal of U.S troops from Afghanistan on the Hazara People

The Hazara people are a Persian-speaking, predominantly Shi’a ethnic group, a religious minority among the country’s majority Sunni population. Comprising 10-20% of Afghanistan’s 38 million people, the minority Shi’a have faced systematic discrimination from the majority Sunni population throughout the centuries and from ISKP and the Taliban more recently.After the fall of Taliban in 2001, Hazaras embraced hopes for a new Afghanistan in terms of political representation and greater access to education for women.

The ongoing peace process with the Taliban and the withdrawal of US troops pose a serious threat to the Hazara community, who now fear that Afghanistan could descend into full-scale civil war. Last but not least, terrorist networks may find fertile ground to grow or consolidate their influence in this crisis.

This could expose the Hazara to greater attacks, like the May 8th attack on the Syed Al-Shahada School in Dasht-e-Barchi, Kabul, which left 85 Hazara dead, including schoolgirls between the ages of 11 and 17.

Among the Hazara, education and civic engagement have long represented a form of resistance to oppression and injustice. For this reason, this Shi’a minority’s voice needs to be included in the Afghan peace process.

According to EASO, 3000 Hazaras were killed under Taliban rule between 1994 and 2001. As mentioned above, after the fall of Taliban in 2001, the Karzai government (2001-2014) gave more rights to the Hazara community, which led to a gradual process of female empowerment.

It is also worth mentioning some of the Hazara women who contributed to shape the political and social context in Afghanistan at that times. Sima Samar served as the first Ministry of Women’s Affairs of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 and was the first female Head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). Habiba Sarābi became the first female governor of Bamyan Province in 2005 and Uzra Jafari was appointed mayor of Nili (Daykundi Province) in 2008. According to the Afghan women’s activist, Zareen Taj, those women broke traditional taboos and had an impact on the political agenda of the country thanks to education, civic engagement, and the support of the international community.

But the Hazara people are seen as a significant threat to terrorist groups as “heretical”, as Shi’a, as well-educated participants in Afghan society. Terrorist groups such as ISKP would carry out attacks at hospital and educational facilities. These are ideal targets to prove that the government is not capable of protecting its most vulnerable citizens. Echoing the words of Zareen Taj, “for my people, obtaining an education is our best hope at weakening the power of terrorists in Afghanistan.”

The data reported below will help analyze the trend of terrorist groups targeting the Hazara after the fall of Taliban.

Between January 2009 and December 2015, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported five incidents targeting the Hazara community. AIHRC recorded further five attacks against Hazaras in 2015-2016, which caused the death of 156 people and the wounding of 479. In 2017, eight attacks targeting Hazaras took place and nineteen in 2018, showing a clear increase in attacks towards the minority group. According to USCIRF, ISKP attacks on the Hazara escalated in brutality, with 300 casualties in 2018.

UNAMA reported a general decline in the number of casualties in 2019. Another report from the same source recorded an increase in the number of civilian deaths in the first quarter of 2020, compared to the same period in 2019.

In conclusion, all the communities of the Afghan society should participate in the Afghan peace process and together complete the puzzle for a long-term and sustainable peace in the country. In particular, the Hazaras need to be protected from possible terrorist attacks that are likely to escalate in this transition phase. Not only do they have to be defended from targeted attacks, but a more structural inclusion of minorities should be seen as a mandatory step in the resolution of the conflict and political stability. The resiliency and the cultural resistance showed by the Hazara community, during all these years, should inspire the Afghan peace process.