India

How the U.S. Withdrawal of Troops from Afghanistan Impacts India

The peace deal agreement between the Taliban and the U.S. in Doha, Qatar, on February 29, 2020, opened up various security concerns in India. And now, after nearly 20 years of annexing the paratroops in Afghanistan in a modus operandi to oust Al-Qaeda supported by the Taliban, President Biden’s government has recently withdrawn U.S. military troops from Afghanistan. Thus, the Taliban has become the de facto government across Afghanistan and controls territory such as border check-posts, rural areas, and urban areas. India shares geographical proximity to Afghanistan, unlike the U.S., and consequently any political instability in the Afghan government is concerning to neighboring countries.

Ultimately the 2020 U.S.-Taliban peace deal agreement stipulated that any group or individual could not use Afghan soil against the security of the U.S. and its allies.

The uncertain future of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s authority may threaten the security and economic interests of India and its assets in Afghanistan. India has deeply invested in standing by Afghanistan’s democratic government; thus, the rise of the radical groups does not bode well for the country.

Haqqani Faction & IS – Khorasan

The presence of the U.S. in Afghanistan was partially the reason for India’s investment in Afghanistan’s future. The Haqqani faction, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, deputy leader of the Taliban, is the best armed and trained Taliban faction. The Haqqani faction may use their power and assert anti-Indian propaganda.  The Haqqani faction is also well known for working against the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan, and leading several attacks on Indian assets and Indians residing in Afghanistan.

In regard to IS-Khorasan, the current understanding that IS-Khorasan has a mixture of former Afghan insurgents, Pakistani militants, and radicalized Indians is a threat to the Indian assets, especially those involving economic relations between India and Afghanistan. Indian-Afghani relations have also been tested in situations involving radicalized Indians conducting attacks on Afghan soil.  Such was the case when IS-Khorasan claimed the Gurudwara attack in Kabul, which took more than 25 lives, and attributed the attack to an Indian ISIS member.

Lashkar-e-Taiba

The relocation of the members of another terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) under the guidance of their chief, Hafeez Muhammed Saeed.  Saeed, who drew up plans with the Pakistani army to attack Indians in large numbers, is an alarming cause to be more prudent about strengthening the Pakistani military advancement owing to the new policy between Pakistan and the U.S.

The growing influence of Pakistan’s Inter-Service-Intelligence Directorate (ISI) on the Taliban can be harmful to India, especially considering India’s wary relations with Pakistan. The Taliban is expected to be ill-disposed towards India by its nature and ideological orientation. The increasing influence of Pakistani power in Afghanistan can cause turbulence to the extremist elements in Kashmir. Srinagar-based General Officer Commanding Lieutenant General D P Pandey stated that some militants might enter Kashmir, but the army is ready to tackle the situation if and when that occurs.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is also the beginning of new relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. Prior to the U.S. troops’ presence in the Afghan region, Pakistan had received significant U.S. aid and cooperation for defense. For the past two decades, the relations between both countries have been dysfunctional and oscillating around the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

The country’s strategic location has historically made it vulnerable to the involvement of outside powers and proxy battles. Pakistan was the medium and the connection between the Taliban and U.S. for counter-terrorism operations.

Another factor to consider in U.S.-Pakistani foreign affairs is the increasing Chinese-Pakistani relations, especially Chinese investments in Pakistan, which may hinder U.S.-Pakistani relations restoring to their pre-U.S. presence in Afghanistan conditions. Due to Pakistan’s strategic location, India must stay vigilant of Pakistan’s ever-evolving foreign relations, whether it be with the U.S., China, or the Taliban.

Additionally, the Taliban considers China a friend, since they have stated that they will not provide shelter to Uyghur Muslims from Xinxiang, China. Ultimately, India must strategically analyze Taliban-China-Pakistan relations and understand how these foreign relations could impact Indian affairs.

Since the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s growing power, India faces many possibilities due to the reshuffling of regional foreign affairs. India has previously invested economically and diplomatically in Afghanistan and, therefore, must stay alert to how these changes will affect Indian Afghan relations.  Amongst other points to highlight, the U.S. wishes to have cross-cutting relations with both India and Pakistan whilst increasing partnership with Pakistan and also playing the role of crisis management as it has been doing.

Possible Approaches for a Peaceful Co-Existence

Ultimately, relations between the Taliban and India can be strategically possible, provided that the Taliban adheres to peace agreements, through creating and engaging in diplomatic channels and by establishing connections to decrease the Taliban’s dependence on Pakistan.

 

Manasvini Rao, Counter-Terrorism Research Fellow

Reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia discussed at UN meeting

Lessons To Be Learnt From Colombia’s Economic Reintegration Programs

A successful peace agreement does not guarantee lasting peace. The successful reintegration of ex-combatants back into society, while it does not guarantee lasting peace, is essential if peace is to stay. Afghanistan is at a crucial moment in its history. If a peace agreement is negotiated, ex-Taliban fighters must be reintegrated back into Afghan society. This will be achieved by implementing a sound reintegration project. Afghanistan might find success by looking at what other countries have done in the past. In particular, Columbia and its economic reintegration programs that have been implemented in recent years. 

Economic Reintegration In Colombia

Decades of war has led to several cease-fire agreements between the Colombian government and its guerrillas and paramilitaries. As a result, there have been demobilisation efforts which have resulted in the need for reintegration programs. During President Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, the economic programs that were created were centred around the integrity of the free market. Thus, the government had a program whereby ex-combatants would receive a 1.5 million Colombian Pesos (COP) grant to start their own businesses or to invest in housing or education. However, the program was not as successful as the government hoped. The grant allowed the ex-combatants to start their own businesses, but it did not prevent them from experiencing severe income insecurity. Moreover, the Colombian government, in the early stages of reintegration, seemed to put more stock into entrepreneurial programs.

Entrepreneurship In Colombia

Alongside the grant program, the government implemented an entrepreneurial program that gave ex-combatants a one-time 8 million pesos (COP) seed capital. The idea was for the recipients of this capital to invest and create their businesses. This program was a success for some but not all. The main problem stemmed from the fact that the ex-combatants simply did not have the entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The government then shifted its focus away from entrepreneurial programs to employability programs.

The 2010 Law of Formalization and Job Creation (Ley 1429) marks this shift. Ley 1429 gave businesses incentives to hire ex-combatants partaking in reintegration programs by granting them a tax exemption. Despite the government’s attempts to increase employability through vocational training and Ley 1429, there has not been an increase in employment opportunities. Even those that are employed earn less than minimum wage. With some ex-combatants earning less than COP 200,000 per month. Moreover, there is wide stigma that prevents ex-combatants from finding and keeping jobs. Although these programs have not had wide-reaching success, there are a fair number of individuals that have benefitted and succeeded through these programs.  

Entrepreneurial programs should only be implemented for those that possess the sufficient entrepreneurial skills necessary to run a business. The Afghan government, if it intends to implement these types of programs, should provide individuals with entrepreneurial training. It should also implement a loan-based program that should run parallel to any grants that they might provide. If Afghanistan is to implement a loan program, it must supply the individuals with loan management training. Businesses that are created must also fill a need in the community.   

How Can Afghanistan Learn From Colombia?

The Colombian government failed, in the early days of the reintegration process, to prevent the stigma of ex-combatants by the Colombian society. This complicated the reintegration process and made economic reintegration programs less effective. Businesses did not want to hire ex-combatants for fear of being publicly judged. Thus, there was a lack of employment opportunities and the vocational training they received did not increase their employability. The stigma that ex-combatants faced in Colombia will likely be faced by ex-Taliban members and this must be taken into account before implementing an economic reintegration plan. By building trust between ex-Taliban members and the wider Afghan community through community-based programs. 

The Afghan government should also make sure that it provides ex-combatants with adequate vocational training. Which covers a wide variety of skills and professions. However, the training should reflect the community’s needs in order to prevent a lack of employment opportunities. It would be pointless to provide ex-combatants with training for professions that are not in high demand.   

Moreover, Afghanistan should create programs that provide reintegration assistance to ex-Taliban members with disabilities. If not, these individuals run the risk of being excluded and they will be less likely to reap the benefits that untailored reintegration programs will provide. 

Success will depend on the ability of the State to promote a more community-focused reintegration that focuses on both the social and economic aspects of reintegration.