As the 21st commemoration of the September 11th terrorist attacks approaches, the solemn anniversary brings a new wave of urgency. It has been one year since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan.
Throughout the past year, the Taliban have worked to reinforce oppression by stripping women of their rights and indoctrinating young boys. Once again, the threat of terrorism is pervasive. After 21 years, we must ask ourselves: how much progress has been made in effective counterterrorism?
Last month, the United States killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. While this is a victory for the United States, it may only be a short-term cause for celebration. The death of their leader will undoubtedly fuel the anti-Western hatred held by al-Qaeda.
In addition, the Taliban have created a friendly environment in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda, a UN report says. In fact, Ayman al Zawahiri was found in the heart of Kabul. The amicable relationship between the two terrorist groups is dangerous not only for the future of Afghanistan but also for the West who may see the Taliban’s war-ridden intentions in the coming years.
How can the United States prevent this? First and foremost, the U.S. should analyze its role in history. The Soviet War in Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989 provides insight into the mistakes made by the United States that ultimately played a part in the rise of terrorism in the 90s.
Throughout the Soviet War, the United States supported rebel groups in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviets and advance their anti-communist agenda. Soon after the defeat, the United States abandoned the country leaving an unstable Afghan government that was easily seized by the Taliban.
From the 1989 up until the attacks on 9/11, Afghanistan then became a safe haven for radical jihadists and terrorists. During that time, some of the most heinous attacks were carried out with 9/11 being the most catastrophic.
The United States could avoid the repetition lost of the past by engaging with Afghanistan to ensure that the upcoming generation of Afghans is not a product of radical, fundamentalist indoctrination to be used for a terrorist agenda.
The United States can further intervene by analyzing relationships with regional actors like Pakistan, who delayed accountability for the 9/11 attacks by providing refuge for Osama Bin Laden, and reconsider new allyships that will further the prospect of counterterrorism in the face of the growing threat. In doing so, the United States can learn from the lessons that came after the Soviet War and contribute to active counterterrorism efforts.
At the very least, it is crucial for the United States to maintain vigilance. The Taliban and al-Qaeda now occupy Afghanistan, however, their desire to exert influence will not stop there. The fundamental principles of these two groups are rooted in Western hatred and the desire to return to Islamic Sharia law of their own version, further perpetuating violence and oppression.
As we remember the events of September 11th, it is also important to remember the role that the United States has as a powerhouse in international relations. With this considered, the U.S. must exercise influence through the correction of its past mistakes. In doing so, the United States can play its part in reducing the expansion of terrorism.
Exactly two decades ago, the United States witnessed a deadly attack that transformed the international security landscape overnight. Only six weeks following the attacks, the Patriot Act was passed by Congress in an attempt to catch ‘terrorists among us,’ on both an international and domestic scale. Consequently, then US President George Bush launched the global War on Terror. This resulted in a 20-year war in Afghanistan, led by US coalition forces which cost the US over $6.4 trillion dollars.
It is believed that if US intelligence had been able to puzzle the pieces together sooner the attacks – which claimed the lives of almost 3,000 individuals – could have been prevented. This may have likely been the case, had the US not turned their backs on Afghanistan only 10-years earlier in the 1990s.
Cold War Origins
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, US forces began to engage in Afghanistan by proxy. Through Pakistani intelligence services, then President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, initiated a programme to arm the mujahedeen. In 1981, Operation Cyclone became the largest covert operation, which saw the US supply money and weapons to the mujahedeen. In total, it is estimated that the operation cost approximately $3bn US dollars.
Only 8-years later, politically, socially and mentally drained, the Soviet Union gave up on Afghanistan. In the Geneva Accords, signed in 1988, the US agreed to cease funding to the mujahedeen whilst the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan completely. Only three years later, the Afghanistan government had collapsed. The country was subsequently enveloped in a civil war between the older mujahedeen factions. As a result, the Taliban quickly gained power, whose interpretation of Islamic sharia laws made life repressive and brutal for various women, opponents and ethnic/religious minorities.
The political climate in Afghanistan leading up to the attacks was a result of both the US and Soviet Union abandoning their foreign policy in the Middle East. As the Soviet Union Ambassador recognised, “We meddled in Afghanistan, and then we stopped paying attention.” Only 10-years later, al-Qaeda orchestrated the deadliest terrorist attack in history on American soil. The group’s involvement with Afghanistan was brought to light in the weeks following the attacks. From 1996-2001, then leader of the Taliban, Mohammed Omar, had developed close ties with Bin Laden as he plotted the deadly attacks.
9/11 stands as a stark reminder that for policymakers, walking away from the problem is not the solution. Instead, it can exacerbate existing issues and create significant security risks. In light of this, it is imperative that policymakers do not repeat the same mistakes 20-years later.
Two Decades Later
The Taliban have a poor track record of sticking to their promises, often stating one thing then doing another. In turn, they promise actions but do not follow through. Currently, the US has placed a great deal of faith in the Taliban. Whilst the group has advocated that they will not harbour terrorists, they still maintain a close relationship with al-Qaeda. Consequently, many of the new leaders announced in Afghanistan’s interim government have former ties to the group.
If the Taliban are not monitored closely, US national security may face severe security threats in the near future. It is a prominent possibility that under Taliban control, radical Islamist terrorism could resurge, with attacks aimed at democratic societies. The 9/11 attacks should act as a forceful reminder, that US citizens safety is not guaranteed if the Taliban are allowed to operate on their own terms.
Intelligence
Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban is an indicator that US intelligence needs revising. The Biden administration hugely underestimating the magnitude and speed of the Taliban’s ability to conquer cities and towns across Afghanistan. As Richard Fonataine from the Centre for a New American Security recognised, “the key miscalculation was the assumption that the US would have the luxury of time.”
This is not the first time that American intelligence has failed to predict and prevent such security failures. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the US Department of Defence failed to recognise the magnitude of the threat from al-Qaeda. In 1997, the US intelligence community regarded Bin-Laden as a financier of terrorism, but not as a leader himself. Domestically, the FBI had little to no knowledge of the broader national security risks. Those working on counterterrorism strategies did so in spite of limited intelligence, which was worsened by legal barriers between both the CIA and FBI in intelligence sharing. If both organisations were able to do so, a comprehensive picture of al-Qaeda’s strategic framework may have been uncovered and disrupted.
The US must engage and have a prominent diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with intelligence that focuses strongly on the region. If not, an attack comparable to the magnitude of the ones witnessed on 9/11 may be a dominant possibility.
The Future of Afghanistan
The Taliban’s ideology has not fundamentally changed. However, their strategy has. Instead, the Taliban are engaging in a much more persuasive game of psychological warfare. The lessons learnt from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, demonstrate that neglecting Afghanistan can have grave consequences for international security. The US must ensure they have a strong diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with adequate intelligence closely monitoring the political landscape in the upcoming months.
9/11 is undoubtedly a tragic and disturbing act of terrorism on US soil, but it acted as a wake-up call for American policymakers at the same time. It is a logical conclusion that the horrible events of that day would not have happened had the US not walked away from the region once their interests were victorious after a prolonged proxy war against the Soviet Union (1979-1989).
After 19 years of conflict, Afghan negotiators headed to Doha for the intra-Afghan dialogues, an initiative started by the United States as they act as the catalyst between the two warring parties- the Taliban and the Afghan government being the most prominent third-party mediator.
Two days before 9/11, the National Hero of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda in Takhar-Afghanistan. The legendary fighter who battled the Soviets and later the Taliban, warned months before his death, that a large-scale attack is underway on the US and Europe soil by al-Qaida. Either the US neglected to grasp the full picture of the attack or did not get enough intel to act and prevent the catastrophe.
Since the commencement of the 19-year long War on Terror, the US has played a pivotal role in ending the Afghan conflict, having as many as 100,000 troops stationed there as part of the 2009 surge. Over $2 trillion USD has been spent on infrastructure, counter-terrorism operations, and building the Afghan National Defense Security Forces to reach a 360,000-strong force, as originally envisioned. This combination of nation-building and counterterrorism has cost the US heavily — financially as well as the 2400 American troops who have lost their lives.
Despite the failures to form strong Afghan institutions and violence of the past nearly two decades, tremendous progress has taken place. Today, an estimated 3.5 million Afghan girls are enrolled in school, a stark contrast to the 50,000 that were enrolled during the Taliban’s reign.
The Taliban governed for five years (1996-2001) and instituted barbaric Islamist policies, such as banning girls from school and stoning women to death. In the 1990s, they provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network, turning Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorist groups, seeking ‘an entry to heaven.’ Infamous leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the founder and leader of the Islamic State) used Afghanistan as a strategic transit point. Terror groups used Afghanistan as the logistic headquarters for deadly attacks in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the orchestration of 9/11.
The push from the Trump administration to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan, with the latest US-Taliban deal reached earlier this year may result in further destabilization. An exit strategy is not always the best strategy. Important questions arise: Will the Taliban remain loyal to their promises? Will there be a guaranteed agreement that the Taliban will no longer harbor terrorism and plan attacks on US soil?
An exit from Afghanistan would result in the creation of another battleground for terrorism. Similar to the vacuum of power created by a lack of American interest in the early 1990s, parallel circumstances would emerge now. The Taliban were enabled to usurp power and consequently turn the country into a safe haven for Islamist extremism back then and thus it remains imperative that the US understands what is at stake if they decide to completely leave Afghanistan now. The Taliban is estimated to have 60,000 active fighters and control roughly 50-70 percent of Afghan territory. They maintain a feared presence across the entire country, and international support for law and order against them is starting to dwindle.
Additionally, the current global political atmosphere commands that the United States adapt its commitments within Afghanistan and focus greater attention towards the East. China continues its ascendance and an ever-stronger India are taking their places on the world stage. Given that the US rivals in the region, primarily Russia, China, and Iran also compete in the region, another regional power may quickly supplant their former position and advance to this strategic location.
The Taliban are not going to cut ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan peace process is unexpected to reach a conclusion soon. Both require time and commitment. It is vital that the next US presidential administration retains a small presence of US troops (as low as 4000) in combination with intelligence operators and diplomats to ensure promises are kept over the next few years. As well, these factors are important in the elimination of terror cells. A new US strategy may also focus on the proper allocation of resources to further avoid wasting US taxpayer money and systematic corruption in Afghanistan.
Finally, as the Taliban are making peace, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISK, ISP, or Daesh-Khorasan) — continues to gain strength through deadly attacks just as the Taliban remain engaged with the Afghan government. It is imperative to devote attention to their rise and activities in this general analysis. Further IS-K has been regrouping and the radical Taliban fighters who opposed the US-Taliban agreement can create a combination of “Islamic Emirate, Caliphate” as their objective.
Given that the Taliban’s main supply route for both personnel and weapons is through Pakistan, the insurgency group can and will continue to fight as long as they have support and safe-havens in Pakistan. They can do so by blocking foreign fighters and state-sponsors of terrorism in interfering in the Afghan peace talks. Further, they can use their diplomatic expertise to ensure that foreign actors, push the Taliban to join the negotiation table.
A stable Afghanistan benefits the region and protects the United States from any potential 9/11 style attacks in the future.
Ahmad Shah Mohibi is the Founder of Rise to Peace, a Washington-based counter-terrorism organization. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi
Ahmad Mohibi’s news analysis on Afghanistan’s TOLOnews in regards to the 9/11 anniversary that marks the 18 years of US war in Afghanistan.
Since talks have been deemed ‘dead’, it is a better option for the US to take a more active stance on their South East Strategy of 2017 to counter state-sponsored terror and increase pressure on countries, such as Pakistan, who actively harbor the Taliban.
September 11, 2019, marked 18 years since the 9/11 attack — a tragic day in the history of the United States. It also marked the beginning of the US’s longest war in Afghanistan. It is a wake-up call for the western world to pay deeper attention to the rise of terrorism around the world and learn from past conflicts, as the US did in the 1990s in Afghanistan — leaving allies ally while terrorism retaliates and attack.
The United States has not been entirely successful in its counter-insurgency operations over the past 18 years. However, progress has been made. An example would be the weakening of Al-Qaeda — a group that had the ability to reach New York and plan deadly attacks. Today, their ability to carry out such an attack has been massively hindered. On the negative side, ISIL has emerged and the Taliban has become stronger than at any point since their removal from power in 2001. Thus, we see some success but at the same time, multiple failures.
Public opinion differs in both Washington and Kabul. In the United States, conservatives, such as Senator Lindsay Graham, are against troop withdrawal and are more in favor of hitting the enemy militarily, while liberals and the majority of Americans have grown tired of a long war in Afghanistan. Everyone is clear: they want an end to this war, but differ on how to bring about that end. So far $ 2.8 trillion USD has been spent, many lives lost and energy expended — it is hard to judge whether the US Global War on Terror was a success or a failure, so let numbers and statistics speak on the matter.
The former head of the Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS), Masoom Stanekzai has said recently that one of the reasons that the US has failed in the war against terrorism is regional barriers.
The Afghan case is sensitive, complex and hard, but it does have similarities to Vietnam. President Richard Nixon’s “Peace with Honor” failed due to US domestic politics, the Watergate scandal, the ongoing Cold War with the Soviets, and mass Chinese support for the communist Vietnamese. The same situation unfolded in Afghanistan.
The Afghan war is not only a religious and ethnic conflict but also a proxy war with many foreign actors. It may appear that the Taliban want to bring an Islamic Emirate and defeat western democracies, but it is more complex than that. Intra-Afghan tribal differences, US economic rivalries with China and political rivalries with Russia, as well as interference from Pakistan and Iran, have all influenced conflict in the region.
There is no doubt that the United States proudly commands the world’s strongest economy and military. During the 9/11 memorial, President Trump said:
We had peace talks scheduled a few days ago. I called them off when I learned that they had killed a great American soldier from Puerto Rico and 11 other innocent people. They thought they would use this attack to show strength but actually what they actually showed us is un-reluctant weakness. The last four days we had hit our enemy harder than they have ever been hit before and that will continue.
He further emphasized that he will not use nuclear weapons to show American strength, but that the strength will come from the US soldiers.
The Afghan war is complex and the US has not been as successful in counterinsurgency operations as they had hoped, but if we look at the achievements of the past 18 years, it is satisfying. After the Taliban was toppled, from 2004 – 2005 Afghanistan was relatively peaceful, the Taliban appeared to have been defeated, but they went to Pakistan where they regrouped and came stronger. Now they claim to control over 70% territory in Afghanistan.
Since talks have been deemed ‘dead’, it is a better option for the US to take a more active stance on their South East Strategy of 2017 to counter state-sponsored terror and increase pressure on countries, such as Pakistan, who actively harbor the Taliban. It is vital that Kabul receives military aid in the form of aircraft and advanced intelligence to combat the Taliban.
At the same time, the US needs to increase efforts to impede Taliban financing. This includes a comprehensive strategy that includes the use of the financial and banking system levers.
Going forward, the United States will need to focus on the implementation of this strategy while creating better counter-insurgency operation strategies in coordination with the Afghan forces and the Afghan government. These include, but are not limited to:
Political and economic pressure on Pakistan
Capacity building of the Afghan government
Fight corruption
Intelligence information sharing
Provide vital equipment and training to the Afghan National Security Forces
These are important steps the US can take going forward to see progress. This way, President Trump can see the achievements he promised in his presidential campaign and bring the soldiers home.
As we are speaking, the agenda for peace in Afghanistan is lost, said Ahmad Mohibi to TOLOnews. Whilst at an event recently, when commenting on the Afghan peace process, a former State Department official smiled and said, “What peace?… Isn’t it dead?”
President Trump is serious about national security. We have seen three National Security Advisors resign or been fired since he took over the current administration. Elections are near; both in Afghanistan and the United States. President Trump wants to show achievements, however, to avoid making Nixon’s mistake, he needs to tread carefully in Afghanistan. Following the recommendations above, he may achieve what Nixon couldn’t — make peace and bring the troops home.
The United States should not consider an immediate troop withdrawal to avoid making the same mistake as Vietnam. As Senator Lindsay Graham emphasized, “If America completely pulls out of Afghanistan, I fear the Security Forces will fracture along regional lines, creating growth opportunities for Al Qaeda and ISIS.”
In conclusion, the US should avoid a troop withdrawal and direct more pressure on regional actors, mainly Pakistan, to stop harboring and financing terrorism in Afghanistan. The US needs to support a transparent election in Afghanistan and ensure the government is chosen by the people. Ideally, the US cancellation of peace talks will be a ‘slap in the face’ for the Taliban so that they may learn from their mistakes, and be open to peaceful negotiations in the future.
The military option has not been as successful as the US hoped over the past 18 years and will only work if the Taliban’s financing is cut on a macro level, which includes pressuring state sponsors. This way, there is a possibility of peace in Afghanistan. We must stress, however, it will not happen overnight. It will require generations of Afghans to work hard and build their nation back up again.
Ahmad Mohibi on TOLOnews
Ahmad Mohibi, a writer and is the founder of Rise to Peace. Follow him on Twitter at @ahmadsmohibi.
I distinctively remember the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as I was barely weeks into a yearlong youth exchange program in France. As a young teenager, it was my first solo venture abroad and I was full of excitement.
On that day, my host mother left a Post-It note on the television advising of a documentary on wild horses to watch after school. I would not have turned on the television otherwise! Once it concluded, I switched stations and could not believe my eyes as I tuned into news coverage. The images were stunning, haunting and foreboding all at once. A sense of utter horror while touching on so many aspects of the human condition simultaneously.
We closely watched the news broadcasts late into the evening. As a Canadian, I felt profound sadness for my neighbors to the south. I was a youth obviously lacking in-depth knowledge of nefarious non-state state actors, but the name Al-Qaeda was familiar due to a unit on terrorism in my high school law class months prior. Though the extent of the dramatic shift in history to come was unimaginable to a high school student, I knew significant ramifications would follow that momentous day.
A certain social anxiety rose around those from Muslim countries. This was most certainty due to the conflation between Islam and terrorism linked to the motivation of the organizers and perpetrators of those awful attacks. It was then I understood that misperception of groups of people often came from fear and misunderstanding. Accordingly, the following question was, ‘Well, what set of beliefs could compel someone to do such a thing?’
It would be improper of me to say that 9/11 has impacted my life as I only experienced the discussed emotions in the detached capacity of an external viewer. Each year I take the time to watch the televised remembrance ceremonies in solemnity of all those lives lost and to consider the plight of all the poorly first responders hampered by illness.
However, the attacks of September 11 solidified many invaluable truths, at least in my perception. Just like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there are moments in history that change our understandings of each other and interactions on a global scale. There is a reason why we discuss the ‘post-9/11’ period because it differs from our perception of security prior.
The attacks firmly demonstrated the reach of transnational terrorism and the vast consequences of extremist ideologies when significant resources are in place. The longevity of terrorist organizations —such as al-Qaeda after the attacks— reveals that combatting terror, despite vital resources, sometimes seems like grasping in the dark since halting the spread of an ideology is impossible.
Therefore, a multifaceted approach from sound intelligence analysis, effective cooperation in areas of security and law enforcement, community engagement and knowledgeable policy decisions hopefully reduces the odds of another event and the need to say, ‘Never Forget’ once more.
Réjeanne Lacroix, Editor-in-chief at Rise to Peace is a Canadian independent researcher focusing on international security and the post-Soviet space. She earned her BA in Political Science at Laurentian University and an MA in International Security Studies at the University of Leicester. Her analysis on a wide range of topics was previously featured at the NATO Association of Canada.
